Caravetta v. Marefat et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING THE CASE. Signed by District Judge Gerald Bruce Lee on 11/22/13. ( See order for details).(gwalk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
SYLVIA CARAVETTA,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. l:13-cv-1064(GBL/TRJ)
v.
SAEED MAREFAT, M.D., et al,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Saeed Marefat ("Marefat") and
Metropolitan Plastic Surgery, P.C. ("Metropolitan")'s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim. (Doc. 5.) This case arises from an eyelid surgery performed by Defendant Marefat on
Plaintiff Sylvia Caravetta ("Caravetta") on April 24, 2009. Plaintiff, who appears pro se, claims
that Defendant Marefat and his employer, Defendant Metropolitan, (i) committed assault by
performing an experimental surgical technique on Plaintiff without her consent, (ii) falsified
records related to the eyelid surgery, and (iii) violated the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA") bywithholding Plaintiffs medical records.1
There are three issues before the Court. The first issue is whether Plaintiffs assault claim
is time-barred, the second issue is whether Virginia law recognizes a standalone cause of action
for the falsification of records, and the third issue is whether HIPAA provides a private cause of
1 Plaintiffs Complaint fails to specify the exact causes of action being pursued against
Defendants. Instead, the Complaint provides a general narrative of the wrongs committed by
Defendants. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has instructed that "a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In accordance with this instruction, the Court has liberally construed the Complaint and
identified the three above-listed claims as being pled therein.
action. The Court holds that Plaintiff fails to a state an assault claim because more than two years
passed between Plaintiff allegedly sustaining her eyelid injury in 2009 and Plaintiff filing her
assault claim in 2013. The Court further holds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for falsification
of records because Virginia law does not recognize falsification of records as a standalone cause
of action. Lastly, the Court holds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under HIPAA
because HIPAA does not provide a private cause of action. For these reasons, the Court
GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Caravetta, appearing pro se, is a citizen of Phoenix, Arizona. (Doc. 1, at 1.)
Defendant Marefat is a citizen of the District of Columbia and a physician licensed in Virginia.
(Id.) Marefat regularly engages in the practice of medicine at Defendant Metropolitan's offices in
Arlington, Virginia. (Id.) This matter arises from Marefat's performance of a blepharoplasty
procedure on Plaintiff. A blepharoplasty procedure is a type of plastic surgery performed on the
eyelids. The surgery occurred on April 24, 2009, at Metropolitan's offices. (Id. at 5.)
Approximately three years later, on April 23, 2012, Plaintiff sued Marefat in the District Court
for the District of Columbia alleging medical malpractice. The claim was dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Id. at 1.)
On August 23, 2013, Plaintiff brought the instant action in this Court alleging assault,
falsification of records, and violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA"). According to Plaintiff, as her case in the District of Columbia developed, Plaintiff
"began to realize" that Marefat's actions were not medical malpractice but rather an "intentional
and premeditated .. . assault, and a violation of [her] rights." (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff now alleges that
Defendants assaulted Plaintiff by (i) performing an experimental surgical procedure on her
without her knowledge or consent and by (ii) using a "cauterizing tool" on her eyes, which added
to, or exacerbated, Plaintiffs injury. (Id.) Plaintiff stresses that her claim sounds not in medical
malpractice but in assault. (Doc. 10, at 1.) Use of the cauterizing tool and experimental
procedure, Plaintiff alleges, resulted in excessive amounts of skin being removed from her right
eye, creating "uneven lopsided eyes" and an asymmetry in Plaintiffs face. (Doc. 1, at 2.)
On May 5, 2013, Plaintiff requested medical records from Defendants. (Id. at 2.)
According to Plaintiff, the medical records sent by Defendants omitted key facts, including use
of the cauterizing tool, and contained false statements, including that Marefat "took care not to
remove too much skin." (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated HIPAA by
providing incomplete records and by not providing the records within fifteen days of Plaintiff
requesting them. (Id. at 3.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should be granted
unless the complaint "states a plausible claim for relief under Rule 8(a). Walters v. McMahen,
684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). In
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint," drawing "all reasonable inferences" in the plaintiffs favor. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). However, no assumption of truth is afforded to "naked assertions" and "unadorned
conclusory allegations" devoid of "factual enhancement." Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co.,
708 F.3d 527, 543 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Nor is the court obligated to assume the
veracity of the legal conclusions drawn from the facts alleged. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550
F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Dist. 28, United Mine Workers ofAm., Inc. v. Wellmore
Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (4th Cir. 1979)). Thus, the court's review involves the
separation of factual allegations from legal conclusions. Burnette v. Fahey, 698 F.3d 171, 180
(4th Cir. 2012). In addition to the complaint, the court will examine "documents incorporated
into the complaint by reference," as well as matters properly subject to judicial notice.
Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted);
Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).
The complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, "to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level" and "nudge [the] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible." Vitol, 708 F.3d at 543 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570
(2007)). The facial plausibility standard requires the pleading of "factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 554 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). This standard imposes not a
probability requirement but rather a requirement that the plaintiff "demonstrate more than 'a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.' " Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186,
193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Accordingly, a complaint is insufficient if it relies upon "naked assertions" and
"unadorned conclusory allegations" devoid of "factual enhancement." Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679, and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The complaint must present " 'enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' of the alleged activity." U.S. Airline
Pilots Ass'n v. Awappa, LLC, 615 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556). Thus, in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must present sufficient
nonconclusory factual allegations to support a reasonable inference thatthe plaintiffis entitled to
relief and the defendant is liable for the unlawful act or omission alleged. See Giacomelli, 588
F.3d at 196-97 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79, and Gooden v. Howard Cnty., Md, 954 F.2d
960,969-70 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for three reasons. First, the Court
holds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for assault because the claim is barred by Virginia's two-
year statute of limitations for personal injury. Second, the Court holds that Plaintiff fails to state
a claim for falsification of records because Virginia law does not recognize a standalone cause of
action for falsification of records. Third, the Court holds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for
relief under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") because HIPAA
does not provide a private cause of action.
A. Plaintiffs Assault Claim Is Time-Barred.
The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs assault claim because
the claim is barred by Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury, the claim
having been filed more than two years after Plaintiff sustained the alleged injury to her eyelids.
Under Virginia law, "every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery ... shall
be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues." Va. Code § 8.01-243(A). This
two-year statute of limitations for personal injury runs from the date the injury is sustained, not
the date the injury is discovered. Id. § 8.01-230; see also Torkie-Tork v. Wyeth, 739 F. Supp. 2d
887, 891 (E.D. Va. 2010); Chalifoux v. Radiology Assocs., Inc, 708 S.E.2d 834, 837 (Va. 2011).
Because Plaintiff alleges personal injury as the consequence of Defendants' assault, her
assault claim is subject to Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury.
Accordingly, the claim is time-barred because more than two years passed between Plaintiffs
April 24, 2009, surgery, where Plaintiff sustained her alleged injury, and Plaintiffs August 23,
2013, filing of her assault claim. That Plaintiff did not discover the assault until later is of no
import, because under Virginia law the statute of limitations for personal injury runs from
infliction of the injury, not discovery of the injury. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs assault claim.
B. Virginia Law Does Not Recognize an Independent Cause of Action for
Falsification of Records.
The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claim for falsification
of records because Virginia law does not recognize falsification of records as a standalone cause
of action. Although the Court cannot find any Virginia cases refusing to recognize a standalone
cause of action for falsified records, it also cannot find any Virginia cases recognizing falsified
records as a standalone cause of action. The only Virginia case on the subject appears to be
Mathias v. Sanders, 14 Va. Cir. 236 (1988), a decision by the Circuit Court for the City of
Winchester. The Mathias court, like this Court, found that "there are no Virginia cases to support
a tort action for falsification of records." Id. Notably, however, the Mathias court also found that
although falsification of records is not an independent basis for legal relief, it can support a claim
for "increased cost of investigation" where the records have been falsified to "subvert an adverse
party's investigation and right to seek a legal remedy." Id.
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Defendants falsified her medical records but fails to
allege any facts grounding the falsification in an intent to subvert Plaintiffs investigation of her
claims. Moreover, Plaintiffs Complaint makes no reference to the investigation costs she
incurred, let alone any increase in those costs resulting from the alleged falsification. Although
the Court must construe Plaintiffs Complaint liberally, Plaintiff must still allege facts that state a
cause of action. "District judges are not mind readers," Beaudett v. City ofHampton, 115 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), and cannot conjure the facts necessary to support a cause of action
for "increased cost of investigation," see Cosner v. Dodt, 526 F. App'x 252, 253 (4th Cir. 2013)
("While a pro se litigant's pleadings are liberally construed, a pro se complaint must still contain
sufficient facts to . . . state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." (citations omitted)).
Thus, the Court construes Plaintiffs Complaint to assert a standalone cause of action for
falsification of records, a cause of action not recognized under Virginia law. For this reason, the
Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claim for falsification of records.
C. HIPAA Provides No Private Cause of Action.
Lastly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claim of a HIPAA
violation because HIPAA does not provide for a private cause of action. See Acara v. Banks, 470
F.3d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 2006); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (citing Acara, 470
F.3d at 571); see also Switzer v. Thomas, 5:12cv00056, 2013 WL 693090, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb.
25, 2013). Rather, HIPAA charges the Secretary of Health and Human Services, not a private
litigant like Plaintiff, to enforce its statutory provisions. See Runkle v. Gonzalez, 391 F. Supp. 2d
210,237 (D.D.C. 2005).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED and that
Plaintiffs claims are hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED this %>W day ofNovember, 2013.
Alexandria, Virginia
11 £^2013
/s/
Gerald Bruce Lee
United States District Judge
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?