Manchanda v. Hays Worldwide LLC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 3 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by David Hays, Hays Worldwide LLC. (See Memorandum Opinion For Details). Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 12/17/14. (nhall)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
MONA MANCHANDA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HAYS WORLDWIDE, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
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M E M O R A N D U M
1:14cv1339 (JCC/TCB)
O P I N I O N
This matter is before the Court on Hays Worldwide LLC
and David Hays’ (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss.
[Dkt. 13.]
Plaintiff Mona Manchanda (“Plaintiff” or “Manchanda”), acting as
personal representative for the estate of Eena Singh Karras, has
brought this wrongful death action against Defendants.
For the
following reasons, the Court will deny the motion.
I. Background
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, read the complaint as a whole, and take the facts
asserted therein as true.
(2009).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
On or about May 27, 2012, at approximately mid-day,
Eena Karras was engaging in a scuba diving certification class
at Lake Rawlings in Brunswick County, Virginia under the
direction of David Hays, an agent of Hays Worldwide.
1
(Notice of
Removal, Ex. A [Dkt. 1] ¶ 3 [hereinafter “Complaint”].)
According to Plaintiff, Hays failed “to act in due care and in a
reasonable and prudent fashion considering the safety
requirements of Lake Rawlings based upon the dive conditions” on
that day.
(Id. ¶ 17.)
As a result of Defendants’ alleged
negligence, Karras drowned and died.
(Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.)
Plaintiff, the administrator of Karras’ estate, filed
this suit in the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria on May
27, 2014.
(See Compl.)
As best can be determined, she alleges
a single count of negligence pursuant to the Virginia Wrongful
Death Act, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-50 et. seq.
She states the
statutory beneficiaries have and will continue to suffer damages
and seeks recovery in the amount of $5,000,000.00 for: (1)
sorrow, mental anguish, and solace; (2) expenses for Karras’
care, treatment, and hospitalization incident to the injury
resulting in death; (3) reasonable funeral expenses; and (4)
compensation for reasonably expected loss of income, and the
“services, protection, care, and assistance” of Karras.
(Compl.
¶ 16.)
Defendants timely removed this action to this Court on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
(Notice of Removal ¶ 3.)
Soon thereafter, they filed this
motion to dismiss [Dkt. 3] and accompanying memorandum in
2
support [Dkt. 4].
Having been fully briefed and argued, this
motion is ripe for disposition.
II. Legal Standard 1
“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the
sufficiency of a complaint[.]”
Republican Party of N.C. v.
Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court has stated that in order “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a [c]omplaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has
facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.
The issue in resolving
such a motion is not whether the non-movant will ultimately
prevail, but whether the non-movant is entitled to offer
evidence to support his or her claims.
1
This case was removed from state court. “The case will proceed as if it
originally had been brought in the federal court. Thus, it has been settled
by numerous cases that the removed case will be governed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and all other provisions of federal law relating to
procedural matters.” 14C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3738 (4th ed. 2011).
Generally, a federal court will not require the parties to redo the state
court pleadings, “although the district court may find it necessary to order
repleading when the state pleading requirements vary markedly from federal
practice.” Id. In practice, however, this has rarely been an issue, as the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have had a strong impact on state court
procedures in most states. Id. Therefore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) is the appropriate legal standard to apply here.
3
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must
demand more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.”
555.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at
Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not
sufficient.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Hence, a pleading that
offers only “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.”
at 557.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S.
Nor will a complaint that tenders mere “naked
assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
Moreover, the plaintiff does not have to show a
likelihood of success on the merits.
Rather, the complaint must
merely allege - directly or indirectly - each element of a
“viable legal theory.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63.
III. Analysis
Defendants make three arguments in support of its
motion to dismiss.
First, they contend Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the two liability releases signed by Karras.
Mem. in Supp. [Dkt. 4] at 8.)
(Defs.’
Second, they argue that Karras
“expressly and voluntarily assumed the risks of scuba diving.”
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(Id.)
Finally, they maintain Plaintiff has failed to allege any
factual basis to support proximate cause of her negligence
claim.
(Id.)
In response, Plaintiff urges the Court not to
consider the “unsupported ‘facts’” related to the liability
agreements that she did not allege in her complaint.
Opp. [Dkt. 10] at 3.)
(Pl.’s
Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that pre-
injury liability waivers are not enforceable under Virginia law.
(Id. at 4.)
While Plaintiff maintains that Defendants’
arguments about assumption of the risk are unavailing, she
argues it is premature to consider the merits at the motion to
dismiss stage.
(Id. at 5-6.)
Finally, Plaintiff maintains she
has sufficiently alleged proximate causation.
(Id. at 7-9.)
Each argument will be addressed in turn.
A. Liability Releases
When considering a motion to dismiss, “[o]rdinarily, a
court may not consider any documents that are outside of the
complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the
motion is converted into one for summary judgment.”
Witthohn v.
Fed. Ins. Co., 164 Fed. App’x 395, 396 (4th Cir. 2006).
are exceptions to this rule.
There
Courts may properly take judicial
notice of matters of public record.
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty.
Mem’l Hosp., 572 F. 3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted).
Courts may also consider “documents attached to the
complaint . . . as well as those attached to the motion to
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dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and
authentic.”
Id.
Here, the Court does not need to decide whether to
convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment nor decide whether the liability releases are
integral to the complaint.
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly,
[a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] does not resolve contests surrounding
the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.”
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44
(4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). 2
Whether the liability waivers apply to bar
Plaintiff’s claim is an affirmative defense that Defendants bear
the burden of pleading and proving.
See Goodman v. Praxair,
Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(c)).
Such an affirmative defense has no bearing on whether
Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for relief.
Should
Defendants wish to assert this defense, the appropriate time is
at a motion for summary judgment.
2
In the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an
affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached
by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6). This principle only
applies, however, if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense “clearly
appear[ ] on the face of the complaint.” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d
458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis is original). The facts necessary to rule
on an affirmative defense here are not present on the face of a complaint, so
this limited exception does not apply here.
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B. Assumption of Risk
Similarly, assumption of risk is an affirmative
defense.
1991).
DeSole v. United States, 947 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir.
To find that assumption of risk applies at the motion to
dismiss stage, the Court must find that the defense applies as a
matter of law, “of universal application and regardless of
factual variation.”
Id.
In Virginia, “[a]pplication of the
defense of assumption of risk requires use of a subjective
standard, which addresses whether a particular plaintiff fully
understood the nature and extent of a known danger and
voluntarily exposed herself to that danger.”
Thurmond v. Prince
William Prof’l Baseball Club, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 246, 249-50 (Va.
2003); see Young v. Lambert, 482 S.E.2d 823, 826 (Va. 1997)
(stating defense depends on “what the particular plaintiff in
fact sees, knows, understands, and appreciates.”).
Unless
reasonable minds could not differ, the defense ordinarily
presents a jury question.
Id.
Defendants have not cited any Virginia case law that
states the defense of assumption of risk applies as a matter of
law in cases involving scuba diving accidents.
Cf. Thurmond,
574 S.E.2d 246, 250-51 (stating that as a matter of law, “when a
particular adult spectator of ordinary intelligence is familiar
with the game of baseball, that spectator assumes the normal
risks of watching a baseball game, including the danger of being
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hit by a ball batted into an unscreened seating area of the
stadium.”).
Therefore, the Court is not prepared to state that,
as a matter of law, Kerras assumed the risk of drowning when she
participated in the dive.
As with the liability releases,
assumption of risk is a defense that is outside the scope of the
Court’s task in considering this motion since it requires an
individualized factual inquiry to determine whether it applies
as well as consideration of the liability waivers, which the
Court will not consider at this stage.
See Edwards, 178 F.3d at
243-44.
C. Pleading Causation
In order to establish a prima facie negligence claim,
a plaintiff has the burden of proving “the existence of a legal
duty, a breach of the duty, and proximate causation resulting in
damage.”
Lathon v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 3:09cv57, 2009
WL 1172864, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2009) (citing Atrium Unit
Owners Ass’n v. King, 585 S.E.2d 545, 548 (Va. 2003)).
Defendant challenges whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
that Defendants’ negligence was the proximate cause of Karras’
death.
(Def.’s Mem. at 15.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Each allegation in the
complaint “must be simple, concise, and direct.
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No technical
form is required.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).
Specific facts are
not necessary; the statement need only “give defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.”
Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555.
Furthermore, “pleadings
must be construed so as to do justice.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
In light of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Supreme Court’s guidance in Twombley, Plaintiff has
sufficiently pled a claim for negligence.
Paragraph 18 of the
complaint lists the ways in which Defendants were allegedly
negligent: failing to properly observe and monitor Karras during
the dive; failing to ascertain whether Karras needed assistance
and promptly rendering that assistance; failing to render care
to Karras after she was removed from the lake; failing to
properly equip Karras; failing to have the appropriate number of
dive personnel to supervise the dive; failing to adequately
train said personnel; failing to adequately supervise students
and personnel; and failing to have proper life-saving equipment
at the lake.
(Compl. ¶ 18.)
The complaint further states that
as a direct and proximate result of these negligent acts, Karras
died.
(Id. ¶ 15.)
Though threadbare, this is sufficient to
give Defendants notice of the claim and thus survives a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Defendants cite three cases in support of its
arguments that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient.
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All
three are inapposite because they were decided after plaintiffs
had presented their case-in-chief and had failed to carry their
burden to show defendants’ negligence proximately caused the
drowning.
See Estate of Knight ex rel. Knight v. Hoggard, Nos.
98-1778, 98-1847, 1999 WL 390987, at *5 (4th Cir. June 15, 1999)
(reversing district court’s denial of motion for judgment as a
matter of law because it was “sheer speculation” to conclude
plaintiff’s drowning was a result of anything defendant did and
jury could only guess at how drowning occurred); Phillips v. Se.
4-H Educ. Ctr., Inc., 510 S.E.2d 458, 460-61 (Va. 1999)
(affirming trial court’s grant of motion to strike at close of
plaintiff’s case because no evidence tending to show that
defendants’ alleged negligence caused plaintiff to drown);
Blacka v. James, 139 S.E.2d 47, 50 (Va. 1964) (setting aside
jury verdict because no proof of causal connection between the
drowning and negligence of the defendant).
Here, Plaintiff has (just barely) pled facts
indicating that negligence is a facially plausible explanation
for the accident.
The Court does not find it unreasonable to
infer, at this point in the proceedings, that the drowning
resulted from some failure on the part of Defendants to
supervise or otherwise provide treatment to Karras.
Therefore,
the Court declines to dismiss the action for failure to
sufficiently allege proximate causation.
10
See Old Republic Ins.
Co. v. Spring Menders, Inc., No. 2:11cv69, 2011 WL 2838179, at
*5 (E.D. Va. July 14, 2011) (denying a motion to dismiss because
defendant’s negligence was a facially plausible explanation for
the property damage).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny
Defendants’ motion.
December 17, 2014
Alexandria, Virginia
An appropriate Order will issue.
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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