Peschke Map Technologies LLC v. Rouse Properties, Inc.

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Liam O'Grady on 3/8/2016. (rban, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

mar -8 20ib

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

aERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Peschke Map Technologies LLC,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. l:15-cv-1365

Rouse Properties Inc.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Rouse

Properties Inc. ("Rouse"). Plaintiff Peschke Map Technologies LLC ("Peschke") filed a

Complaint against Rouse on October 20, 2015, claiming patent infringement.' Rouse, in turn,
filed the current Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Plaintiffs Patent is invalid.
For the reasons outlined below, the Court finds good cause to grant the Motion to
Dismiss. Plaintiffs Patent is not valid. BecauseRouse cannot infringeon an invalid patent, it is

appropriate for the Court to dismiss the Complaint at this time.
I. Background

Plaintiff holds the rights to United States Patent No. 6,397,143 (the "M43 Patent"), which
was invented by George Peschke inthe late 1990s. Mr. Peschke filed his patent application on
October 26, 2000. The PTO issued the ' 143 Patent on May 28, 2002. The Patent contains 19
claims, two of which—Claims 1 and 17—are independent.

' PlaintifT filed an almost identical Complaint against Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust. I:l5-cv-1366.
The Defendants in both cases filed almost identical motions to dismiss. The Court heard these motions together at
the March 4, 2016, hearing.

The invention covered by the '143 Patent is a "computer based" "map navigation and
display system" that is "used to assist users in locating stores and businesses" through "the visual
presentation of a shopping center showing the layout of the buildings and stores." '143 Pat col.
1:6-9; abstract. The basic iteration of the system is a map of a shopping mall that displays the

location and shape of all of the different stores in the mall. Each store functions as a link that,
when clicked on, takes the user to a "description page" containing information about that

particular store. The system might also contain several levels of maps that permit a user to zoom
in to and out of the shopping mall from a larger region or neighborhood. This system is designed

to give consumers access to information about different stores using the physical layout ofa mall

as opposed to, for example, navigating through a list ofthe names ofthe stores at a mall.
The Defendant allegedly owns a website for a shopping mall that uses this type of

computerized mapping system. Specifically, Plaintiff says Defendant Rouse is infringing on die
'143 Patent through its webpage <http://www.chesterfieldcenter.com/map.php7outlet_id

=MTg30DY=&level=g#CHE0001>, which contains a map ofChesterfield Town Center, located
in Chesterfield, Virginia.
11. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the

pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ARule 12(b)(6) motion tests the
sufficiency ofa complaint without resolving factual disputes; therefore a district court '"must

accept as true all ofthe factual allegations contained in the complaint' and 'draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plalntifT.'" Kensington Volimleer Fire Dep't v. Montgomery County,

684 F.3d462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting E.I. duPontde Nemoi/rs <& Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc.,

637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir , 2011)). However, to survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual information to "state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bel!All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550
(2007). Further, a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) must be considered in

combination with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When the complaint asserts patent
infringement, "a patentee need only plead facts sufficient to place the alleged infringer on notice.
The requirement ensures that the accused infringer has sufficient knowledge of the facts alleged

to enable it to answer the complaint and defend itself" Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospiiality
Franchise Systems, Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 794 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
III. Discussion

Defendant argues that the Complaint must be dismissed because the '143 Patent is
invalid. More specifically. Defendant asserts that the ' 143 Patent is directed at a patent-

ineligible abstract idea. Plaintiff, in response, contends that these arguments are not properly
raised at the 12(b)(6) stageand that the '143 Patent is valid. The Courtaddresses each argument
m turn.

A. Whether These Argimenls Are Properly Raised in a Motion to Dismiss
First, Plaintiff contends that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is premature because the

Court has not yet construed any of the claims in the '143 Patent. As a general matter,"patent

eligibility under section 101 is a question of law, [and] the Court can resolve such issue on the
pleadings, if theeligibility of the subject matter of the patents-in-suit does not involve an
underlying factual dispute." Certu.sView Techs., LLC v. S & N Locating Set-vs.. LLC, 111 P.

Supp. 3d 688, 704(E.D. Va. 2015). The Federal Circuit has made clear that there is no "bright
line rule requiring district courts to construe claims before determining subject matter

eligibility." Ultramercial. LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011) cert.
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. WildTangent. Inc. v. Ultramercial LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431,

182 L. Ed. 2d 1059 (2012).^ The Federal Circuit explained that "because eligibility is a 'coarse'
gauge of the suitability of broad subject matter categories for patent protection, claim
construction may not always be necessary for a § 101 analysis." Id. (citations omitted). As

Defendant points out, many courts have decided § 101 eligibility prior to claim constructioa
See, e.g.. In re TLICommc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 87 F. Supp. 3d 773, 805 (E.D. Va. 2015) ("tA]ll

of the claims in the '295 patent are invalid, and defendants' consolidated motion to dismiss is

granted in these respects."); see also OIP Technologies. Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2015). For example, the Supreme Court found ihe patent at issue in Bilski v, Kappos

was aimed at patent-ineligible subject matter before claim constructionhad occurred. 130 S.Ct.
3218, 3231 (2010). Nevertheless, this Court acknowledges that "it will ordinarily be desirable—

and oflen necessary—to resolve claim constructiondisputes prior to a § 101 analysis." Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. ofCanada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
This is because claim construction may "clarify the basic character of the subject matter of the
invention," and may resolve "questions about subject matter abstractness." Ultramercial, 657
F.3dat 1325.

Aftera thorough review of the '143 Patent, the Courtconcludes that the claimed subject
matter is readily ascertainable from the face of the '143 Patent. The claims in the '143 Patent
describe a "[m]ethod of presentingand providing navigation through a series of maps." '143
Patent, col. 7:17-18; col. 8:44-45. The invention includes at least three levels of maps. Claim 1

provides for a first level map that depicts several store layouts. Id. col. 7:20-21. For each store
' "Although Uhramerdal has since been vacated bythe Supreme Court," the Federal Circuit has realTirmed its
conclusion that "claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determinaiion under § 101."

Bancorp Servs., LLC. v. SunLife Assur. Co. ofCanada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

layout depicted on the first level map, there is a corresponding "description page." Id. 22-23.
The invention also provides for a link for each store layout that, when activated, causes the
"description page to be displayed." Id. 25-28.

The ' 143 Patent next provides for a second level map that "depict[s] a larger physical
area than said first level map" and encompasses the area depicted in the first level map. Id. col.
7:29-35. The invention includes a "link from said second level map to said first level map." Id.

The Patent provides for several second level maps and "navigation symbols" that allow a user to
move from one second level map to the next. Id. 42-50. The navigation symbols correspondto

different physical directions. Id. "[A]ctivating one of said navigational symbols causes the
display of the nearest of saidsecond level maps depicting an area in that relative direction." Id.
The Patent also provides that where the first level map represents the location and shape of a
store within a shopping center, the second level map represents the shape of the shopping center
in which that store is located. Id. 57-61. The second level map also "represents the location of

said shopping center within a neighborhood." Id. 62-65.

The '143 Patent next provides for a "third level map" which "depict[s] a larger physical
area than said second level map," and encompasses the area covered by the second level map.
Id. col. 8: 4-9. The Patent provides for a link between the second and third level map. Id. The

third level map also depicts the layout of the shopping centers on theencompassed second level
maps and their relative location within a neighborhood. Id. 19-23; 32-36. The third level map
also "represents the location of said neighborhood within a region." Id. 24-31.
In addition to map levels, the Patent describes the use of "symbolic icons" and "text

based search." The "symbolic icons provid[eJ a non-textual indication of the type of business

conducted by" a particular store. Id. 1-3. The text based search allows a user to search for a

store by a selected "characteristic." Id. 37-44. A usercan searchby "address, business name,
business type, street name, town name, service provides, and goods sold." Id.

Claim 17, the second independent claim, reiterates the method of navigating through a
series of maps depicting store layouts located with shopping centers and providing description
pages for each store. Id. col. 8:46-col. 10:5. Claim 17 also provides for neighborhood maps and
regional maps of increasing geographic area linked together to enable a user to zoom in from a
larger area to a smaller area. Id.
As a whole, the invention seeks to assist a user in locating "a particular store through the
use of location and layout information," particularly where the address or name of a store is
unknown. Id. col. 2: 31-39. In addition to helping a user to find a store based on location, the

invention provides information about that store to the user "to allow the store to be contacted or
visited." Id. All of this is readily ascertainable from the face of the ' 143 Patent and is not

contested by the parties. Further, nearly all of the technical terms used in the ' 143 Patent—
including click, layout, link, hyperlink, neighborhood, region, shopping center, and store—have
been defined in the glossary section.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that claim construction is necessary to determine the scope
of the claims in the '143 Patent prior to the § 101 analysis. Plaintiff cites just one term—

"description page"—that it argues needs to be defined before the validity of the Patent can be
determined. The Court does not find this persuasive. It is true that "description page" is not

specifically defined in the glossary section of the '143 Patent. However, the Patent does describe
providing users with "detailed information about a particular store or business such as name,
address, telephone numbers, hours of operation, etc." Id. col. 2:1-3. Further, and most

importantly, Plaintiff has not indicated how defining "description page" in a claim construction

hearing would clarify the subject matter of the invention or change the Court's analysis in any

PlaintiiTalso argues that this Court must conduct claim construction before analyzing the

patent under § 101 because the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Delaware, in a

separate action,"found claim constructionwas necessary to understand the scope and meaning of
the claim terms" in the '143 Patent. PI. Memo. 0pp. at 4. The Court also does not find this

argument persuasive. It is true that theDistrict of Delaware conducted claim construction for the
'143 Patent. Peschke Map Techs. LLC v. J.J. Gumberg el ai, l:12-cv-1525, Dkt. 81 (D. Del.
June 3,2014). However, that Courtdid not conclude that claim construction was necessary

specifically for itto conduct a § 101 analysis. Id. It does not appear that the parties ever
contested the validity of the '143 Patent in that case. The Court thus declines to read this
conclusion into the District of Delaware's order.

As described above, the character of the '143 Patent is readily ascertainable from the face
of the Patent. Plaintiffhas identified just one term that it argues needs to be defined to

understand the scope ofthe Patent. The Court does not find il necessary to define this term in a
claim construction hearing to conduct a validity analysis of the '143 Patent under § 101.

Accordingly, the Court concludes this Motion to Dismiss is not premature.
B. Whether the Claims of the '143 Patent Are Invalid Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
"Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter eligible for patent protection."

Alice Corp. Pty. v. CIS Bank Int 7, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). This section provides that an
individual who "invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or

composition ofmatter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements ofthis title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court

has long held that there are several important exceptions to this provision; that is, "[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Associationfor Molecular
Pathology V. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (citing A/aj'o Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)). However, considering
the reality that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are "the basic tools of
scientific and technological work," the Supreme Court has also expressed concern that these
exceptions would "swallow all of patent law." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).

With this concern in mind, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories.
Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012), the Supreme Court "set forth a framework for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-

eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. First, a court must "determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept." Id. If the patent is
directed at a law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea, the court must consider whether
the claims contain an "inventive concept" that "transform the nature of the claim" into patenteligible subject matter. Mayo, 132 S.Ct., at 1297-98.

Defendant argues that PlaintifTs patent is directed at a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
The Court, therefore, must first determine whether the claims in the ' 143 Patent are directed at an
abstract idea. If so, the Court then must determine whether the claims contain a transformative

inventive concept that transforms the abstract idea into a patent-eligible subject matter.
1) Whether the Claims in the ' 143 Patent are Directed to an Abstract Idea

The Supreme Court has not precisely defined the outer limits of what constitutes an
abstract idea, however, the Court has provided some concrete guidance. "The 'abstract ideas'

category embodies the longstanding rule that an idea of itself is not patentable." Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355 (citations and quotations omitted). Following this principal, the Supreme Court has held

that "mathematical algorithms, including those executed on a generic computer, are abstract
ideas." DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing
Goltschalk v. Benson., 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972)). In addition, "longstanding commercial

practices," fundamental economic procedures, and other "well-understood, routine conventional
activities," are considered abstract ideas. Id.', Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356; Bilski v. Kappos, 1561

U.S. 593 (2010); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Further, "tying an abstract idea to a general purpose computer or to the Internet, wathout more, is

generally insufficient to make an abstract idea patentable." In re TLI Commc 'ns LLC Patent

Litig., 87 F. Supp. 3d 773, 783 (E.D. Va. 2015) (citing Uitramercial. Inc. v, Hulu. LLC, 772 F.3d
709, 715-17 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

As described above, the '143 Patent describes an electronic map navigation system that

enables a user to "locate aparticular store through the use oflocation and layout information"
and that provides a link to a description page containing information about the store. ' 143
Patent, col. 2:31-39. The claims also describe the ability to zoom in and out oflarger or smaller

geographic areas depicted on these maps. Id. 13-19; 35-36. The Court agrees with Defendant
that these are"well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]." See Mayo Collaborative

Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,1291 (2012). For example, maps ofcities have

long existed that depict structures and include identifying marks that direct a user to information
about those structures. The Court finds Defendant's demonstrative map depicting theCity of

Alexandria telling. Def. Ex. B. The 1798 map titled "Town ofAlexandria" depicts the layout of
Alexandria and identifies the location of several structures, which have been labeled with

numbers. The "Remarks" section of the map identifies the building that corresponds to each

number. Like the invention covered by the '143 Patent, an individual using the Alexandria map
can locate a particular building "though the use of location and layout information even if the
address or even street is unknown." '143 Pat. col. 2:31-33. This map achieves the same result as
the invention described in the '143 Patent. The only difference is that the process described in

the '143 Patent occurs on a computer and uses hyperlinks that cause a description page to appear
instead of using markers that direct a user to an index or legend.
The Plaintiff makes much out of the fact that their invention is a "non-text based system"

that does not require, for example, the numbers used on the Alexandria map to provide a user
vi'ith information about a particular store. The Court finds this fact inapposite. The numbers

perform the same function as the hyperlinks in the ' 143 Patent in that they directs users to
information about the buildings. Further, the use of numbers does not change the reality that

both map systems present "information by physical layout and shapeand by relation to
geographic landmarks." Id. col. 1:6-10.
The Court also finds the use of multiple layers of maps that enables users to zoom into

and out of a geographic area is an unpatentable abstract idea. First, the ' 143 Patent admits that
the ability to zoom in and out is a well-known technique. Id col. 4:2-6 (Existing methods

emphasize the use of street names and/or addresses for navigation possibly combined with the
ability to zoom in and out of the current screen."). Second, atlases have long provided maps of
large geographic areas along with corresponding maps of smaller portions of these larger maps
that contain more detail. This system thus simply ties a long-standing practice to a general

purpose computer. As the case law indicates, suchan invention is an unpatentable abstract idea.
See In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 87 F. Supp. 3d 773, 783 (E.D. Va. 2015).

The dependent claims also do not change the natnre of the '143 Patent. The dependent
Claims (Claims 2-16 and 18-19) merely describe other conventional electronic map navigation

features such as panning, using symbolic icons, and text based searching. None of these features
add anything to the "143 Patent to take it outside of the abstract idea realm.
Finally, Plaintiff insists that the Claims in the "143 Patent are analogous to the claims in
DDR Holdings, LLC v. HoteJs.com, L.P., which were upheld as valid by the Federal Circuit. 773

F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). TTie Patent at issue in DDR Holdings addressed the problem of
retaining website visitors. Id. at 11248. The system covered by the DDR patent was described
as follows:

On activation of a hyperlink on a host website—such as an advertisement for a
third-party merchant—instead of taking the visitor to the merchant's website, the
system generates and directs the visitor to a composite web page that displays
product information from the third-party merchant, but retains the host website's
Mook and feel."

Thus, the host website can display a third-party merchant's

products, but retain its visitor traffic by displaying this product information from
within a generated web page that 'gives the viewer of the page the impression that
she is viewing pages served by the host' website.

Id (citations omitted). The Federal Circuit held that the claims in the DDR patent stood apart
from the other patents that the Federal Circuit and ihe Supreme Court had recently held invalid

"because they did not merely recite the performance of some business practice known from the

pre-Intemet world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet." Id. at 1257. Rather,
the claims were "necessarilyrooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem

specifically arising in the realm of computer networks." 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Plaintiffargues that its claims are also directed towards solving a problem that exists specifically
within the realm of computers and, accordingly, that the claims should be found valid.

The Court does not agree that the ' 143 Patent addresses a challenge particular to

computers or the Internet. Rather, the '143 Patent addresses a problem "known from the pre-

Internet world": navigating through maps and locating information about structures appearing on
those maps. Thus, the Court cannot analogize the claims in this case to those at issue in DDR
Holdings.
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the ' 143 Patent is directed at an

abstract idea. With this settled, the Court turns to the second step of the § 101 analysis.
2) Whether the Claims in the '143 Patent Contain an Inventive Concent

Step two of the § 101 analysis is a search for an "inventive concept." In this step, the
Court looks for "an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent

in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself." Alice
Corp. Pty. V. CLS Bonk Int 7, 134 S. Ct. 2347,2355 (2014) (citations and brackets omitted). "A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is

more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. (citing Mayo, 132
S.Ct. at 1297. To qualify as an inventive concept, the claims "must do more than simply state

the [abstract idea] while adding the words 'apply it.'" Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294. Further,

"[t]hoseadditional features must be more than 'well-understood, routine, conventional activity.'"
MicroSiralegyInc. v. Aptlus Corp.,

F. Supp. 3d

, 2015 WL 4425828. at *2 (E.D. Va. July

17,2015).

Gottschalk v. Benson is instructive here. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). In Benson, the Supreme

Court considered a patent that claimed an algorithm implemented on "a general-purpose digital
computer." Id. at 64. The Court first found the algorithm was an abstract idea and then
considered whether the patent applied the abstract idea in a "new and useful" way that would

make it patent eligible. Id. at 67. The patent described implementing the algorithm on a general

use computer that had long been in use. Id. The Court found that "simply implementing a

mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a computer, was not a patentable
application of that principle." Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (citing Benson 409 U.S. at 71).

In contrast, in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the Supreme Cotul held that a
computer-implemented process for curing rubber was patent eligible. The patent claim described
a "well-known" mathematical equation and utilized a computer, but it used that equation in a
new way to solve a technological problem in the process of rubber molding. Id. at 177,178.

This application made the otherwise abstract idea patentable. Id. The invention in Diehr used a
"thermocouple" to record constant temperature measurements inside a rubber mold; up until this
point, the industry had not been able to obtain these measurements. Id. at 178. The temperature
measurements were then processed in a computer, which constantly calculated the amount of
time the rubber in the mold needed to cure based on the temperature using the mathematical

equation. Id. at 178-79. The Diehr Court concluded that "the claims in Diehr were patent
eligible because they improved an existing technological process," namely curing rubber, "not
because they were implemented on a computer." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358.
This case is much closer to Benson than Diehr. After a review of the patent, the Court

must conclude that the claims do nothing more than describe an abstract idea with the instruction

to "apply it" on a computer, as in Benson. As the Supreme Court has made clear, "[g]iven the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of
'additional featur[e]'" that makes an abstract idea patentable. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations
omitted). Unlike in Diehr, the ' 143 Patent does not apply the abstract idea, using a computer, to
a new technological process or in an otherwise new way to solve a unique problem.

Plaintiff argues that the '143 Patent's "inventive concept" is the improvement of

computerized mapping through the use of layers and linking. Specifically, the Plaintiffpoints to

the Patent's requirement that hyperlinked icons be overlaid on a background map in the shape of
the different stores as a new and inventive concept. Plaintiff insists that when the computerized

mapping system was invented it was not commonplace to use an object overlaid on a map as a
hyperlink to an information page. The Court declines to find that using a hyperlinked icon in the
shape of a store overlaid on a map to be an inventive concept. This is simply the
computerization of the well-known practice, explained extensively above, of using a map that

depicts the shapes of stores as seen from above to provide the map user with information about
those different stores. The Plaintiff concedes that electronic maps, hyperlinks, and the use of
servers and databases to provide information were widely used when the system was invented.
The '143 Patent merely describes the use of these widely-used and well-understood tools to

implement the abstract idea on a computer. This application of the abstract idea does not make
the computerized mapping system patent-eligible.
As the ' 143 Patent has failed both steps of the patentability test set forth in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012) and/4//ce Corp.

Pty. V. CLSBankIni'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). the Court must conclude that the '143 Patent is
invalid.
IV. Conclusion

As explained above, the invention described in the '143 Patent is not patentable. The
invention does not pass the two part test laid out by the Supreme Court in Mayo and Alice. First,
the '143 Patent describes an abstract idea. Second, the '143 Patent does not contain an inventive

concept that would make the abstract idea patent-eligible. Finally, because the subject matter of
the Claims is readily ascertainable from the face of the '143 Patent, claim construction is not

necessary for the Court to consider the validity of the Patent. Accordingly, in this case, the § 101

analysis is properly conducted at the 12(b)(6) stage. Because the '143 Patent is invalid, the
Court finds good cause to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss.
An appropriate Order will issue.

l.iam O'Grady

zsAMii
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United States District Jua>