Zargarpur v. Townsend et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 18 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Ron Cavanaugh, Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Dennis Townsend, Danny White. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 10/22/13. (Copy Mailed To Plt 10/23/13)(nhall)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
MATTIN ZARGARPUR,
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Plaintiff,
v.
DENNIS TOWNSEND, et al.,
Defendants.
M E M O R A N D U M
1:13cv1022 (JCC/TRJ)
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Dennis
Townsend, Danny White, Ron Cavanaugh, and Kenneth Cuccinelli’s
(collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”).
18.]
[Dkt.
For the following reasons, the Court will grant
Defendants’ Motion.
I.
Background
The facts of this case are recounted in the Court's
Memorandum Opinion dated September 24, 2013, familiarity with
which is presumed.
In brief, Plaintiff Mattin Zargarpur
(“Plaintiff”) had an illicit affair with his teacher, Tina Amato
(“Amato”), while a student at her school.
4.)
(Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶
Amato pled guilty to several charges associated with this
relationship in 2012.
(Compl. ¶ 5.)
Amato is currently
prohibited from communicating with Plaintiff as part of her
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probation.
(Compl. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff wishes to engage in a
romantic relationship with Amato and alleges that this
restriction infringes upon his “rights to enjoy the freedom of
association and the freedom of intimate association guaranteed
[to him] by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.”
(Compl. ¶ 13.)
In addition to damages,
Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to enjoin Defendants from enforcing
this condition of Amato’s probation.
(Compl. ¶ 18.)
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to maintain this
suit, and, alternatively, the Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
19] at 2-3.)
(Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. [Dkt.
Plaintiff filed an opposition brief on the morning
of oral argument.
(Pl.’s Objection to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
(“Pl.’s Resp.”) [Dkts. 23-24] at 1.)
In addition to disputing
Defendants’ position, Plaintiff’s brief asks the Court to
reconsider its prior ruling on his motion for a preliminary
injunction.
(Pl.’s Resp. at 1.)
This matter is now ripe for
disposition.
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II.
A.
Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs the
dismissal of an action where the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.
Defendants may attack subject matter jurisdiction
in one of two ways.
First, defendants may contend, as is the
case here, that the complaint fails to allege facts upon which
subject matter jurisdiction may be based.
See Adams v. Bain,
697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982); King v. Riverside Reg'l
Med. Ctr., 211 F. Supp. 2d 779, 780 (E.D. Va. 2002).
In such
instances, all facts alleged in the complaint are presumed true.
Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219; Virginia v. United States, 926 F. Supp.
537, 540 (E.D. Va. 1995).
Second, defendants may argue that the jurisdictional
facts alleged in the complaint are untrue.
1219; King, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 780.
Adams, 697 F.2d at
In that situation, “the
Court may ‘look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the
complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the
issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction
exists.’”
Virginia, 926 F. Supp. at 540 (quoting Capitol
Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993)).
In either circumstance, the burden of proving subject
matter jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff.
McNutt v. Gen.
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Adams, 697
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F.2d at 1219; see also Johnson v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,
682 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566 (E.D. Va. 2009) (holding that “having
filed this suit and thereby seeking to invoke the jurisdiction
of the Court, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that this
Court has subject matter jurisdiction”).
B.
Rule 12(b)(6)
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the
sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, [it] does not resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.”
Butler v. United States. 702 F.3d
749, 752 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
When ruling on such a motion, a district court must
accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true, drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007).
However, the court need not accept as true legal
conclusion disguised as a factual allegation.
at 679–81.
Iqbal, 556 U.S.
The plaintiff’s facts must “be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
III.
Analysis
Having carefully reviewed the Complaint and applicable
case law, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff lacks
standing to pursue this action.
See Flaum v. Colonial
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Williamsburg Found., Civil Action No. 4:12cv111, 2012 WL
5879128, at *1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2012) (“Generally, challenges
to standing are addressed under Rule 12(b)(1).” (citation
omitted)).
Standing is a threshold requirement implicating the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, and is “perhaps the most
important” condition for a justiciable claim.
468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
Allen v. Wright,
The “constitutional minimum of
standing” requires (1) “an injury in fact - a harm suffered by
the plaintiff that is concrete and actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “causation - a fairly
traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the
complained-of conduct of the defendant”; and (3) “redressability
- a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the
alleged injury.”
McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 402 (4th
Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
“The standing doctrine, of
course, depends [upon] . . . whether the plaintiff is the proper
party to bring the suit.”
White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413
F.3d 451, 460 (4th Cir. 2005).
As noted above, Plaintiff is seeking to quash the nocontact provision of Amato’s probation on grounds that it
infringes upon his constitutional rights.
Plaintiff’s
Complaint, however, makes clear that this no-contact provision
is personal to Amato and intended only to circumscribe her
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conduct.
(Compl. ¶¶ 5-6.)
No penalties will be imposed upon
Plaintiff if he chooses to associate with Amato.
6.)
(Compl. ¶¶ 5-
Consequently, there is no concrete injury to Plaintiff
sufficient to confer standing.
See Drollinger v. Milligan, 552
F.2d 1220, 1227 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that a father
lacked standing to challenge his daughter’s probation conditions
that restricted their association); see also Clark v. Prichard,
812 F.2d 991, 999 (5th Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., concurring) (“As
for the action by [the plaintiff] on behalf of her children I
agree that they are not entitled any relief.
They lack standing
to contest the conditions of their mother's probation.”).
Plaintiff’s argument that the Court should grant him
third-party standing is unavailing.
(Pl.’s Resp. at 1-2.)
To
establish third-party standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate,
among other things, “a hindrance to the third party's ability to
protect his or her own interests.”
Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake
Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir.2002).
“The Fourth
Circuit has further clarified that the hurdle preventing a third
party from asserting [his or] her own rights must be high
indeed, as the mere fact that a person is disabled, chronically
ill, or indigent does not constitute an obstacle sufficient to”
confer third-party standing.
Equal Rights Ctr. v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 510, 523 (D. Md. 2010) (citing
Freilich, 313 F.3d at 215).
Plaintiff is unable to meet this
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burden, as nothing suggests that Amato is incapable of
effectively protecting her own interests.
In short, Plaintiff
is not the proper party to contest Amato’s probation conditions.
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff had standing to bring
this action, his Complaint fails to state a claim.
As detailed
in the Court's prior Memorandum Opinion, state impediments on
non-martial romantic relationships are permissible provided they
withstand rational basis scrutiny.
See Stevens v. Holder, No.
1:12-cv-1105, 2013 WL 4430901, at *8-10 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16,
2013).
The Court is satisfied that the no-contact provision at
issue here, which prevents a convicted sex offender from contact
with a prior victim, is rationally related to the government’s
interest in rehabilitation.
See Alvarez v. Holder, 454 F. App’x
769, 774 (11th Cir. 2011) (upholding a no-contact order as a
reasonable restriction on the right to associate); see also
Wirsching v. Colorado, 350 F.3d 1191, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)
(finding that a legitimate interest in furthering rehabilitation
supports banning contact between sex offenders and their
victims); Hughbanks v. Dooley, No. Civ. 10-4064, 2010 WL
4366103, at *4 (D.S.D. Oct. 28, 2010) (concluding that a
regulation prohibiting sex offenders from possessing pornography
was rationally related to the government’s interest in
furthering rehabilitation); Ramirez v. Pugh, 486 F. Supp. 2d
421, 430 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (noting that the government has a
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“strong interest” in rehabilitating sex offenders).
Despite
Plaintiff’s belief otherwise, the terms of Amato’s probation do
not violate the Constitution.
Finally, the Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation to
reconsider its prior ruling in this matter under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59.
(Pl.’s Resp. at 1.)
First, it is not clear
that Rule 59 is the appropriate avenue for the relief Plaintiff
seeks.
See Saint Annes Dev. Co., Inc v. Trabich, 443 F. App’x
829, 832 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Rule 59(e) . . .
final judgments.”).
applies only to
However, even considering the merits,
Plaintiff’s brief does not provide a suitable basis for granting
his request.
(Pl.’s Resp. at 2-3.)
Where a litigant merely
seeks to rehash prior arguments, as is the case here,
reconsideration is unavailable.
See Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l
Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding
that a party’s mere disagreement with the court’s ruling does
not warrant a Rule 59 motion); Stoney Glen, LLC v. S. Bank and
Trust Co., Civil Action No. 2:13cv8–HCM–LRL, 2013 WL 4539736, at
*2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2013) (noting that a motion for
reconsideration “should not be used to merely reiterate
arguments”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request is denied.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant
Defendants’ Motion and dismiss this action without prejudice.
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See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at
Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A dismissal
for lack of standing-or any other defect in subject matter
jurisdiction-must be one without prejudice[.]”).
An appropriate
Order will issue.
October 22, 2013
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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