Garris et al v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION re Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 4/9/14. Copies mailed: yes (klau, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

ROSCOE GARRIS, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et
al.,
Defendants.

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M E M O R A N D U M

1:14cv118(JCC/JFA)

O P I N I O N

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Samuel I.
White, P.C.’s (“SWPC”) Motion to Dismiss.

[Dkt. 4.]

For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will grant SWPC’s motion and
allow Plaintiffs Roscoe Garris Jr. and Doretha Wright
(“Plaintiffs”) to file an amended complaint.
I. Background
As best the Court can discern, this case arises out of
a residential foreclosure action in connection with Plaintiffs’
home located in Woodbridge, Virginia. 1

(Compl. [Dkt. 1] at 10.)

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Although Roscoe Garris Jr. and Doretha Wright are the identified claimants,
an individual named Muhammad Rashid apparently authored and submitted the
pleadings in this matter. (Compl. at 1.) Mr. Rashid categorizes himself as
a “3rd Party Intervener” and does not claim to be an attorney authorized to
practice law in any jurisdiction. (Id.) Litigants in civil and criminal
actions before this Court, except parties appearing pro se, must be
represented by at least one attorney who is a member of the bar. “Although a
pro se party may bring suit for his own personal constitutional or other
injury, generally a pro se litigant may not sue anyone ‘on behalf of’ anyone
else.” Murray v. Singhi, No. 0:09–451–PMD–PJG, 2009 WL 2447987, at *3
(D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2009). “The right to litigate for oneself . . . does not

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Plaintiffs allege that several corporate entities, including
their mortgage lender and SWPC (collectively “Defendants”),
conspired to fraudulently foreclose on their property. 2
1, 11-15.)

(Id. at

According to Plaintiffs, this foreclosure action is

illegal because Defendants have not presented “the GENUINE
ORIGINAL PROMISSORY NOTE.”

(Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).)

Plaintiffs also attack the validity of Virginia’s foreclosure
process, claiming that “non-judicial” foreclosure actions are
per se illegal and encroach on their rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
at 12, 20.)

(Id.

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that it is Defendants’

burden to prove that the “mortgage in question was not paidoff.”

(Id. at 28.)
SWPC has now moved to dismiss this matter pursuant to

Rules 8 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(Mot.

create a coordinate right to litigate for others.” Myers v. Loudoun Cnty.
Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). In
light of this well-established principle, courts in this Circuit have
uniformly precluded non-attorneys from litigating matters in the name of
others based on claimed authority. See, e.g., Umstead v. Chase Manhattan
Mortg. Corp., No. Civ.A. 7:04CV00747, 2005 WL 2233554, at *2 (W.D. Va. Sept.
13, 2005) (ruling that, despite possessing a power of attorney, “M. Umstead,
as a lay person without a license to practice, cannot represent J. Umstead in
this action”). “It follows from the rule prohibiting lay representation that
any pleadings filed through lay representation must be disregarded as a
nullity.” Id. at *2. Thus, when presented with pleadings filed through lay
representation, district courts generally dismiss the action void ab initio.
Id. Nevertheless, because it is extremely difficult to discern precisely
what is alleged and by whom in this case, the Court will address SWPC’s
motion below. The Court notes that any amended pleading filed in this matter
must be submitted by a licensed attorney or Plaintiffs, pro se.
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Who is currently in possession of the identified property is unclear based
upon the pleadings; however, it is apparent that some institution has at
least initiated foreclosure proceedings.

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to Dismiss at 1; Def.’s Mem. in Supp. [Dkt. 5] at 2.)

SWPC

argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint is comprised of rambling
factual allegations and irrelevant legal citations with no
discernable structure.

(Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 2-3.)

As such,

it fails to provide “Defendants with adequate notice of the
allegations against them.”

(Id. at 3.)

Plaintiffs have filed a response that does not appear
to address SWPC’s arguments.

(Pls.’ Resp. [Dkt. 8] at 1.)

Instead, Plaintiffs further argue that SWPC “perverted the legal
system” by foreclosing on their property without proper
authority.

(Id. at 4.)

Plaintiffs also claim that they are

invoking “the oath of office of the presiding judge in this
case” and the “the oath of office of the district attorney in
this case.”

(Id. at 2-3.)

While not entirely clear, Plaintiffs

appear to believe that this gives them authority to prosecute
this case and act as the presiding judge.

(Id.)

Finally,

Plaintiffs’ response silently seeks to add several defendants,
including “Prince William County District Judge William E.
Jarvis,” “Prince William County Circuit Court,” and “Prince
William County Sheriff Department.”

(Id. at 1.)

Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court is
satisfied that oral argument would not assist the decisional
process.

Accordingly, the Court will decide SWPC’s motion on

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the papers pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(J) and Rule 78(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. Standard of Review
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

This rule further

necessitates that each averment “be simple, concise, and
direct.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

While courts must liberally

construe pro se complaints to address constitutional
deprivations, see Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978), “[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se
complaints are not . . . without limits,” Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

“Even pro se

plaintiffs must recognize Rule 8’s vision for ‘a system of
simplified pleadings that give notice of the general claim
asserted, allow for the preparation of a basic defense, narrow
the issues to be litigated, and provide a means for quick
dispositions of sham claims.’”

Sewraz v. Guice, No. 3:08cv35,

2008 WL 3926443, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2008) (citations
omitted).

Protracted pleadings that consist of confusing

narrative place an unjustified burden on the district court and
the party who must respond.

See North Carolina v. McGuirt, 114

F. App’x 555, 558-59 (4th Cir. 2004).

A complaint that fails to

comply with these pleading requirements is subject to dismissal
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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

McGuirt, 114 F. App’x at 558.
III. Analysis
Even construing Plaintiffs’ pleadings generously, as

the Court must, the complaint falls far short of the minimum
pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2).

Plaintiffs’ complaint is

comprised of forty-five pages with no discernable structure.
Much of the complaint consists of rambling narrative
interspersed with irrelevant legal citations and accusations of
collective and individual wrongdoing by Defendants.
at 3-9.)

(See Compl.

In short, Plaintiffs’ claims are unintelligible.

It

is impossible to tell what any Defendant is alleged to have done
wrong, let alone whether relief is appropriate.

Even under the

liberal pro se pleading standards, Plaintiffs’ perplexing jumble
of seemingly unconnected, redundant, and immaterial facts are
insufficient to make relief plausible or put Defendants on
notice.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine what answer any

Defendants could produce.
As the Supreme Court has explained, the pleading
standards set forth under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should, at a minimum, accomplish two goals: (1) provide a solid
basis for the plaintiff’s allegations, and (2) put the defendant
on notice, effectively allowing them a fair opportunity to
defend themselves.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78
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(2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007).

The complaint in this case does neither, and therefore

it cannot proceed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant SWPC’s
motion.

Additionally, because the analysis set forth above is

equally applicable to the non-moving defendants, the Court finds
it appropriate to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

While

SWPC claims that amendment is futile in this particular case,
the Court will permit Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint
because they are proceeding pro se and this is the first time
the Court is advising them that their pleadings fail to state a
claim.

See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Fairfield Police Dep’t, No.

3:04CV715 (RNC), 2004 WL 1058123, at *1 (D. Conn. May 10, 2004)
(“When a court dismisses a complaint for failure to comply with
Rule 8, it generally gives the plaintiff leave to amend.”).

Any

amended complaint must be filed within thirty-days of this
decision.

If no such complaint is filed, or if the amended

complaint also fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), this case will
be dismissed without further notice.

An appropriate order will

follow.

April 9, 2014
Alexandria, Virginia

/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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