Beltran v. Poston et al
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 8/5/15. (gwalk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
D.B., AS NEXT FRIEND OF
R.M.B., A MINOR,
Petitioner,
v.
DARRYL POSTON, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, NORTHERN VIRGINIA
JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER,
et al.,
Respondents.
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M E M O R A N D U M
1:15-cv-745 (JCC/JFA)
O P I N I O N
R.M.B.,1 a 16-year-old minor and citizen of Guatemala,
is currently in the custody of the federal government after the
Department of Homeland Security designated him an “Unaccompanied
Alien Child” on December 15, 2013.
Since then, he made one
appearance before an immigration judge who terminated his
immigration proceedings.
Yet, R.M.B. remains in the custody of
the Department of Health and Human Services, which refuses to
release R.M.B. to the custody of his mother, D.B., who currently
lives in Texas.
This matter is before the Court on D.B.’s Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
1
[Dkt. 1.]
Given the sensitive nature of the issues involved in this
proceeding, the Court refers to all individuals by their
initials.
1
For the following reasons, the Court will deny the Petition.
I. Background
The Court makes the following findings of fact, which
are undisputed and “determined” by the Court based on the
evidence now in the record, unless otherwise noted.2
R.M.B. is a 16-year-old citizen of Guatemala.
[Dkt. 1] ¶ 10.)
(Pet.
In 2005, at age 6, R.M.B. entered the United
States with his mother, Petitioner D.B. (“D.B.” or
“Petitioner”), leaving D.B.’s biological father in Guatemala.
(Id. at ¶ 11; but see Pet’r’s Reply [Dkt. 16] Ex. A [Dkt. 16-1]
“D.B. Decl.” ¶ 2 (“My son has lived with me in the United States
ever since he came here when he was about nine years old.”).)
Once she was in the United States, D.B. remarried to T.R.
(Pet.
¶ 11; Resp’ts’ Mem. [Dkt. 11] Ex. C. [Dkt. 11-3] at 1-2.)
D.B.
2
As a procedural matter, there is no motion currently pending
before the Court in this case. Stated differently, Respondents
did not file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), nor
did they file a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.
Respondents do, however, oppose the requested relief in the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ask that it be
“denied,” but neither party has squarely addressed the lens
through which the Court should view the allegations in the
petition or evidence in the record. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2243, “[t]he court shall summarily hear and determine the facts,
and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” Both
Petitioner and Respondents have submitted sworn affidavits and
documentary evidence in favor of their respective positions.
Neither party has requested a period of discovery, but instead,
each party asks for summary disposition of the Petition.
Accordingly, the Court makes the following findings of fact
after considering all of the material in the record and the oral
argument of counsel, just as it would if the matter were before
the Court on summary judgment.
2
originally settled with R.M.B. and her other children in Rio
Bravo, Texas near Laredo, Texas, not far from the Texas-Mexico
border.
(D.B. Decl. ¶ 3.)
In July of 2013, D.B. moved her
family to Corpus Christi, Texas, after R.M.B. “started having
problems” in Rio Bravo.
(Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.)
It is unclear whether D.B. is a Lawful Permanent
Resident of the United States (see Pet’r’s Mem. [Dkt. 2] Ex. 1
[Dkt. 2-1] at 9), or whether D.B. is in the process of attaining
Lawful Permanent Residence status as a victim of domestic
violence through the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) (see
D.B. Decl. ¶ 9).
Regardless, in September of 2012,
approximately seven years after arriving in the United States,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) approved
D.B.’s Form I-360 Petition to classify R.M.B. as a Child of a
United States Citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident.
Mem. Ex. 1 at 1.)
(Pet’r’s
On February 19, 2013, USCIS decided to place
R.M.B.’s case “under deferred action, which is an administrative
choice to give some cases lower priority for removal.”
(Id.)
Consequently, “USCIS [did] not anticipate instituting action for
removal at [that] time.”
(Id.)
From 2011 to 2013, beginning around the age of twelve,
R.M.B. was arrested or charged numerous times with various
violations of state law, including but not limited to criminal
mischief, runaway, theft, burglary, assault, possession of
3
marijuana, assault causing bodily injury on a family member, and
unauthorized use of a vehicle.
at 5.)
(Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. D [Dkt. 11-4]
One of these charges, making a terroristic threat, was
adjudicated on July 19, 2012 and R.M.B. was placed on probation.
(Id.)
Otherwise, the majority of these charges were dismissed.
(Id.)
Four charges, unauthorized use of a vehicle, violation of
a court order, possession of marijuana less than two ounces, and
assault causing bodily harm, remain pending.
(Id. at 3.)
During this same period of time, R.M.B. also began to abuse
various substances.
(Resp’ts' Mem. Ex. C at 4 (“When asked
about substance use, [R.M.B.] reported he started using tobacco
and drinking alcohol at around 10 or 11 years old.
He started
using marijuana and drinking alcohol heavily at 13.
By age 14
he ‘jumped into heroin and cocaine very heavily.
[He] would
smoke marijuana daily and would use heroin at least twice a
week.’
He was sniffing heroin because he is afraid of
needles.”); see also id. Ex. D at 6 (“[R.M.B.] reported he would
be under the influence of drugs on a daily basis . . . [and]
indicated his mother was aware he was consuming marijuana and
heroin; however, she was not aware he was also using
cocaine.”).)
In the fall of 2013, R.M.B. ran away from D.B.’s
residence in Corpus Christi, Texas to Rio Bravo, Texas, near the
Texas-Mexico border.
(Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. D at 4; D.B. Decl. ¶
4
5.)
R.M.B. reported that he previously ran away from home
approximately ten (10) different times, and indicated that he
ran away to Rio Bravo because “he no longer wanted to live with
his family and wanted to live on his own.”
did not like being at home.”).
(Id. (stating “he
R.M.B. reportedly rented an
apartment and stated that “his friend got him a job driving
undocumented people from the border to different locations in
McAllen, Texas.”
(Id.)
Specifically, R.M.B. would “do jobs”
for the Mexican Mafia, “like [] crossing illegal immigrants and
bundles of drugs into the US.”
(Resp’ts’ Ex. C at 3-4 (“He
would get paid over $100 per person and $500 per bundle of
drugs, which he called ‘Barbies or Munecas.’”).)
R.M.B.
apparently started this work at the age of fourteen but briefly
stopped when he moved with the family to Corpus Christi “because
there is no river there.”
(Id. at 4.)
D.B. denied any
knowledge of R.M.B.’s activities along the border.
Mem. Ex. D at 4.)
(Resp’ts’
R.M.B. also “reported he would carry guns and
he has used a gun to shoot somebody.”
(Resp’ts’ Ex. C. at 4.)
Specifically:
When asked to elaborate, [R.M.B.] reported
that he was once taken to a house by a gang
member, Martin, and was told to shoot
someone who was tied up. “Martin told me to
do it, but I did not want to. He told me to
get crazy and do a lot of drugs. The drugs,
heroin and cocaine, were on the table along
with tequila.
I got crazy with the drugs
and I shot the guy. I killed him. He fell
5
to the ground after I shot him.
He had a
bullet right here (forehead).
Martin told
me that they were going to wrap him in
plastic and tie something heavy around him
and throw him in the river (Rio Grande). I
got over it because it is in the past, but
sometimes I feel a bit guilty.
Half of my
head says that it was bad, but the other
half says to keep moving forward and forget
about it. After I killed him . . . that was
my initiation into the organized crime . . .
this is not a gang, it is organized crime
because it does not have colors or numbers.
It is about business because they call you
and pay you good money to do jobs . . . .
I’m not going to go down that path again
because I got caught twice, and you don’t
fool around with the Border Patrol.” R.M.B.
said.
He denied shooting or killing anyone
else.
(Id.)
On or around December 15, 2013, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) agents apprehended R.M.B. at the age
of 14 years old in Rio Grande City, Texas near the Texas-Mexico
border.
(Pet. ¶ 12; Resp’ts’ Ex. B.)
R.M.B. stated that “he
was apprehended by Border Patrol while he was waiting for a
group of undocumented people near the border.”
Ex. D at 4.)
Child (“UAC”).
(Resp’ts’ Mem.
CBP classified R.M.B. as an Unaccompanied Alien
(Pet. ¶¶ 12-13; Resp’ts’ Ex. B.)
During his
apprehension by CBP, R.M.B. called D.B. and told her that he had
been stopped by immigration in Rio Grande City.
6.)
(D.B. Decl. ¶
D.B. told R.M.B. “to remind the agent that he had VAWA.”
6
(Id.)
At some point during the phone conversation, “all of a
sudden the line went dead.”
(Id. at ¶ 7.)
During the phone call, D.B. also spoke to a CBP agent,
and told the agent that “both R.M.B. and [she] had VAWA and that
[they] were filling out the papers and doing the other things
[they] needed to do to become permanent residents.”
¶¶ 9-10.)
(D.B. Decl.
D.B. “told the agent that [she] had immigration
papers that would prove all of this.
He told [her] to look for
them and that he would call [her] back in 15 minutes.”
¶ 10.)
(Id. at
D.B. got the papers and immediately started driving to
Rio Grande City.
(Id. at ¶ 11.)
After traveling about 30 to 40
miles, the CBP agent called D.B. and told her to not bother
coming because “they were going to detain R.M.B. because they
had found him near the river and . . . they were going to send
him to a youth shelter.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.)
After insisting
that she had immigration papers for R.M.B., D.B. turned around
and went home, fearing that the CBP would arrest her if she
tried to pick up R.M.B.
(Id. at ¶ 14.)
CBP referred and transferred custody of R.M.B. to the
Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”), the agency within the
United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)
charged with providing care for UACs, as defined by 6 U.S.C. §
279(g).
(Pet. ¶ 13.)
R.M.B. has remained in the custody of
HHS/ORR ever since, and he has been housed in HHS/ORR facilities
7
in Texas, New Jersey, Florida, and Virginia.3
(Pet. ¶¶ 15-16.)
He currently remains in HHS/ORR’s custody at the Northern
Virginia Juvenile Detention Center (“NVJDC”) in Alexandria,
Virginia, a secure facility, which is operated by Respondent
Darryl Poston, Executive Director.
(Pet. ¶ 1.)
R.M.B. has had one immigration court appearance since
his apprehension.
(Pet. ¶ 17.)
On April 15, 2015, the
immigration judge terminated the immigration proceedings against
R.M.B. because of the deferred status of D.B.’s I-360 Petition.
(Id.; Pet’r’s Mem. Ex. 1 at 3.)
On May 6, 2015, USCIS extended
the deferred status of the I-360 Petition until April 6, 2016.
(Pet’r’s Mem. Ex. 1 at 2.)
Nonetheless, R.M.B. remains in the
custody of Respondent Poston, at the direction of Respondent
Robert Carey, Director of ORR, and Respondent Sylvia Matthews
Burwell, Secretary of HHS.
(Pet. ¶ 1.)
3
While in HHS/ORR custody, R.M.B. has repeatedly exhibited
physically aggressive, destructive, and sexually offensive
behavior. (Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. A [Dkt. 11-1] “De La Cruz Decl.” ¶
7.) Specifically, in October of 2014, R.M.B. escaped from a
transport vehicle by freeing himself from soft restraints and
kicking out the back window of the vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 8.) The
same month, R.M.B. physically assaulted and possibly attempted
to sexually assault a facility staff member. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
Additionally, R.M.B. has been in six physical altercations with
other UACs or staff members. (Id. at ¶ 10 (“R.M.B. poured a cup
of urine and soap on roommate and later the two broke out in a
physical fight.”).) R.M.B. has also exhibited self-injurious
behaviors and suicidal ideation. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) Due to
these behaviors, HHS/ORR has had to transfer R.M.B. on five
separate occasions, and eventually placed him in a secure
juvenile facility. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
8
At some point during HHS/ORR’s custody of R.M.B., D.B.
formally requested that he be released to her custody.
Cruz Decl. ¶ 18.)
(De La
On May 12, 2014, HHS/ORR formally denied
D.B.’s request because R.M.B. “requires an environment with a
high level of supervision and structure [and] . . . it did not
appear from [HHS/ORR’s] home study that [D.B.’s] home can
provide the structure and supervision necessary for the safety
of [her] son.”
(Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. G.)
On March 11, 2015, D.B.
requested that HHS/ORR reconsider the decision to deny the
release of R.M.B. to her custody.
On June 10, 2015, the Acting
Assistant Secretary for Children and Families denied the request
for reconsideration.
(Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. H. (finding that R.M.B.
should not be released due to “concerns and necessity to provide
structured supervision” given his “needs and welfare.”).)
On June 12, 2015, D.B. filed this petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 with a memorandum
in support on behalf of her next friend, R.M.B., requesting that
the Court order R.M.B.’s release.
On June 17, 2015, the Court
ordered service upon the named Respondents, and ordered the
Respondents to show cause why the writ should not issue, in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
(Order [Dkt. 4].)
On July
17, 2015, Respondents filed a Memorandum of Law in Response to
the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and asked the Court to
deny the Petition.
(Resp’ts’ Mem. [Dkt. 11].)
9
On July 24,
2015, Petitioner filed a reply memorandum of in support of the
Petition.
(Reply Mem. [Dkt. 16].)
The Court heard oral
argument of counsel on July 30, 2015.
Accordingly, the Petition
is ripe for disposition.
II. Legal Standard
“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . the
district courts . . . [but] shall not extend to a prisoner
unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. §§
2241(a), (c)(3); see also Bowrin v. U.S. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 194 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Since
its inclusion in the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 2241 has given
district courts jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus to
petitioners who are held in custody by the federal government in
violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
District courts have
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) if (1)
the petitioner is “in custody,” and (2) such custody is “in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.”
See, e.g., Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989).
The district court “shall forthwith award the writ or
issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the
writ should not be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 2243.
“The person to
whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return
10
certifying the true cause of the detention.”
Id.
For good
cause shown, the district court may authorize the parties to
conduct discovery.
Rule 6, Rules Governing Section 22544 Cases
in the United States District Courts.
Ultimately, however,
“[t]he court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and
dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”
28 U.S.C. §
2243.
III. Analysis
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, Respondents do not contest
whether this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition.
Nonetheless, the Court does find that it has subject matter
jurisdiction.
First, the Petitioner, D.B., brings this action
under section 2241 as “the next friend” of R.M.B., a minor
child.
While “next friend” standing is not automatically
granted, the Court finds it proper in this case because R.M.B.
is a minor and D.B. is dedicated to act in his best interests.
See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1990) (holding
the next friend must provide (1) an adequate explanation for why
the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to
prosecute the action and (2) demonstrate that the next friend is
4
The district court may apply any or all of these rules to a
habeas corpus petition not covered by Rule 1(a), i.e., petitions
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts.
11
truly dedicated to the best interest of the person on whose
behalf he seeks to litigate).
Second, at the time of filing,
R.M.B. was in the custody of HHS/ORR and detained in NVJDC in
Alexandria, Virginia, which is within this Court’s jurisdiction
in the Eastern District of Virginia.
U.S. 1, 7 (1998).
See Spencer v. Kemna, 523
Lastly, the Petitioner, D.B., as next friend
of R.M.B., asserts that his detention is not authorized by
federal statute and violates his constitutional rights.
See
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 445-46 (3d Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the Petition.
Substantively, the Petitioner presents both statutory
and constitutional claims.
First, Petitioner argues that
HHS/ORR lacks statutory authority to exercise custody over
R.M.B. because (1) R.M.B. allegedly never met the statutory
definition of an “unaccompanied alien child” and (2) even if he
did previously, HHS/ORR is now required to release R.M.B. to the
Petitioner’s custody after his immigration proceedings were
terminated.
(Pet’r’s Mem. at 2-5.)
Second, Petitioner argues
that R.M.B.’s continued detention violates due process under the
Constitution.
(Id. at 5-9.)
Each argument is addressed in
turn.
B. Statutory Claims
Among the many changes to federal law upon the
enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”), as is
12
relevant to the issues now before the Court, Congress
“transferred [to] the Director of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement of the Department of Health and Human Services
functions under the immigration laws of the United States with
respect to the care of unaccompanied alien children that were
[previously] vested [in the now-defunct Immigration and
Naturalization Service].”
6 U.S.C. § 279(a), Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107296, § 462(a), 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25,
2002); see also 6 C.F.R. § 279(a) (transferring to ORR the care
of UACs that was formerly performed by INS).
“This change
finally resolved the conflict of interest inherent in the former
system that pitted the enforcement side of the [INS] against the
benefits side of that same agency in the care of unaccompanied
alien children.”
153 Cong. Rec. S3001, S3004 (daily ed. Mar.
12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
Thus, “the care and
custody of all unaccompanied alien children, including
responsibility for their detention, where appropriate, shall be
the responsibility of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.”
8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1).5
HHS/ORR is the federal
agency entrusted with the care and custody of all UACs.
Petitioner’s statutory claim rests largely on R.M.B.’s
5
Congress reauthorized this statutory scheme in 2008 by enacting
the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2002 (“TVPRA”). See Pub. L. No. 110-457,
122 Stat. 5044 (Dec. 23, 2008).
13
classification as a UAC.
In short, Petitioner argues that
R.M.B. should have never been classified as a UAC, and even if
it was appropriate to do so initially, now that immigration
proceedings have been terminated, there is no statutory basis
for HHS/ORR to continue to exercise custody over R.M.B.
“The
standard practice of classifying an alien juvenile as
‘unaccompanied’ is based upon the statutory definition of
‘unaccompanied alien juvenile’ from the Homeland Security Act.”
(Pet’r’s Reply Ex. J [Dkt. 16-10] “CRS Mem.” at 2.)
The term “unaccompanied alien child” means a
child who:
(A) has no lawful immigration status in the
United States;
(B) has not attained 18 years of age; and
(C) with respect to whom:
(i) there is no parent or legal guardian in
the United States; or
(ii) no parent or legal guardian in the
United States is available to provide care
and physical custody.
6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).
It is uncontested that, both at the time
of his apprehension by CBP and now, R.M.B. satisfies the first
two elements of this statutory definition: he has no lawful
immigration status in the United States,6 and he has not yet
6
“Deferred action does not confer any form of legal status in
this country, much less citizenship, it does mean that, for a
specified period of time, an individual is permitted to be
14
attained 18 years of age.
Thus, Petitioner asks the Court to
find that R.M.B. does not satisfy the third element, as
initially decided by CBP: that he has no parent or legal
guardian in the United States available to provide care and
physical custody.
To answer this question, the Court must look to the
statutes that govern HHS/ORR’s custody of UACs, and determine
whether Respondents have acted in violation of these statutory
directives.
To be clear, the only question before the Court, in
this section, is whether R.M.B.’s custody violates federal law.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
This matter is not before the Court for
judicial review of the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”)
actual classification of R.M.B. as a UAC, nor is it before the
Court for judicial review of HHS/ORR’s denial of Petitioner’s
request for custody and denial of Petitioner’s request for
reconsideration.
As discussed below, because Respondents have
acted in accordance with federal law and not in violation of it,
the Court will not issue the writ on this basis.
1. HHS/ORR’s Statutory Framework for UAC Custody
Aside from the special considerations given to
lawfully present in the United States.” Texas v. United States,
787 F.3d 733, 744 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Memorandum from Jeh
Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon Rodriguez, Dir.,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., et al., at 3-4 (Nov.
20, 2014) (the “DAPA Memo”), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo
_deferred_action.pdf).
15
children from contiguous countries that are inapplicable here,
“the care and custody of all unaccompanied alien children,
including responsibility for their detention, where
appropriate,” lies solely with HHS and ORR.
8 U.S.C. §§
1232(b)(1), (c)(1) (stating generally that HHS/ORR must develop
policies and programs to ensure that UACs “are protected from
traffickers and other persons seeking to victimize or otherwise
engage such children in criminal, harmful, or exploitative
activity . . . .”).
Within 48 hours of the apprehension or
discovery of a UAC, any federal agency “shall notify the
Department of Health and Human Services.”
1232(b)(2)(A)-(B).
8 U.S.C. §§
And not later than 72 hours after
determining that such a child is a UAC, the federal agency shall
transfer custody of the UAC to HHS.
8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3).
Notably, “[i]f neither a parent or legal guardian (with a courtorder to that effect) is with the juvenile at the time of
apprehension, or within a geographical proximity to quickly
provide care for the juvenile, the juvenile alien is classified
as ‘unaccompanied.’”
(CRS Mem. at 2.)
HHS, and subsequently
ORR, relies on the federal agency’s initial determination of UAC
status.
(De La Cruz Decl. ¶ 16.)
After assuming custody of the UAC, HHS/ORR must
“promptly” place the UAC “in the least restrictive setting that
is in the best interest of the child.”
16
8 U.S.C. §
1232(c)(2)(A).
“In making such placements, the Secretary may
consider danger to self, danger to the community, and risk of
flight.”
Id.
HHS/ORR may place UACs “in either a detention
facility or an alternative to such a facility,” like foster
homes.
6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(1).
Indeed, HHS/ORR places UACs in
foster homes, “shelter care,”7 “staff-secure care,”8 and “secure
care.”9
See ORR Guide: Children Entering the United States
Unaccompanied, § 1, available at:
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/children-enteringthe-united-states-unaccompanied (hereinafter “ORR Guide”).
HHS/ORR may also place UACs with a proposed custodian.
However, the UAC
may not be placed with a person or entity
unless [HHS/ORR] makes a determination that
the
proposed
custodian
is
capable
of
providing for the child’s physical and
mental
well-being.
Such
determination
shall, at a minimum, include verification of
the custodian’s identity and relationship to
the child, if any, as well as an independent
finding that the individual has not engaged
7
“A shelter is a residential care provider facility in which all
of the programmatic components are administered on-site, in the
least restrictive environment.” ORR Guide to Terms.
8
“Staff-secure care is intended for children or youth who have
engaged in disruptive behavior or criminal or juvenile offenses
that may indicate a moderate risk to self or others.” ORR Guide
§ 1.2.4.
9
“A secure care provider is a facility with a physically secure
structure and staff able to control violent behavior. ORR uses
a secure facility as the most restrictive placement option for
an unaccompanied child who poses a danger to self or others or
has been charged with having committed a criminal offense.” ORR
Guide to Terms; id. § 1.2.4.
17
in any activity that would
potential risk to the child.
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(A).
indicate
a
In some instances, HHS/ORR must
conduct a home study for certain UACs before placing the UAC
with a proposed custodian.
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(B).
HHS/ORR
must conduct a home study for a UAC
who is the victim of a severe form of
trafficking in persons, a special needs
child with a disability [], a child who has
been a victim of physical or sexual abuse
under circumstances that indicate that the
child’s
health
or
welfare
has
been
significantly harmed or threatened, or a
child
whose
proposed
sponsor
clearly
presents a risk of abuse, maltreatment,
exploitation, or trafficking to the child
based on all available objective evidence.
Id.
The Court considers the facts of this case in light of this
statutory scheme.
2. Application to R.M.B.
When applying the facts of R.M.B.’s custody to the
statutory framework described above, the Court is also mindful
of the standard of review under section 2241 petitions.
There
is no dispute that R.M.B. is in the custody of the federal
government.
Thus, the Court need only determine whether
R.M.B.’s custody is “in violation” of the statutory scheme
above.
See, e.g., Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989).
The Court answers this question in the negative and will deny
Petitioner’s statutory claim.
18
a. Classification as an Unaccompanied Alien Child
Petitioner first argues that because “R.M.B. has
always lived with his natural mother since first coming to the
United States in 2005, he has never been an Unaccompanied Alien
Child, as that term is defined by statute.
never had the authority to detain him.”
Accordingly, ORR has
(Pet’r’s Mem. at 3.)
While questionable as a matter of fact,10 this argument
ultimately fails because R.M.B.’s actual custody does not
violate federal law.
Instead, R.M.B. is in HHS/ORR’s custody in
compliance with federal law.
On December 15, 2013, field officers with CBP, an
agency under DHS, encountered and apprehended R.M.B. near Rio
Grande City, Texas along the United States-Mexico border.
(Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. B.)
(Id.)
R.M.B. was 14 years old at the time.
R.M.B. told CBP field officers that he ran away from home
and subsequently refused to talk to his mother, who resided in
Corpus Christi, Texas, over 160 miles away from Rio Grande City.
(Id.; see also Pet’r’s Reply at 9 n.7)
CBP also determined
R.M.B. had no legal immigration status in the United States.
10
Respondents have provided ample evidence that shows not only
did R.M.B. runaway from D.B.’s home on at least 10 occasions,
but that at the time of his apprehension, he was not living at
home and instead, had run away to the Mexican border and was
living on his own and working as a smuggler for the Mexican
cartel. (See Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. C at 3, Ex. D at 4, Ex. F at 5.)
Thus, it is not factually accurate to state that R.M.B. has
“always lived with his natural mother since first coming to the
United States in 2005.”
19
(Id.)
Accordingly, CBP field officers determined, within their
discretion, that R.M.B. met the definition of a UAC.
(Id. at ¶
4.)
It is clear that Petitioner disagrees with DHS/CBP’s
determination that R.M.B. was a UAC at the time of apprehension.
(Pet’r’s Mem. at 2-3.)
But this disagreement is not cognizable
for habeas relief under section 2241.
In short, 28 U.S.C. §
2241 is not the proper vehicle to challenge discretionary
federal agency action.
Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).
Instead,
under section 2241, Petitioner must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that R.M.B. is in custody in violation of the laws
of the United States.
In this regard, Petitioner fails to point
to any statute that supports this argument.
Rather, the evidence now before the Court shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the CBP field officers,
acting under the umbrella of DHS and within their discretion,
classified R.M.B. as a UAC in accordance with 6 U.S.C. §
279(g)(2) after apprehending R.M.B., who, at that point in time:
(1) had no lawful immigration status in the United States, see
Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 744 (5th Cir. 2015); (2)
had not yet attained 18 years of age, see Pet. ¶ 12; and (3)
20
with respect to whom no parent or legal guardian in the United
States was available to quickly provide care and physical
custody over R.M.B, as D.B. was over 160 miles away at the time
of R.M.B.’s apprehension.
D.B.’s “availability”
11
Accord 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)(ii).
to provide care and assert physical
custody over R.M.B. at the time of his apprehension is central
to the dispute between the parties.
This classification, or any
subsequent “final agency action,” might theoretically be subject
to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
5 U.S.C. § 702.
See
But R.M.B.’s custody that occurred as a result
of this initial determination does not violate the laws of the
United States, as required for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
The statutory definition of an “unaccompanied alien
child” has been the center of much controversy.
This
controversy is memorialized in a memorandum from the
Congressional Research Service that is attached as an exhibit to
D.B.’s reply brief.
Mem.”)
(See Pet’r’s Reply Ex. J [Dkt. 16-10] “CRS
Therein, an official from the Congressional Research
Service’s Domestic Social Policy Division responded to the House
Judiciary Committee’s inquiry regarding the classification of
11
DHS’s initial classification of R.M.B. as an unaccompanied
alien child implies that the CBP field officers determined that
Petitioner was “not available” to provide care and physical
custody to R.M.B. at the time of his apprehension. This
discretionary determination is not subject to review by this
Court under section 2241, for the reasons discussed below.
21
unaccompanied or accompanied alien children.
(Id. at 1.)
The
memorandum clarified classification procedures and discussed
standard practices, recognizing that as is relevant here,
federal agencies are afforded discretion under the statutory
scheme when classifying juveniles as unaccompanied alien
children.
Specifically,
DHS officials maintain that when a CBP
officer arrests a juvenile, the officer has
some discretion to either take the juvenile
into federal custody, allow the child to
voluntarily return across a border [if
applicable], or release the juvenile to an
adult
relative
in
the
United
States.
However, it is mostly the case that a
juvenile apprehended at the border is taken
into federal custody by the CBP field
officer.
(Id. at 4 (emphasis added).)
This discretionary action by CBP
officials forms the substance of Petitioner’s statutory claim:
CBP officials erroneously classified R.M.B. as an unaccompanied
alien child, and therefore, his custody allegedly violates
federal law.
“However, § 2241 does not say that habeas is
available to challenge purely discretionary (yet arguably
unwise) decisions made by the executive branch that do not
involve violations of the Constitution or federal law.”
Gutierrez-Chaves v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 298 F.3d
824, 827 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Bowrin v. U.S. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 194 F.3d 483, 490 (4th Cir. 1999).
Indeed, all circuits to consider the proper scope of review for
22
2241 petitions filed by aliens challenging removal orders “have
concluded that habeas review of administrative factual findings
or the exercise of discretion is impermissible.”
Cadet v.
Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1184 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Bakhtriger
v. Elwood, 260 F.3d 414, 425 (3d Cir. 2004); Bravo v. Ashcroft,
341 F.3d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 2003); Gutierrez-Chaves, 298 F.3d at
829-830, amended by, 337 F.3d 1023; Carranza v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 277 F.3d 65, 71-73 (1st Cir. 2002); Sol v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 274 F.3d 648, 651 (2d Cir.
2001); Bowrin, 194 F.3d at 490).
Even though Gutierrez-Chaves is factually
distinguishable from the facts of this case, the legal
proposition gleaned from that case, and from Bowrin, is
applicable here.
Quite simply,
[h]abeas is available to claim that the
[federal agency] somehow failed to exercise
discretion in accordance with federal law or
did so in an unconstitutional manner.
But
habeas is not available to claim that the
[federal agency] simply came to an unwise,
yet lawful, conclusion when it did exercise
its discretion.
Gutierrez-Chaves, 298 F.3d at 828; see also Bowrin, 194 F.3d at
490 (“Only questions of pure law will be considered on § 2241
habeas review.
Review of factual or discretionary issues is
prohibited.”).
This distinction under section 2241 is narrow.
While Petitioner cannot use section 2241 habeas relief to obtain
23
review of the CBP’s discretionary classification of R.M.B. as an
Unaccompanied Alien Child, Petitioner’s claim that the
discretionary process itself was constitutionally flawed is
cognizable in district court on habeas review because such a
claim fits within the scope of section 2241.
298 F.3d at 829.
Gutierrez-Chaves,
Those claims are discussed infra, section
III.C.
Moreover, once R.M.B. was classified as a UAC by CBP
field officers, in accordance with federal law, HHS/ORR cannot
release R.M.B. to the custody of another individual, including
D.B., unless HHS/ORR “makes a determination that the proposed
custodian is capable of providing for the child’s physical and
mental well-being.”
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(A).
And indeed,
HHS/ORR has complied with this statutory provision and with 8
U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(B) by conducting a Home Study for Petitioner
to determine whether Petitioner is capable of providing for his
physical and mental well-being.
(Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. D.)
Additionally, R.M.B underwent a psychological evaluation and
psychosexual evaluation.12
(Id. Exs. F, G.)
12
The Home Study and
The Court need not address these evaluations, as they are not
required by statute, unlike the Home Study. Needless to say,
however, the results of the evaluations are disturbing, and
support the conclusion that R.M.B.’s current needs can only be
met in a secure setting, which Petitioner cannot currently
provide. (See Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. C (“R.M.B. is a very troubled
and violent young man who is struggling with chronic depressive
tendencies, an unstable and unpredictable sense of self,
24
psychological evaluations reach the same conclusion: R.M.B.
requires a very restrictive and secure living environment, and
the Petitioner is not capable of providing for his well-being at
this time.13
Ultimately, in accordance with 8 U.S.C. §
1232(c)(3)(B), HHS/ORR concluded that Petitioner “clearly
hypervigilance, high levels of impulsivity and anger, severe
substance abuse and a complete disregard for basic social norms
or laws.”); Ex. F (concluding R.M.B. “should not live at home or
reside in a home where there are children three years younger
than him. He should only have supervised contact with his
siblings or any other child . . . [due to] possible engagement
in homicidal behaviors, association with gang members, inability
to manage his anger and impulsivity and lengthy substance abuse
history . . . .”).)
13
Specifically, on March 4, 2014, HHS/ORR completed a Home
Study, again in accordance with federal law, 8 U.S.C. §
1232(c)(3)(B), to determine whether R.M.B. could be released to
the Petitioner’s custody. (Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. D.) Notably, in
March of 2013, Petitioner was charged with child endangerment
and abandonment. (De La Cruz Decl. ¶ 18.) At that time, her
children, including R.M.B., were temporarily removed from her
care. (Id.) Petitioner also admitted to being in an abusive
relationship with T.R., R.M.B.’s stepfather. (Id.) After a
thorough investigation, despite the fact that her children were
eventually returned to her by child protective services, and
despite Petitioner’s willingness to care for R.M.B., HHS/ORR
concluded that placement with Petitioner was not appropriate at
that time because: (1) Petitioner’s home was not a safe and
stable environment due to Petitioner’s abusive relationship with
R.M.B.’s stepfather; (2) R.M.B. has an extensive criminal
history, and a history of substance abuse; (3) R.M.B. has an
active warrant for his arrest; (4) Petitioner was unable to
provide a safety plan for R.M.B.; and (5) R.M.B. previously
demonstrated defiant behavior while in HHS/ORR’s custody. (Id.
at 13.) One week later, on March 11, 2014, an independent
third-party concurred with this recommendation, “based on the
concerns of domestic violence, [R.M.B.’s] criminal charges,
[R.M.B.’s] substance abuse, and the overall needs of both R.M.B.
and his family, [concluding] it does not appear that a safe
release can be made at this time.” (Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. E at 5.)
25
presents a risk of abuse, maltreatment, exploitation, or
trafficking to the child based on all available objective
evidence.”
(De La Cruz Decl. ¶ 18.)
On March 12, 2014, HHS/ORR
formally denied Petitioner’s application for custody of R.M.B.
(Resp’ts’ Mem. Ex. G.)
After Petitioner requested
reconsideration, on June 10, 2015, the Acting Assistant
Secretary for Children and Families denied Petitioner’s
reconsideration request due to “concerns and necessity to
provide structured supervision,” among other issues presented in
the Home Study.
(Id. Ex. H.)
In short, with regard to
Petitioner’s first statutory argument, Petitioner fails to
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Respondents’ custody of R.M.B. violates any federal law.
Indeed, the only statutory provision that Petitioner cites in
this regard is 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2), the definition of an
unaccompanied alien child, which again illustrates that
Petitioner contests the Respondents’ discretionary
classification of R.M.B. as a UAC.14
14
But this argument does not
Petitioner also cites Coreas-Giron v. Holder, 422 F. App’x
602, 603 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)(C)(ii))
for the proposition that the minor child at issue in that case
did not meet the statutory definition of a UAC because he lived
with his mother in the United States. This case is
distinguishable factually and legally. First, in that case, the
minor was actually living with his mother, unlike R.M.B. who was
unaccompanied and living on his own by the Mexican border at the
time of his apprehension. Second, this case involved asylum
petitions and not HHS/ORR’s custodial requirements for such
26
prove that R.M.B. is currently in custody in violation of
federal law.
Thus, Petitioner’s first statutory argument fails
to state a proper claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and
the Petition will be denied on this basis.
b. Effect of Termination of Immigration Proceedings
Next, Petitioner argues that because the removal
proceedings against R.M.B. have been terminated, his continued
immigration detention is unlawful and he must be released.
(Pet’r’s Mem. at 3-5.)
As support for this argument, Petitioner
contends that the federal government can only detain a person in
immigration custody pursuant to a warrant and pending
adjudication of that person’s removability.
(Id. at 3 (citing 8
C.F.R. § 236.1(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General,
an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”).)
Petitioner’s argument in this regard relies on a false premise,
i.e., that R.M.B. is in “immigration detention.”
For the
following reasons, the Court will also deny the Petition on this
basis.
R.M.B. is not in “immigration detention,” as
Petitioner contends.
As discussed at length above, R.M.B. is in
the custody of HHS/ORR, a federal agency that has no
children. Accordingly, it does not impact the Court’s analysis
or this outcome.
27
responsibility for adjudicating the immigration status of any
individual.
See 6 U.S.C. § 279(c).
Instead, R.M.B.’s
classification as a UAC has resulted in his HHS/ORR custody.
And the statutory framework precludes HHS/ORR from releasing
R.M.B. to the custody of any individual unless it determines
that the proposed individual “is capable of providing for the
child’s physical or mental well-being.”
1232(c)(3)(A).
8 U.S.C. §
Notably, in 2002, by enacting the HSA, Congress
intentionally separated HHS/ORR from any immigration
considerations or decisions.
See 153 Cong. Rec. S3001, S3004
(daily ed. Mar. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“This
change finally resolved the conflict of interest inherent in the
former system that pitted the enforcement side of the [INS]
against the benefits side of that same agency in the care of
unaccompanied alien children.”).
As the statute expressly recognizes, in an effort to
combat child trafficking and exploitation in the United States,
“the care and custody of all unaccompanied alien children . . .
shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.”
8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1).
And most importantly,
nothing in the statutory scheme at issue “may be construed to
transfer the responsibility for adjudicating benefit
determinations under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.) from the authority of any official of the
28
Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, or
the Department of State.”
6 U.S.C. § 279(c).
In other words,
when read together, the statutory framework tasks HHS/ORR
primarily with caring for and assuming custody over UACs; all
immigration adjudications remain with DOJ, DHS, or the State
Department.
Again, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Petitioner must show
that R.M.B.’s custody violates federal law.
Petitioner fails to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the termination
of R.M.B.’s removal proceeding somehow causes HHS/ORR’s custody
over R.M.B. to violate federal law.
Because HHS/ORR’s continued
custody over R.M.B. is in accordance with the statutory
framework designed by Congress, the Court will deny the Petition
on this basis as well.
C. Constitutional Claim
Lastly, Petitioner contends that HHS/ORR’s continued
custody of R.M.B. violates R.M.B.’s substantive and procedural
due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.
(Pet. at 5; Pet’r’s Mem. at 5-9.)
The Court
disagrees in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
The Supreme Court decided this
case before Congress enacted the HSA in 2002, and thus, the
Court scrutinized the now-defunct statutory and regulatory
scheme promulgated by the now-defunct INS that governed the
29
release and custody of alien juveniles.
However, the reasoning
from Flores regarding substantive and procedural due process
extends to the statutory scheme at issue in this case and
HHS/ORR’s custody of unaccompanied alien children.
In Flores, juvenile aliens who were detained on
suspicion of being deportable challenged the INS regulation that
provided for release only to their parents, close relatives, or
legal guardians, except in unusual and compelling circumstances.
Id. at 294-99.
Under the regulation, juvenile aliens who were
not released under the above conditions were placed in juvenile
care facilities.
Id.
The juvenile aliens argued under the
Constitution and immigration laws that they had a right to be
routinely released into the custody of other “responsible
adults.”
Id.
Specifically, as relevant here, the juvenile
aliens made two arguments: (1) they had a “fundamental right to
freedom from physical restraint” and it was a denial of
“substantive due process” to detain them because the INS “cannot
prove that it [was] pursuing an important government interest in
a manner narrowly tailored to minimize the restraint on liberty”
and (2) the regulation violates “procedural due process, because
it does not require the [INS] to determine, with regard to each
individual detained juvenile who lacks an approved custodian,
whether his best interests lie in remaining in INS custody or in
release to some other ‘responsible adult.’”
30
Id. at 299-300.
First, the Supreme Court determined that the right at
issue was “the alleged right of a child who has no available
parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the
government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a
willing-and-able private custodian rather than a governmentoperated or government-selected child-care institution.”
302.
Id. at
The Court noted the novelty of the issue, and ultimately
held that the INS regulation did not deprive the juvenile aliens
of “substantive due process.”
Flores, 507 U.S. at 304-305.
The
Court found that the government’s humane custody of juvenile
aliens with no available parent, close relative, or legal
guardian was rationally connected to promoting the general
welfare of the child.
Id. at 303 (citation omitted).
Moreover,
in the context of alien children, the Court recognized the
judiciary’s deferral to the political branches of the federal
government.
Id. at 305 (“For reasons long recognized as valid,
the responsibility of for regulating the relationship between
the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to
the political branches of the Federal Government.”) (quoting
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
Indeed, “over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete.”
Flores, 507 U.S. at 305 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (additional citations omitted)).
31
Here, the facts are slightly different, in that D.B.,
R.M.B.’s mother, argues that she is both available and willing
to care for R.M.B., and that by refusing to release R.M.B. into
her custody, the federal government is interfering with her
fundamental liberty interest in having custody of her child.
(Pet’r’s Reply at 11-12 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody,
and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”)).)
But the federal government has determined, in its discretion and
either rightly or wrongly, but in accordance with statute, that
R.M.B. is an alien child that has no available parent.
Thus,
the right at issue here is more properly characterized as the
alleged right of an alien child who has no available parent,
close relative, or legal guardian, as determined by the federal
government, and for whom the government is responsible, to
nonetheless be placed in the custody of his parent, who cannot,
at this time, properly care for his mental and physical needs.
This cannot be characterized as a fundamental right.
See
Flores, 507 U.S. at 305 (“The impairment of a lesser interest
(here, the alleged interest in being released into the custody
of strangers) demands no more than a ‘reasonable fit’ between
governmental purpose (here, protecting the welfare of the
juveniles who have come into the Government’s custody) and the
32
means chosen to advance that purpose.”).
And it is entirely
reasonable for the federal government to advance the interest of
protecting the welfare of R.M.B., a minor now within its
custody.
The record is replete with factual bases for why
R.M.B. cannot be released to D.B.’s custody at this time, and
they need not be repeated here.
There are also no other
suitable custodial arrangements available for R.M.B. at this
time, based on his needs.
See id. at 302 (“[J]uveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody, and where the
custody of the parent or legal guardian fails, the government
may (indeed, we have said must) either exercise custody itself
or appoint someone else to do so.”) (quoting Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)).
Ultimately, Flores controls this
outcome, and for these reasons, the Court holds that the
statutory scheme does not deprive Petitioner of “substantive due
process.”
Id. at 300-306.
Second, the Supreme Court held that the juvenile
aliens’ demand for an individualized custody hearing was merely
the “substantive due process” argument recast in procedural
terms, and that existing INS procedures were sufficient to
satisfy “procedural due process.”
Id. at 307-309.
Specifically, the Court found that due process was satisfied by
giving the detained alien juveniles the right to a hearing
before an immigration judge.
Id. at 309.
33
Here, R.M.B. was afforded the same right to a hearing
before an immigration judge, where his immigration proceedings
were terminated.
And in 2002, Congress separated the
immigration enforcement mechanism from the care and custody of
unaccompanied alien children, which now rests solely with
HHS/ORR, an agency that has no involvement in immigration
matters.
D.B. completed the procedural administrative process
in an attempt to gain custody of R.M.B., in accordance with
federal statute.
HHS ultimately denied her request, both
initially and upon reconsideration, which presumably is subject
to deferential judicial review under the APA.
702.
See 5 U.S.C. §
Thus, the Court finds that from a procedural due process
perspective, the mechanism currently in place satisfies any
constitutional scrutiny.
Therefore, the Court will also deny
the Petition on this basis.
It is worth noting that Petitioner raises a valid
argument regarding the historical abstention of federal courts
from deciding and meddling into matters of domestic relations or
family law.
(See Pet’r’s Reply at 17-18 (quoting In re Burrus,
136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”).)
However, R.M.B. came to the attention of--and eventually found
himself in the custody of--the federal government due to his
34
age, immigration status, and unaccompanied status.
“[I]n the
exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization,
‘Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens.’”
Flores, 507 U.S. at 305-306 (quoting
Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
79-80 (1976))). Congress made explicit its choice to separate
the enforcement mechanisms of USCIS and the care of
unaccompanied alien children with HHS/ORR when it enacted the
HSA in 2002.
Regardless, R.M.B.’s immigration status in this
country ultimately factored into his current custody with
HHS/ORR, and this Court recognizes the overriding and broad
power afforded to the legislative branch regarding issues of
immigration.
In sum, the Court views this case through the lens
of immigration and habeas law, rather than “domestic custody
issues” as framed by Petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court finds
nothing unconstitutional in this regard either.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
An appropriate Order shall issue.
August 5, 2015
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
35
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