Stephenson v. Rojas et al
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge T. S. Ellis, III on 12/31/14. (copy mailed to pro se).(gwalk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
Javon Marqus Stephenson,
Plaintiff,
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)
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V.
l;14cv319(TSE/TCB)
)
)
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C. Rojas, et aL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On March 27,2014, Javon Marqus Stephenson, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se,
filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as rights under the Contract Clause, U.S. Constitution
Article I, § 10. Plaintiffs allegations arise out of his refusal to sign a refusal of treatment/hold
harmless agreement at the time of refusing his prescribed medications, and resulting disciplinary
infractions. See Compl. Att., "Facts"
1-43. By Order dated April 28,2014, plaintiffs
Contract Clause and First Amendment claims were dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l), for failure to state a claim. Therefore, plaintiffs Due Process claim is the
sole remaming claim in this action. Plaintiff was also directed to particularize and amend his
Due Process claim, to sign and complete a Consent Form, and to sign and complete an
exhaustion affidavit. Dkt. 4. In response, plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which the Court construes as filed pursuant to Rule
60(b).' This motion must begranted inpart and denied inpart. Also pending before the Court is
plaintiffs Motionfor Appointment of Counsel, which must be denied, withoutprejudice.
' Rule 59(e) states that"a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than28
days after the entry ofthe judgment." As the Court's initial order did not render a judgment.
Rule 59(e) is inapposite to plaintifPs case. In deference to his pro se status, however, plaintiffs
I.
Reconsideration under Rule 60(b) is available for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraudmisrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in its April 28,2014 Order by (1) wrongfully
concluding that he did not have standing under the Contract Clause to challenge the "arbitrary
implementation" of a Virginia Beach Correctional Center ("VBCC") policy; (2) dismissing his
First Amendment claim; (3) misinterpreting his Fourteenth Amendment claim; and (4) declining
to address his request to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law tort claims.
Plaintiffs motion must be denied on claims (1), (2), and (3). Plaintiff's motion will be granted
for the limited purpose of addressing plaintiff's fourth allegation. After considering this issue,
plaintiffs state-law tort claim must be denied.
II.
In its April 28,2014 Order, the Court held that plaintiff had failed to state a claim under
the Contract Clause because plaintiff was challenging the unplementation of a Virginia
Department of Corrections ("VDOC") policy, rather than a state legislative act. The Contract
Clause, Article I, § 10, provides "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts." The Contract Clause prohibits state legislatures from passing any law that
retroactively impairs the obligations of pre-existing contractual rights. Allied Structural Steel
motion will be construed under Rule 60(b), which allows the Court to relieve a party "from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding
"
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Co. V. Spannaus. 438 U.S. 234,243 (9178). To state a claim under the Contract Clause properly,
a plaintiff must allege that a state legislative act retroactively impaired an existing contractual
relationship.
In response, plaintiff argues that the policies he challenges come from the VBCC, not the
VDOC. He also argues that the VBCC, as a government entity, can be held liable under the
logic of Monell v. Deo't of Social Services of New York. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court
concedes that it incorrectly stated that plaintiffs challenges arose out of a VDOC, rather than a
VBCC policy. This mistake was irrelevant to the ultimate decision to dismiss plaintiffs
Contract Clause claim, however. Assuming without deciding that Monell applies to the Contract
Clause, the VBCC is not liable under Monell. As plaintiff correctly points out, a governmental
entity can only be sued in a § 1983 action if the entity "implements or executes [an
unconstitutional] policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. As the challenged policy does
not actually impede any of plaintiffs constitutional rights, the VBCC cannot be held liable under
Monell.
As stated above, a plaintiff only states a claim under the Contract Clause if he alleges that
a state law impairs an existing contractual relationship. Determining whether a state law violates
the Contract Clause requires a three-step inquiry: (1) determining whether a contractual
relationship exists; (2) determining whether a change in state law impairs that relationship; and
(3) determining whether the impairment in that relationship is "substantial." General Motors
Corp. V. Romein. 503 U.S. 181,186 (1992). Plaintiff cannot meet the first prong of the test.
Plaintiff has no contractual relationship with the VBCC. A contract is a consensual agreement
betweentwo parties to submitto an agreed-upon course of dealing. See> e.g., IrvingTrust Co. v.
Day, 314 U.S. 556, 560-61 (1942) (describing mutuality of agreement and consideration as
necessary elements of a contract). Plaintiff, as a state inmate, is, in his own words, a "ward of
the state," Compl. Att., "Facts" f 11, and has therefore not entered into any kind of voluntary
agreement with the VBCC. Thus, the VBCC policy requiring him to sign a form before refusing
medication does not infnnge on his contractual rights.
On April 28,2014, plaintiffs First Amendment claim, holding that he had no
constitutional right to use the prison grievance process, was also dismissed. Plaintiff argues that
this dismissal was erroneous, stating that "because [he] was overtly retaliated against for
exercising his constitutional right in deciding whether to sign a hold harmless agreement
indemnifying the State and its officials," the First Amendment claim is adequately alleged. Mot.
for Reconsid., at Unnumbered Page 6.
This is incorrect; these allegations, taken as true, still do not state a claim for retaliation in
violation of the First Amendment. An inmate's First Amendment rights are not absolute. Prison
regulations can restrict free speech, if such a restriction is "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests." Turner v. Saflev. 482 U.S. 78,87 (1987). Therefore, even if plaintiff had
a First Amendment right to refuse his medication, the First Amendment does not prohibit prison
officials from imposing reasonable restrictions on this right. OfHcials do not violate the First
Amendment by requiring plaintiff to sign a release of liability form, nor for disciplining him for
his failure to follow such a policy.
Because plaintiffhad no First Amendment right to disobey institutional policies, he has
failed to state a claim for retaliation. In order to establish a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must
make a threshold showdng that the allegedly "retaliatory act violated some constitutional right of
an inmate or constituted punishment for the exercise ofa constitutional right." Cochran v.
Morris. 73 F.3d 1310, 1318 (4th Cir. 1996). The inmate must allege facts demonstrating that
exercise of some constitutional right was a substantial factor motivating the retaliation. See
Wagner v. Wheeler. 13 F.3d 86,90-91 (4th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff has not alleged that he was
disciplined for anything other than the failure to follow an institutional order. Therefore, he has
not alleged a valid claim for retaliation.
III.
Plaintiffalso asks the Court to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law
claim of tortious interference with contractual rights. This request was not addressed in the April
28,2014 Order. In the interest of clarity, plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration must be granted
for the limited purpose of deciding plaintiffs state-law tort claim.
Under Virginia law, the elements of tortious interference with contractual rights are: (1)
the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) knowledge of the
relationship by the individual interfering with contractual rights; (3) intentional interference with
a contractual or business relationship; and (4) damage as a resuUof the interference. See Chaves
V. Johnson. 230 Va. 112, 120,335 S.E. 2d 97,102 (1985). Plaintiff has not shown a prima facie
case of tortious interference with his contractual rights. As stated above, he has no contractual
relationship with the VBCC. Therefore, he has not stated a cause of action for tortious
interference with contractual rights. This claim therefore must be dismissed, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l).2
Section 1915A provides:
(a) Screening.—^The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal.—On review, the court shall identify cognizable
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IV.
Lastly, Plaintiffargues that the Court misconstrued his Due Process claim as a procedural
claim, rather than a substantive claim for the right to avoid unwanted medical treatment. See
Mot. for Reconsid., at Unnumbered Page 7 (As plaintiffs Due Process claim is the only
remaining claim in this action, and plamtiffis permitted to particularize and amend his
allegations, plaintiff may include his substantive Due Process allegations in his amended
complaint. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from
depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const,
amend. XIV, § 1. Although their constitutional protections are limited by the "exigencies of the
institutional environment," inmates are entitled to basic due process protections. See Wolff v.
McDonnell. 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that an inmate does
have a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Washington v. Harper. 494
U.S. 210,221-22 (1990). However, the Court also held that the state may impose reasonable
restrictions on this right, such as medicating an inmate against his will, if such restrictions are
necessary to protect the safety and security ofthe prison environment. See id at 223-227 (citing
Turner. 482 U.S. 78); see also Rieeins v. Nevada. 504 U.S. 127,135 (1992) ("Under Harper.
forcing antipsychotic drugs on an convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of
overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness."). An inmate is entitled
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint—
(1) is fnvolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such action
which plaintiff asserts is a federal offense
to certain basic procedural protections before receiving antipsychotic drugs against his will, such
as a hearing before medical professionals. Id at 231-236.
As stated in the April 28,2014 Order, plaintiff has not stated a procedural Due Process
claim. He has also not yet stated a substantive Due Process claim. As an initial matter, plaintiff
has not established that he, who takes Paxil "for mild anxiety," Compl. Att. "Facts" Tj 4, has the
same substantive liberty interest as the respondent in Harper. In Harper, the respondent had been
treated with antipsychotic drugs for schizophrenia for a period of four years. Sm Harper. 494 at
213-14 & n.2. Plaintiff has not established that his mental illness renders the same substantive
protections as Harper's. Secondly, plaintiff has not established that he is actually being
medicated against his will. Plaintiff states that the VBCC has informed him that the he "ha[s] the
right to refuse to take his medication whenever he [chooses] to." Compl. Att. "Facts" 17.
Plaintiff takes issue only with the VBCC's decision to discipline him for refusing to sign a
refusal of treatment/hold harmless agreement. See, e.g.. id. f 1. He has therefore not established
that he actually has a substantive, rather than procedural. Due Process, claim. In deference to his
pro se status, he is directed to particularize and amend his allegations, and to explain why he
believes that officials have violated his right to be free of unwanted medical treatment. In
addition, he is directed to explain why he believes that the procedures used to restrict this right
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiff is also directed to provide more information about why he believes that specific
defendants are liable for violations of his Due Process Rights. In general, a defendant can only
be held liableunder § 1983 if a plaintiffcan show that the defendant "acted personally in the
deprivation ofthe plaintiffs rights." Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff appears to name Moissett and Luft as
defendants because they responded to plaintiffs grievances. See generally Compl. Att.
"Defendants." However, responding to an inmate's grievances is generally not sufficient
personal conduct to render a defendant liable for constitutional violations. Cf id (finding that
defendant was not sufficiently personally involved in an allegedly unconstitutional action when
he received a letter from plaintiff); see also Alder v. Corr. Med. Servs.. 73 F. App'x 839,841
(6th Cir. 2003) ("The mere denial of a prisoner's grievance states no claim of constitutional
dimension."). In deference to his pro sq status, plaintiff is instructed to provide additional
information supporting the liability ofdefendants Moissett and Luft. Similarly, plaintiff is
instructed to provide facts sufficient to allege that defendants Day, Roso, Bendily, Gibbs, and the
four unknown officers played significant personal roles in the alleged violation of his Due
Process rights.
Plaintiff also appears to name Capt. Stuzzieri as a defendant for his "ability to create and
implement [VBCC] policy." Compl. Att. "Defendants." Similarly, plaintiff appears to name
Sheriff Ken Stolle as a defendant due to his role "as the official policymaker at the VBCC." Id.
It thus appears that plaintiff is attempting to hold both defendants liable as supervisors.
Supervisory officials may be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates
only in certain circumstances, however. See Shaw v. Stroud. 13 F,3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994)
(citing Slakan v. Porter. 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984)). This liability is not premised on
respondeat superior, but upon "recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of
subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on
those committed to their care." Id at 798 (quoting Slakan. 737 F.2d at 372-73). "[L]iability
ultimately is determined 'by pinpointing the persons in the decisionmaking chain whose
deliberate indifference permitted the constitutional abuses to continue unchecked.'" Id To
establish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate
was engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response
to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show "deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the alleged offensive practicesand (3) that there was an
"affirmative causal link" between the supervisor's inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Id. at 799 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has not provided any allegations against Stuzzieri or Stolle to justify holding
them liable as supervisors. In deference to his pro se status, he is directed to particularize and
amend his allegations against the defendants.
Lastly, although plaintiff submitted copies of several grievance forms, it is unclear
whether plaintiff has fully exhausted his administrative remedies. "No action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Neo. 548 U.S.
81,92 (2006) (requiring complete exhaustion of correctional facility administrative remedies).
Plaintiff, as a Virginia inmate, is required to exhaust the claims raised in the instant complaint in
accordance with the Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC") grievance procedures. In
particular, he must comply with VDOC Department Operating Procedure ("DOP") 866.1, which
provides multiple levels ofadministrative remedies in the form of inmate grievances. Per DOP
866.1(V)(B), an inmate must first attempt to resolve any issues informally. Prison officials must
respond to the inmate's complaint within fifteen daysof receiving an informal complaint. See
DOP 866.1(V)(C). After seeking informal resolution, an inmate may file a regular grievance to
the warden or superintendent. The grievance must be filed withinthirty days of the imderlying
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incident or occurrence, except in circumstances beyond an inmate's control, or in a situation
involving alleged sexual abuse. See DOP 866.1(VI)(A)(1). Depending on the subject ofthe
grievance, up to two additional levels of review by higher authorities within VDOC may be
available following the filing of a regular grievance. Sm DOP 866.1(VI)(C).
Before this action may proceed, plaintiff will be required to submit additional information
concerning his exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health
Servs.. Inc.. 407 F.3d 674,680 (4th Cir. 2005) (deeming improper sua sponte dismissal of a
claim on exhaustion grounds).
Due to the passage oftime and the fact that plaintiff has been transferred to a new
institution, plaintiff is also directed to sign and complete a Consent Form, and his institution is
directed to submit an Imnate Account Report Form.
V.
Also pending before the Court is plaintiff's March 18,2014 Motion for Appointment of
Counsel. Plaintiff requests that counsel be appointed due to the fact that he is incarcerated and
unable to afford counsel. This motion must be denied.
A court may request an attorney to represent an indigent plaintiff proceeding in forma
pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The Fourth Circuit, however, has limited the appointment of
counsel to cases where "exceptional circumstances" exist, such as cases with particularly
complex factual and legal issues or with a litigant who is unable to represent himself adequately.
Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984). It is unnecessary at this time to appoint
counsel for plaintiff, as his arguments that is indigent, is incarcerated, and without formal legal
training are not "exceptional circumstances" that would warrant appointment of counsel. To
date, plaintiff has ably filed his both his complaintand his Motion for Reconsideration. Thus,
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plaintiffs request for the appointment ofcounsel must be denied, without prejudice to renew at a
later stage of tlie proceedings, if appropriate.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration must be granted in part
and denied in part, and he will be allowed another opportunity to comply with the Court's April
28,2014 Order. His Motion for Appointment ofCounsel must be denied. An appropriate Order
will issue.
Enteredthis
day of fW^k^
201^.
Alexandria. Virginia
T.S.Ellis, III
United States D strict Judge
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