Carroll v. Vinnell Arabia, LLC.

Filing 56

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James C. Cacheris on 1/7/2016. (dvanm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

DANIEL B. CARROLL,

Plaintiff,
v.
VINNELL ARABIA, LLC,
Defendant.

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M E M O R A N D U M

1:15cv815(JCC/JFA)

O P I N I O N

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Daniel
Carroll’s Motion to Alter Judgment [Dkt. 41], and relatedly,
Plaintiff Daniel Carroll’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s
Memorandum in Opposition [Dkt. 49].

Plaintiff requests that the

Court alter its September 22, 2015 order dismissing his
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction due to the Court’s
alleged failure to consider personal jurisdiction pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

The Court denies

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion to
Strike Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition for the reasons
discussed below.
I. Background
The facts remain as described in this court’s previous
Memorandum Opinion of September 22, 2015 [Dkt. 39].
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On October

20, 2015, Plaintiff Daniel Carroll, now acting pro se, filed a
Motion to Alter Judgment seeking reversal of this Court’s Order
of September 22, 2015 [Dkt. 40].

Defendant Vinnell Arabia filed

their opposition brief on November 5, 2015.

Plaintiff filed a

Motion to Strike Defendant’s opposition brief on November 9,
2015.

Defendant filed their Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike on November 10, 2015.

Oral

argument has been waived on both motions, and both motions are
ripe for decision.
II. Legal Standard
Plaintiff asks the Court to amend its previous Order
of September 22, 2015 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e).

A court may amend a judgment under Rule 59(e)

in the following three circumstances: “(1) to accommodate an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new
evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error
of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993).

Hutchinson v. Staton,

Amending a judgment “is an

extraordinary remedy that should be applied sparingly.”
Mayfield v. NASCAR, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2012).

A

reconsideration motion “is inappropriate if it asks the court to
‘reevaluate the basis upon which it made a prior ruling’ or
‘merely seeks to reargue a previous claim.’”

Projects Mgmt. Co.

v. DynCorp Int’l, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d 539, 541 (E.D. Va. 2014)
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(quoting United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 969 F. Supp.
975, 977 (E.D. Va. 1997)).

A Rule 59(e) motion does not allow

parties “to raise arguments which could have been raised prior
to the issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue a
case under a novel legal theory that the party had the ability
to address in the first instance.”

Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l

Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998).
III. Analysis
The Court begins by noting that the Plaintiff could
have raised their argument for personal jurisdiction pursuant to
Rule 4(k)(2) in their original opposition to the Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff’s argument that he could not raise

a Rule 4(k)(2) argument until the Court had already determined
that the Defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Virginia is incorrect.

See Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC

“Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory”, 283 F.3d 208, 215-216 (4th
Cir. 2002)(“it is generally permissible for a litigant to
present inconsistent alternate positions in a case” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

The Fourth Circuit has held that

“Rule 59(e) motions may not be used [] to raise arguments which
could have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment,
nor may they be used to argue a case under a novel legal theory
that the party had the ability to address in the first
instance.”

Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403.
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Plaintiff could

have made his 4(k)(2) argument during the earlier proceedings on
the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and elected not to do so.
Plaintiff cannot now use a rule 59(e) to raise his 4(k)(2)
argument after dismissal.

However, because of the unique

circumstances in this case regarding the contentious
relationship between the Plaintiff and his former attorneys, the
Court will proceed to analyze the merits of the Plaintiff’s Rule
4(k)(2) argument, which ultimately fails.
In the Court’s previous memorandum opinion dismissing
this case, the Court explained that this Court could not
constitutionally subject Vinnell Arabia to specific jurisdiction
in this case because the plaintiff’s claims arose from “Vinnell
Arabia’s alleged misconduct in Saudi Arabia, not Virginia”.
(Order, at 19.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) does

not alter the constitutional minimum contacts analysis the Court
employed in reaching its previous decision.

It merely expands

the geographical scope of the inquiry from the forum state to
the United States as a whole.

See Touchom, Inc. V. Bereskin &

Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“while the test of
specific jurisdiction under 4(k)(2) involves the same steps as
under 4(k)(1), we must consider appellees contacts with the
nation as a whole” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).

Here, expanding the geographical scope of the forum

from Virginia to the United States generally would not change
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the Court’s previous analysis of the constitutional sufficiency
of Defendant’s contacts with the forum.

As the Court previously

noted, Vinnell Arabia is domiciled in Saudi Arabia, and all of
the conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim took place in Saudi
Arabia.

Plaintiff was living in Saudi Arabia when he applied

for the position at issue, the interviews took place in Saudi
Arabia, the position was to be performed in Saudi Arabia, and
all decisions regarding the position were made in Saudi Arabia.
Because Carroll’s claim does not arise out of activities
directed at the United States, but rather out of activities
which took place in and were directed towards Saudi Arabia, it
would not be “consistent with the United States Constitution and
laws” for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
Vinnell Arabia in this case.
Lastly, Carroll requests that the Court strike Vinnell
Arabia’s brief in opposition to his Motion to Amend Judgment,
arguing that the brief was five days late.
Strike [Dkt. 49] at 1-2.)

(Pl.’s Mot. to

Specifically, Carroll claims that

because he filed his motion on October 20, 2015, under the Local
Rules of this Court and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Vinnell Arabia’s brief was due eleven days thereafter, or on
October 31, 2015.

(Id. citing E.D. Va. Local Civ. R. 7(F)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A)-(B).)

By filing the brief on

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November 5, 2015, Carroll claims the reply brief should be
stricken as untimely.

The Court does not agree.

As Vinnell Arabia correctly notes, Rule 6 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs computation of time for
which certain actions must be taken in federal civil litigation.
(Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Strike [Dkt. 51] at 1-2.)
Specifically:
(a) Computing Time.
The following rules
apply in computing any time period specified
in these rules, in any local rule or court
order, or in any statute that does not
specify a method of computing time.
(1) Period Stated in Days or a Longer Unit.
When the period is stated in days or a
longer unit of time:
(A) exclude the day of the event that
triggers the period;
(B) count every day, including intermediate
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and
(C) include the last day of the period, but
if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday, the period continues to run
until the end of the next day that is not a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1).

This provision governs the computation

of deadlines in briefing schedules, as defined by this Court’s
Local Rules.

Under E.D. Va. Local Civil Rule 7(F)(1), once a

motion is filed, “the opposing party shall file a responsive
brief and such supporting documents as are appropriate, within
eleven (11) days after service and the moving party may file a

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rebuttal brief within three (3) days after the service of the
opposing party’s reply brief.”

Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 6(d), when a party serves papers by mail, leaves it
with the clerk of court, sends it by electronic means, or
delivers it by any other means that the person consented to in
writing, then “3 days are added after the period would otherwise
expire under Rule 6(a).”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), (F)).
In 2005, the advisory committee amended Rule 6 “to
remove any doubt as to the method for extending the time to
respond after service by mail, leaving with the clerk of court,
electronic means, or other means consented to by the party
served.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (2005).

Specifically, and importantly for purposes of this litigation,
“[t]hree days are added after the prescribed period otherwise
expires under Rule 6(a).”

Id.

In other words, if

electronically served, three days are not automatically added to
the three day period to file a reply brief under this Court’s
local rules for a total of six days.

Instead, three additional

days are added from the date the original three-day period
expired.

The advisory committee provides the following

illustration:
Assum[e] that the thirtieth day of a thirtyday period is Saturday. Under Rule 6(a) the
period expires on the next day that is not a
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Sunday or legal holiday.
If the following
Monday is a legal holiday, under Rule 6(a)
the period expires on Tuesday.
Three days
are
then
added--Wednesday, Thursday and
Friday as the third and final day to act.
Id.
Here, when the above principles are applied, it
becomes readily apparent that Carroll’s motion to strike the
reply brief must be denied.

Carroll filed his Motion to Amend

Judgment on Tuesday, October 20, 2015.
1.)

(Pl.’s Mot. to Strike at

Under Local Rule 7(F)(1), Vinnell Arabia as “the opposing

party shall file a responsive brief and such supporting
documents as are appropriate, within eleven (11) days after
service.”

E.D. Va. Local Civil Rule 7(F)(1).

Excluding

Tuesday, the day of the event that triggers the eleven day
period, the eleven day period expires on Saturday, after
counting through Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.

Under Rule 6(a),

however, the period actually expires on the next day that is not
a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

Therefore, the eleven day

period under this Court’s local rules expired on Monday,
November 2, 2015.

It is undisputed that Vinnell Arabia then

gets three additional days, pursuant to Rule 6(d), for serving
the opposition by electronic means, which means that the
deadline to file its reply brief was Thursday, November 5, 2015,
the date it was actually filed.
51].)

(See Def.’s Reply Brief [Dkt.

The memorandum in opposition was therefore timely filed.
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment and deny Plaintiff’s Motion
to Strike Defendant’s Opposition Brief.
An appropriate Order shall issue.

January 7, 2016
Alexandria, Virginia

/s/
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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