Sanyal v. Toyota Motor Corporation

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 2 MOTION to Quash. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 9/30/2014. (rban, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

SATYAJIT SANYAL,

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Plaintiff,
v.
TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION,
Defendant.

1:14cv906 (JCC/JFA)

M E M O R A N D U M

O P I N I O N

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Toyota
Motor Corporation’s (“Defendant” or “TMC”) Motion to Quash
Service [Dkt.2].

For the following reasons, the Court will

grant TMC’s Motion to Quash Service and allow Satyajit Sanyal
(“Plaintiff” or “Sanyal”) to serve TMC in accordance with the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents (“Hague Convention”).
I. Background
On July 10, 2012, Sanyal was driving to work in his
2011 Toyota Camry when he crashed head-on into a tree.
of Removal [Dkt. 1], Ex. 1 ¶ 7.)

(Notice

According to Sanyal, the

airbags did not deploy despite significant damage to the front
end of the vehicle.

(Id. ¶ 8(c).)

He sustained serious and

lasting injuries that have diminished his earning capacity and
require expensive medical treatments.
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Sanyal filed the current action in the Circuit Court
for Fairfax County on June 18, 2014.

(Notice of Removal [Dkt.

1] ¶ 1.)

Attached to his state court complaint is a return of

service.

(Notice of Removal, Ex. 1, at 21-22). 1

on the return is barely legible.

The handwriting

From what can be discerned,

the return states that on June 27, 2014, the complaint was
served on “Defendant Toyota Motor Corporation by serving its
U.S. headquarters [illegible] Toyota Motor North America, the
legal California company to the parent Japanese Corporation, at
19001 Southwestern Ave., Torrance, CA 90501.”

(Id.)

Sanyal

also sent the complaint and summons via certified mail to
“Toyota Motor Corporation, National Customer Relations” at
“19001 Southwestern Avenue WC11 Torrance, CA 90501.”
Opp. [Dkt. 7], Ex. 2, at 2.)

(Pl.’s

According to Sanyal, “he was

advised by a customer service representative of Toyota to use
Toyota Motor Corporation as the name of corporation and was also
provided the California address information during the same call
made by the plaintiff to request the postal address to mail
documents[.]”

(Pl.’s Opp. ¶ 7.)

TMC received the complaint and summons on June 27,
2014.

(Notice of Removal ¶ 2.)

Shortly thereafter, it removed

to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1).
1

(Id. ¶ 4).

TMC then moved to quash service and

Pagination is according to CM/ECF.

2

dismiss Sanyal’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(5) on grounds that Sanyal did not properly serve TMC, a
Japanese corporation, under the Hague Convention.
to Dismiss [Dkt. 2].)

(Def.’s Mot.

Having been fully briefed and argued,

TMC’s motion is now before the Court. 2
II. Standard of Review
A defendant may challenge the sufficiency of service
of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5).

Once

challenged, the burden of establishing validity of service under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 shifts to the plaintiff.
O’Meara v. Waters, 464 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (D. Md. 2006).

When

a defendant has actual notice of the claim, “the rules, in
general, are entitled to a liberal construction.”

Armco, Inc.

v. Penrod-Stauffer Bld. Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th
Cir. 1984).

“When there is actual notice, every technical

violation of the rule or failure of strict compliance may not
invalidate the service of process.”

Id.

However, “the rules

are there to be followed, and plain requirements for the means
of effecting service of process may not be ignored.”

Id.

If a

court finds that plaintiff has failed to effectuate service
2

After the motion hearing, Sanyal filed “Reference Documents for Service of
Process on a Foreign Corporation [Dkt. 14].” The documents referred to
California cases discussing serving a foreign corporation by serving its
general manager or domestic subsidiary. The Court has considered these
documents and found them inapplicable here, as the cases discuss whether
service was effective under California law. As this case has been filed in
Virginia, Virginia law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure control
whether service of process is effective.

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under the meaning of Rule 4, the court may either dismiss the
complaint or quash service and allow the plaintiff to attempt
service again.

Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 576

(4th Cir. 1983).
III. Analysis
TMC argues that the Hague Convention governs service
in this case.

(Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Mem. [Dkt. 3] at 2.)

Article 1 of the Hague Convention states that “[t]he present
Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial
matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial .
document for service abroad.”

. .

Convention on the Service Abroad

of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents art. 1, Nov. 15, 1965,
20 U.S.T. 361, 65 U.N.T.S. 163.
the complaint and summons.

TMC acknowledges it received

(Def.’s Reply [Dkt. 8] at 2; Notice

of Removal ¶ 2.)
The Supreme Court considered the applicability of the
Hague Convention in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk.

The question presented in that case was whether the

attempt to serve process on a foreign corporation by serving its
domestic subsidiary complied with the Hague Convention.

486

U.S. 694, 696 (1988). The Supreme Court held that “[i]f the
internal law of the forum state defines the applicable method of
serving process as requiring the transmittal of documents
abroad, then the Hague Service Convention applies.”
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Id.

In

Schlunk, Illinois law did not require the plaintiff to transmit
documents abroad, as a state statute made the wholly-owned
domestic subsidiary the foreign corporation’s involuntary agent
for service of process.

Id. at 707.

Convention was inapplicable.

Therefore, the Hague

Id. at 708.

Under Virginia law, service of process on a foreign
defendant’s wholly-owned subsidiary is not sufficient to effect
service on the foreign parent so long as the parent and the
subsidiary maintain separate corporate identities.

Davies v.

Jobs & Adverts Online, Gmbh, 94 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722-23 (E.D.
Va. 2000); Fleming v. Yamaha Corp., USA, 774 F. Supp. 992, 994
(W.D. Va. 1991) (citing Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1925)).

Thus, the question

is whether Toyota Motor Sales and TMC are considered separate
corporate entities.

If they are separate, then Sanyal has not

properly effected service on TMC.
The parties have not produced any evidence on this
point.

At oral argument, TMC’s counsel stated that TMC did have

an ownership interest in Toyota Motor Sales.

According to

filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
Toyota Motor Sales is a wholly-owned subsidiary of TMC.

Toyota

Motor Corp., Annual Report Form 20-F,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094517/0001193125142461

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00/d678020d20f.htm#toc. 3

Without anything further, the Court

cannot discern whether the corporations are, in fact, separate.
Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will grant
Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service and direct Sanyal to reserve TMC in accordance with the Hague Convention.

See Hague

Form, Civil Forms, United States District Court Eastern District
of Virginia,
http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/formsandfees/civil.htm; Hague
Conference on Private International Law,
Authorities,http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.det
ails&aid=261.

Sanyal is advised that he has sixty days from the

entry of this Memorandum Opinion and corresponding Order in
which to effectuate service properly.
2d at 721.

See Davies, 94 F. Supp.

Should he fail to do so, his case against TMC will

be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant TMC’s
Motion to Quash.

An appropriate order will issue.

September 30, 2014
Alexandria, Virginia

/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

3

In considering a motion to dismiss, a district court may consider “matters
of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and
exhibits attached to the complaint.” Moore v. Flagstar Bank, 6 F. Supp. 2d
496, 500 (E.D. Va. 1997).

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