Gillespie v. Marriott International, Inc. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re Motions to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 5/18/15. (klau, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
SELENA GILLESPIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
et al.,
Defendant.
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M E M O R A N D U M
1:15-cv-350 (JCC/IDD)
O P I N I O N
This personal injury action is before the Court on
three motions to dismiss filed by the collective Defendants.
[Dkts. 1-4, 1-6, 12.]
Following oral argument of counsel, the
Court granted all three motions to dismiss without prejudice,
and required any amended complaint to be filed by May 22, 2015,
with responsive pleadings due May 25, 2015.
This opinion
memorializes the Court’s reasons for this decision.
I. Background
Originally filed in Virginia state court, this matter
was removed to this district court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction.
(See Notice of Removal [Dkt. 1] at 1-6.)
It is
well-settled that removed cases are governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and all other provisions of federal law
relating to procedural matters.
See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503
1
U.S. 131 (1992), reh’g denied, 504 U.S. 935 (1992).
Thus, at
the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must read the complaint
as a whole, construe the complaint in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and accept the facts alleged in the complaint as
true.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 1
On August 31, 2014, Plaintiff Selena Gillespie
(“Plaintiff”) was attending a family reunion in the ballroom of
the Marriott Crystal Gateway hotel. 2
(Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶ 6.)
While her granddaughter was sitting on Plaintiff’s lap, a large
piece of a light fixture fell from the ceiling directly above
Plaintiff, striking the granddaughter in her head, causing a
depressed skull fracture.
(Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.)
The light fixture
did not strike Plaintiff, but Plaintiff “was in the zone of
danger . . . and received physical impact from blood striking
her in the incident.”
(Id. at ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff has also
suffered “extreme shock and anxiety” as a result.
(Id. at ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff claims that the accident happened “because of the
willful and wanton conduct in the installation of the light
1
Regardless, this standard is similar if not identical to the
standard under Virginia law. See Glazebrook v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Spotsylvania Cnty., 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (Va.
2003) (“A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of facts alleged
in pleadings, not the strength of proof. We accept as true all
facts properly pleaded in the bill of complaint and all
reasonable and fair inferences that may be drawn from those
facts.”) (citations omitted).
2
Plaintiff does not allege where the hotel is geographically
located.
2
fixture by the defendants and/or their agents, and, as a direct
and proximate result of the defendants’ conduct, the plaintiff
suffers from severe emotional distress.”
(Id. at ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff requests $500,000 in compensatory damages, jointly and
severally, against four named-Defendants: Marriott
International, Inc. (“Marriott”), Ashford Hospitality Prime,
Ashford Gateway TRS Corp. (collectively “Ashford”), and Humphrey
Rich Construction Group, Inc. (“Humphrey”) (collectively
“Defendants”).
(Id. at 3.)
Marriott, Ashford, and Humphrey each filed motions to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Defendants all argue that the factual allegations in
the short, two-page Complaint, even if true, fail to state a
claim for either negligent infliction of emotional distress
(“NIED”) or intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) under Virginia law.
Marriott also contends that
Plaintiff fails to allege facts regarding any duty of care owed
to Plaintiff.
For these reasons that follow, the Court granted
the motions.
II. Legal Standard
A court reviewing a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion must accept well-pleaded allegations as true, and must
construe all allegations in favor of the plaintiff.
3
See Randall
v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994). 3
However,
the court need not accept as true legal conclusions disguised as
factual allegations.
(2009).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679-81
Therefore, a pleading that offers only a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557 (2007).
Nor will a complaint that tenders mere “naked
assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
III. Analysis
All arguments raised by Defendants are well-taken and
the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice and grant
Plaintiff leave of court to amend the Complaint.
As an initial
matter, the theory of relief is unclear from the face of
Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Even though Plaintiff alleges that she
“suffers from severe emotional distress,” the Court cannot
determine whether Plaintiff asserts a claim for NIED or IIED.
(See Compl. ¶ 10.).
3
The legal standard under Rule 12(b)(6) applies here. See
Manchanda v. Hays Worldwide, LLC, No. 1:14CV1339 JCC/TCB, 2014
WL 7239095, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2014) (“Generally, a
federal court will not require the parties to redo the state
court pleadings, although the district court may find it
necessary to order repleading when the state pleading
requirements vary markedly from federal practice. In practice,
however, this has rarely been an issue, as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have had a strong impact on state court
procedures in most states.”) (citation omitted).
4
Virginia law 4 recognizes both NIED and IIED causes of
action.
See, e.g., Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 523
S.E.2d 826 (Va. 2000).
To state a claim for NIED under Virginia
law, Plaintiff must allege a “physical injury [that] was the
natural result of fright or shock proximately caused by the
defendant’s negligence.
In other words, there may be recovery
in such a case if, but only if, there is shown a clear and
unbroken chain of causal connection between the negligent act,
the emotional disturbance, and the physical injury.”
Id. at
833-34 (quoting Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973);
Myseros v. Sissler, 387 S.E.2d 463, 464 (1990)).
To state a
claim for IIED under Virginia law, Plaintiff must allege each of
the following elements with the requisite degree of specificity:
(1) the defendant’s conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the
conduct was outrageous and intolerable; (3) the conduct and
emotional distress are causally connected; and the distress was
or is severe.
Delk, 523 S.E.2d at 833 (citing Russo v. White,
400 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1991)) (additional citations omitted).
Here, in the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “the
accident occurred because of the willful and wanton conduct in
the installation of the light fixture by the defendants and/or
4
Defendants do not contest the subject matter jurisdiction of
this Court pursuant to diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, and it appears Plaintiff’s factual allegations satisfy
the diversity requirements. Accordingly, Virginia substantive
law applies.
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their agents . . . .”
(Compl. ¶ 10.)
This allegation appears
to support a theory of intentional conduct under an IIED claim.
Yet, in Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to the motions to
dismiss, Plaintiff argues she has stated a claim for NIED.
(See
Pl.’s Opp’n [Dkt. 19] at 3-6 (“Plaintiff properly pled facts
that support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress and the Defendants’ motions should be denied.”).)
Regardless, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to
sufficiently allege facts to support either an NIED or IIED
claim.
First, Plaintiff wholly fails to allege that any of
the Defendants owed a specific duty to Plaintiff.
A breach of duty being essential, there must
be some unlawful act or omission at the
foundation of every tort . . . . While every
wrongful invasion of a protected right
causing damage gives rise to a tort, to have
that result, there must not only be an
invasion of right, but the invasion must be
wrongful; that is, it must result from the
breach or omission of a correlative duty or
it will not be tortious.
86 C.J.S. Torts § 17 (2015) (citing cases).
The only allegation
in the Complaint regarding each of the four named Defendants
refers to Defendants’ citizenship for diversity purposes.
(See Compl. ¶¶ 2-5.)
There is no allegation that one named
Defendant acted, or failed to act, resulting in a breach of some
duty allegedly owed to Plaintiff.
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In other words, the Court is
left to speculate as to the duty each named Defendant owed to
Plaintiff, and their associated liability or ultimate
responsibility for the allegedly defective light fixture that
caused the harm.
While Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires only “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” the
factual allegations in the Complaint “must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”
550 U.S. at 555.
Twombly,
Thus, Rule 12(b)(6) guards against the
speculation that is required here to state a claim for relief
under NIED or IIED, and the Complaint was dismissed on this
basis.
Alternatively, and assuming Plaintiff attempts to
state a claim for IIED, the Court cannot accept the “labels and
conclusions” alleged in paragraph ten regarding Defendants’
alleged conduct.
See Twombly 550 U.S. at 555-56.
Plaintiff
claims that “the accident occurred because of the willful and
wanton conduct in the installation of the light fixture by the
defendants and/or their agents,” but does not provide any
additional factual specificity to support such a legal
conclusion.
Again, this leaves the Court to speculate as to
Defendants’ acts or omissions, and does not “give the
defendant[s] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
7
93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Complaint on
this basis as well.
Lastly, even though Plaintiff does not request leave
of court to amend the Complaint in the event it stands
dismissed, the Court will grant such leave freely “when justice
so requires.”
See, e.g., Ward Elec. Serv., Inc. v. First
Commercial Bank, 819 F.2d 496, 497 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
The Court denies
leave to amend only if it appears the amendment is futile,
offered in bad faith, prejudicial, or otherwise contrary to the
interests of justice.
Id.
Accordingly, because there has been
no showing as to futility, bad faith, or prejudice, the Court
granted Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint in the interest
of justice.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court granted
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
An appropriate Order shall
issue.
May 18, 2015
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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