Zargarpur v. Townsend et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 9/24/2013. (rban, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
MATTIN ZARGARPUR,
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Plaintiff,
v.
DENNIS TOWNSEND, et al.,
Defendants.
M E M O R A N D U M
1:13cv1022 (JCC/TRJ)
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Mattin
Zargarpur’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction.
[Dkts. 2-3.]
For the
following reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.
I.
Background
In October 2009, Plaintiff, then fifteen, began a
sexual relationship with his former English teacher Tina Amato
(“Amato”).
(Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶ 4.)
School officials
subsequently discovered the affair and Amato was indicted on
charges of taking indecent liberties with a minor.
5.)
(Compl. ¶
Amato pled guilty in 2012, and she is currently prohibited
from communicating with Plaintiff per her probation.
5-6.)
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(Compl. ¶¶
On August 19, 2013, Plaintiff, who is now nineteen,
filed the instant action challenging the aforementioned
condition of Amato’s probation.
(Compl. ¶ 3.)
Plaintiff wishes
to have a romantic relationship with Amato and alleges that such
a restriction infringes upon his “rights to enjoy the freedom of
association and the freedom of intimate association guaranteed
[to him] by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.”
(Compl. ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint
seeks to enjoin Virginia officials (“Defendants”) from enforcing
this condition of Amato’s probation.
also requests $150,000 in damages.
(Compl. ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff
(Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.)
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, which
seeks to suspend enforcement of Amato’s probation pending the
outcome of this case.
[Dkt. 3.]
Defendants have answered,
contending that injunctive relief is inappropriate because
Plaintiff has failed to make a clear showing that he is likely
to succeed on the merits at trial.
(Obj. to Pl.’s Mot. [Dkt.
13] at 13).
II.
Standard of Review
“The standard for granting either a [temporary
restraining order (“TRO”)] or a preliminary injunction is the
same.”
Moore v. Kempthorne, 464 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D. Va.
2006) (citations omitted).
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
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injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that should be
granted “only sparingly and in limited circumstances.”
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th
Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff’s motion fails because he has not
established any likelihood of success on the merits at trial.
Plaintiff’s underlying case is grounded in the argument that the
disputed provision of Amato’s probation violates his fundamental
right to “freedom of association and . . . intimate
association.”
(Compl. ¶ 3.)
Although the Constitution does
protect the right to enter into and maintain certain intimate
relationships, including “those that attend the creation and
sustenance of a family-marriage,” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 619 (1984), Plaintiff’s right to engage in a nonmarital romantic relationship with Amato is not a fundamentally
protected right encompassed by due process.
See Stevens v.
Holder, No. 1:12-cv-1105, 2013 WL 4430901, at *8 (E.D. Va. Aug.
16, 2013) (declining to find that a fundamental right exists
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with respect to a non-marital relationship devoid of any
familial ties); Plummer v. Town of Somerset, 601 F. Supp. 2d
358, 366 (D. Mass. 2009) (refusing to extend constitutional
protection to the right to an intimate association outside the
bounds of marriage or a civil union because “[i]t is impossible
to draw a principled line demarcating the point . . . at which a
romantic attraction is transformed from a dalliance into a
prospective union worthy of constitutional protection”); see
also Willis v. Town of Marshall, N.C., 426 F.3d 251, 265-66 (4th
Cir. 2005) (noting that district courts should be reluctant in
expanding the list of implied fundamental rights (citation
omitted)).
Since Plaintiff does not allege the infringement of a
fundamental right, Defendants’ conduct (i.e., the probation
restriction) is subject to rational basis review.
See
Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000)
(“The penalty need only serve a rational legislative basis in
this instance, since no fundamental right is implicated.”
(citation omitted)).
As this Court recently confirmed, state
impediments on non-martial romantic relationships are
permissible provided they withstand rational basis
scrutiny.
See Stevens, 2013 WL 4430901, at *10.
This highly
deferential standard will uphold a limitation provided it “is
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rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”
Willis, 426
F.3d at 262.
The Court is satisfied that the probation restriction
at issue here, which prevents a convicted sex offender from
contact with a prior victim, is rationally related to the
government’s interest in rehabilitation.
See Wirsching v.
Colorado, 350 F.3d 1191, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that a
legitimate interest in furthering rehabilitation supports
banning contact between sex offenders and their victims);
Hughbanks v. Dooley, No. Civ. 10-4064, 2010 WL 4366103, at *4
(D.S.D. Oct. 28, 2010) (concluding that a regulation prohibiting
sex offenders from possessing pornography was rationally related
to the government’s interest in furthering rehabilitation);
Ramirez v. Pugh, 486 F. Supp. 2d 421, 430 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(noting that the government has a “strong interest” in
rehabilitating sex offenders).
Accordingly, despite Plaintiff’s
belief otherwise, the terms of Amato’s probation do not run
afoul of the Constitution.
See Alvarez v. Holder, 454 F. App’x
769, 774 (11th Cir. 2011) (upholding a no-contact order as a
reasonable restriction on the right to associate).
Even more problematic is Plaintiff’s apparent lack of
standing to pursue this action.
The “irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing” requires (1) “an injury in fact - a harm
suffered by the plaintiff that is concrete and actual or
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imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “causation - a
fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and
the complained-of conduct of the defendant”; and (3)
“redressability - a likelihood that the requested relief will
redress the alleged injury.”
McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d
393, 402 (4th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
“The standing
doctrine, of course, depends [upon] . . . whether the plaintiff
is the proper party to bring the suit.”
White Tail Park, Inc.
v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 460 (4th Cir. 2005).
Here, the
disputed probation conditions are personal to Amato and intend
only to circumscribe her conduct.
No penalties will be imposed
upon Plaintiff if he chooses to associate with Amato.
¶¶ 5-6.)
(Compl.
As such, there is no injury to Plaintiff sufficient to
confer standing.
See Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220,
1227 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that a father lacked
standing to challenge his daughter’s probation conditions
restricting their association); see also Clark v. Prichard, 812
F.2d 991, 999 (5th Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., concurring) (“As for
the action by Clark on behalf of her children I agree that they
are not entitled any relief.
They lack standing to contest the
conditions of their mother's probation.”).
Finally, because Plaintiff is free to associate as he
chooses without penalty, there is no risk of any irreparable
harm.
See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (“A plaintiff seeking a
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preliminary injunction must establish . . . that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief[.]”).
Given Plaintiff's underlying claim is unlikely to
withstand review, and there is no likelihood of irreparable
harm, his current request for injunctive relief must be denied.
See Holbrook v. Univ. of Va., 706 F. Supp. 2d 652, 655 (W.D. Va.
2010) (“[A] federal court may grant a preliminary injunction only
when a litigant clearly meets all four prongs of the Winter
test.”); Via v. Wilhelm, No. 7:11CV0050, 2011 WL 2516338, at *2
(W.D. Va. June 22, 2011) (denying temporary injunctive relief
after determining that plaintiff had not established a clear
likelihood of success on the merits).
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is
denied.
An appropriate Order will issue.
September 24, 2013
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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