White v. Chapman et al
Filing
225
MEMORANDUM OPINION in re Objection to 184 Order on Motion to Seal. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 07/14/2015. (jlan)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
MAURICE WHITE
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
1:14cv848(JCC/IDD)
M E M O R A N D U M
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Maurice
White’s (“White” or “Plaintiff”) Notice of and Request for
Hearing on Defendants’ Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Ruling
on Motions to Seal.
[Dkt. 219.]
For the following reasons, the
Court will overrule the objections.
I. Background
Familiarity with the facts is presumed.
Mem. Op. and Order on Summ. J. [Dkt. 186].)
(See 4/3/15
As relevant here,
White brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wade
Phillips (“Deputy Phillips”), a deputy sheriff with the Loudon
County Police Department, and Michael Chapman (“Sheriff
Chapman”) (collectively “Defendants”), Sheriff of Loudon County,
Virginia stemming from an August 11, 2013 traffic stop.
¶¶ 5-6.)
White alleges that Deputy Phillips maliciously
1
(Compl.
orchestrated White’s arrest and prosecution on three charges.
(Id. ¶ 1.)
According to White, Deputy Phillips made false
statements to secure an arrest warrant and to initiate White’s
prosecution as retaliation for a complaint White and his wife
filed regarding Phillips’ behavior during a traffic stop.
(Id.)
As a result of his arrest, White suffered several injuries,
including suspension from his job as a federal police officer
for eight months.
(Id.)
Pursuant to § 1983, White alleged one
count of false arrest (“Count I”) and two counts of malicious
prosecution (assaulting a police officer (“Count II”) and
reckless driving and disorderly conduct (“Count III”)) against
Phillips.
He also asserted two counts of malicious prosecution
under Virginia law against Phillips (assaulting a police officer
(“Count IV”) and reckless driving and disorderly conduct (“Count
V”)) and one count of malicious prosecution under Virginia law
based on both strict liability and the doctrine of respondeat
superior against Chapman (“Count VI”).
Defendants filed for summary judgment.
A hearing on
the motion was held on March 20, 2015 before the Honorable U.S.
District Judge Gerald Bruce Lee.
the motion.
[Id.].
[Dkt. 183.]
Judge Lee denied
On the same day, the Honorable U.S.
Magistrate Judge Ivan D. Davis held a hearing on various motions
to seal documents in this case.
[Dkt. 182.]
As relevant here,
Judge Davis denied Defendants’ motion to seal internal affairs
2
reports related to Phillips.
(3/24/15 Order [Dkt. 184].)
Davis stayed his ruling to allow the parties to appeal. 1
Judge
(Id.)
On April 3, 2015, Defendants 2 filed objections to Judge Davis’s
ruling, arguing the internal affairs reports should remain
sealed.
(Objections to Order on Motion to Seal [Dkt. 185].)
It
was set for a hearing on April 30, 2015. 3
On April 27, 2015 Defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration of the summary judgment ruling or, in the
alternative, to take an interlocutory appeal on the question of
whether Sheriff Chapman is entitled to sovereign immunity.
(Defs.’ Mot. for Reconsideration [Dkt. 191].)
On April 29, the
Court granted leave to take an interlocutory appeal and stayed
1
Judge Davis stayed his ruling as to Dkts. 92, 125, 132, 138,
141, and 157. The documents challenged here are those described
in Dkts. 125, 132, 138, and 141. As the Court understands it,
the documents are internal affairs reports about Deputy
Phillips. As to Dkts. 92 and 157, White’s counsel asked Judge
Davis to stay his ruling on these documents, which are his
disciplinary records. (Hr’g Tr. at 27.) White never filed any
objections to the unsealing of Dkts. 92 and 157. Therefore, the
stay of the unsealing of those documents should be lifted
without any analysis of the merits of the order to unseal.
2
The objections were filed on behalf of both Defendants. White
argues Sheriff Chapman does not have standing to challenge Judge
Davis’s ruling because the documents at issue are Deputy
Phillips’s internal affairs reports. As Sheriff Chapman is sued
in his individual capacity, not as the Sheriff of Loudon County,
he has no interest in the documents. Judge Davis did not
conclusively decide this issue. (See Hr’g Tr. at 19 (“The Court
would tend to agree [that Sheriff Chapman does not have
standing].”).) As determining whether Sheriff Chapman has
standing is not necessary to resolving the merits of this
appeal, the Court will not consider this argument in the first
instance here.
3
This case was transferred to the undersigned on April 21, 2015.
3
this case.
(4/29/15 Order [Dkt. 195].)
and docketed.
[Dkts. 197-202.]
An appeal was noticed
After the appeal was docketed,
the parties informed the Court that White had accepted
Defendants’ Offer of Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68.
203].)
(Notice of Acceptance of Offer of Judgment [Dkt.
The appeal was dismissed, vesting this Court with
jurisdiction.
[Dkts. 207-209.]
Judgment was entered in favor
of White against Deputy Phillips in his individual capacity in
the amount of $275,000, and judgment was so entered.
[Dkts.
209, 216.]
White now moves the Court to lift the stay on Judge
Davis’s ruling unsealing Deputy Phillips’s internal affairs
reports.
(Notice [Dkt. 219].)
Both Defendants oppose this
request, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction lift Judge
Davis’s stay, or, in the alternative, that his ruling should be
vacated.
221].)
(See Phillips Opp’n [Dkt. 220], Chapman Opp’n [Dkt.
Having been fully briefed and argued, this motion is
ripe for disposition.
II. Legal Standard
Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a magistrate judge to hear and decide non-dispositive
motions.
Rule 72(a) also permits a party to submit objections
to a magistrate judge's ruling on such motions, like discovery
orders.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. §
4
636(b)(1)(A); Fed. Elec. Comm'n v. The Christian Coal., 178
F.R.D. 456, 459–60 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citation omitted)).
Only if a magistrate judge's decision is “clearly
erroneous or contrary to law” may a district judge modify or set
aside any portion of the decision.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see
The alteration of a magistrate
judge’s order is “extremely difficult to justify.”
Bruce v.
Hartford, 21 F. Supp. 3d 590, 593 (E.D. Va. 2014) (citing 12
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 3069 (2d ed. 1997)).
The “clearly erroneous” standard applies to questions
of fact.
In applying this standard, a reviewing court will not
reverse a lower court’s findings of fact “simply because we
would have decided the case differently.”
Easley v. Cromartie,
532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
“Rather, a reviewing court must ask whether, on the
entire evidence, it is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
and internal quotation marks omitted).
standard is therefore deferential.
Id. (citation
The “clearly erroneous”
The Christian Coalition, 178
F.R.D. at 460.
Where pure questions of law are involved, “‘that
review is plenary under the ‘contrary to law’ branch of the Rule
72(a) standard.’”
HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n v. Resh, No.
5
3:12cv668, 2014 WL 317820, at *7 (W.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2014)
(citing PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 15 (1st
Cir. 2010) (collecting cases)).
“‘This means that, for
questions of law, there is no practical difference between
review under Rule 72(a)’s ‘contrary to law’ standard and [a] de
novo standard.’”
Id. (citing PowerShare, 597 F.3d at 15).
Therefore, the Court will review the factual portions of the
magistrate judge’s order under the clearly erroneous standard
but will review the legal conclusions de novo.
III. Analysis
Though this case has proceeded to judgment, this Court
has jurisdiction to consider the appeal of Judge Davis’s sealing
order.
The Fourth Circuit has held that jurisdiction to review
sealing orders is not impacted by resolution of the merits of
the underlying case.
See Rosenfeld v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub.
Schs., 25 F. App’x 123, 131 (4th Cir. 2010) (“The caselaw
establishes that our jurisdiction to review a district court’s
sealing orders is based not on our jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the underlying claims addressed by the district court,
but on the public right of access, under the common law or the
First Amendment, to judicial documents. . . . The dismissal of
the [plaintiffs’] claims on standing grounds thus does not
deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the sealing order
below[.]”); In re Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., Nos. 94-2254, 946
2341, 1995 WL 541623, at *2 n.3 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995)
(noting that settlement did not moot appeal of sealing order
because “the right of access to judicial records and documents
is independent of the disposition of the merits of the case.”);
Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 n.*
(4th Cir. 1988) (“The affirmance of the summary judgment order
in this case does not moot the [intervenor’s] motion to unseal,
because the right of access to judicial records and documents is
independent of the disposition of the merits of the case.”).
Here, this Court sits as an appellate court in
reviewing Judge Davis’s sealing order.
The fact that this case
has proceeded to judgment does not deprive this Court of
jurisdiction to hear Defendants’ objections to Judge Davis’s
ruling.
Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to consider
whether Judge Davis’s ruling was contrary to law. 4
Turning to the merits, there are two independent
sources of the right of public access to documents filed in
district court: the common law and the First Amendment.
Va.
Dep't of State Police v. Washington Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th
4
Accepting Defendants’ jurisdictional arguments would mean that
Judge Davis’s order would never take effect. Judge Davis’s
ruling ordered that the documents be unsealed. However, he
stayed that order to allow Defendants to appeal. Such appeal
was never heard by virtue of Sheriff Chapman’s interlocutory
appeal. Thus, Defendants’ argument that this Court lacks
jurisdiction over the case since the case is closed would grant
Defendants relief by default – namely, keeping the contested
documents sealed – to which they are not entitled.
7
Cir. 2004).
“The common law presumes a right to inspect and
copy judicial records and documents.” Stone, 855 F.2d at 180
(citing Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597
(1978)). “‘This presumption of access, however, can be rebutted
if countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public
interests in access,’ and ‘the party seeking to overcome the
presumption bears the burden of showing some significant
interest that outweighs the presumption.’” Va. Dep't of State
Police, 386 F.3d at 575 (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)).
The First Amendment guarantee of access, however, has
been “extended only to particular judicial records and
documents.”
Stone, 855 F.2d at 180.
Where the First Amendment
does guarantee access, “there must be a showing, in the first
instance by the district court, that the denial serves an
important governmental interest and that there is no less
restrictive way to serve that governmental interest.”
846 F.2d at 253.
Rushford,
In making that determination, there must be
(1) adequate notice that the documents may be sealed; (2)
interested persons must have an opportunity to object to the
request before the court makes its decision; (3) if sealed, the
court must state its reasons on the record, supported by
specific findings, and (4) the court must state its reasons for
8
rejecting alternatives.
Id. (citing In re Knight Publishing
Co., 743 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1984)).
At the hearing, Judge Davis noted that the documents
in question were both exhibits to and incorporated into
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
at 5.) 5
(Hr’g Tr. [Dkt. 219-1]
As Judge Davis correctly noted, “the First Amendment
guarantee applies to documents filed in connection with a
summary judgment motion.”
In re Policy Mgmt., 1995 WL 541623,
at *3; see also Rushford, 846 F.2d at 252 (stating that
documents filed as part of a dispositive motion “lose their
status of being raw fruits of discovery”) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
“A summary judgment motion requires a
5
It appears that the same documents were also incorporated into
Plaintiff’s oppositions to both Sheriff Chapman’s and Deputy
Phillips’s motions in limine. (Hr’g Tr. at 13, 19.) Since the
same documents were used in connection with opposing Defendants’
summary judgment motions, and thus the First Amendment
protection applies, the Court does not reach the question of
whether motions in limine are “judicial documents,” that is,
whether it is a document a court uses in determining a
litigant’s substantive rights. See ATI Indus. Automation, Inc.
v. Applied Robotics, Inc., No. 1:09cv471, 2014 WL 2607364, at *4
(M.D.N.C. June 11, 2014) (noting that there is no consensus
among the Courts of Appeal, and specifically no guidance from
the Fourth Circuit, as to the appropriate level of protection
for documents filed in connection with a non-dispositive
pretrial motion that does not concern discovery, i.e., a motion
to amend a complaint); see also In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(D), 707 F.3d 283, 290-91 (4th Cir.
2013) (stating “documents filed with the court are ‘judicial
records’ if they play a role in the adjudicative process, or
adjudicate substantive rights” and holding that motions filed
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) were judicial records because they
were filed with the objective of obtaining judicial action or
relief pertaining to § 2703(d) orders).
9
district court to examine the entire record, including
affidavits and materials beyond the pleadings, to determine
whether there is a genuine issue of any material fact and
whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
In Re Policy Mgmt., 1995 WL 541623, at *3.
judgment is a substitute for trial.
In short, summary
Id.
Judge Davis correctly applied Fourth Circuit precedent
in denying the motion to seal.
Judge Davis held a hearing in
open court to discuss the proposed sealing in which interested
persons could object. 6
He found that Defendants had not met
their burden here, stating that in a civil case where material
is protected by the First Amendment, the only compelling reason
to seal is “significant business damaging information such as
trade secrets.”
(Hr’g Tr. at 9.)
6
To the extent that any
No member of the press or public objected to sealing the
documents at the hearing. Under the relevant case law,
objection by a member of the press or public is not a
prerequisite to ordering documents unsealed. See Rushford, 846
F.2d at 253; Constand v. Cosby, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No. 05-1099,
2015 WL 4071586, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2015) (noting neither
that plaintiff nor a member of the public appeared at the
hearing on unsealing documents). During this appeal, the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press sent a letter to
the undersigned detailing its objection to sealing these
documents. [Dkt. 224.] The Court construes this letter as a
motion for leave to file an amicus brief, which the Court
grants. See Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 659 (E.D. Va.
2007) (citations omitted) (“The Court has broad discretion in
deciding whether to allow a non-party to participate as an
amicus curiae.”); see also Constand, 2015 WL 4071586, at *1 n.1
(construing Associated Press’s letter to the court as a motion
to intervene).
10
federally-protected medical information was contained within the
reports, Judge Davis noted those must be redacted.
7.) 7
(Hr’g Tr. at
Ultimately, however, Judge Davis held that there was no
legal basis to keep the documents sealed.
As Judge Davis noted,
“When we look at what has been going on with police forces
around the United States, this is exactly the type of
information that the public has a great interest in.”
at 8.)
(Hr’g Tr.
The reports detail the behavior of a public officer
entrusted with the public’s confidence on matters relevant to
his job performance.
Therefore, Judge Davis’s decision to keep
the documents public is not contrary to law, and the stay on
sealing the documents should be lifted.
At the motion hearing, Defendants’ counsel argued that
Plaintiff had failed to follow the stipulated protective order
in filing the instant motion.
Specifically, Defendants argued
that Plaintiff failed to follow paragraph 11 of the Order.
That
paragraph states that “[i]f any party disagrees with the
designation by the producing party or the non-party of any
material as Confidential information, then the parties will
attempt first to resolve the dispute on an informal basis before
presenting the dispute to the Court.”
¶ 11.)
(11/12/14 Order [Dkt. 22]
“If the dispute cannot be resolved informally, the
7
It appears that Judge Davis concluded there was no such
information contained in the reports.
11
producing party or non-party bears the burden of persuading the
Court that the information is in fact Confidential within the
definition(s) of those term(s) set forth above.”
(Id.)
Importantly, paragraph 12 of the Order prohibits any party from
filing “pleadings, motions papers, memoranda, affidavits,
exhibits, transcripts, or other papers that consist of, contain,
or reflect confidential information . . . unless and until the
Party has obtained leave of court to file such documents or the
portions thereof containing or reflecting such information under
seal.”
(Id. ¶ 12.)
Thus, the Order contemplates that any
information must be kept confidential until the Court says
otherwise.
Therefore, any material designated as confidential
was properly the subject of a motion to seal.
The internal affairs reports were designated
confidential pursuant to the protective order.
¶ 2(b).)
(11/12/14 Order
As White’s counsel noted in the hearing before Judge
Davis, the parties agreed that anything marked confidential
under the protective order would be subject to a motion to seal
if one of the parties wanted to use the document(s) in
connection with a pleading.
Order ¶¶ 11, 12.)
(Hr’g Tr. at 4; see also 11/12/14
White filed the motion to seal the internal
affairs reports because they were designated confidential by
Defendants.
(Hr’g Tr. at 5.)
Therefore, the Court finds that
12
Plaintiff complied with the terms of the protective order in
filing the motions to seal the internal affairs reports.
8
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ objections to
Judge Davis’s ruling are overruled.
The stay on Judge Davis’s
order keeping the documents sealed pending an appeal should be
lifted.
However, this Court will stay its ruling to allow the
parties to take an appeal, if any.
An appropriate order will
issue.
July 14, 2015
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
8
The Court makes no comment on whether the parties attempted to
resolve the issue informally before filing the motion to seal.
The Court assumes that the motions to seal complied with E.D.
Va. Local Civil Rule 7(E)’s meet and confer requirement.
13
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