Hassan v. Johnson et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION re Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema on 2/20/15. (klau, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

AMIN MOHAMED BASHER HASSAN,
Petitioner,

I:14cvll90 (LMB/TRJ)

V.

JEH CHARLES JOHNSON, Secretary of
Homeland Security, and SARAH TAYLOR,
District Director, USCIS Washington District
Office,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Amir Mohamed Basher Hassan ("petitioner" or"Hassan"),' an Egyptian
national, has filed a motion for summary judgment in which he seeks an order reversing the
decision of the U.S. Citizen and Inmiigration Services ("USCIS" or the "agency"), which denied

his naturalization application. The USCIS has filed its own motion for summaryjudgment
A

seeking an affirmance of its decision. Hassan has properly exhausted his administrative
remedies, making the issues in the parties' motions ripe for adjudication. For the reasons

discussed briefly in open court and in more detail below, the defendants' motion for summary
judgment will be granted and petitioner's motion wall be denied.

' The named defendants are Jeh Charles Johnson, the Secretary ofHomeland Security, and Sarah
Taylor, the District Director of the USCIS Washington District Office (collectively
"defendants").

^Although Hassan filed a brief insupport ofhis motion, he did not file a brief inopposition to
the agency's motion for summary judgment. Counsel for Hassan also failed to appear in court
when the motions were set for oral argument; however, as the Court explained in open court and
explains in this opinion, given the uncontested facts in the administrative record, oral argument
would not have assisted the decisional process.

passesmusterunder sections 1101(f) or 316(b), as those sections identify specific, objective
factors that indicate a lack of good moral character. Then the Court can filter Plaintiffs

characterthrough the subjective [average citizen] test under section 316(a)(2)." Id
B, Analysis

Hassan makes several arguments in support of his good moral character. First, he argues

that Virginia's bigamy law should apply because states have primary responsibility over
domestic relationships,
V. Windsor. 570 U.S.

Mem. Supp. PL's Mot. Sum. J. ("PL's Mem.") 3 (citing United States
, 133 S. Ct. 2884 (2013)); however, he does not cite any authority to

support the argimient that state domestic relations law applies with the same force in the
inmiigration context, in which federal law typically preempts state law. He then argues that,

under Virginia law, he has not committed the crime of bigamy because he did not marry or
cohabitate with his second wife in Virginia. Id

Addressing the latter part of Hassan's argument first, the relevant statute provides:
If any person, being married, shall, during the life of the husband or wife, marry
another person in this Commonwealth, or if the marriage with such other person
take place out of the Commonwealth, shall thereafter cohabit with such other
person in this Commonwealth, he or she shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-362. As the agency explained in its decision on appeal, the
Supreme Court of Virginia has clearly rejected Hassan's interpretation of the statute. See
Farewell v. Commonwealth. 189 S.E. 321,323 (Va. 1937). In Farewell, the court

explained, "Either the second imlawful marriage, or the cohabitation after the second
unlawful marriage has been entered into out of this State, must take place within this
State to give our courts jurisdiction. Neither the place of marriage, nor the place of
cohabitation, [however,] is an element of the nature or character of the crime." Id
Therefore, although Hassan could not be prosecuted for bigamy in Virginia, he still