Holloway v. Taylor et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema on 8/14/17. Copy mailed by Chambers.(klau, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

Michael Holloway,
Plaintiff,
I:16cv410 (LMB/MSN)
Lt. Taylor and Officer Bradley,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Michael Holloway, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro

has filed a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants LieutenantC. Taylor and Officer R. Bradley
used excessive force by applying metal handcuffs during plaintiffs transportation to a medical
appointment at the Medical College of Virginia ("MCV"). Defendants have filed a joint Motion
for Summary Judgment with a supporting memorandum of law and exhibits and provided plaintiff
with the notice required by Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) and Local Rule
7(K). Plaintiff has filed a Motion in Limine, Dkt. No. 31, to exclude from evidence the affidavits
of officers A. Boone and L. Smallwood, which defendants included as exhibits in support of their
memorandum of law, Dkt. No. 27, and he has submitted a "Brief," which will be taken as his

memorandum in opposition to defendants' joint Motion for Summary Judgment. After
consideration of these submissions, the Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, judgment
will be entered in favor of the defendants, and plaintiffs Motion in Limine and Motion for
Evidentiary Hearing will be denied.
I.

Background

Plaintiff alleges that on July 10, 2015, he was an inmate at Indian Creek Correctional
Center ("ICCC") when he was escorted from his cell to a room in the back of the medical

department to change clothes for an appointment with his cardiologist at MCV. Compl. § IV.

Plaintiffs face sheet and gate pass, which ordinarily would include any relevant medical
restrictions, did not contain information concerning a metal cuff restriction.

Smallwood Aff. T| 4.

Such a restriction, however, was noted in plaintiffs medical records for the period from October 3,
2014 to October 3, 2015. Dkt. No. 40, Ex. 1 at 37. Plaintiff advised the defendants that if they

required him to wear metal handcuffs during his transportation to MCV, he would refuse to go.
Compl. § IV. At that point, Taylor grabbed plaintiff by the collar and upper right arm and forced
plaintiff against a brick wall. Id To maintain control over plaintiff. Officer Bradley grabbed
plaintiffs left arm, twisted it behind his back, and the defendants held plaintiff in that position
while Taylor asked plaintiff if he was going to change his mind regarding the metal handcuffs. Id.
Plaintiff eventually agreed to wear the metal handcuffs. Id
Defendants have submitted affidavits which contain the following additional facts. On

the morning of July 10, 2015, plaintiff acted aggressively and belligerently towards Bradley, used

foul language, and, in an "aggressive manner," refused to be searched or wear metal cuffs.
Bradley Aff. Tf 4; Taylor Aff. ^ 5. Plaintiff was also upset because the jumpsuit provided for his

appointment was too large, and he threw the jumpsuit back onto a shelf Bradley Aff. f 4.
Taylor attempted to talk plaintiff into turning around to be searched, but he remained "aggressive,
argumentative, and belligerent" and again refused to be searched. Taylor Aff. U5. Plaintiff
began walking away from Taylor when Taylor grabbed the collar of plaintiffs shirt and advised
plaintiff that he needed to change for his medical run. Bradley Aff ^ 5; Taylor Aff f 6. When
plaintiff "struggled" and attempted to "pull away" from Taylor, the defendants "placed [plaintiff]

up against the back wall of the intake area." Bradley Aff ^ 5; Taylor Aff ^ 6. Because plaintiff
continued to "act aggressively," Bradley pirmed plaintiffs arm behind his back "to obtain, and

maintain, control of him," and Taylor advised plaintiff that "he could either get dressed for the
appointment or [defendants] would do it for him." Bradley Aff ^ 5. At that point, plaintiff
calmed down, complied with the strip search, and put on the jumpsuit. Id According to
Bradley, the force used on plaintiff was necessary "to bring the situation under control," and had

plaintiff "obeyed orders to be searched in preparation for his transport, no force would have been
necessary." Id. II 7.

Plaintiff does not expressly deny that he yelled at the defendants or acted aggressively
towards them.

See Dkt. Nos. 24, 31.

Instead, in his Brief he states:

[I]t is not a good strategy for [the defendants] to insinuate [that plaintiff] came into
the medical intake unit in a rage. Every inmate welcomes the chance to [sic]
Richmond. But, to prevail the defendants know they must risk perjury or its
equivalent. The defendants [sic] version of events uses an interpretation of my
frame of mind, unfortunately that elaborate and graphic fabrication is inconsistent
with the frame of mind 1 had.

But, for reasons beyond what the defendants and their witnesses claim, [sic] It was
decided right before my eyes to disregard duty, procedures, rules, rights, and my
medical condition. And I was helpless, in fear for my safty [sic] I tryed [sic] to
place myself beyond harms [sic] way. But it became an exercise in cruel and
unusual punishment. And whether they thought they could get away with the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and injury, is evident in the (1)
unrealistic story, the (2) inconsistent statements, (3) contradictions and (4) lies in
their defense.

Dkt. No. 35 at 11, 15. In addition, plaintiff states "[i]t is also hinted that the plaintiff was
animated and belligerant [sic] by the words loud and aggressive. That sounds like the behavior ofa
man out of his mind and intimidating. I don't think I could intimidate Lieuenant [sic] Taylor and
certainly not Officer Bradley." Dkt. No. 24 at 15.

Defendants deny any knowledge of a medical restriction requiring plaintiff to be restrained
using plastic cuffs. Bradley Aff ^ 8. More specifically, Bradley states that he did not have

access to any of plaintiffs medical records or medical orders. Id. Taylor states that, had

plaintiff advised Taylor of any medical restrictions, he would have verified those restrictions with
institutional medical staff before preparing plaintiff for transport. Taylor Aff. ^ 7. Plaintiff
alleges that he advised Taylor that he could not wear metal cuffs because he was taking blood
thinners that caused "bruising and swelling at almost the simplest contact," and an exemption

order to that effect could be found in plaintiffs medical file." Compl. § IV; Dkt. No. 31 at 2.
Plaintiff contends that, when provided this information, Taylor laughed at plaintiff, advised
plaintiff that he did not have time to check plaintiffs medical file, and stated that plaintiff "would
be wearing [metal handcuffs] that day." Dkt. No. 31 at 2. According to plaintiff, when he told
the defendants that he would refuse to go to his medical appointment if they required him to wear
metal handcuffs, Taylor grabbed plaintiff by the collar, twisted his right arm behind his back, and
pinned him against a cement wall; Bradley grabbed plaintiffs left arm and pinned it behind his
back. Id Plaintiff alleges that he was held with his arms behind his back, and he only agreed to

wear metal cuffs because of the pain he was suffering and his fear "for his life" due to his medical
condition.

Dkt. No. 31 at 2; Dkt. No. 35 at 2.

Plaintiff alleges that he had bruising and swelling on his shoulders, arms, hands, ankles,

legs, and knees and could not walk for weeks following this incident. Dkt. No. 31 at 3; Dkt. No.
35 at 2; however, the medical records from July 10, 2015 contradict most of those allegations by

not mentioning any swelling or complaints of pain in plaintiffs arms or legs. Dkt. No. 40, Ex. 1
at 17. A treatment note from July 11, 2015, only mentions "a large dark blue/black bruise to [his]
L bicep and swelling (soft) to [his] R elbow." There is also a reference to "a small soft nodule to

' In each individual pleading, plaintiff does not claim, under penalty of peijury, thatthe facts set
forth are a true and accurate representation of the events described. Instead, plaintiff has filed a
separate pleading titled "certification" in which he declares under penalty of perjury that the facts
he has set forth are true. Dkt. No. 41. In deference to his £ro ^ status, plaintiffs certification
will be taken as a certification encompassing the totality of his pleadings.

[the] top of [his] R foot," but plaintiff reported having had the nodule for seven days, which means
it was unrelated to the incident at issue.

Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1.

Plaintiffs medical records also belie his contention that he was unable to walk for weeks

following the incident.

See Dkt. No. 40, Ex. 1. Although the July 11, 2015 treatment notes

reflect that plaintiff reported having swollen feet, his feet did "not appear swollen at [that] time."
Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1. Treatment notes dated July 17, 2015 reflect that plaintiff was "agitated" and
"cursing" because he had been advised that "his condition was stable" and he did not need to be in
the medical unit, notwithstanding plaintiffs opinion that he should "have his meals and meds
served to him" in the medical unit. Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1. September 9, 2015 medical records

document that plaintiff complained of leg and arm swelling along with bruising from wearing
cuffs, but the nurse noted "no edema on exam today" and plaintiff stated that the "bruising is
better." Id. at 13. Moreover, no leg or arm injuries were noted in the medical history portion of
plaintiffs September 9, 2015 records. Id. at 14.
Finally, plaintiff contends that several statements in the affidavits provided by defendants

are contradictory. Dkt. No. 31 at 5. More specifically, plaintiff appears to allege that if the
defendants and other officers acknowledged that plaintiff was yelling and talking loudly, then they
cannot simultaneously assert that plaintiff did not inform them of his metal cuff restriction.

Id at

7. Plaintiff further alleges, without any elaboration, that defendants advance an unrealistic story,
rife with inconsistencies, contradictions, and lies. Dkt. No. 35 at 15. Moreover, plaintiff

contends, without further support, that the medical records provided to him by ICCC are
incomplete, contradictory, and contain altered and false entries. Dkt. No. 40 at 3.
Plaintiff apparently tried to file criminal charges against Bradley and Taylor for their
actions, but the magistrate who investigated the incident did not find probable cause to issue

charges against the defendants. Dkt.No. l,Ex. 1. In the magistrate's October 20, 2015 letter to

plaintiff concerning his investigation of plaintiff s allegations, which plaintiff attached as an
exhibit in support of his complaint, the magistrate stated:
[ajfter our hearing on September 25,1 later examined the evidence under oath
presented by Officer Dawson at Indian Creek Correctional Center. Video footage
of the incident you described to me does not support your allegations. Officer
Dawson and Sergeant Doran readily provided the investigation file for me to
review and some of the witness statements in the official reports contradicts [sic]
your testimony to me. In addition, the result of the prison's own internal
investigation was that your allegations were unfounded.
Id. The magistrate's stated reason for not issuing charges was a "lack of evidence." Id.
II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party, thus, bears the burden of proving that judgment
on the pleadings is appropriate, i.e., that no genuine issues of material fact are present for
resolution. S^ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The facts which a
moving party bears the burden of proving are those which are material: materiality is dictated by
"the substantive law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Once a moving party has met its burden of proof, the non-moving party must produce
specific facts to generate a disputed issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The court will view the evidence and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Porter v. U.S. Alumoweld Co..
125 F.3d 243, 245 (4th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, "[o]nly disputes over facts which might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment." Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248. Unsubstantiated, conciusory claims without evidentiary
support are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Braithwaite v. Hinkle. 752 F.
Supp. 2d 692, 694 (E.D. Va. 2010), affd,412 F. App'x 583 (4th Cir. 2011). Therefore, evidence
that is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," will not preclude summary judgment.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate
only when no material facts are genuinely disputed and the evidence as a whole could not lead a
rational fact fmder to rule for the non-moving party. Matsushita. 475 U.S. at 587
III. Analysis
In determining whether the record supports an Eighth Amendment claim that defendants

used excessive force, the "core judicial inquiry" is "whether force was applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v.
McMillian. 503 U.S. 1, 7 ("1992'): see also Whitlev v. Albers. 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). In the
latter situation, "contemporary standards of decency always are violated ... whether or not
significant injury is evident." Hudson. 503 U.S. at 9; s^ Wilkins v. Gaddv. 559 U.S. 34, 37-39

(2010) (opining that an excessive force claim involving only de minimis injury is not subject to
automatic dismissal). Nevertheless, the extent of injury suffered by an inmate at the hands of a
prison official may be relevant to an Eighth Amendment inquiry, both because it may suggest
whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation,
Whitlev. 475 U.S. at 321, and because it may provide some indication of the force applied.
Wilkins. 559 U.S. at 37-39. Summary Judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs claims of

excessive force is appropriate because the pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits on file demonstrate
that the amount of force used by Bradley and Taylor in restraining plaintiff was reasonable, given
the circumstances, for several reasons.

First, the state magistrate who investigated plaintiffs complaint against Taylor and
Bradley did not find sufficient evidence to support criminal charges against them under a probable

cause standard, which requires that a magistrate, before issuing an arrest warrant, conclude that
based on the totality of the circumstances there is "a fair probability" that a crime has occurred.
Corey v. Virginia. 381 S.E.2d 19, 22 (Va. Ct. App. 1989). Significantly, following a September

25, 2015 evidentiary hearing, which included a video of the incident, concerning the charges, the
magistrate concluded that "[vjideo footage of the incident... [did] not support [plaintiffs]
allegations" and stated that "some of the witness statements in the official reports contradict[ed]

[plaintiffs] testimony." Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1. Moreover, plaintiff, who offered this letter as
evidence in support of his complaint, does not directly challenge the validity the magistrate's
findings.
Second, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the force used by defendants was excessive.

Although there is a factual dispute between Taylor and plaintiff as to whether plaintiff told
defendants that he had medical reasons for not wearing metal handcuffs, even assuming that
plaintiff advised defendants of his metal cuff restriction, the pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits on
file do not demonstrate that Taylor and Bradley used excessive force in restraining plaintiff under
the circumstances. Plaintiff does not deny that while he was being prepared for transport to his
routine appointment at MCV, he acted aggressively and belligerently towards Bradley, used foul
language, and, in an "aggressive manner," refused to be searched or wear metal cuffs. Bradley
Aff T| 4; Taylor Aff ^ 5. Moreover, the medical records submitted by plaintiff in support of his

complaint indicate that on at least one other occasion he became similarly "agitated" and began
"cursing" when he disagreed with ICCC medical staff regarding his medical treatment. Dkt. No.
1, Ex. 1. In addition, affidavits submitted by the defendants indicate that before Taylor physically

restrained plaintiff, he attempted, to no avail, to convince plaintiff to turn around to be searched.

Taylor Aff. ^ 5. Notwithstanding Taylor's efforts, plaintiff remained "aggressive, argumentative,
and belligerent." Id Taylor did not attempt to physically restrain plaintiff, until plaintiff walked
away from Taylor, "struggled," and attempted to "pull away." Bradley Aff. | 5; Taylor Aff. ^ 6.

Even then, defendants merely "placed [plaintiff] up against the back wall of the intake area" and
pinned his arms behind his back "to obtain, and maintain, control of him." Id The force used by
Bradley was limited to twisting plaintiffs arm behind his back in order to maintain control of him;
this was done so that Taylor could handcuff plaintiff. Id Defendants did not kick, punch, or

otherwise strike plaintiff, and when plaintiff was pinned, defendants advised plaintiff that "he

could either get dressed for the appointment or [defendants] would do it for him." Bradley Aff. ^
5. Plaintiffs July 11, 2015 treatment note, which notes only "a large dark blue/black bruise to

[his] L bicep and swelling (soft) to [his] R elbow" further corroborate defendants' version of
events.

Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1.

To be sure, it is unfortunate, and perhaps even negligent, that unnamed institutional

employees failed to include plaintiffs metal cuff restriction on the face sheet and gate pass that
were available to the defendants.

But, in the absence of such information, defendants' failure to

abide by those restrictions would not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.

Astorga v.

Vick. No. 15-3191-CM, 2017 WL 1397540, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 17, 2017) (concluding that
plaintiffs allegations that defendants injured his shoulder when they forced him into regular
handcuffs, despite plaintiff informing them that he had a medical restriction requiring extra links,
by yanking his arms were not sufficient to state a claim for use of excessive force).
Finally, plaintiffs asserted injuries, bruising and swelling in his arms and legs, are not
indicative of the use of excessive force.

Taylor v. McDuffie. 155 F.3d 479, 482 (4th Cir.

1998) (concluding that injuries similar to plaintiff's alleged injuries, including abrasions, slight
swelling, and tenderness, were ^ minimisy Plaintiffs attendance at his routine medical
appointment, which immediately succeeded the incident, without any stated difficulty further
belies his claim that he was unable to walk for weeks.

See Dkt. No. 3 5.

Medical records one and

seven days after the incident do not support any claim of being unable to walk as a result of the
incident. Specifically, his feet did "not appear swollen" on July 11, 2015, and that, on July 17,
2015, "his condition was stable" and he was able to walk to meals and pill call. Dkt. No. l,Ex. 1.

Thus, plaintiffs injuries do not suggest that a greater amount of force was applied than would have
been required to ensure that he would submit to a search and agree to be restrained. Wilkins, 559
U.S. at 37-39. Under these circumstances, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that

defendants acted "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson. 503 U.S. at 7.
Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim
of excessive force.

IV. Motions

Plaintiff has filed two outstanding motions, a Motion in Limine to exclude the affidavits of
officers A. Boone and L. Smallwood and a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing. In support of his

Motion in Limine, plaintiffstates that he finds it suspicious that officers Boone and Smallwood did
not provide affidavits detailing their recollection of the events that gave rise to this cause of action
sooner than one year after the incident occurred, and he takes issue with the fact that neither
individual was mentioned in the defendants' answer to the complaint. Dkt. No. 31 at 4. In
addition, plaintiff contends that the aforementioned affidavits should be excluded because they
provide nothing more than "confusion, lies and contradiction." Id. at 7. Construed liberally.
plaintiffs motion will be taken as a motion to exclude the affidavits under Federal Rule of

Evidence 403. Rule 403 states that a court "may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by a danger of... confusing the issues."

Here, there is no question that the evidence that plaintiff seeks to exclude is relevant to the
penultimate question in this case: whether the defendants subjected plaintiff to excessive force.
Both affidavits provide information that sheds light on what took place between plaintiff and the

defendants in the ICCC medical department on July 10, 2015, and are not confusing. Therefore,
plaintiffs Motion in Limine will be denied.

Because defendants are entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law, plaintiffs Motion for Evidentiary Hearing will be denied as moot.
V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' joint Motion for Summary Judgment will be

granted, and summaryjudgment will be entered in their favor, and plaintiff s Motion in Limine
and Motion for Evidentiary Hearing will be denied. An appropriate Order and Judgment shall

Entered this

/1

Alexandria, Virginia

day of

2017.

Leonie M. Brinkema

United States District Judge