Gillespie v. Marriott International, Inc. et al
Filing
40
MEMORANDUM OPINION re: Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 7/14/15. (klau, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
SELENA GILLESPIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
ASHFORD HOSPITALITY PRIME,
et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
M E M O R A N D U M
1:15-cv-350 (JCC/IDD)
O P I N I O N
This personal injury action is before the Court on two
motions to dismiss the amended complaint.
[Dkts. 29, 30.]
For
the following reasons, the Court will deny in part both motions
to dismiss.
I. Background
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must read
the complaint as a whole, construe the complaint in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and accept the facts alleged in the
complaint as true.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Thus, the following facts taken from the amended complaint are
accepted as true for purposes of these motions.
Defendants Ashford Hospitality Prime and Ashford
Gateway TRS Corporation (“Ashford”) own and operate the Marriott
Crystal Gateway Hotel in Arlington, Virginia.
1
(Am. Compl. [Dkt.
28] ¶ 5.)
Defendant Humphrey Rich Construction Group, Inc.
(“Humphrey Rich”) (collectively “Defendants”) was hired by
Ashford as a general contractor to perform significant
renovations to the Marriott Crystal Gateway Hotel.
6-7.)
(Id. at ¶¶
The renovation included “substantial work to the ceilings
and lighting fixtures in the hotel’s ball rooms.”
(Id. at ¶ 8.)
On August 31, 2014, Plaintiff Selena Gillespie
(“Plaintiff”) was a guest of the hotel and attended a family
reunion in the ballroom.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 10.)
“Without warning
to the plaintiff, one of the lighting fixtures in the ballroom
detached from the ceiling directly above the plaintiff.”
at ¶ 11.)
(Id.
The light fixture itself did not directly strike
Plaintiff, but it did strike the Plaintiff’s infant
granddaughter, who was sitting in her lap at the time.
(Id.)
As a result of the falling fixture, “Plaintiff was battered,
struck and injured by blood, brain and other debris.”
(Id.)
“[A]s a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the
defendants . . . plaintiff has suffered severe injury from the
falling fixture incident, including physical, mental and
emotional harm.”
(Id. at ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff claims that “Defendants’ actions in the
design, installation and inspection of the lighting fixtures
were reckless, evincing willful and wanton disregard for the
safety of the plaintiff.”
(Am. Compl. at ¶ 9.)
2
Plaintiff
alleges that “Defendants knew that there would be large
gatherings of people congregating under these lighting fixtures
creating a heightened duty to make sure that the renovations
were performed properly and resulted in a safe environment.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff requests $500,000 in damages, jointly and
severally, against Ashford and Humphrey Rich.1
(Id. at 3.)
Ashford and Humphrey Rich have both filed motions to
dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Humphrey Rich’s Mot. [Dkt. 30].)
(Ashford’s Mot. [Dkt. 29];
Both argue that Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for relief under a theory of negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), or
negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”), and that
her allegations do not support a claim for punitive damages.
(Id.)
Plaintiff opposes Defendants motions and argues that she
has sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim for negligence
and punitive damages under Virginia law.2
(Pl.’s Opp’n at 4
(“Plaintiff does not make a claim for negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress in her Amended Complaint.”).)
1
Plaintiff named “Marriott International, Inc.” as a Defendant
in her original complaint, but has not named it as a Defendant
in her amended complaint. (See Compl. [Dkt. 1-1] ¶ 2.)
Therefore, Marriott International will be stricken as a party.
2
The parties do not dispute that Virginia law, the law of the
forum state, applies to the substantive claims in this diversity
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
3
Ashford filed a reply brief [Dkt. 37] and the Court heard oral
argument of counsel on July 8, 2015.
Thus, the motion is ripe
for disposition.
II. Legal Standard
A court reviewing a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion must accept well-pleaded allegations as true, and must
construe all allegations in favor of the plaintiff.
See Randall
v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994).
However,
the court need not accept as true legal conclusions disguised as
factual allegations.
(2009).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679-81
Therefore, a pleading that offers only a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557 (2007).
Nor will a complaint that tenders mere “naked
assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
III. Analysis
As a threshold matter, despite prior notice from the
Court that the original complaint failed to clearly specify what
theory of relief Plaintiff was pursuing, the amended complaint
does little to resolve this defect.
(See Mem. Op. [Dkt. 26] at
4 (“As an initial matter, the theory of relief is unclear from
the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint.”).)
In her original
complaint, Plaintiff attempted to state a claim for NIED.
4
(Id.
at 6.)
Although still not expressly clear from the face of the
amended complaint, it now appears that Plaintiff is asserting a
claim for negligence against both Ashford and Humphrey Rich.
(See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 (“[T]he Plaintiff alleges that she
sustained injuries, cognizable under Virginia law, as a
proximate result of Defendants’ negligence.”); id. at 4 at
(“Plaintiff does not make a claim for negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress in her Amended Complaint.”).)
Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed this at oral argument.
In Virginia, to recover on a negligence claim,
Plaintiff must establish that: (1) Defendants owed Plaintiff a
duty of care, (2) Defendants breached that duty of care, and (3)
Defendants’ breach proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer
damages or injury.
Atrium Unit Owners Ass’n v. King, 585 S.E.2d
545, 548 (Va. 2003) (citing Fox v. Custis, 372 S.E.2d 373, 375
(Va. 1988); Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., 66 S.E.2d 441, 443
(Va. 1951)); see also Jappell v. Am. Ass’n of Blood Banks, 162
F. Supp. 2d 476, 479 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“The prima facie case of
negligence includes proof of a legal duty, breach of that duty,
and consequent injury.”) (citation omitted).
Stated
differently, an action for negligence lies only where there has
been a failure to perform some legal duty that the defendant
owed to the injured party.
See Balderson v. Robertson, 125
S.E.2d 180 (Va. 1962); Blue Ridge Serv. Corp. v. Saxon Shoes,
5
Inc., 624 S.E.2d 55 (Va. 2006).
“The standard of care required
to comply with the duty of care may be established by the common
law duty or statute.”
Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC,
726 S.E.2d 251, 254 (Va. 2012).
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court is mindful
that dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is disfavored.
Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d
1462, 1471 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing 2A Moore’s Federal Practice,
¶ 12.07, p. 12-63).
For that reason, and for the following
reasons discussed below, the Court will deny in part Ashford’s
motion to dismiss and deny in part Humphrey Rich’s motion to
dismiss.
The Court will address each Defendant separately, as
each Defendant appears to have played a different role in this
unfortunate series of alleged events.
A. Ashford as Owner and Operator of the Hotel
Plaintiff alleges that, as the owner and operator of
the Marriott Crystal Gateway hotel, Ashford owed Plaintiff, as
its guest, a heightened duty of care but breached its duty when
the light fixture fell, causing plaintiff “severe injury . . .
including physical, mental and emotional harm.”
5, 9, 11-12.)
(Am. Compl. ¶¶
Plaintiff claims that as a result of the falling
light fixture, she was “battered, struck and injured by blood,
brain and other debris.”
(Id. at ¶ 11.)
6
Under Virginia common law, innkeepers owe their guests
a heightened duty of care, similar to the duty owed by a common
carrier to its passengers, which requires it “to use the utmost
care and diligence of very cautious persons; and they will be
held liable for the slightest negligence which human care, skill
and foresight could have foreseen and guarded against.”
Taboada
v. Daly Seven, Inc., 626 S.E.2d 428, 434 (Va. 2006) (quoting
Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Birchfield, 54 S.E. 879, 883 (Va. 1906)
(quoting Connell v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 24 S.E. 467,
468 (Va. 1896))).
“Like a passenger, the guest of an innkeeper
entrusts his safety to the innkeeper and has little ability to
control his environment.”
Taboada, 626 S.E.2d at 434.
This
long-recognized heightened duty of care remains governed by the
common law, even though statutory provisions limit an
innkeeper’s liability for losses primarily related to property
damage.
Id. at 432-33 (discussing Va. Code §§ 35.1-28(A)-(D)
(stating this statute does not “change or alter the principles
of law concerning a hotel’s liability to a guest . . . for
personal injury.”)).
Here, in short, Plaintiff now sufficiently states a
claim for negligence against Ashford by identifying a heightened
duty of care (Am. Compl. ¶ 9), a breach of that duty (id. at ¶
11), and her consequent injury or harm (id. at ¶ 12).
And even
though the exact nature of Plaintiff’s “severe injury” remains
7
less than clear (see id. at ¶ 12 (“including physical, mental
and emotional harm”)), under a theory of negligence, Plaintiff
need not, at this stage, provide more specifics of her injury.
See, e.g., Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va. 1991)
(distinguishing IIED claims from negligence claims by stating:
“This is not a negligence case where . . . an allegation of
‘negligence’ is sufficient without specifying the
particulars.”).
Whether Plaintiff can prove these allegations,
i.e., some actual injury, remains yet to be seen.
But at this
stage, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s well-pleaded
allegations as true, and must construe all allegations in her
favor.
See Randall, 30 F.3d at 522.
If true, Ashford breached its duty as an innkeeper to
“use the utmost care and diligence” when a light fixture fell
from the ceiling and caused Plaintiff to suffer damages or
injury.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a claim for
negligence against Ashford, and therefore the Court will deny
Ashford’s motion in this regard.
B. Humphrey Rich as General Contractor
Plaintiff’s claim of negligence against Humphrey Rich
as the general contractor for renovations performed at the hotel
is a closer call.
Again, without clearly specifying the theory
of recovery against Humphrey Rich, much less the elements of
that cause of action, and facts to support each element,
8
Plaintiff does not make this Court’s task an easy one.
Nonetheless, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court reads
Plaintiff’s amended complaint in her favor.
At oral argument,
Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that she was also proceeding with
a negligence cause of action against Humphrey Rich.
Just as
before, an action for negligence lies only where there has been
a failure to perform some legal duty that the defendant owes to
the injured party.
See supra, sec. III.
First, Plaintiff argued at oral argument that Humphrey
Rich--the general contractor that presumably installed the light
fixture at issue--owed Plaintiff the same heightened duty of
care that Ashford owed as an innkeeper.
Plaintiff provides no
authority for this contention, and indeed, the Court can find
none.
Unlike Ashford, Plaintiff had no special relationship
with Humphrey Rich.
She found herself seated under the light
fixture as a guest of the hotel, not of Humphrey Rich.
Plaintiff’s relationship to Humphrey Rich can only be
characterized as that of a third party.
Nonetheless, there is a
duty “owed to mankind generally” not to injure others.
Overstreet v. Sec. Storage & Safe Deposit Co., 138 S.E. 552, 555
(Va. 1927) (“Overstreet had no contractual relations with the
security company.
He was in the building as the servant of [the
contractor], who had the contract to do the electrical work.
was not there as the licensee or invitee of the security
9
He
company.
Their relation to each other was that of third
persons.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged that Humphrey Rich
“knew that there would be large gatherings of people
congregating under these lighting fixtures,” which creates a
duty to “make sure that the renovations were performed properly
and resulted in a safe environment.”
(Am. Compl. ¶ 9.)
Stated
differently, and reading this allegation in Plaintiff’s favor,
she has alleged that Plaintiff’s injury was foreseeable by
Humphrey Rich.
See Norfolk S. Ry. v. Rogers, 621 S.E.2d 59 (Va.
2005) (discussing the general rule that no injury is actionable
unless it could have been foreseen by the defendant).
Accordingly, at this stage, Plaintiff has alleged that Humphrey
Rich owed her a duty of reasonable care, or the degree of care
that an ordinary prudent person would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances to avoid injury to another.
See Cowan v.
Hospice Support Care, Inc., 603 S.E.2d 916, 918 (Va. 2004)
(citations omitted).
Second, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that
Humphrey Rich breached this duty when the light fixture that it
installed “detached from the ceiling directly above plaintiff.”
(Am. Compl. ¶ 11.)
In other words, Humphrey Rich’s negligence
in the installation of the light fixture breached the duty owed
to avoid injury to individuals congregating beneath it.
Third,
similar to the analysis for Ashford, Plaintiff has sufficiently
10
alleged an injury or harm as a result of Humphrey Rich’s breach.
See, e.g., Russo, 400 S.E.2d at 163.
The Court cannot emphasize
strongly enough that the pleading in this regard is just barely
sufficient, enough so that it sufficiently puts Humphrey Rich on
notice of the claim against it in accordance with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Discovery will shed light on
now unknown but otherwise important facts of this case that
could affect Humphrey Rich’s liability.
See, e.g., Va. Code
Ann. § 8.01-250 (“No action to recover . . . for bodily injury
or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe
condition of an improvement to real property . . . shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the design,
planning, surveying, supervision of construction, or
construction of such improvement to real property more than five
years after the performance or furnishing of such services and
construction.”).
Regardless, the Court has determined that Plaintiff is
entitled to discovery based on the allegations in her amended
complaint.3
That is not to say that the Court does not have its
doubts about the ultimate merits of Plaintiff’s claim against
Ashford and Humphrey Rich, as many important questions
3
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted).
11
surrounding this bizarre sequence of events remain.
But that is
what discovery is for, and at this stage, outright dismissal is
disfavored.
Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders,
Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1471 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing 2A Moore’s
Federal Practice, ¶ 12.07, p. 12-63).
Accordingly, Plaintiff
has stated a claim for negligence against Humphrey Rich, and
therefore the Court will also deny Humphrey Rich’s motion in
this regard.
C. Punitive Damages
Lastly, Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to
punitive damages because her “injuries were the proximate result
of the defendants’ willful and wanton conduct as set forth
above.”
(Am. Compl. ¶ 13.)
Under Virginia law, “[t]o properly
plead a claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to plausibly demonstrate such willful and
wanton conduct.
Mere conclusory legal statements, without facts
to support them, will not suffice.”
Brown v. Cox, No. 2:11cv184
(RGD), 2011 WL 3269680, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2011) (citing
Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not allege sufficient
facts to sustain a claim for punitive damages.
Indeed, as
recognized at oral argument, Ashford’s willful and conscious
maintenance of an unreasonably safe hotel defies logic.
Similarly, Humphrey Rich’s willful and malicious installation of
12
an unreasonably safe light fixture would be just as bad for its
business, such that it too is an illogical proposition.
In
short, Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is “vaguely
pleaded as a mere conclusion,” and unlike a claim for general
negligence, facts with heightened specificity evincing malice or
conscious disregard must be pled to sustain such a claim.
Brown, 2011 WL 3269680 at *6; see also Peacock v. J.C. Penney
Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1012, 1015 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Exemplary
damages are allowable only where there is misconduct or malice,
or such recklessness or negligence as evinces a conscious
disregard of the rights of others.”) (quoting Baker v. Marcus,
114 S.E.2d 617, 621 (Va. 1960) (emphasis in original)).
Here,
there are no facts to support this extraordinary request.
Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s punitive damages
claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny both
motions as to the negligence claim, and grant both motions as to
the punitive damages claim.
An appropriate Order shall issue.
July 14, 2015
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?