Trueheart v. Director Of The Department Of Corrections
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 8 MOTION to Dismiss by Director Of The Department Of Corrections, 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by Latroise Trueheart. (See Memorandum Opinion For Details). Signed by District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema on 8/21/14. (Copy Mailed 8/22/14)(nhall )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
Latroise Trueheart,
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
)
Dir., Dep't Corr.,
Respondent.
)
)
)
l:14cv289(LMB/JFA)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Latroise Trueheart, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging he was denied due process during the
sentencing phase of his state criminal trial. On May 16, 2014, respondent filed a Rule 5 Answer
and Motion to Dismiss with a supporting brief and exhibits, and provided Trueheart with the
notice required by Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) and Local Civil Rule 7K.
After being granted an extension of time to reply, Trueheart timely submitted a reply brief on
July 8, 2014. Accordingly, the matter is now ripe for disposition. After careful consideration,
respondent's Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and the petition will be dismissed with
prejudice.
I. Background
Following a bench trial in the Circuit Court for the County of Prince Edward, Trueheart
was convicted of robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and two counts
of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Case Nos. CR10-191-00, CR10-192-00,
CR10-193-00, CR10-194-00, and CR10-325-00. The court sentenced Trueheart to fifty-three
years imprisonment with forty-one years suspended. The facts underlying the conviction were
described by the Court of Appeals of Virginia as follow:
[0]n September 19, 2009, Jasmine Morrison answered her door and two men
rushed inside and robbed her at gunpoint. The men also took money and a gun
from her residence. She called the police, and Lieutenant Epps responded to the
scene at which time she told him that two of her boyfriend's friends had robbed
her. Within a week of the incident, Morrison was shown a photo of the individuals
she originally reported had committed the crime, and realized that they were in
fact not the individuals who robbed her. She testified that the two robbers
resembled the men she initially but mistakenly identified. She again identified
appellant during the trial.
Antonio Haskins testified he participated in the robbery with appellant and
Vernon Brookshire. He explained that they had gone to Morrison's house to
purchase marijuana from her boyfriend, but he was not there. Then, appellant
insisted Haskins knock on Morrison's door and when she opened it, appellant and
Brookshire ran inside with the firearm displayed. Brookshire also testified at
appellant's trial and confirmed Haskins' account of the events.
Appellant's mother and stepfather, in his defense, testified he was with them at
their home at the time the crime was committed.
Trueheart v. Commonwealth. R. No. 2459-11-2 (Va. Ct. App. July 12, 2012); Resp. Ex. 3.
After Trueheart's trial but before he was sentenced, the Commonwealth sought to amend
the original indictment to correct an incorrect citation to the Virginia Crime Code. Nov. 30, 2011
Tr. 11-15. On direct appeal, Trueheart raised two claims: the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction and the trial court erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to amend the
indictments pertaining to the charge of use of a firearm while committing a felony and
possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony. Resp. Ex. 2. On July 12, 2012, the
Court of Appeals of Virginia denied the appeal. R. No. 2459-11-2. The Supreme Court of
Virginia refused a petition for further review on January 14, 2013, and refused a rehearing on
March 8, 2013. Trueheart v. Commonwealth. R. No. 121776.
Trueheart then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of
Virginia on the sole claim that the trial court violated his due process rights when the indictments
were amended and his sentence was enhanced without prior notice. The court dismissed the
petition on September 30, 2013, applying Henrv v. Warden. 265 Va. 246, 576 S.E.2d 495 (2003),
to hold that the issue was previously litigated at trial and on direct appeal, and thus was not
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Trueheart v. Dir„ Dep't Corr., R. No. 13112.
On March 19, 2014, Trueheart timely filed the instant federal habeas petition raising the sole
claim that the trial court violated his due process rights when the indictments were amended and
his sentence was enhanced without prior notice. Based on the pleadings and record before this
Court, it is uncontested that Trueheart exhausted this claim as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
II. Standard of Review
When a state court has addressed the merits of a claim raised in a federal habeas petition,
a federal court may not grant the petition based on the claim unless the state court's adjudication
is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or is based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The evaluation of whether a state
court decision is "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of federal law is based on an
independent review of each standard. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
A state court determination runs afoul of the "contrary to" standard if it "arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a question of law or
if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme] Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, the
writ should be granted if the federal court finds that the state court "identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. Importantly, this standard of reasonableness is an
objective one. Id. at 410. Under this standard, "[t]he focus of federal court review is now on the
state court decision that previously addressed the claims rather than the petitioner's free-standing
claims themselves." McLee v. Angelone, 967 F. Supp. 152, 156 (E.D. Va. 1997), appeal
dismissed, 139 F.3d 891 (4th Cir. 1998).
III. Analysis
The Supreme Court of Virginia refused further review of Trueheart's state habeas petition
by its September 30, 2013 order. R. No. 131129. Because the Virginia Court of Appeals's order
was the last reasoned state court decision on Trueheart's claim, its reasoning is imputed to the
Supreme Court of Virginia. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806 (1991). As such, only
the Virginia Court of Appeals's order is reviewed below.
Trueheart alleges he was denied due process during the sentencing phase of his state
criminal trial. Pet. 6. Specifically, he argues that had he been given notice that the
Commonwealth was going to seek a sentence enhancement prior to sentencing, he could have
"prepared and raised a defense." Pet. Handwritten insert. Further he argues "the facts in the case
conclude that the gun was never use[d] to gain entry into the house at any point in time and
therefore was never use[d] in the commission of a felony of burglary and was not a recidivist
offence." ]d. When Trueheart presented this claim to the Court of Appeals of Virginia in his
direct appeal, it ruled that:
After the jury1 reached its verdicts, the Commonwealth sought to amend an
indictment simply to correct a clerical error. The Virginia Crime Code (VCC)
corresponding to the charged offense possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon- was listed as WPN-5291-F6 instead of WPN-5297-F6. The correct Virginia
Code section was on the indictment as well a description of the offense. Although
appellant asserts in his petition that "the court authorized the Commonwealth to
amend the specific language contained in the indictment," in fact, only the VCC
number was altered. Similarly, although appellant contends other indictments
were amended post-verdict, the record does not reflect that any other indictment
was changed.
'"The function of an indictment... is to give an accused notice of the nature and
character of the accusations against him in order that he can adequately prepare to
defend against his accuser.'" Sloan v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 240, 246, 544
S.E. 2d 375, 378 (2001) (quoting Morris v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 664,
668, 536 S.E. 2d 458, 460 (2000)) (citations omitted).
1The Court of Appeal of Virginia inadvertently referred to Trueheart's trial as a jury trial, but it wasa bench trial.
See Sept. 8,2011 Tr. 9.
Regarding Code § 18.2-308.2, we have specifically held that "the indictment need
not allege the 'within the prior ten years' language to authorize the imposition of a
mandatory sentence." Atkins v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 2, 29, 698 S.E.2d
249,262(2010).
Here, the indictment clearly placed appellant on notice of the nature and character
of the accusation against him, as well as the facts essential to punishment. It also
listed the code section under which punishment was sought.
It is true that Code § 19.2-231 provides for amendment of an
indictment "[i]f there be any defect in form . . . . , or if there shall
appear any variance between the allegations therein and the
evidence offered in proof... at any time before the jury returns a
verdict . . . ." There was no defect in form in the . . . indictments
here, nor was there any variance between the allegations listed and
the evidence offered at trial. The indictments contained the
necessary language to put [appellant] on notice of the nature and
character of the accusations against him, as well as the facts
essential to punishment. The fact that the indictments contained
surplus language, and were subject to a technical correction, did
not render them defective and in need of a substantive amendment
to sustain their validity. We therefore find the court's action to be
in the nature of a correction to remove incorrect or misleading
surplusage rather than a substantive amendment subject to Code §
19.2-231.
Sloan, 35 Va. App. at 247, 544 S.E. 2d at 379.
Furthermore, appellant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced either by the
alleged error or by the court's action in correcting it. Accordingly, even if we
were to assume that the trial court erred in permitting the post-verdict corrections,
any such error would have been harmless.
Trueheart v. Commonwealth, R. No. 2459-11-2 * 2-3 (Va. Ct. App. July 12, 2014).
Due process requires that an accused be informed of the specific charge against him and
an opportunity to defend himself. See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201, (1948); see also In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) ("A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him,
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense ... are basic in our system of jurisprudence . . . .").
"Variances and other deficiencies in state court indictments are not ordinarily a basis of federal
habeas corpus relief unless the deficiency makes the trial so egregiously unfair as to amount to a
deprivation of the defendant's right to due process." Ashford v. Edwards. 780 F.2d 405, 407 (4th
Cir. 1985).
Pursuant to these authorities, the state court's rejection of Trueheart's claim was not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. As the Court of Appeals of Virginia
correctly held, the change in Trueheart's indictment was to fix a clerical error: changing the
Virginia Crime Code that corresponded to the charged possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon offense from WPN-5291-F6 to WPN-5297-F6. Such a change amounts to nothing more
than a "variance" or "other deficienc[y]" in his indictment and failed to make his trial "so
egregiously unfair as to amount to a deprivation of Trueheart's right to due process. See
Ashford, 780 F.2d at 407. The indictment code, § 19.2-231, remained the same and provided
Trueheart with both a reasonable notice of the charge against him and an opportunity to be heard
on his defense. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273. Because the state court's rejection of this claim
was based on a reasonable determination of the facts and was not contrary to the controlling
federal law, its decision may not be disturbed here. Id, Therefore, this claim must be dismissed.
IV. Outstanding Motion
Trueheart submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis, which will be denied as
moot.
V. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, this petition will be dismissed with prejudice. An
appropriate Order shall issue.
Entered this ,yj )
day of _£j:x^_u^L&
2014.
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
Leonie M. Brinkema
United States District Judge
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