Lawrence v. Global Linguist Solutions, LLC
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM OPINION Re: Deft Global Linguist Solutions, LLC's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 12/19/13. (pmil, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
AMANDA LAWRENCE
)
)
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)
)
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Plaintiff,
v.
GLOBAL LINGUIST SOLUTIONS
LLC,
Defendant.
1:13cv1207 (JCC/TRJ)
M E M O R A N D U M
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Global
Linguist Solutions, LLC’s (“Defendant” or “GLS”) Motion to
Dismiss.
[Dkt. 29.]
For the following reasons, the Court will
grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
I.
Background
This case arises out of a former employee’s claims of
gender discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”).
A.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Amanda Lawrence (“Plaintiff”) is an American
citizen formerly employed by GLS in Kuwait.
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(Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26.)
Defendant GLS is a Delaware corporation that maintains a
facility on a military base in Kuwait.
(Compl. ¶ 35.)
In March 2009, Plaintiff moved to Kuwait as an
employee of another company.
(Compl. ¶ 30.)
In May 2009,
Plaintiff met Todd Lawrence (“Mr. Lawrence”), GLS’s manager for
linguistics in the Middle East.
(Compl. ¶ 32.)
Plaintiff and
Mr. Lawrence married in January 2010 and Plaintiff became
employed by GLS in September 2010.
(Compl. ¶¶ 33, 34.)
That
same month, Plaintiff and Mr. Lawrence moved into housing
provided by GLS in Kuwait.
(Compl. ¶ 36.)
Plaintiff alleges that beginning in the fall of 2010
Mr. Lawrence began to physically abuse her.
(Compl. ¶¶ 37-40.)
Plaintiff alleges that she informed supervisors at GLS about
this abuse, but no corrective action was taken.
45.)
(Compl. ¶¶ 40-
In July 2010, Mr. Lawrence moved out of the apartment he
and Plaintiff shared and asked for a divorce.
(Compl. ¶ 47.)
Plaintiff alleges that beginning around July 2011, GLS
managers subjected her to a changed work schedule, that she
received a rude phone call from a manager after a meeting
regarding working hours and the costs of transportation, and
that she was instructed to cease communications with Mr.
Lawrence or she would be fired and have her security clearance
canceled.
(Compl. ¶¶ 51, 53, 64.)
Additionally, Plaintiff
alleges that she was accused of leaving work early and received
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harassing calls about having the desk she staffed covered at all
times.
(Compl. ¶¶ 78, 80, 81.)
In late October or early November 2011, GLS fired
Plaintiff.
(Compl. ¶ 85.)
Plaintiff alleges that she was
subjected to further harassment and retaliation in the
termination process.
Plaintiff avers that GLS improperly
withheld her passport and wrongfully changed her termination
from a reduction in force (“RIF”) to a termination for cause,
preventing her from receiving unemployment benefits.
(Compl. ¶¶
100, 106-108.)
Plaintiff alleges that GLS replaced her with a
male employee.
(Compl. ¶ 119.)
On May 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
(Compl. ¶ 15.)
2012, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue.
On June 28,
(Compl. ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff filed this action in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia on September 27, 2012,
within 90 days of her receipt of the Notice of Right to Sue.
[Dkt. 1.]
B.
Procedural Background
On September 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed her Complaint
against GLS in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia.
[Dkt. 1.]
On February 8, 2013, GLS filed
its Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), (3) and (6) or,
3
in the Alternative to Transfer.
[Dkt. 7.]
On September 25,
2013, the Honorable J. Randal Hall granted in part and denied in
part Defendant’s motion and directed the clerk to transfer this
case to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Alexandria Division.
[Dkt. 18.]
On November 22, 2013, Defendant filed its Motion to
Dismiss.
[Dkt. 29.]
Plaintiff filed her opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on December 5, 2013.
Defendant filed its reply on December 11, 2013.
[Dkt. 37.]
[Dkt. 38.]
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is before this Court.
II.
Standard of Review
“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the
sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.”
Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin,
980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
The
Supreme Court has stated that in order “[t]o survive a motion to
dismiss, a [c]omplaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual
content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
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Id.
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted).
While legal conclusions can provide the framework for a
complaint, all claims must be supported by factual allegations.
Id.
Based upon these allegations, the court will determine
whether the plaintiff's pleadings plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.
Id.
Legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations are not sufficient, Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555, nor are “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions,
or arguments,” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,
213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
Moreover, the plaintiff does
not have to show a likelihood of success; rather, the complaint
must merely allege - directly or indirectly - each element of a
“viable legal theory.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63.
In
addition, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, read the complaint as a whole, and take the facts
asserted therein as true.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
An employment discrimination plaintiff need not allege
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515
(2002); Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765
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(4th Cir. 2003).
The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas
is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-11 (“[The Supreme Court] has never
indicated that the requirements for establishing a prima facie
case under McDonnell Douglas also apply to the pleading standard
that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to
dismiss.”).
Nevertheless, a plaintiff retains the burden of
pleading sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim
for relief.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains three causes of action:
(1) gender discrimination; (2) hostile work environment; (3)
retaliation.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss seeks dismissal of
Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim.
Plaintiff’s gender
discrimination claim appears to contain two theories: disparate
treatment and discriminatory discharge.
The Court will consider
each theory in turn.
A.
Disparate Treatment Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s disparate treatment
claim lacks facial plausibility because she does not advance any
facts which, if proven true, would demonstrate that: (1)
Plaintiff performed her job satisfactorily; (2) she was treated
differently from similarly situated male employees.
5.)
(Mem. at
Plaintiff argues that based on the totality of the
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circumstances, she has pled a plausible claim of disparate
treatment based on gender.
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice
for an employer – (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1).
Absent direct evidence, to state a claim of disparate
treatment sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) she has satisfactory job performance; (3) she was subject to
adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees
outside her class received more favorable treatment.”
Prince-
Garrison v. Md. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, 317 F. App’x
351, 353 (4th Cir. 2009).
Defendant has not disputed that, for
purposes of this motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is a member of a
protected class or that Plaintiff was subject to adverse
employment action.
Plaintiff has not, however, adequately pled the second
element of her prima facie case – that she was performing her
job duties satisfactorily.
In Tohotcheu v. Harris Teeter, this
Court found that where a plaintiff’s complaint contained only
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the “conclusory statement that ‘he was a very good or
outstanding employee’ who completed work beyond his employer’s
expectations,” the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead this
element of his discrimination claim.
No. 1:11-CV-767, 2011 WL
5873074, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 22, 2011); see also Tibbs v.
Baltimore City Police Dep’t, No. RDB-11-1335, 2012 WL 365564, at
*4 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2012) (dismissing disparate treatment claim
where plaintiff failed to allege that her job performance was
satisfactory).
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges only that in
October or early November 2011, a little over a year after she
was hired, Plaintiff was informed that “she would be RIF’d.”
(Compl. ¶ 85.)
Plaintiff argues that because “a legitimate RIF
is done without focus on fault” the Court may draw an inference
that Plaintiff was performing satisfactorily at the time of her
termination.
(Opp’n at 2.)
The Court finds, however, that
Plaintiff has advanced no factual allegations that would allow
for such an inference.
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege
that she was performing satisfactorily; it states only that
Plaintiff was “RIF’d.”
(Compl. ¶ 85.)
Even accepting
Plaintiff’s argument that a RIF is done without an inquiry into
fault, the fact that Plaintiff was terminated through a RIF does
not appear to point the Court to any facts – favorable or
unfavorable – regarding her on-the-job performance.
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Defendant further argues that Plaintiff fails to point
to any similarly situated male comparators who were treated
differently than Plaintiff.
(Mem. at 6.)
Defendant argues that
Plaintiff points only to Mr. Lawrence as an individual who was
given more favorable treatment because of gender.
Mr. Lawrence,
as a manager, was not similarly situated to Plaintiff.
6.)
(Mem. at
Plaintiff argues that she may state a Title VII claim
without reliance on comparator proof.
(Opp’n at 5.)
“Plaintiffs are not required as a matter of law to
point to a similarly situated comparator to succeed on a
discrimination claim.”
Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App’x 355, 359
(4th Cir. 2010) (citing Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., Inc.,
333 F.3d 536, 545 (4th Cir. 2003)).
However, in this case,
Plaintiff has based her allegations “completely upon a
comparison to an employee from a non-protected class and
therefore the validity of [her] prima facie case depends upon
whether that comparator is indeed similarly situated.”
387 F. App’x at 359.
Haywood,
A plaintiff must show that she is “similar
in all relevant respects to [her] comparator.”
Id.
Employees
are similarly situated where they “dealt with the same
supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards and . . .
engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or
mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or
the employer’s treatment of them for it.”
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Id.
Plaintiff has not clearly identified which other
similarly situated GLS employees received more favorable
treatment than she.
Plaintiff appears to point to her ex-
husband Mr. Lawrence, GLS’s manager for linguistics in the
Middle East, as a relevant comparator.
(Compl. ¶¶ 67-72.)
Plaintiff alleges that she was “to operate under more arduous
and different rules from Lawrence, a male” with regards to her
and Mr. Lawrence’s communications in the workplace.
70.)
(Compl. ¶
Plaintiff further alleges that she was the only employee
“blamed and admonished” for a meeting regarding hours and costs
of transportation and that the co-worker with whom she attended
lunch on a particular occasion was not “similarly chastised” for
taking a lunch break.
(Compl. ¶¶ 54, 82.)
Plaintiff fails to plead any facts on which to find
that the individuals she references in her Complaint are
“similarly situated” to her for purposes of her disparate
treatment claim.
The other employees not chastised by GLS
management are only given passing references in the Complaint.
Additionally, while Plaintiff appears to allege that she and Mr.
Lawrence were similarly situated, the Complaint “fails to
establish a plausible basis for believing [they] were actually
similarly situated.”
Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d
187, 191 (4th Cir. 2010).
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Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
disparate treatment claim.
B.
Discriminatory Discharge Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead a prima
facie case of discriminatory discharge under Title VII.
Absent
direct evidence, to state a claim of discriminatory discharge, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) that he is a member of a protected
class; (2) that he suffered from an adverse employment action;
(3) that at the time the employer took the adverse employment
action he was performing at a level that met his employer’s
legitimate expectations; and (4) that the position was filled by
a similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class.”
King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003).
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that she was
performing at a level that met her employer’s legitimate
expectations or that a similarly qualified male applicant
replaced her.
As in Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim,
Plaintiff’s discriminatory discharge claim fails to plead the
required element of satisfactory job performance.
Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not allege that she was meeting legitimate
expectations.
While Plaintiff claims that the allegations
concerning the RIF are sufficient on this point, as above, the
Court disagrees.
Plaintiff has, however, adequately plead that
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Defendant filled the position with an employee outside the
protected class.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that GLS
“replaced Plaintiff with a male.”
(Compl. ¶ 119.)
For purposes
of a motion to dismiss this is sufficient.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
discriminatory discharge claim.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
The Court will dismiss
Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims without prejudice.
An appropriate Order will issue.
December 19, 2013
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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