Rabb v. Wilson
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by District Judge T. S. Ellis, III on 2/19/15. (copy mailed to pro se).(gwalk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
Yusef A. Rabb,
Petitioner,
I;13cv999 (TSE/TRJ)
V.
EricD. Wilson,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Yusef A. Rabb, a federal inmate housed in the Eastern District of Virginia and
proceeding eto
has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuantto 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
challenging the Bureau of Prisons' refusal to consider his petition seekingnuncpro tune
designation of the federal facility in which he served sentences for D.C. Code offenses. On
March 3,2014, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, or in the
alternative, for Summary Judgment, accompanied by a supporting memorandum.^ Petitioner was
' Petitioner's memorandum in support ofhis August 1,2013 petition was signed by himself
and two attorneys, Ronald Sullivan and Intisar Rabb, who appear to be members of the D.C. and
New York bar. See Dkt. 3. Petitioner's response to the respondent's Motion to Dismiss, filed on
April 18,2014, was not signed by these attorneys. Neither attorney appears to be a member of
the Virginia Bar. Pursuant to new Local Rule 83.1, effective January 9,2015, any attorney who
assists a ETO se litigant in preparing a document for filing in this Court "shall be considered to
have entered an appearance in the proceeding in which such document is filed and shall be
subject to all rules thatgovern attorneys who have formally appeared in theproceeding." E.D.
Va. R. Civ. P. 83.1(M)(1). Accordingly, had this petition been filed more recently, these
attorneys would be required either to be admitted to the Virginia baror to seek to appear pro hac
vice, pursuant to Local Rule 83.1(D), to enter an appearance in this case. As this case
commenced nearly two years before the enactment of Local Rule 83.1(M)(1), however, it would
inappropriate to apply this rule to these attorneys. Thus, the memorandum in support of the
petition is considered validly filed and is considered to be part of the record in this case.
^Because respondent's Motion contained supporting exhibits, this Motion will be construed as
one for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d). There are no
given the opportunity to file responsive materials, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d
309 (4th Cir. 1975),and he filed a response. Respondent filed a reply to petitioner's response.
For the reasons that follow, respondent's Motion must be granted, and the petition must be
dismissed.
I. Background
The petitionerhas a lengthycriminal history, and the following material facts are
undisputed. On May 9,1991, petitionerwas arrested by authorities in Washington, D.C. for
Murder1WhileArmed, Carrying a Pistol without a License, and Possession of a Firearm During
Crime of Violence.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, or
in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment ("Resp.'s Mem.") [Dkt. 8], Ex, A (Erickson
Decl.) H5. On July 11,1991, petitioner was convicted and sentenced in the District of Columbia
Superior Court to a 7-year sentence on a prior charge of Possession with Intent to Distribute
Cocaine. Id K6; Att. 1. On October 27, 1992, petitioner was convicted and sentenced in the
same court to a 25 year-to-life term on his May 9, 1991 charges. This sentence was ordered to
run consecutively to his sentence imposed for Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine. Id ^
7; Att. 2. On February23,1993, petitionerwas paroled fi-om his original 7-year sentenceand
began serving his 25-to-life sentence. Resp.'s Mem., Ex. A ^ 8. On December 15, 1994,
petitioner pled guilty and was sentenced in the Districtof ColumbiaSuperiorCourt to a term of
16 months-to-4 years for Attempted Possession with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine. This
sentence was to run concurrently with any other previously-imposed sentence. Id.
9; Att. 4.
On December 24, 1994, while confined at the Lorton Correctional Complex, petitioner
attacked and repeatedly stabbed another inmate.
Resp.'s Mem., Ex. B, at 1. Petitioner was
material disputes of fact, and petitioner has not submitted an affidavit that he has not been able to
present all material facts, pursuant to Rule 56(d). ^
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
charged with Assaultwith Intent to Murder, and on July 28, 1995 - whilestill in custody on his
D.C. sentences - he pled guilty, and was sentenced by this Court to a 105-month sentence. Id
Ex. A H10;Att. 5 (Judgment in a Criminal Case), The sentencing judge explicitly statedthat the
105-month should "run consecutive to any other sentence presently being served." Resp.'s
Mem., Ex. A, Att. 5; see also Ex. B, at 2-3. In 1999, the Lortonfacility closed, and petitioner
was transferred to Virginia state prison before beingtransferred to the custody of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") in 2004. See Memorandum in Supportof Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus ("Pet's Mem.") [Dkt. 3]
31 n.l, 32. Petitioner began serving his federal
sentence on June 21,2010, when he was paroled from his D.C. offenses.
Resp.'s Mem., Ex.
A H11. Petitioner is currently housed at FCC Petersburg ("Petersburg"), and is scheduled to be
released from custody on February 2,2018. Pet.'s Mem. ^ 1; Resp.'s Mem., Ex. A ^ 13.
OnJanuary 31,2012, petitioner submitted to Petersburg officials a petition to designate
mine pro tune designate his federal confinement as the place of concurrently serving his federal
sentence, alongwithan attempt at informal resolution of his request. ^
Pet.'s Mem. 114.
After being told that informal resolution of his request was not possible, petitioner submitted all
required formal administrative remedies. Id
26. The BOP's Regional Director denied
petitioner's request for nuncpro tmc designation based onthe fact that the petitioner's federal
sentence was ordered to run consecutively to his D.C. sentences, and thus determined that his
sentence had been calculated correctly. ^
Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pet's
0pp.") [Dkt. 12], Ex. 1, at unnumbered page 10. The BOP's Central Office affirmed this
decision, finding that "[petitioner's] sentence has been computed as directed by federal statute
[and BOP policy]." Id at unnumbered page 12.
Petitioner alleges that the BOP's refusal to consider his mncpro tune petition is
erroneous, and violates 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), "which confers on the BOP discretionary authority
to determine the computation and place of service for federal sentences, including nunc pro tune
designations ofconcurrency." Pet.'s Mem. H39.^ Petitioner seeks to have his federal facility
designated as the place of serving his federal sentence concurrent to his D.C. sentences.
According to petitioner, such designation would result in the calculation of his federal sentence
starting on July 28,1995, the date it was imposed, rather than on June 21,2010, the date on
which he was paroled from his D.C. sentence. Id 134. In the alternative, he argues thatthe
BOP could calculate his federal sentence as running from the date he entered federal custody, on
July 1,2004. He argues that, notwithstanding this Court's order that his sentences run
consecutively, the BOP is required "to make its own determination as to concurrency," id 147,
based upon various statutory factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Respondent statesthat the
BOP does not have authority to consider petitioner's request, in lightof this Court's order that
petitioner's federal sentence run consecutive to his D.C. sentences. See, e.g.. Resp.'s Mem., at 2.
Because it is undisputed that petitionerhas exhausted his administrative remedies, this
petition is ripe for review on the merits. Forthe reasons stated below, respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment must be granted.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, andadmissions on file, together with theaffidavits, if any, showthat there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter
^Petitioner also requests that his petition be construed as amotion to request that the Director
of the BOP file a petition for a reduction insentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and
that this Court enter an order retroactively reducing his sentence. For the reasons discussed in
Part III.C., petitioner's requests cannot be considered.
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The moving party bears the burden of proving that judgment as a
matter of law is appropriate.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986). To meet
that burden, the moving party must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact are
present for resolution. Id. at 322. Once a moving party has met its burden to show that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to point out the
specific facts that create disputed factual issues. Anderson v. Liberty Lobbv. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a district court should consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences
from those facts in favor of that party. United States v. Diebold. Inc.. 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
Those facts which the moving party bears the burden of proving are facts which are
material. "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts
which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment." Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248; see also Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera.
249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001). An issue of material fact is genuine when, "the evidence...
create[s] [a] fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice." Ross v. Commc'ns
Satellite Corp.. 759 F.2d 355,364 (4th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds bv Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only
where no material facts are genuinely disputed and the evidence as a whole could not lead a
rational fact finder to rule for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
111. Analysis
A. Relevant Legal Standards
This petition has been properly filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241, which gives district courtsjurisdiction over petitions by federal inmates who
allege that they are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Specifically, challenges to the "execution of a federal sentence
are properly brought under § 2241," including challenges to the BOP's calculation of an inmate's
sentence. United States v. Little. 392F.3d 671, 679(4th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
Petitioner's challenge involves the relationship between 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), which
governs a federal court's ability to impose multipleterms of imprisonment, and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(b), which gives BOP the ability to determine where an inmate will serve a criminal
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), in relevant part, provides:
If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, or
if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an
undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or
consecutively
Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run
consecutively unless the courtorders that the terms are to run concurrently.
Thus, unless a federal court explicitly states that multiple sentences imposed at differenttimes
will run concurrently, it is presumed that they run consecutively. The decision whetherto
impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence is one committed solely to the discretion of the
Judiciary. S^ Setser v. United States. _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1463,1468 (2012) (citing Oregon v.
Ice. 555 U.S. 160, 168-69 (2009)). When making a sentencing decision, judges should consider
the factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the nature and seriousness of the offense,
the defendant's history, and the specific purposes of the sentence imposed. 28 U.S.C. § 3584(c).
Asonly the Judiciary has the power to sentence, only the Judiciary has the actual power to
determine whether sentences will run consecutively or concurrently, and the BOP may not
overrule the Judiciary's decision once the sentence is imposed. Sm Setser. 132 S. Ct. at 1469
("[0]nly district courts ... have the authority to make the concurrent-vs.-consecutive
decision... and the [BOP] is not free to use its 'place of imprisonment' authority to achieve a
different result.").
Once an inmate is committed to federal custody, however, the BOP has discretion to
determine his "place of confinement." When making this decision, "the [BOP] may designate
any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and
habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or
otherwise
" 28 U.S.C. § 3621(b). The BOP should consider several factors when
designating an offender's place of confinement, including the resources of the relevant
institution, the inmate's own characteristics, the nature of his offense, any views of the
sentencing court on the purposes of the imposed sentence, and any relevant policy statements
prepared by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3621(b)(l)-(5).
Under § 3621(b), the BOP has authority to designate a state institution for concurrent
service of a federal sentence. This situation ordinarily occurs when "primary custody resided
with the non-federal jurisdiction and the federal sentencing court intended its sentence to be
served concurrently with the non-federal sentence." BOP Program Statement 5160.05(9)(a)
(January 16,2003). In other words, if an inmate was in state custody when sentenced, and the
federal court determined that it would be proper for his federal sentence to run concurrently to
that state sentence, the BOP can determine how best to implementthe resulting sentencing
scheme. Inmates can petition for mm pro tune designation after they enter federal custody, and
the BOP must consider these petitions in accordance with the factors provided in § 3621. The
BOP, in exercising its discretion under § 3621(b), must weigh all the listed factors and determine
mine pro time whether an inmate's federal sentence should run concurrently with his state
sentence. This ability applies only where a sentencing judge has not explicitly ordered that an
inmate's federal sentence should run consecutively to a previously-imposed sentence, however.
id 5160.05(9)(f) ("The Bureau will not allow a concurrent designation if the sentencing
court has already made a determination regarding the order of service of sentence (e.g., the
federal sentencing court ordered the sentence to run consecutively to any other sentence ...
during the time in which the inmate requests concurrent designation.).") The BOP must take into
consideration the views of the sentencingjudge, but these views are not dispositive, unless the
sentencingjudge has already ruled that an inmate's federal sentence should run consecutively to
his state sentence. See, e.g., Bardenv. Keohane. 921 F.2d 476,482-83 (3d Cir. 1990)(holding
that the BOP erred in finding that the decision of the sentencing judge rendered it unable to
exercise its own discretion in considering a petition for mmcpro tune designation); Pub. Serv.
Co. of Ind. V. I.C.C.. 749 F.2d 753, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that, when an agency
implements multi-factor tests, the agency cannot selectany one particular factor as controlling).
If a federal sentencingjudge, exercising his or her lawful discretion under § 3584(a),
explicitly mandatesthat an inmate's federal sentenceshould run consecutively to any other
imposed sentences - state or federal - the BOP does not have the authority to designate that
federal sentence as nuncpro tune concurrent to a state sentence. This limit on the BOP's power
is based on the fact that, as described above, only the judiciary has the actual power to impose a
sentence. If a federal sentencing court explicitly exercises its discretion to determine that
sentences should run consecutive, the BOP has no power, ability, or discretion to overrule that
decision. See Setser. 132 S. Ct. at 1469-70 (2012). The BOP's discretion under § 3621(b) arises
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only when a federal judge does not definitively exercise his or her discretion to mandate
consecutive sentences. Only when a federal judge does not mandate consecutive sentences does
the BOP have the ability to determine how best to implement the federal sentence, including
determining whether the sentences should run consecutively or concurrently.
B. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Nmc Pro Tune Designation
Petitioner challenges the BOP's refusal to consider his petition for nmc pro iurtc
designation in accordance with the factors provided in § 2361(b). He alleges that the agency
abused its discretion by relying solely on the views of the sentencingjudge, and that the agency
should be compelled to at least consider his petition.
In the specific circumstances of petitioner's case, it is clear that the BOP did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to consider his request for nmc pro tune designation. Petitioner is correct
that numerous courts have found that BOP, when considering a petition for nuncpro tune
designation, "abdicated its statutory responsibility to bring its independent judgment to bear on
the matter" by relying solely on the sentencing judge's objection to such a designation. Trowell
V. Beeler, 135 F. App'x 590,594-95 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Fortnev v. Yancev. No.
2:05cv2168-RBH, 2007 WL 1202766, at *5-*6 (D.S.C. Apr. 20,2007) (granting a writ of habeas
corpus when BOP, after first determining that inmate's request had merit, relied only on the
objections of the sentencing judge to deny the petition). Indeed, in Barden v. Keohane. 921 F.2d
476, the seminal case governing the BOP's ability to make nunc pro tune designations, the Third
Circuh held that the BOP's decision not to grant a petition solely because the federal sentencing
judge did not explicitly order that an inmate's sentences run concurrently was an abuse of
discretion. Id at 482-83. Accordingly, petitioner's argument, that the BOP must exercise its
independent discretion and weigh all the factors in § 3621(b), is correct, on the facts of Barden
and numerous similar situations. Importantly, petitioner's case is not similar to the facts of
Barden.
Unlike Barden. the specific facts of petitioner's case are that, at the time of his federal
sentencing, he was serving an as-yet undischarged state sentence, and the federal sentencing
court explicitly ruled that his federal sentence was to run consecutively to that state sentence.
See, e.g.. Resp.'s Mem., Ex. B, at 2-3 ("The sentence imposed in [the federal case] shall run
consecutive to any other sentence heretofore imposed."). In Barden and every other case cited
by petitioner, federal sentences were imposed before state sentences, the federal sentencing judge
did not specify at sentencing whether the petitioner's federal sentence was to run concurrently or
consecutively to his state sentence, or both. See, e.g.. Barden. 921 F.2d at 478,482 (petitioner
was sentenced to federal charges, with no recommendation as to concurrency of sentences,
returned to state custody, and then sentenced on state charges); Fortnev. 2007 WL 1202766, at
*3 (petitioner was sentenced in the Middle District of Floridatwo months prior to his state trial);
Parks v. Stansberrv. No. I:10cvl217 (LMB/TCB), 2011 WL 3895298, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 1,
2011) (Brinkema, J.) (initial federal sentencing memorandum did not specify whetherthe federal
sentence would run concurrently or consecutively to any future state sentence); Williams v.
Stephens. No. 5:09-HC-2131-D, 2011 WL 2269408, at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 7,2011) (federal
judgment silent on whether sentence was concurrent or consecutive to already-imposed state
sentence). Accordingly, sentences in those cases were imposed in situations when there was no
express statement from the sentencing judge on whether a federal sentence should run
consecutively to a previously-imposed state sentence. In these situations, BOP has the discretion
to consider petitions for mmc pro tune designations. In the instant case, however, thesentencing
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judge explicitly ordered petitioner's sentences to run consecutively, and it is therefore clear that
BOP did not abuse its discretion in not considering the petition.
When petitioner was sentenced in federal court, he was already subject to a 25-to-life
sentence imposed by D.C. authorities. This Court, presented with that information, explicitly
chose to impose petitioner's federal sentence consecutively to that undischarged state sentence.
This sentencing decision, made with full knowledge of petitioner's crimesand imposed
sentences, is not one that can be overturned by the BOP. See Setser. 132 S. Ct. at 1468 ("Judges
have long been understood to have discretion to select whether the sentences they impose will
run concurrently or consecutively with respect to other sentences ... that have been imposed in
other proceedings, including state proceedings."); Sweat v. Grondolskv. 898 F. Supp. 2d 347,
352 (D. Mass. 2012) ("Where, as here, the federal court has made an express determination that
the federal sentence should run consecutively to the state sentence, the BOP is bound by that
directive."); Brown v. Zvch. No. 7:1 l-cv-605,2012 WL 5386339, at *5 (W.D. Va. Nov. 1,2012)
("[T]he Setsercourt explained that the [BOP's] authority to [designate a state facility as a place
to serve a federal sentence] does not constitute authority to make a decision about concurrency or
consecutive sentences in the first instance, while lies with the district court."). Prior to Setser.
there was some debate about a district court's ability to impose a federal sentence to run
concurrent with a yet-to-be-imposed state sentence, s^ e^g.. United States v. Hopkins. 568 F.
App'x 143, 144 (3d Cir. 2014), but there has never been any uncertainty about the power of a
federal court to impose consecutive sentences in a case such as this, when thejudge hasall the
information necessary to make such a decision at the time of federal sentencing. Cf Setser. 132
S. Ct. at 1472-73 (concluding that the federal court's sentence was not objectively unreasonable
at the time rendered due to changed circumstances arisingafter its imposition). The BOP's
II
discretionto designate a place of confinement extends only to implementation of a sentence, not
to the actual decision of how to classify an inmate's initial sentence.
Petitioner argues that"late-onset facts," including the change in the sentencing guidelines
from mandatory to advisory, "the environment of notorious dangerousness at Lorton," the
"dubious nature" of petitioner's underlying D.C. conviction, petitioner's "exemplary record of
service for over two decades without a single infraction since the federal conviction incurred,"
and petitioner's existing post-release plan, mandate that BOP consider his petition for nmcpro
tune designation. ^
Pet.'s 0pp., at 11. This argument is irrelevant, however, to the facts of
petitioner's case. In Setser. the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "late-onset facts thatmaterially
alter a prisoner's position [may] make it difficult, or even impossible, to implement his
sentence." In those situations, the BOP hasdiscretion to "determine how long the District
Court's sentenceauthorizes it to continue [petitioner's] confinement." Setser. 132 S. Ct. at 1473.
Here, this Court's sentence authorized the BOP to keep petitioner confined in federal custody for
a period of time consecutive to his state sentence. To the extent the BOP wishes to consider the
above factors in implementing the remainder of his federal sentence - by releasing petitioner to
home confinement earlier than planned, by petitioning this Court for a reduction in sentence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), or through some other method - the BOP is, of course,
free to do so. These "late-onset factors" have no impact, however, onpetitioner's initiallyimposed federal sentence.
Because the BOP does not have the authority to overrule this Court's determination that
petitioner serve consecutive sentences, it is clear from the record that the BOP did not abuse its
discretion in failing to consider petitioner's request for nunc pro tune designation.
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C. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction over Petitioner's Additional Requests
Petitioner appears to also request that this Court construe his petition as a request for the
Directorof the BOP to move for a sentencing modification, pursuantto 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). See Pet.'s 0pp., at 5. To the extentthat petitioner requests this relief, his
request cannot be entertained until the Director of the BOP makes such a motion. Section
3582(c)(1)(A) provides:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed
except that in any case, the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, may reduce the term of imprisonment... after considering the factors set
forth in section 3553(a to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that (i)
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such reduction . , . and that such a
reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i). As the Director of the BOP has not made such a motion on
petitioner's behalf, there is no jurisdiction to consider petitioner's request. Petitioner states that
he has already petitioned the BOP Director to make a motion on his behalf, but was told that his
requested reliefproperly was sought through the Administrative Remedy Process. SeePet.'s
Opp., at 6. Accordingly, petitioner needs to pursue his request for such a motion through the
internal BOP process.
In the alternative, petitioner asks this Court to "reviewthe facts and equities of his case,
modify its original sentence to enter a (retroactive) concurrence designation and order immediate
release." Pet.'s Opp., at 8. This request also cannot beconsidered. "The law closely guards the
finality of criminal sentences againstjudicial 'change of heart.'" United States v. Goodwvn. 596
F.2d 233,235 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Lavman. 116 F.3d 105,109 (4th Cir.
1997)). The scope of a court's ability to modify a sentence is necessarily limited, in orderto
promote the finality of criminal judgments and sentences. See United States v. Fields. 552 F.3d
13
401,405 (4th Cir. 2009). Indeed, as 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) makes clear, "the court may not
modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed," unless the BOP moves for a
modification based on the existence of "extraordinary and compelling reasons." See United
States V. Cunmneham. 554 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that there is no "inherent
authority" for a district court to modify a previously-imposed sentence). Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35, which governs a court's ability to reduceor correct a sentence, allows a
court to adjust a sentence in limited ways within a limited period of time after trial. S^ Fed. R.
Crim. P. 35(a) (allowing the court to correct clerical errors in sentencing within 14days afterits
imposition); 35(b) (allowing a sentence to be reduced for substantial assistance within oneyear
after the imposition ofthe sentence). In petitioner's case, these periods have long since expired.
Therefore, as the BOP has made no motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), petitioner's
request to modify his sentence must be denied.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the BOP's decision not to consider petitioner's request for
mine pro time designation was not an abuse of discretion, and respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment must be granted.
is iJ
Entered this
day of.
2015.
T. S. Ellis, m
United States Di^ trict Judge
Alexandria, Virginia
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