Smith v. The Strayer University Corporation
Filing
78
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 2/19/15. (gwalk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
CHERIE D. SMITH,
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Plaintiff,
v.
THE STRAYER UNIVERSITY
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
M E M O R A N D U M
1:14cv565 (JCC/JFA)
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Cherie D.
Smith’s Motion to Amend or Alter the Court’s January 13, 2015
Judgment as to Count III of the Amended Complaint pursuant to
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Dkt. 69.]
For the following reasons, the Court will deny the motion.
I. Background
Through an Order and an accompanying Memorandum
Opinion dated January 13, 2015, the Court granted Defendant The
Strayer University Corporation’s (“Defendant”) Motion for
Summary Judgment on Counts Two, Three, and Four of the Amended
Complaint.
(Mem. Op. [Dkt. 65]; Order [Dkt. 66].)
The Clerk of
Court entered Judgment for Defendant on Counts Two, Three, and
Four on this basis.
[Dkt. 67.]
The Court denied Defendant’s
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Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count One, which still remains
pending with a jury trial set for March 3, 2015.
Plaintiff Cherie D. Smith (“Plaintiff”) now asks the
Court to amend this Judgment as to Count Three, her wrongful
termination claim, and “to reinstate this claim for appropriate
determination by the jury.”
(Pl.’s Mem. [Dkt. 70] at 1.)
Specifically, Plaintiff challenges the Court’s ruling that (1)
she failed to make out the prima facie case of wrongful
termination under the American’s with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
and (2) she failed to show that Defendant’s reason for her
termination –- poor performance –- was pretext for
discrimination on the basis of her alleged disability, vision
impairment.
(Id. at 2-10.)
Plaintiff argues this ruling was
clearly erroneous and must be amended to prevent manifest
injustice.
(Id.)
In short, Plaintiff repeats arguments previously made
throughout the extensive summary judgment briefing, raises some
new arguments not previously before the Court, and again
attempts to raise factual disputes that are not material to the
disposition of Count Three.
In the event the Court was not
clear enough in its previous ruling, let the Court be clear now:
there is simply no evidence in the record -- when viewed in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff and when drawing every
possible inference in Plaintiff’s favor -- that would lead a
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reasonable finder of fact to conclude that Defendant terminated
Plaintiff’s employment because of her alleged disability.
For
this reason, and those discussed below, the motion to amend must
be denied.
II. Legal Standard
Even though Plaintiff initially moved the Court for
reconsideration under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (see Pl.’s Mem. at 1-2), the analysis for
reconsideration of an interlocutory entry of partial summary
judgment is properly governed by Rule 54(b), as Plaintiff
subsequently noted in her Reply Brief (Pl.’s Reply [Dkt. 74] at
3-4).
See Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505,
514-15 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v.
ValueClick, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 544, 546 (E.D. Va. 2010).
Reconsideration of an interlocutory order is not “subject to the
strict standards” that govern reconsideration of a final
judgment.
Am. Canoe Ass’n, 326 F.3d at 514.
Yet, when
analyzing a Rule 54(b) motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order, the Court is nonetheless guided by the
general principles of Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions for
reconsideration of final judgments.
Id. at 514-15; see also
Zaklit v. Global Linguist Solutions, LLC, No. 1:14cv314
(JCC/JFA), 2014 WL 4161981, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2014)
(citing cases).
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Departing from a previous ruling is within the sole
discretion of the district court “(1) to accommodate an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new
evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error
of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
Hill v. Braxton, 277
F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
These
circumstances “rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should
be equally rare.”
Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing,
Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983).
As there is no
intervening change in the law or new evidence now before the
Court, the Court would only reconsider the previous order to
correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.
Such motions for reconsideration may not “reargue the facts and
law originally argued in the parties’ briefs.”
Projects Mgmt.
Co. v. DynCorp Int’l, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d 539, 541 (E.D. Va.
2014) (quoting United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 969 F.
Supp. 975, 977 (E.D. Va. 1997)) (citing Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am.
Nat’l Fire. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (“The
Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to relitigate old matters.”).
Stated differently, it is inappropriate for the court to
“reevaluate the basis upon which it made a prior ruling,”
especially when it appears the motion “merely seeks to reargue a
previous claim.”
DynCorp Int’l, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 541
(quoting Smithfield Foods, 969 F. Supp. at 997).
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Indeed, such a
request necessarily requires an “extraordinary remedy which
should be used sparingly.”
DynCorp Int’l, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d
at 541 (quoting Pacific Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403).
III. Analysis
In its prior ruling, the Court found that Plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination
as a matter of law because “it is undisputed that Plaintiff was
not, at the time of her termination, meeting Defendant’s
legitimate expectations.”
(Mem. Op. at 23-26.)
Alternatively,
the Court held that even if Plaintiff had established a prima
facie case, Defendant offered poor performance as a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for her termination.
(Id. at 26-27.)
The Court found no evidence of pretext in the record.
(Id.)
In asking the Court to amend its judgment to correct a
clear error of law, Plaintiff argues that there is a factual
dispute as to whether she was meeting the legitimate
expectations of Defendant at the time of termination, and that
the Defendant’s explanation for her termination was a pretext
for discrimination.
(Pl.’s Mem. at 2-10.)
However, Plaintiff’s
memorandum fails to articulate how the Court’s ruling was a
“clear error of law,” but rather “calls attention to factual
quibbles that are not material to the disposition” of the
wrongful termination claim.
DynCorp Int’l, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d
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at 541.
Nonetheless, the Court will address Plaintiff’s
evaluation of this Court’s prior ruling.
A. Prima Facie Case of Wrongful Termination
“Mere disagreement” with the Court’s previous
application of the law to Plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment
does not support a motion for reconsideration.
Hutchinson v.
Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081-82 (4th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted).
In support of her motion, Plaintiff cites Warch v.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. 435 F.3d 510, 517 (4th Cir. 2005) for the
proposition that the McDonnell-Douglas test should not be
applied rigidly, and that Plaintiff is free to argue the
employer’s expectations were not legitimate when that element of
the prima facie case is contested.
(Pl.’s Mem. at 3.)
Yet,
Plaintiff is unable to overcome the quite simple fact that the
Court found no evidence of discrimination in the record on
summary judgment.
Regardless, Plaintiff claims (1) there is evidence in
the record that contradicts Plaintiff’s documented performance
failures in the Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) (id. at 35); (2) a reasonable jury could infer that the Plaintiff’s selfassessment of her own poor performance was negatively influenced
by her recent placement on the PIP (id. at 5); (3) there is
evidence in the record that shows Plaintiff was meeting
Defendant’s legitimate expectations (id. at 6); and (4)
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Plaintiff received better performance reviews in previous years
(id. at 6-8.)
These arguments, which were previously considered
by the Court on summary judgment, do not demonstrate that the
Court’s ruling was clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust.
In Warch, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court granting summary judgment in employer’s favor when
evidence in the record showed the employee had failed to meet
the employer’s legitimate job expectations.
435 F.3d at 514-18.
There, the employee argued that the employer’s criticisms “were
too subjective” and that the counseling he received to improve
his performance was also “not specific and used only general and
subjective language.”
Id. at 517-18.
The employee also
referred “to opinions of those who thought he was doing a good
job and points to . . . [other] evidence [that] demonstrates he
was meeting [the employer’s] legitimate performance
expectations.”
Id. at 518.
The Fourth Circuit rejected each of
these arguments made by the employee.
Here, Plaintiff raises
similar arguments on the Motion to Amend that were previously
rejected on summary judgment and must be rejected again under
the “clearly erroneous” standard.
Whether the PIP was invalid, as Plaintiff argued on
summary judgment (see Mem. Op. at 24), or whether the
conclusions in the PIP can allegedly be “contradicted” by other
evidence, is ultimately irrelevant and does not create a genuine
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issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was meeting
Defendant’s legitimate employment expectations.
“It is the
perception of the decision maker which is relevant[.]”
v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2000).
Hawkins
The
perception of the decision maker, as documented by the PIP,
shows that Plaintiff’s work performance was unsatisfactory.
Plaintiff simply cannot overcome this obstacle.
Just like in
Warch, Defendant counseled Plaintiff “on concrete, specific
observations and accompanied its reprimands with explicit
instructions on how to improve.”
Warch, 435 F.3d at 517-18.
But, as stated, discussed, and previously analyzed in the
Memorandum Opinion, “Plaintiff’s performance did not improve; in
fact, it is undisputed that her performance worsened.”
(Mem.
Op. at 23.)
Similarly, Plaintiff’s reliance on evidence “that
other employees within Strayer considered Plaintiff to be
adequately fulfilling her responsibilities,” and that her
previous performance reviews were better, does not change the
outcome.
Co-workers’ opinions might be relevant in certain
situations, but not where the opinions fail to establish the
employer’s expectations and whether the employee met them.
Warch, 435 F.3d at 518 (citing King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145,
149-50 (4th Cir. 2003)).
And a review of an employee’s
performance in prior years is irrelevant to a determination of
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whether her performance was satisfactory at the time of her
termination.
Warch, 435 F.3d at 518 (citing O’Connor v. Consol.
Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1995), rev’d on
other grounds, 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
On summary judgment, the Court viewed the evidence in
the record in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, drawing every
inference in her favor, as it is required to do.
Now, on the
motion to amend this judgment, there is nothing before the Court
to suggest the ruling was clearly erroneous.
The evidence that
Plaintiff cites
even if true, is simply not enough to
genuinely dispute the considerable evidence
of [her] repeated failures and negative
performance.
Faced with such abundant
evidence,
[Plaintiff]
cannot
create
a
genuine dispute concerning [her] prima facie
case by cherry-picking the record to find
one isolated instance where [she] arguably
performed better than the average employee.
Warch, 435 F.3d at 518.
Accordingly, the Court will deny
Plaintiff’s motion on this basis.
B. Defendant’s Legitimate Explanation for Termination
“For largely the same reasons as stated in the
discussion of the prima facie case above,” Plaintiff argues she
has produced evidence that is sufficient for a jury to find
Defendant’s proffered reasons for terminating her employment
were a pretext for discrimination.
(Pl.’s Mem. at 8.)
In
support, Plaintiff claims that Defendant “embellished” the
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findings in the Final Progress Check in Plaintiff’s PIP.
at 8-9.)
(Id.
Again, Plaintiff does not cite any legal authority for
how the Court’s ruling was clearly erroneous.
She does,
however, pick one piece of evidence in the record, and suggests
that somehow, these two exhibits present an issue of fact for
the jury to decide.
This argument is unavailing.
As the Court previously stated in the Memorandum
Opinion:
“In reviewing whether an employer’s decision
is unlawful, the Court’s task is not ‘to
decide whether the reason for termination of
employment was wise, fair, or even correct,
ultimately, so long as it truly was the
reason for the decision.’” Mercer v. Arc of
Prince George’s Cnty., Inc., 532 F. App’x
392, 399 (4th Cir. July 11, 2013) (quoting
Laing v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 722
(4th Cir. 2013)).
There is nothing in the
record to support the notion that Plaintiff
was actually terminated because of her
disability.
(Mem. Op. at 26.)
Instead, the record was clear on summary
judgment: in the eyes of Defendant, Plaintiff’s performance was
poor and necessitated her termination.
Throughout this
additional briefing, there is nothing before the Court to
suggest Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff for poor
performance was a pretext for discrimination based on her
alleged disability.
Revisions to Plaintiff’s Final Progress
Check do not allow the Court to make such a finding.
More
importantly, no reasonable jury could make such a finding.
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Again, “[m]ere disagreement” with the Court’s previous
application of the law to Plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment
does not support a motion for reconsideration.
Hutchinson v.
Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081-82 (4th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted).
Accordingly, because the Court finds no clear error
of law or need to prevent manifest injustice, the Court will
deny Plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment on this basis as
well.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Judgment as to Count Three.
An appropriate Order shall issue.
February 19, 2015
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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