Edmonds v. Pruett
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM OPINION (see for details). Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 08/20/14. (pmil, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
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Alexandria Division
Joshua Edmonds,
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Petitioner,
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Samuel V. Pruett,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
Joshua Edmonds, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, pursuantto 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the constitutionality of his convictions
in the Circuit Court for the City of Fredericksburg, Virginia. On December 18,2013, respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss and Rule 5 Answer. Edmonds wasgiven the opportunity to file
responsive materials, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), and he
filed a reply on January 13,2014. Upon careful review, the Court finds that this habeas corpus
application mustbe dismissed because the statecourts' decisions were not contrary to or
unreasonable applications of federal law.
I. Background
On January 14,2009, Edmonds entered an Alford plea of guilty to one count of
reproduction of child pornography and pleaded guilty to 25 counts of possession of child
pornography. Case Nos. CR08-119 through CR08-1224; Jan. 14, 2009 Tr. 31. The Court
sentenced Edmonds to fifty-seven (57) years imprisonment with forty-three (43) years and six
months suspended. March 27,2009 Tr. 103-04. Edmonds pursued a direct appeal arguing that
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentences violated the federal
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Appeals of
Virginia denied his appeal onFebruary 25,2010. R. No. 0894-09-2. Edmonds sought further
review by the Supreme Court of Virginia, buthis appeal was refused on February 18, 2011. R.
No. 100872.
On or about February 14, 2012, Edmonds filed a petition for a state writ of habeas corpus
in the Circuit Court for the City of Fredericksburg, Virginia. In hispetition, Edmonds argued
that: (1) and (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel refused to discuss
defenses with petitioner and when she incorrectly advised him that he would notbe required to
register as a sex offender if he pleaded guilty; and (3) the Commonwealth Attorney coerced him
into pleading guilty to production of child pornography by misleading him on the elements of
that crime. The court denied the petition on October 23,2012.
Edmonds appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which refused the appeal on July
18, 2013, finding no reversible error in the circuit court's opinion. R. No. 130183. Edmonds filed
the instant application for § 2254 relief on or about September 11,2013,' raising the following
claims:
A. Trial counsel was ineffective in refusing to discuss defenses
with Edmonds.
B. Trial counsel was ineffective for incorrectly advising Edmonds
that his guilty pleas would not require him to register as a sex
offender.
On December 18,2013, respondent filed a Rule 5 Response and a Motion to Dismiss,
along with a supporting brief and exhibits. Petitioner filed a reply on January 13,2014. Based
on the pleadings and record before this Court, it is uncontested that Edmonds exhausted his
claims, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, the petition is now ripe for disposition.
1For federal purposes, a pleading submitted by an incarcerated litigant generally is deemed filed when the
pleading is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Lewis v. City of Richmond Police Dep't. 947 F.2d
733 (4th Cir. 199H: see also Houston v. Lack. 487 U.S. 266 (1988). In this case petitioner states he
mailed his petition on September 11, 2013.
III. Standard of Review
When a state court has addressed the merits ofa claim raised in a federal habeas petition,
a federal court may not grant the petition based on the claim unless the state court's adjudications
are (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or (2) are
based onan unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The evaluation of
whether a state court decision is "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of federal lawis
based on an independent review of each of these criteria. See Williams v. Tavlor. 529 U.S. 362,
412-13 (2000). A state courtdetermination runs afoul of the "contrary to" standard if it "arrives
at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a question of
law" or if the state court decision is different from thedecision of the Supreme Court "on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts." Williams. 529 U.S. at 413. Under the "unreasonable
application" clause,the writ should be granted if the federal court finds that the state court
"identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisionsbut
unreasonably applies thatprinciple to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. Importantly, this
standard of reasonableness is an objective one. Id. at 410.
IV. Analysis
In both of petitioner's claims, he asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) "counsel's
performance was deficient" and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant."
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To prove that counsel's performance was
deficient, a petitioner must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness," id at 688, and that the "acts and omissions" of counsel were, in light of all
the circumstances, "outside the range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690. Such a
determination "must be highly deferential," with a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct
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falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id at 689; see also Burket v.
Aneelone. 208 F.3d 172, 189 (4th Cir. 2000) (reviewing court "must be highly deferential in
scrutinizing [counsel's] performance and must filter the distorting effects of hindsight from [its]
analysis"); Spencer v. Murray. 18 F.3d 229,233 (4th Cir. 1994) (court must "presume that
challenged acts are likely the result of sound trial strategy.").
To satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong, a "defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694. And, in this respect, "[a] reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.; accord Lovitt v. True. 403
F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2005). The burden is on the petitioner to establish not merely that
counsel'serrors created the possibility of prejudice, but rather "that they worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimension."
Carrier. 477 U.S. at 494(citations omitted, emphasis original). Thetwo prongs of the Strickland
test are "separate and distinct elements of an ineffective assistance claim," and a successful
petition "must show both deficient performance and prejudice." Spencer. 18 F.3d at 233.
Therefore, a court need not review thereasonableness of counsel's performance if a petitioner
fails to show prejudice.
The two-partStrickland test also "applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on
ineffective assistance of counsel." Hill v. Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). In the context of a
guilty plea, the "performance" prong of the Stricklandtest 'is nothing more than a restatement of
the standard of attorney competence already set forth in ... McMann v. Richardson.' 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970), that is, whether the advice of counsel "was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id at 58-59. With regard to the "prejudice" prong in
the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner must show that, "but for counsel's errors, he would not
havepleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id at 59; see also Burket v.
Aneelone. 208 F.3d 172, 190(4th Cir. 2000). In reviewing a petitioner's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding a guilty plea, "the representations of the defendant, his lawyer,
and the prosecutor atsuch a hearing, as well as any findings made bythe judge accepting the
plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings." Blackledge v.
Allison. 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). Declarations made "inopen court carry a strong presumption
ofveracity," and "the subsequent presentation ofconclusory allegations unsupported by specifics
is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that inthe face of the record are wholly
incredible." Id. at 74. Thus, absent clearand convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is
bound by his representations at a pleacolloquy concerning the voluntariness of the plea and the
adequacy of his representation. Beck v. Aneelone. 261 F.3d 377, 396(4thCir. 2001).
In claim A, Edmonds asserts that his attorney was ineffective for refusing to discuss a
defense strategy with him. Pet. 8. Specifically, heclaims thathis counsel "continuously pushed a
plea-agreement" and"demanded thathe enter[] into a plea-bargain ... as that [was] his best
option." Id Edmonds goes on to argue that his counsel's ineffectiveness meets the Strickland
standard because she "refused to utilize several family and friends that Edmonds had available to
provide assistance to counsel." Id at 9. Edmonds argues his counsel's allegedly deficient
performanceprejudiced him by denying him his right to:
(1) properly confront the witnesses against him, (2) challenge the allegations
against him, (3) force the Commonwealth to prove the actual reproduction and
possession of child pornography, and (4) denied him his right to free choice in
whether he wanted to pursue a trial by jury or plea bargain.
Id at 9-10.
In claim B, petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when
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counsel incorrectly advised him that if he pleaded guilty, he would not have toregister as a sex
offender. Id at 10. Specifically, trial counsel allegedly admitted to misinterpreting Virginia
Code § 9.1-902 as not applying to Edmonds, ifhe accepted the plea bargain. Id Edmonds argues
that counsel's misinterpretation of the law amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel because
his counsel:
refused to take all the necessary actions to establish on the record that (1)
Edmonds understood the process that lead to the offer, (2) the advantages and
disadvantages of accepting it, and (3) the sentencing consequences that would
ensue once the conviction was entered.
Id at 12. Further, Edmonds was prejudiced because it "denied him of his right to free choice in
whether he wanted to pursue a trial byjury or plea-bargain," left him subject to Court order after
the Court accepted his guilty plea, and "requires himto register as a sex offender, after his
counsel assured him that he would not be" subject to theregistration requirements. Id at 12.
Onstate habeas review, the Circuit Court for the City of Fredericksburg rejected these
claims as failing to meet boththe performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland. Edmonds v.
Pruett. R. No. 12000110-00, at 2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 23,2012). The Virginia Supreme Court
found that:
petitioner has not shown that his attorney failed to discuss defenses with him. The
Court further finds that the petitioner stated under oath that he had had enough
time to discuss defenses with his attorney and was entirely satisfied with the
services of his lawyer. The Court further finds that the petitioner has failed to
show that he was prejudiced by any of the alleged acts or omissions of his
attorney. . . . Consequently, the Court rules that that [sic], under the criteria set
forth in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the petitioner has not
shown that his attorney was ineffective and that, therefore, [petitioner's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims] should be dismissed.
Id
Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused further review by its
July 18,2013 order. Because the foregoing order was the last reasoned state court decision on the
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claim at issue, its reasoning is imputed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Ylstv.
Nunnemaker. 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991).
Because the circuit court's decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, Edmonds's petition will bedismissed. At the plea
colloquy onJanuary 14, 2009, Edmonds stated under oath that he freely and voluntarily made his
owndecision to enteran Alford plea of guilty as to the one count of reproducing child
pornography and to plead guilty to all twenty-five counts of possession of child pornography,
and entered such pleas because he was in fact guilty. Tr. 34-35. Edmonds told the Court that he
had discussed the charges and their elements with his attorney, that he understood the charges
against him, and that he had discussed any potential defenses that he might have had to the
charges. Id at 33-34. Afterthat discussion, Edmonds stated that by entering his respective pleas
he was giving up or waiving his right to a jury trial, his right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses that would have appeared to testifyagainst him, and his right to defend himself at trial.
Id. at 36-37. Edmonds testified that no one threatened or forced him to plead guilty. Id at 39.
Edmonds then stated under oath that he was entirely satisfied with counsel's services. Id. at 43.
Because Edmonds is bound by these statements, Lemaster. 403 F.3d at 221 - 22, and because the
voluntariness of the plea has not been successfullychallenged, Edmonds cannot now show that
but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
In Edmonds's reply to respondent's Motion to Dismiss, he characterizes respondent's
motion as "arguing that there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in the negotiation of a
plea offer." Pet'r's Traverse 1; docket # 9. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing and cites Missouri v. Frve as providing the appropriate standard of review. Pet'r's
Traverse 3. Edmonds then argues that respondent's Motion to Dismiss was not a properresponse
to his petitionbecause it is not an answer. Id at 4. Lastly, in one line, Edmondsargues that "he
was not advised of the requirement to register until well after he pled guilty, thereby, making his
guilty plea unintelligent, involuntary, and invalid." Id. at 7.
Edmondsarguments are without merit. A review of respondent's Motion to Dismiss
clearly shows that Edmonds's characterizationof respondent's arguments is inaccurate. Rather
than arguing that there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in the negotiation of a plea
offer- as Edmonds claims - respondent properly acknowledges that the Strickland test applies to
guilty pleas and correctly states that "[b]ecause the petitionerpled guilty, the measureof
prejudice is whether, but for the alleged ineffectiveness he would have pled not guilty and gone
to trial." Mot. Dismiss 4. Edmonds argumentthat he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing is in
error because, pursuant to Cullen v. Pinholster. at this juncture Edmonds is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing.
U.S.
,131 S.Ct. 1388 (Apr. 4,2011). Similarly, petitioner's reliance on
Missouri v. Frve. _ U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (Oct. 31,2011) is inaccurate in that in Missouri the
Court held that defense counsel provided deficient representation when he failed to communicate
a formal plea agreement offer to plaintiff before it lapsed. 132 S.Ct. at 1409. As it is uncontested
that Edmonds's trial counsel communicated the Commonwealth's plea offer to him, which
Edmonds then accepted, Missouri is inapplicable to Edmonds's petition. Edmonds's argument
that respondent's Motion to Dismiss is not a proper response to his petition is inaccurate and
ignores this Court's October 23,2013 Order, which directed respondent to show cause why the
writ should not be granted, which respondent has now done through filing his motion.
Lastly, Edmonds's conclusory argument that "he was not advised of the requirement to
register until well after he pled guilty, thereby, making his guilty plea unintelligent, involuntary,
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and invalid" fails to rebut the "strong presumption of veracity" that his "open court" declaration
carries. See Blackledge. 431 U.S. at 74. Indeed, his one-line argument amounts to nothing more
than a "subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics," that the
Court in Blackledge held was subject to summary dismissal. See id
This conclusion is supported by the transcript of Edmonds's plea colloquoy, where
Edmonds twice stated that he understood the charges against him, tr. 10, 33; discussed the
elements of each charge with his counsel, tr. 10-11, 34; decided on his own to plead guilty, tr. 11,
34-35; and did so because he was in fact guilty, tr. 12, 35. Edmonds gave this testimony twice
because during the Commonwealth's proffer of what the evidence would have shown had his
case gone to trial, which occurred halfway through Edmonds's plea colloquy, the
Commonwealth and Edmonds disagreed that the evidence would have shown that all the victims
were under thirteen years of age. Tr. 15-17. After proffering photographic evidence taken from
Edmonds computer that showed "a three-year old child which showed her vagina and semen all
over the child's vagina with an adult male with an erect penis in the frame of the photo," tr. 15,
and reviewing other evidence, Edmonds agreed with the Commonwealth's proffer "that the
victims that are in the photographs would appear to be under the age of thirteen," tr. 29. The
Court then went through a second plea colloquy with Edmonds, where he testified that he was
pleading guilty - voluntarily and of his own free will - because, after fully discussing the
charges with his attorney, he was in fact guilty and was satisfied with his attorney. Tr. 33-35,42.
As there is no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Edmonds is bound by his sworn
statements made at trial concerning the voluntariness of the plea and the adequacy of his
representation. See Beck, 261 F.3d at 396.
Further, Courts have held that failure of "defense counsel to ascertain and advise of the
collateral consequences ofaguilty plea... is not ineffective assistance of counsel." United
States v. Yearwood. 863 F. 2d 6, 8 (4th Cir. 1988). As "sex offender registration is a collateral
consequence ofaguilty plea," Leslie v. Randle. 296 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2002), Edmonds's
argument that his counsel was ineffective in failing to correctly inform him that "ifhe pleaded
guilty, he would not have to register as asex offender," pet. 10, fails as amatter of law.
Therefore, under these circumstances, the Circuit Court ofFredericksburg's rejection of
Edmonds's ineffective assistance ofcounsel claims was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable
application ofthe applicable federal law; thus, the same result must pertain here. Williams, 529
U.S. at 412-13.
V. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, this petition will be dismissed. An appropriate Order shall
issue.
Entered this £*
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