Booking.com B.V. v. Lee et al

Filing 87

MEMORANDUM OPINION re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema on 08/09/17. (pmil, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

BOOKING.COM B.V.,
Plaintiff
v.
JOSEPH MATAL,
Performing the Functions and Duties of the
Undersecretary of Commerce for
Intellectual Property and Director of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office,
AND THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE

Defendants.

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1:16-cv-425 (LMB/IDD)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Booking.com B.V. (“Booking.com” or “plaintiff”) filed this civil action
challenging the denial by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) of four trademark applications involving the mark
“BOOKING.COM” for services in Classes 39 and 43. One of the applications was for the word
mark and three were for stylized versions of the mark. For each of the applications, the TTAB
found plaintiff’s marks ineligible for registration as trademarks because it concluded that
BOOKING.COM is generic for the services identified in the applications or, alternatively, that it
is merely descriptive and lacks acquired distinctiveness.
Before the Court are plaintiff and defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment. For
the reasons that follow, plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 63] will be granted
in part and denied in part; defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 60] will be

granted in part and denied in part and the US
t;
SPTO will b ordered to register the mark
be
o
e
BOOKIN
NG.COM as to the Class 43 services identified in plaintiff’s applications but not as t the
s
n
s
to
Class 39 services.
I.

BACKGROU
B
UND

On December 1, 2011, pl
O
r
laintiff filed a federal tra
ademark application, Ser No.
rial
85485097 (“’097 Application”), based on use for the ma
e,
ark:

A3166. The services identified in the applica
T
n
ation (as ame
ended) were:
Class 39: Tra agency services, nam
C
avel
s
mely, making reservation for transp
g
ns
portation;
tr
ravel and tou ticket rese
ur
ervation serv
vices; travel a
agency servi
ices, namely making
y
re
eservations for transportation for tou
f
urists; provis
sion of travel information
l
n;
pr
roviding con
nsultation related to mak
king reservat
tions for tran
nsportation, and
tr
ravel and tou ticket rese
ur
ervation; all of the forego
o
oing services rendered in
n-person
an via the in
nd
nternet.
Class 43: Mak
C
king hotel re
eservations for others in person and via the inter
f
rnet;
pr
roviding per
rsonalized in
nformation about hotels a tempora accommo
a
and
ary
odations
fo travel in-p
or
person and via the Intern providin on-line rev
v
net;
ng
views of hot
tels;
co
onsultation services rela to makin hotel rese
s
ated
ng
ervations for others, prov
r
vision of
personalized information about hotels and tempor
s
rary accomm
modations fo travel,
or
an on-line re
nd
eviews of ho
otels.
Moskin Decl. [Dkt. No. 65-5] ¶ 2.
D
N
2
On June 5, 20 plaintiff filed Appli
O
012,
f
ication Seria No. 79114 (“’998 A
al
498
Application”) for
),
recogniti in the Un
ion
nited States of its Interna
o
ational Regis
stration (here
einafter refe
erred to by th
he
name of the authorizi treaty, “t Madrid Protocol”) fo the mark:
t
ing
the
P
or

A4. The services iden
ntified in the application (as amende were:
e
n
ed)

2

Class 39: Arr
C
ranging of to and arra
ours
anging of tou online; re
urs
eservation an sale of
nd
tr
ravel tickets and online reservation and sale of tr
r
a
ravel tickets; information advice
;
n,
an consultan regarding the arranging of tours and the rese
nd
ncy
ervation and sale of
tr
ravel tickets; provision of informatio relating to travel and t
;
o
on
o
travel destin
nations;
tr
ravel and tou agency ser
ur
rvices, name travel an tour ticke reservation
ely,
nd
et
n
se
ervices; travel agency se
ervices; touri agency se
ist
ervices; prov
viding online travel
e
an tourism services, nam
nd
s
mely, providi online tr
ing
ravel and tou ticket rese
ur
ervation
se
ervices, onlin travel age
ne
ency service online tou
es,
urist agency services and
d
pr
roviding onl informat
line
tion relating to travel an travel dest
g
nd
tinations.
Class 43: Mak
C
king hotel re
eservations for others; ho
f
oliday accom
mmodation
re
eservation se
ervices and resort reservation service namely p
r
es,
providing on
nline hotel
an resort hot room rese
nd
tel
ervation serv
vices; provid
ding informa
ation about h
hotels,
holiday accom
mmodations and resort accommodat
a
tions, whethe or not bas on the
er
sed
valuation of customers; providing inf
c
p
formation, ad
dvice and co
onsultancy re
elating to
making hotel reservations and tempor
m
s
rary accomm
modation res
servations; p
providing
on
nline inform
mation, advic and consu
ce
ultancy relati to makin hotel reser
ing
ng
rvations
an temporar accommod
nd
ry
dation reserv
vations.
Moskin Decl. [Dkt. No. 65-5] ¶ 3.
D
N
3
On Novembe 7, 2012, pl
O
er
laintiff filed two federal trademark a
applications, Serial No.
,
79122365 (“’365 Application”) and Serial No. 79122366 (“’366 App
a
6
plication”), u
under the Madrid
owing marks:
Protocol for the follo

A
ntified in the two applica
e
ations (as am
mended) wer limited to a
re
A2153, A1138. The services iden
subset of services in Class 43:
f
Hotel reserva
H
ation services for others; holiday acc ommodation reservation services
s
n
n
an resort res
nd
servation ser
rvices, namel providing hotel room reservation services
ly,
g
m
n
an resort hot reservatio services and providin online hot and resor hotel
nd
tel
on
a
ng
tel
rt
ro
oom reservat
tion services providing information about hotel hotel
s;
n
ls,
ac
ccommodati
ions and reso accommo
ort
odations, wh
hether or not based on th
t
he
3

valuation of customers; information, advice and consultancy relating to the
aforesaid services; aforesaid services also provided electronically.
Moskin Decl. [Dkt. No. 65-5] ¶ 4.
During review by the USPTO, all four applications followed the same procedural history.
The examiner initially rejected each application on the ground that BOOKING.COM is merely
descriptive of plaintiff’s services and therefore unregisterable. A1074, A2089, A3765. After
plaintiff objected that the mark BOOKING.COM had acquired distinctiveness, the examiner
issued a new refusal, this time on the basis that the word mark is generic as applied to the
relevant services and, in the alternative, that the mark is merely descriptive and that plaintiff had
failed to establish acquired distinctiveness. A1074, A2089-90, A3766. For each application,
plaintiff sought reconsideration of the new refusal and in each instance reconsideration was
denied. A1075, A2090, A3766.
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal for each application and requested consolidated briefing
before the TTAB, which was granted. A3766. The evidence submitted to the TTAB included
dictionary definitions of the words “booking” and “.com;” print-outs of plaintiff’s webpages;
examples from news articles and travel websites of terms such as “online booking services” and
“booking sites,” used to refer to hotel reservation and travel agency services; examples of eight
third-party domain names that include “booking.com;” a 2012 JD Power & Associates press
release and survey results, indicating that Booking.com ranked highest in overall customer
satisfaction; and a declaration from plaintiff’s director listing awards won by plaintiff and figures
regarding plaintiff’s sales success, advertising campaigns, followers on social media, and
unsolicited news articles. See Def. Mem. at 6; A1089-92.
Following the hearing, the TTAB affirmed the four refusals of registration in three
separate opinions. See A1073-111 (denying the appeal for the ’998 Application), A2088-126

4

(denying the appeals for the ’365 and ’366 Applications), A3764-801 (denying the appeal for the
’097 Application). Although there are minor differences among the three opinions, all share the
same central conclusions that “booking” refers to “a reservation or arrangement to buy a travel
ticket or stay in a hotel room” or “the act of reserving such travel or accommodation;” that
“.com” indicates a commercial website, which does not negate the generic character of the term
“booking;” and that the combined term BOOKING.COM would be understood by consumers
“primarily to refer to an online reservation service for travel, tours, and lodging,” which is
consistent with the services proposed in the applications, making the mark generic for the
services offered. See, e.g., A1092, A1096, A1107. In the alternative, the TTAB concluded that
BOOKING.COM is descriptive of plaintiff’s services and that plaintiff “failed to demonstrate
that the term has acquired distinctiveness.” See, e.g., A1111.
On April 15, 2016, plaintiff filed this civil action under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) against
Michelle Lee, who was then the USPTO Director (“the USPTO Director”),1 and the USPTO
(collectively “defendants”), challenging the USPTO’s denial of registration of the four
applications. The parties have filed the administrative record from the USPTO proceedings and
both sides have produced new evidence on the questions of genericness and descriptiveness.
Although the body of evidence before this Court is similar to what was before the TTAB, of
significance, plaintiff has now submitted a “Teflon survey,” which, as will be discussed below, is
the most widely used survey format for measuring consumer opinion in a genericness challenge,
and defendants have provided a report by a rebuttal expert. By way of relief, plaintiff asks the

1

The USPTO Director position has since been vacated and is currently being filled in an acting
capacity by Joseph Matal.

5

Court to reverse the decisions of the TTAB and order the USPTO Director to publish each
application in the Principal Register. Compl., [Dkt. No. 1] at 17.
II.

DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review
A trademark applicant “dissatisfied with the decision” of the USPTO has two remedies
under the Lanham Act: either “appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit,” see 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a), or file a civil action against the USPTO Director in federal
district court, see 15 U.S.C. §1071(b). Under § 1071(a), an appeal to the Federal Circuit is taken
“on the record” before the USPTO, id. § 1071(a)(4), and the USPTO’s factual findings will be
upheld if they are supported by “substantial evidence,” see, e.g., Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d
1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In contrast, in a civil action under §1071(b), “the district court
reviews the record de novo and acts as the finder of fact.” Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale,
LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Durox Co. v. Duron Paint Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d
882, 883-84 (4th Cir. 1963)).2 Placement of a mark on the generic-descriptive-suggestive-

2

Defendants try to distinguish Swatch AG, arguing that it does not apply to cases where “a party
submits new evidence on only some discrete questions of fact but not others.” Def. Opp. at 4-5.
This reading of the case law is indefensible. Swatch AG explicitly held, “where new evidence is
submitted, de novo review of the entire record is required because the district court ‘cannot
meaningfully defer to the [USPTO’s] factual findings if the [USPTO] considered a different set
of facts.’” 739 F.3d at 155 (citing Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012)) (alterations
added). Indeed, the “dual capacity” standard of review endorsed by defendants—where the
district court acts as appellate reviewer of facts found by the USPTO and fact-finder on issues for
which there is new evidence—was held to be “erroneous” by the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 156. Were
there any room for ambiguity about the applicability of de novo review, it was dispelled by the
Fourth Circuit’s subsequent decision in Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015),
which explained that § 1071(b) authorizes “[d]e novo civil actions” in which “[t]he district court
reviews all the evidence de novo and acts as the trier of fact.” Id. at 225 (emphasis added) (citing
Swatch, 739 F.3d at 155), cert. denied sub nom. Shammas v. Hirshfeld, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016).
Moreover, even if defendants were correct that substantial evidence review applies when no new
evidence has been submitted on a particular question of fact, Def. Opp. at 4 (citing Dome Pat.,

6

fanciful continuum is a question of fact. In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Upon the motion of a party, the district court must admit the USPTO record and give it
the “same effect as if originally taken and produced in the suit.” § 1071(b)(3). “[T]he district
court may, in its discretion, ‘consider the proceedings before and findings of the [USPTO] in
deciding what weight to afford an applicant’s newly-admitted evidence.’” Kappos v. Hyatt, 132
S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012) (quoting Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). The
district court also “has authority independent of the [USPTO] to grant or cancel registrations.”
Swatch AG, 739 F.3d at 155 (citing § 1071(b)(1)).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record demonstrates that “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although the Court must view the record “in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party,” Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 324 (4th
Cir. 2012), “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s]
position will be insufficient” to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see also Am. Arms Int’l v. Herbert, 563 F.3d 78, 82 (4th
Cir. 2009). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Summary judgment does not become disfavored simply because there is an “important, difficult

LP v. Rea, 59 F. Supp. 3d 52, 78-79 (D.D.C. 2014)), there is no basis to apply that standard here;
rather, both parties acknowledge that genericness and descriptiveness determinations are
questions of fact, Pl. Mem. at 10; Def. Mem. at 10, and the new evidence before the Court bears
on both of those questions.

7

or complicated question of law.” Lewis v. Coleman, 257 F. Supp. 38, 40 (S.D. W. Va. 1966);
Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 514, 521 (D.S.C. 2014).
The parties have “expressly agree[d] that if the Court determines after reviewing the
briefs and evidence on summary judgment that any material issue of fact exists, the Court is
authorized to resolve any such factual dispute.” [Dkt. No. 26] ¶ 4(B). Accordingly, the Court will
make factual determinations as well as weighting decisions that are not normally appropriate on
a motion for summary judgment.
B. Analysis
Although plaintiff filed four trademark applications, neither plaintiff nor defendants
contend that the stylized elements described in those applications affect the protectability of the
mark. Instead, the parties focus on the word mark BOOKING.COM and on where along the
generic-descriptive-suggestive-fanciful continuum the mark is situated. Def. Mem. at 1-2; Pl.
Mem. at 10-12. Therefore, rather than addressing each application individually, the Court will
disregard the stylized elements and focus on the appropriate categorization of the word mark
BOOKING.COM; however, because a multi-class application is regarded as a series of separate
applications, the Court must independently assess the protectability of the mark for the two
classes of services plaintiff claims in its applications, Classes 39 and 43. See 3 J. Thomas
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:56.50 (4th ed.) (hereinafter
McCarthy on Trademarks).
1. The Framework of the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act provides nationwide protection of trademarks. A trademark is “any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” used “to identify and distinguish . . .
goods [or services], including a unique product [or service], from those manufactured or sold by

8

others and to indicate the source of the goods [or services], even if that source is unknown.” 15
U.S.C. § 1127. The Act has two purposes. The first is to prevent consumer confusion regarding
the source of goods and services and to reduce consumers’ information costs by “quickly and
easily assur[ing] a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the
same producer as other similarly marked items [or services] that he or she liked (or disliked) in
the past.” Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (emphasis in
original). Second, the Act incentivizes brand investment by assuring the “producer that it (and
not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a
desirable product [or service],” id. at 164, thereby “secur[ing] to the owner of the mark the
goodwill of his business,” Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
By allowing the producer to reap the benefits of consumer goodwill, trademark law “encourages
the production of quality products [and services] and simultaneously discourages those who hope
to sell inferior products [or services] by capitalizing on a consumer’s inability quickly to evaluate
the quality of an item [or service] offered for sale.” Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, the Lanham Act reflects Congress’s conclusion that “[n]ational protection
of trademarks is desirable . . . because [it] foster[s] competition and the maintenance of quality
by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.” Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198.
In keeping with these twin purposes, the Lanham Act identifies four categories of marks.
“Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility [for] trademark status and
the degree of protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive,
and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.” Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d
Cir. 1976). “A generic mark refers to the genus or class of which a particular product [or service]
is a member and can never be protected.” Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A., 187

9

F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 1999). Examples include Light Beer for ale-type beverages and Thermos
for vacuum-insulated bottles. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir.
1996). A descriptive mark “describes a function, use, characteristic, size, or intended purpose” of
the product or service, such as 5 Minute glue and the Yellow Pages telephone directory. Id.
“Marks that are merely descriptive are accorded protection only if they have acquired a
secondary meaning [also called ‘acquired distinctiveness’], that is, if in the minds of the public,
the primary significance of a product [or service] feature or term is to identify the source of the
product [or service] rather than the product [or service] itself.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Although eligible for protection in some instances, descriptive marks are considered weak marks.
Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 239–40 (4th Cir. 1997). Suggestive
marks, such as Coppertone for sunscreen and Orange Crush for orange flavored soda, “connote,
without describing, some quality, ingredient, or characteristic of the product [or service].” Sara
Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 464. Marks that are “comprised of words in common usage” but “do not
suggest or describe any quality, ingredient, or characteristic of the goods [or services] they serve,
are said to have been arbitrarily assigned.” Id. Examples of arbitrary marks include Tea Rose
brand flour and Apple for computers. Id. Lastly, fanciful marks are “in essence, made-up words
expressly coined for serving as a trademark,” such as Clorox for a bleach product and Kodak for
photography-related products. Id. Because the “intrinsic nature” of suggestive, arbitrary, and
fanciful marks “serves to identify a particular source of a product [or service],” these categories
“are deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
2. Genericness

10

Because a generic mark, which is statutorily defined as “the common descriptive name of
an article or substance,” Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96252, § 18, 94 Stat. 374, 391, by definition neither signifies the source of goods or services nor
distinguishes the particular product or service from other products or services on the market, it
cannot be protected as a trademark nor registered as one. Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g,
364 F.3d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194). To permit otherwise
“would grant the owner of the [generic] mark a monopoly since a competitor could not describe
his goods [or services] as what they are.” CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, Inc., 531 F.2d
11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Renaissance Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 405
F. Supp. 2d 680, 688 (E.D. Va. 2005), aff’d, 227 F. App’x 239 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he goals of
trademark protection . . . must be balanced by the concern that trademark protection not become
a means of monopolizing language or stifling productive competition.”). To the contrary, such
marks must remain in the public domain where they are free for all to use. See Am. Online, Inc.
v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 821 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that trademark law “protects for
public use those commonly used words and phrases that the public has adopted, denying to any
one competitor a right to corner those words and phrases by expropriating them from the public
‘linguistic commons’”); 2 McCarthy on Trademarks § 12:2.
“The rub . . . is in trying to distinguish generic marks from [protectable marks].” Ashley
Furniture Indus., 187 F.3d at 369. According to the test adopted by the Supreme Court in
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., a plaintiff seeking to establish a valid trademark as compared to
a generic mark “must show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the
consuming public is not the product but the producer.” 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). A mark is not
generic simply because it plays some role in denoting to the public what the product or service

11

is; rather, a mark may serve a “dual function—that of identifying a product [or service] while at
the same time indicating its source.” S. Rep. No. 98-627, at 5 (1984). Hence, Kellogg focuses on
whether “the primary significance of the mark [is] indication of the nature or class of the product
or service, rather than an indication of source.” Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir.
1996) (emphasis in original); see also Retail Servs., 364 F.3d at 544 (explaining that a generic
mark “neither signifies the source of goods nor distinguishes the particular product from other
products on the market”).
Determining whether a mark is generic involves three steps: “(1) identify[ing] the class of
product or service to which use of the mark is relevant; (2) identify[ing] the relevant purchasing
public of the class of product or service; and (3) [determining whether] the primary significance
of the mark to the relevant public is to identify the class of product or service to which the mark
relates.” Glover, 74 F.3d at 59. Evidence of public understanding of the primary significance of a
mark can come from “purchaser testimony, consumer surveys, listings and dictionaries, trade
journals, newspapers, and other publications.” Id. The burden of proof rests with the party
seeking to establish genericness, in this case the defendants, who must prove that the mark is
generic by clear and convincing evidence. In re Cordua Restaurants, Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 600
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
a. Classes of Services
The first step in analyzing the proposed BOOKING.COM mark is to determine the
classes of services (sometimes referred to as “genera of services”) at issue in each application.
Glover, 74 F.3d at 59. The defendants recognize that the services identified in each registration
vary, but summarize the classes of services as “online travel agency services, namely the
arrangement of transportation and tours,” for Class 39 and “online hotel and lodging services”

12

for Class 43. Def. Mem. at 17-18. Plaintiff does not appear to understand that this is a class
specific analysis and argues that the USPTO’s “inability to adopt a single genus . . . requires
reversal.” See Pl. Reply at 16-17 & n.5. This argument is inconsistent with the longstanding
principle that a single application to register multiple classes, i.e., a combined application, is
treated “as though it were a group of individual applications” requiring “separate analyses for
each class of goods [or services].” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d
1098, 1102 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
Plaintiff further criticizes the defendants’ “new proposed genera” for “ignor[ing] most of
plaintiff’s actual services,” including “the information and search (or research) services . . . and
business oriented services . . . used by hotels and other travel services seeking to advertise and
list their accommodations for rental.” Pl. Opp. at 28. This critique is baseless for several reasons.
As an initial matter, plaintiff overlooks that it too has taken a reductivist view of the class of
service by defining the relevant class of services or genus as “travel agency services.” Pl. Mem.
at 13. Further, plaintiff’s suggestion that the class of services should include specific services,
such as business consulting, stems from plaintiff’s argument that a granular approach that
emphasizes services that would not be described with the word “booking” can save its mark from
genericness. See Pl. Opp. at 28 n.18 (“[T]here is no reason a broad specification of services or
goods cannot be held distinctive for some of the services and not so for others.”). Defendants, on
the other hand, maintain that “registration is properly refused if genericness is found as to any
service specified in the application.” Def. Reply at 9. On this issue, defendants have the better of
the argument. Registration must be refused if a mark “is the generic name of any of the goods or
services for which registration is sought.” See Cordua Restaurants, 823 F.3d at 605 (quoting 2
McCarthy on Trademarks § 12:57). Therefore, even though plaintiff provides business

13

consulting services, its mark will fail if it is generic as to plaintiff’s hotel reservation services.
Similarly, even if, as plaintiff argues, the appropriate genus is “travel agency services,” to the
extent that this encompasses hotel reservation services, plaintiff’s mark is not entitled to
protection if it is generic for hotel reservation services. See Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan
Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties
of a good are . . . ineligible for trademark protection.”).
In addition, as defendants acknowledge, “[p]laintiff is the master of its application,
including the identification of services covered by it” and “[i]t was from the identification of
services provided by plaintiff that the TTAB derived its recitation of the services.” Def. Opp. at
10; see also A1076 (describing the genus of services as an “accurate[] summar[y]” of the
recitation provided by the plaintiff); A3768 (same). Because “the question of registrability of an
applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods [and services] set
forth in the application regardless of what the record may reveal as to the particular nature of an
applicant’s goods,” Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942
(Fed. Cir. 1990), the identification of services in plaintiff’s applications “controls this analysis,”
In re Dayan, 61 F. App’x 695, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although plaintiff’s applications reference a
multitude of services, because “registration is properly refused if the word is the generic name of
any of the goods or services for which registration is sought,” 2 McCarthy on Trademarks
§ 12:57, the Court need not analyze each service. Instead, it will focus on the broadest services
described in plaintiff’s applications: “travel and tour ticket reservation services” for Class 39 and
“[m]aking hotel reservations for others” for Class 43. Moskin Decl. [Dkt. No. 65-5] ¶¶ 2-4.
b. Relevant Purchasing Public

14

To define the relevant purchasing public, a court must look to the class of goods and
services for which the trademark application was submitted. Cf. Glover, 74 F.3d at 59; Retail
Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g, 247 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d Retail Servs.,
364 F.3d at 535. Here, the applications sought registration for travel, tour, and hotel reservation
services, including those offered online, making consumers who use travel, tour, and hotel
reservation services offered via the internet or in person the relevant purchasing public.
c. Primary Public Understanding
The next consideration is whether “the primary significance of the term in the minds of
the consuming public is not the product but the producer.” Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118. The
public’s primary understanding of a mark “is derived from it as a whole, not from its elements
separated and considered in detail;” therefore, “it should be considered in its entirety.” Estate of
P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545-46 (1920). Although “a mark must
be considered as a whole,” this “does not preclude courts from considering the meaning of
individual words in determining the meaning of the entire mark.” Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry’s
Seafood Rest., Inc., 240 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, this Court will consider the
two elements “booking” and “.com” separately before considering them in combination.
i. “Booking”
Defendants’ argument that BOOKING.COM is generic rests primarily on its view of the
meaning of “booking,” for which its primary sources are various dictionary definitions.
“Although not controlling, ‘dictionary definitions are relevant and sometimes persuasive’ on the
issue of genericness ‘based upon the assumption that dictionary definitions usually reflect the
public’s perception of a word’s meaning and its contemporary usage.’” Retail Servs., 364 F.3d at

15

544–45 (citing 2 McCarthy on Trademarks at § 12:13). The definitions in the record, which are
nearly identical to those relied on by the TTAB, include:
1. An engagement, as for a performance. 2. A reservation, as for accommodations
at a hotel. American Heritage College Dictionary (3d ed. 1997).
1. a contract, engagement or scheduled performance of a professional entertainer.
2. a reservation. 3. the act of a person who books. Random House Unabridged
Dictionary (2d ed. 1993).
1: the act of one that books 2: an engagement or scheduled performance . . . 3:
RESERVATION; esp one for transportation, entertainment, or lodging 4:
ORDER. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993).
1: the act of one that books 2: an engagement or scheduled performance 3:
RESERVATION. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2008).
Plaintiff points out that the primary definition of “booking” in the definitions produced by the
defendants refers to a performance, as in a theatrical engagement, and that the word has
numerous other meanings. Pl. Mem. at 21. Although this observation is correct, it does not
advance plaintiff’s cause as “a word may have more than one generic use.” Abercrombie &
Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11.
Defendants also cite evidence that plaintiff and its competitors routinely use the word
“booking” in reference to their services. For example, plaintiff’s website uses “booking” as a
noun, to describe a reservation, see A345 (“Sign in to manage your bookings.”); id. (“Latest
booking 10 minutes ago.”), and as a verb, meaning to make a reservation, see A349 (“Our goal is
to provide business and leisure travelers with the most accessible and cost effective way of
discovering and booking the broadest section of accommodations in every corner of the world.”),
as do its confirmation notices, which refer to the reservation as a “booking” in the subject line,
see Def. Ex. A, PTO-00011. Similarly, plaintiff’s competitors use “booking” as both a noun and
a verb in describing their services. For example, Hotwire, which provides services for making

16

hotel, car, and flight reservations, advertises “easier booking,” id. at PTO-00322, Hotels.com
claims to be the preferred choice “when it comes to booking the perfect hotel,” id. at PTO000298, and Travelocity and Expedia offer services for “hotel booking,” id. at PTO-00326; PTO00313, “vacation package booking,” PTO-00315, and “booking a rental car,” PTO-00327.
“Booking” is also a common component of descriptors for hotel reservation and travel agency
services. A 2016 New York Times article regarding the impact of online reservation services on
hotel loyalty programs referred to “Hotels.com, Hotwire.com, Trivago.com, and
Travelocity.com” as “booking sites.” Id. at PTO-00261-64; see also id. at PTO-00286-92. And,
Skift, an information platform for the travel sector, headlined an article discussing flight
reservation services with reference to “booking sites.” Id. at PTO-00250-54. Finally, defendants
identify fifteen third-party websites that include “booking.com” or “bookings.com” as
components of their domain names. See id. at PTO-00148-65; A764-68, A772-81, A1085-86.
Plaintiff contends that this evidence is not enough to show that the word “booking” is
“ever used as a generic term for travel agency services” and “has no relation whatsoever to
plaintiff’s business consulting services.” Pl. Mem. at 21. This argument parallels plaintiff’s
argument regarding the proper genus of services, which effectively contends that the term
“booking” is too narrow to describe the broad “travel agency services” offered by plaintiff while
simultaneously too general to capture plaintiff’s consulting services. But, this “heads I win, tails
you lose” approach has no legal support. See Nat’l Nonwovens, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Enters.,
397 F. Supp. 2d 245, 252 (D. Mass. 2005) (rebuffing plaintiff’s “subtle rhetorical move that
attempts to abstract [the genus] to a higher level of generality”). As explained above, it is wellestablished that “[a] registration is properly refused if the word is the generic name of any of the
goods or services for which registration is sought.” Cordua Rests., 823 F.3d at 605 (citing 2

17

McCarthy on Trademarks § 12:57). This makes good sense. Otherwise, applicants could elude a
finding of genericness by simply tailoring their recitation of the goods and services at issue to be
broader or narrower than the linguistic scope of their generic or descriptive mark. Permitting
such gamesmanship would defeat one of the central purposes of the Lanham Act, which “is
carefully crafted to prevent commercial monopolization of language that otherwise belongs in
the public domain.” S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 573
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The evidence presented by the defendants establishes that, by itself, the word “booking”
is generic for the classes of hotel and travel reservation services recited in plaintiff’s
applications. The dictionary definitions include as a meaning of “booking” a reservation or the
act of making a reservation. Even more tellingly, plaintiff and its competitors use the term in this
manner. This definition is also consistent with public usage, as indicated by the news sources
quoted in the record. In this respect, the word “booking,” standing alone, is the common
descriptive name for both the act of making a reservation and the reservation itself. This
conclusion is equally true for hotel reservations and the wider set of reservations offered by a
travel agency service, because hotel, flight, and tour reservations are all referred to as
“bookings,” just as the act of making these types of reservations is often called “booking.” Based
on this evidence, the Court finds that the term “booking” is generic for these types of services.
ii. Top-Level Domains
The finding that “booking” is a generic term does not end the analysis because the mark
at issue is BOOKING.COM. Therefore the Court must consider whether the term resulting from
combining “booking” with “.com” remains generic. According to dictionary definitions, “.com”
refers to a “commercial organization (in Internet addresses),” American Heritage College

18

Dictionary (3d ed. 1997), or “[p]art of the internet address of many companies and
organizations,” Dictionary.com, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/-com (last accessed Apr. 7,
2017). In addition, some dictionaries state that “the phrase dot-com is used to refer generically to
almost anything connected to business on the Internet.” Id. Plaintiff argues that “.com” should be
read as a top-level domain (TLD), in the same family as “.net,” “.org,” and “.edu.” Pl. Mem. at
22. A TLD can be contrasted with a second-level domain (SLD), which is the next level of
organization in the domain name hierarchy. For example, in “booking.com,” “booking” is the
SLD and “.com” is the TLD. According to plaintiff, the combination of “booking” and “.com”
signals a domain name, 3 which is a unique identifier capable of indicating the source of a
product or service. Id. at 21, 23. The defendants, on the other hand, argue that “.com” is merely a
term that denotes services offered via the Internet, and point to Federal Circuit cases holding that
a TLD has no source identifying significance.
Although Federal Circuit case law on trademark is not controlling in this jurisdiction, it is
persuasive authority. Because the parties acknowledge that there is no Fourth Circuit precedent
regarding the source identifying significance of a TLD, Def. Mem. at 19 n.13, the reasoning of
the Federal Circuit, which has addressed the role of TLDs in at least five cases, is a helpful
starting point; however, it is important to appreciate that all of these opinions arose in § 1071(a)
proceedings, in which the Federal Circuit reviewed the TTAB’s decisions regarding genericness
and descriptiveness for substantial evidence, which is a more deferential standard than the de
novo review applicable in this civil action brought under §1071(b).

3

A domain name is “any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by any
domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority as
part of an electronic address on the Internet.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

19

The Federal Circuit first addressed the legal effect of combining a SLD consisting of a
generic word (henceforth “generic SLD”) and a TLD in In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d
1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004). There, the USPTO found that PATENTS.COM was generic for software
that allowed consumers to track the status of U.S. trademark and patent applications. This
holding relied on the conclusion that “patents” was generic and the Trademark Manual of
Examining Procedure’s instruction that “[b]ecause TLDs generally serve no source-indicating
function, their addition to an otherwise unregistrable mark typically cannot render it registrable.”
Id. at 1174-75 (citing 1209.03(m) Domain Names [R-2]). Before the Federal Circuit, the
applicant argued that domain name marks were inherently distinctive and therefore all such
marks were entitled to registration. Id. at 1176. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and
affirmed the USPTO, reasoning that “[t]elephone numbers and street addresses are also unique,
but they do not by themselves convey to the public the source of specific goods or services.” Id.
at 1176-77. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit cautioned that “a bright-line rule that the addition
of a TLD to an otherwise descriptive term will never under any circumstances affect the
registratibility [sic] of a mark” would “be a legal error,” concluding that the USPTO’s policy was
not a bright-line rule. Id. at 1175.
The Federal Circuit’s next TLD case, In re Steelbuilding, 415 F.3d 1293 (2005), is the
only case in which the Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s finding that a domain name was
generic, although it ultimately sustained the USPTO’s denial of registration. In that case, the
applicant sought registration of STEELBUILDING.COM for “computerized on-line retail
services in the field of pre-engineered metal buildings and roofing systems.” Id. at 1296. On
appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that the evidence did not support the TTAB’s genericness
finding because “[t]he applicant’s web site permits a customer to first design, then determine an

20

appropriate price, for its own unique design,” and that the TTAB “misunderst[ood] the proper
genus.” Id. at 1298. With respect to the TLD, the court concluded that “[i]n [that] unusual case,
the addition of the TLD indicator expanded the meaning of the mark to include goods and
services beyond the mere sale of steel buildings” by “expand[ing] the mark to include internet
services that include ‘building’ or designing steel structures on the web site and then calculating
an appropriate price before ordering the unique structure.” Id. at 1299. Although it rejected the
genericness finding, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s alternative conclusion that the
mark was descriptive for the online services specified in the application and that the applicant
had failed to meet its burden of proving acquired distinctiveness. Id. at 1299-300. In a separate
opinion that diverged from Oppedahl & Larson’s conclusion that TLDs generally serve no
source identifying function, Judge Linn argued that “[i]n the Internet world, domain-name
recognition is a form of source identification” and argued that the case should be remanded to the
TTAB for a reassessment of the evidence. Id. at 1301 (Linn, J., concurring-in-part and
dissenting-in-part).
The Federal Circuit’s next case4 involved the mark HOTELS.COM, which the examiner
concluded was descriptive for the class of services—“providing information for others about
temporary lodging; travel agency services, namely, making reservations and bookings for
temporary lodging for others by means of telephone and global computer network”—and had not
acquired secondary meaning. In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The
TTAB subsequently affirmed the rejection but on the alternative basis that HOTELS.COM is a

4

The Federal Circuit briefly addressed domain name marks in 2007, but there the argument was
not about the source identifying significance of TLDs but rather whether the USPTO properly
determined the genus of services. In re Reed Elsevier Props. Inc., 482 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2007).

21

generic term for hotel information and reservation services and that the addition of “.com” to
“hotels” did not convert the generic term “hotels” into a protectable mark. Id. In reaching this
conclusion, the TTAB relied on dictionary definitions of “hotel,” computer printouts of the
applicant’s website featuring links to hotels, and the inclusion of the characters “hotel.com” in
other domain names. Id. at 1301. The applicant presented rebuttal evidence, including sixty-four
declarations from customers, vendors, and competitors, who each stated that “the term
HOTELS.COM is not the common, generic name of any product, service, or field of study,” as
well as a Teflon survey drawn from 277 respondents in which 76% regarded HOTELS.COM as a
brand name, both of which the TTAB declined to credit. Id. at 1304-05. On appeal, the Federal
Circuit concluded that “on the entirety of the evidence before the TTAB, and with cognizance of
the standard and burden of proof borne by the USPTO, the TTAB could reasonably have given
controlling weight to the large number of similar usages of ‘hotels’ with a dot-com suffix, as
well as the common meaning and dictionary definition of ‘hotels’ and the standard usage of
‘.com’ to show a commercial internet domain” and held that “Board’s finding that
HOTELS.COM is generic was supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 1305-06.
The USPTO also denied registration to MATTRESS.COM for services identified as
“online retail store service in the field of mattresses, beds, and bedding” on the basis of
genericness. In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The
Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting the applicant’s argument that because consumers did not refer
to such stores as “mattresses.com’s” the term could not be generic and instead holding that
“substantial evidence . . . support[ed] the Board’s conclusion that ‘[c]onsumers would see
MATTRESS.COM and would immediately recognize it as a term that denotes a commercial
website rendering retail services featuring mattresses.’” Id. at 1362, 1364. In addition, the court

22

found that “[b]ecause websites operate under the term ‘mattress.com’ to provide mattresses, and
they provide them online, the [TTAB] properly concluded that the relevant public understands
the mark MATTRESS.COM to be no more than the sum of its constituent parts, viz., an online
provider of mattresses.” Id. at 1363.
Although the Court recognizes the persuasive force of Federal Circuit cases, a number of
factors caution against crediting these precedents here. From a chronological perspective, the
Federal Circuit’s first TLD case, Oppehahl & Larson, which held that “TLDs generally serve no
source-indicating function,” was decided in 2004 when the internet was in its infancy and norms
regarding domain names were just taking root. See 373 F.3d at 1176. Subsequent opinions have
undermined Oppehahl & Larson’s reasoning by recognizing that a TLD indicates a domain name
and “domain-name recognition is a form of source identification.” Steelbuilding, 415 F.3d at
1301 (Linn, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part). There also appears to be a tension
between the Federal Circuit’s statement that a per se rule that TLDs cannot be source identifying
would be “legal error,” Oppedahl & Larson, 373 F.3d at 1177, and the outcomes of these cases,
which show that the USPTO’s guidance on TLDs functions as a per se rule, see Oppedahl &
Larson, 373 F.3d at 1177; Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1306; 1800Mattress.com, 586 F.3d at 1363.
As discussed above, Steelbuilding is a notable exception, but as Professor McCarthy explains,
this case “muddied the waters” and appears to be based on an “erroneous” characterization of
STEELBUILDING.COM. 1 McCarthy on Trademarks § 7:17.50.
Beyond the tension within the cases, the Federal Circuit’s TLD precedents also
demonstrate the difficulty of distinguishing between generic and descriptive marks, an
indeterminacy evidenced both by the anomalous holding in Steelbuilding and the multiple cases
in which examining attorneys denied registration based on descriptiveness only to be affirmed by

23

TTAB decisions concluding that the mark was actually generic, Oppedahl & Larson, 373 F.3d at
1173; Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1301. As discussed below, because “categorizing trademarks is
necessarily an imperfect science,” Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand
Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010), it would be imprudent to adopt a sweeping
presumption denying trademark protection to a whole category of domain name marks in the
absence of robust evidence that public ownership of this language is necessary for consumers
and competitors to describe a class of products or services—evidence that does not appear in the
Federal Circuit cases. Most importantly, in each of these TLD cases the Federal Circuit reviewed
TTAB decisions under the deferential substantial evidence standard, a point that was repeatedly
emphasized in the cases. See, e.g., Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1301. By contrast, under § 1071(b)
this Court is required to conduct a de novo review. For all these reasons, this Court declines to
rely on the Federal Circuit’s precedents regarding TLDs and will treat this question as an issue of
first impression. And, for the reasons developed below, the Court concludes that, when
combined with an SLD, a TLD generally has source identifying significance and the combination
of a generic SLD and a TLD is generally a descriptive mark that is protectable upon a showing of
acquired distinctiveness.
To illustrate this conclusion, it is helpful to consider the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in a
case involving telephone numbers as marks. In 2001, before the Federal Circuit first confronted
the issue of TLDs, it held that the mark 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S was protectable as a descriptive
mark. In re Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In that case, the applicant
applied to register 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S as a service mark for “telephone shop-at-home retail
services in the field of mattresses.” Id. at 1343. The examining attorney rejected the mark as
generic for the relevant services or, in the alternative, as a descriptive mark with insufficient

24

evidence of acquired distinctiveness. Id. at 1344. The TTAB affirmed both rationales. Id. On
appeal to the Federal Circuit, Dial-A-Mattress conceded that the area code in the mark was
devoid of source identifying significance by itself and that the word “mattress,” no matter how
creatively spelled, was generic for retail services in the field of mattresses; however, it argued
that, considered in its entirety, the mark was not generic. Id. at 1345. The Federal Circuit agreed,
holding that although area codes have no source identifying significance by themselves and the
term “mattress” was generic, the combination of an area code and a generic term (1-888MATRESS) was source identifying. Id. at 1346. Specifically, it was descriptive, as it indicated
that “a service relating to mattresses [was] available by calling the telephone number.” Id. Yet,
even though the telephone mnemonic was source identifying, the Federal Circuit explained that
the applicant still needed to establish “acquired secondary meaning” (also termed “acquired
distinctiveness”) in order to register the descriptive mark. Id. at 1347.5
The reasoning in Dial-a-Mattress maps seamlessly onto TLDs. Although a TLD, like an
area code, has no source identifying significance by itself, in combination with a SLD, it
indicates a domain name, which, like a telephone number, is unique. Moreover, like the
mnemonic phone number 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S, the combination of a TLD and a generic SLD
creates a descriptive mark by indicating that services relating to the generic SLD are available by
accessing the domain name. Finally, whether such a mark is entitled to trademark protection
depends on whether the applicant can demonstrate that it has acquired distinctiveness. In short,

5

Defendants attempt to distinguish Dial-a-Mattress by arguing that unlike “888,” “.com” has a
recognized generic meaning and that 1-888-MATRESS was a mnemonic while
BOOKING.COM is not. Def. Mem. at 10. Neither of these distinctions is persuasive because the
Dial-a-Mattress court recognized that “888” was an area code, just as the Federal Circuit later
recognized that “.com” is a TLD and, even though a domain name is not a mnemonic, it can
function like a mnemonic by describing the associated goods or services.

25

TLDs generally do have source identifying value when used in conjunction with an SLD and a
mark comprised of a generic SLD and a TLD is generally a descriptive mark entitled to
trademark protection if the mark holder can establish acquired distinctiveness.
Defendants resist this conclusion. Beyond invoking the Federal Circuit cases, defendants’
argument that a TLD does not have identifying significance relies principally on the Supreme
Court’s 1888 decision in Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598,
602 (1888), which held that adding terms such as “Corp.,” “Inc.,” and “Co.” to a generic term
does not add any trademark significance to an otherwise unregistrable mark. Def. Mem. at 13,
21. By analogy, defendants argue that “[a]dding ‘.com’ to a generic term does not create a
composite that is capable of identifying source, just as Plaintiff would not have created a
protectable mark by adopting the designation ‘Booking Company.’” Id. at 13. This analogy is
unhelpful because Goodyear’s reasoning regarding corporate designators does not apply with
equal force to domain names. As the Supreme Court explained in Goodyear, the use of a
corporate designation had no source identifying value because it “only indicates that the parties
have formed an association or partnership to deal in [particular] goods, either to produce or to
sell them.” 128 U.S. at 602. By contrast, adding a TLD such as “.com” to a generic SLD does
more than indicate that a company offers services via the internet; it indicates a unique domain
name that can only be owned by one entity. In this respect, unlike a corporate designation, a TLD
that functions as part of a domain name does have source identifying significance.
Defendants further argue that the public understands that a mark comprised of a generic
SLD combined with a TLD is generic for that class of goods or services; however, they provide
no evidence to support this position other than citations to the aforementioned Federal Circuit
decisions. Def. Mem. at 13. As will be discussed below, defendants’ evidence shows that the

26

public understands that such a mark represents a unique domain name indicating to consumers
that the proprietor of the domain name provides goods or services relating to the generic term.
Blair Rep. at 14 (arguing there is a “tendency for [some survey] respondents to think that any
DOT-COM name is a brand”).
Next, citing Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Adver., Inc., 616 F.3d 974. 980 (9th Cir. 2010),
defendants raise the policy argument that recognizing the source identifying significance of
TLDs would create “a per se rule—in contravention of the Lanham Act—that the combination of
‘.com’ with any generic term renders it protectable.” Def. Mem. at 2, 17. In Advertise.com, the
Ninth Circuit addressed AOL’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the registrant of
ADVERTISE.COM on the basis that the mark was confusingly similar to AOL’s mark
ADVERTISING.COM, ultimately holding that the combination of a generic SLD and a TLD
was not eligible for protection. The Court understands defendants to be invoking
Advertise.com’s conclusion to argue that, if trademark law recognizes TLDs as source
identifying, the addition of a TLD to a generic SLD would always result in a protectable mark.
This argument overreaches. Acknowledging that combining a TLD with a generic SLD can
produce a source identifying domain name is not tantamount to finding that all domain name
marks are protectable. Rather, a generic SLD combined with a TLD creates a descriptive mark
that is eligible for protection only upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness. Importantly,
acquired distinctiveness is a much higher bar than uniqueness and requires an evidentiary
showing that “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a . . . term is to identify the
source of the product rather than the product itself.” Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S.
844, 851 n.11 (1982). In the trademark context, “source” does not refer to the location where a
good or service may be found, e.g., at the website associated with a domain name, but to the

27

“producer.” Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118. Therefore, domain name marks composed of a generic
SLD and TLD, will be eligible for protection only when the applicant can show that “the primary
significance” of the mark in the minds of the relevant consumers is the producer. Id. Such a
showing is only possible where the owner of the mark has developed strong brand recognition.
The second policy concern raised by defendants is that granting trademark protections to
domain names with a generic SLD would prevent competitors from using the generic term in
their domain names, hampering their ability to communicate the nature of their services. Def.
Opp. at 25. This argument again echoes the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Advertise.com, which
reasoned that granting protection to such a mark would “grant[] the trademark holder rights over
far more intellectual property than the domain name itself,” permitting mark holders to
monopolize a wide swath of domain names, including those comprised of the generic SLD at
issue and any other TLD (e.g., “advertise.net”; “advertise.biz”; “advertise.org”) as well other
domain names that contain the generic word (e.g., “localadvertise.com”; “advertiseonline.com”).
See 616 F.3d at 980-81. This argument, although initially alarming, does not withstand scrutiny.
The most obvious refutation of the monopolization concern is that domain names with a
descriptive SLD, such as “steelbuilding,” are already eligible for protection upon a showing of
secondary meaning. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1299; Oppedahl & Larson, 373 F.3d at 1173.
Moreover, although the USPTO has registered marks with what it determined are descriptive
SLDs, such as WORKOUT.COM, ENTERTAINMENT.COM, and WEATHER.COM, this has
not stopped competitors from using the words “workout,” “entertainment,” or “weather” in their
domain names. To the contrary, such related domain names abound and many, such as
MIRACLEWORKOUT.COM, WWW.GOLIVE-ENTERTAINMENT.COM, and

28

CAMPERSWEATHER.COM, have actually been afforded trademark protection by being
registered on the Principal Register.6
In addition, the descriptive nature of domain name marks with a generic SLD will
significantly limit the protection they receive, thereby safeguarding competition and public use.
It is axiomatic that “descriptive terms qualify for registration as trademarks only after taking on
secondary meaning . . . with the registrant getting an exclusive right not in the original,
descriptive sense, but only in the secondary one associated with the markholder’s goods.” KP
Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 122. Beyond the circumscribed protection afforded to
descriptive marks, competitors are also protected by the likelihood of confusion standard. As the
Supreme Court emphasized in KP Permanent Make-Up, the party charging infringement bears
the burden of proving that a competitor’s use of a mark is likely to confuse consumers. Id. at
118. This is a heavy burden for a plaintiff because likelihood of confusion rests on nine factors,
which include the source identifying strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the degree of similarity
between the marks, and the defendant’s intent.7 See, e.g., H. Jay Spiegel & Assocs., P.C. v.
Spiegel, 652 F. Supp. 2d 639, 650 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d, 400 F. App’x 757 (4th Cir. 2010)
(finding, on a motion for summary judgment, that the record was inconclusive as to whether
SPIEGELLAW.COM was confusingly similar to SPIEGELAW.COM). Likelihood of confusion
6

The Court may take judicial notice of information in the public record, Sec’y of State for
Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007), such as registrations in
the Principal Register.
7

The Fourth Circuit’s likelihood of confusion doctrine instructs courts to examine the following
factors: “(1) the strength or distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark as actually used in the
marketplace; (2) the similarity of the two marks to consumers; (3) the similarity of the goods or
services that the marks identify; (4) the similarity of the facilities used by the markholders; (5)
the similarity of advertising used by the markholders; (6) the defendant’s intent; (7) actual
confusion; (8) the quality of the defendant’s product; and (9) the sophistication of the consuming
public.” George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 393 (4th Cir. 2009).

29

is particularly difficult to prove for descriptive marks because they are considered “weak” marks,
see Shakespeare Co., 110 F.3d at 239-40, and “when the common element between two marks is
a word which is ‘weak,’ the likelihood of confusion between the marks is reduced.” Pizzeria Uno
Corp. v. Temple, 566 F. Supp. 385, 396 (D.S.C. 1983), aff’d, 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984).
Moreover, even if the party charging infringement succeeds in establishing likelihood of
confusion, the accused party can defend itself by demonstrating fair use.8 See KP Permanent
Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 121 (“some possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with
fair use”). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[i]f any confusion results” from descriptive fair
use “that is a risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with a mark that
uses a well known descriptive phrase.” Id. (internal citation omitted). This principle is equally
true in the context of domain names and will preclude holders of marks comprised of a generic
SLD and a TLD from preventing competitors from using the generic term in other domain
names.9
Defendants’ third policy concern, which again proves more imagined than real, is that
granting trademark protection to domain names with generic SLDs would deprive competitors of
the right to describe their goods and services as what they are. Def. Mem. at 11-12. As
defendants elaborate, “Imagine being forbidden to describe a Chevrolet as a ‘car’ or an
‘automobile’ because Ford or Chrysler or Volvo had trademarked these generic words.” Id. at 12
8

Fair use is “use, otherwise than as a mark, . . . of a term or device which is descriptive of and
used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their
geographic origin . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). Descriptive or classic fair use “applies when the
[dilution] defendant is using a trademark in its primary, descriptive sense to describe the
defendant’s goods or services,” whereas “nominative fair use comes into play when the
defendant uses the famous mark to identify or compare the trademark owner’s product.” Rosetta
Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 169 (4th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).
9

At oral argument, plaintiff conceded that other domain names involving the word “booking”
are protected under the fair use doctrine.

30

(citing Retail Servs., 364 F.3d at 538). Defendants appear to suggest that plaintiff’s competitors
need to be able to describe themselves as “booking.coms.” Although concerns about monopoly
are one of the animating forces behind the prohibition on registering generic marks, because each
domain name is unique the Court is unpersuaded that the threat of monopoly applies with equal
force to domain names.10 Further, the monopoly argument appears to assume that certain terms
must be left in the public commons because they have descriptive value and are needed by
consumers and competitors alike; however, no evidence in this record supports the view that
domain names are used as descriptive terms for classes of services. To the contrary, the record is
replete with evidence that consumers are predisposed to think that a domain name refers to a
particular entity. Blair Rep. at 14; In re Hotels.com, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1100, 1109 (T.T.A.B. Mar.
24, 2008) (according to the TTAB, “consumers may automatically equate a domain name with a
brand name”). By this same logic, plaintiff’s competitors, such as Expedia and Travelocity, have
no incentive to describe themselves as “booking.coms” because this risks diverting customers to
the website of their competitor. In short, there is no evidence in this record indicating that
permitting registration of a domain names with a generic SLD would result in the
monopolization of descriptive terms that must be left free for public use.
Recognizing that the policy concerns regarding generic terms are a poor fit for marks
comprised of a generic SLD and a TLD, the next question is whether the dual purposes of the
10

In rejecting plaintiff’s applications, the TTAB observed that “[a]s domain name registrations
are not perpetual, [the plaintiff] may be supplanted as the registrant of that Internet address or
may voluntarily transfer its domain name registration to another.” A1103. A practical problem
might arise if the plaintiff let the domain name registration lapse or transferred it but wanted to
continue using the mark; however, because a trademark right would only enhance plaintiff’s
incentive to maintain its registration the Court need not concern itself with this remote
possibility. In addition, this concern applies equally to personal names and alphanumeric
telephone numbers, both of which are eligible for trademark protection. See 1 McCarthy on
Trademarks §§ 7:13, 7:17.50, 13:1.

31

Lanham Act—protecting consumers and incentivizing brand development—militate for or
against protection. Generally, the consumer protection rationale favors trademark protection
because brands minimize the information costs of purchasing decisions. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at
164. Although trademark rights are disfavored when they would cause consumer confusion or
impede competition, Am. Online, 243 F.3d at 821, because domain names are inherently unique
and the scope of protection afforded to a domain name with a generic SLD will be narrow, the
risk of consumer confusion or anticompetitive monopolies is remote. Rather, the evidence in this
record shows that consumers are primed to perceive a domain name as a brand which militates
for, not against, trademark protection for domain names. In addition, because online goods and
services are a significant and ever-growing part of the economy, granting trademarks to
producers who primarily offer goods and services online and brand themselves based on their
domain name favors the interest of consumers by limiting the prospect of deception and
confusion. Incidentally, this also protects the good will generated by producers, often at great
effort and expense, and thereby incentivizes brand development.11 In sum, the rationales
animating the Lanham Act are aligned with the conclusions that TLDs are generally source
identifying and that a mark composed of a generic SLD and a TLD is a descriptive mark eligible
for protection upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness.

11

At first glance, it may not be immediately apparent why plaintiff, which uses a unique domain
name as its mark, needs trademark protection; however, in the absence of protection, competitors
could capitalize on plaintiff’s goodwill by expropriating its brand identifiers by, for example,
adopting a similar domain name and using the stylized elements of plaintiff’s mark or advertising
with a hyperlink labeled “Booking.com” that opened a different domain name. Without
trademark protection, plaintiff might have some recourse in unfair competition and related torts,
but outcomes in this area of law are difficult to predict and leave much to judicial discretion, see
1 McCarthy on Trademarks § 1.11, increasing plaintiff’s business risk and leaving consumers
more vulnerable to misinformation regarding plaintiff’s brand.

32

iii. Evidence of Public Understanding Regarding Genericness
The Court now considers evidence of the public’s understanding of BOOKING.COM,
which may include “purchaser testimony, customer surveys, dictionary listings, newspapers, and
other publications.” Retail Servs., 247 F. Supp. 2d at 826. The most striking feature of the
evidence in this record is the absence of evidence that consumers or producers use the term
“booking.com” to describe the genera of services at issue, that is, hotel and travel reservation
services. Pl. Mem. at 12. Defendants point to no purchaser testimony, consumer surveys,
newspaper articles, websites, or other publications demonstrating that either the consuming
public or plaintiff’s competitors refer to travel and hotel reservation services offered online as
“booking.coms.” See Dial-a-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1346. Instead, they rely heavily on a statement
from the Federal Circuit that use “is irrelevant” and “the correct inquiry is whether the relevant
public would understand, when hearing the term ‘mattress.com,’ that it refers to online mattress
stores.” Def. Mem. at 13 (citing 1800Mattress.com, 586 F.3d at 1364 (emphasis added)); see also
Def. Opp. at 7, 18; Def. Reply at 13. In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit cited H.
Marvin Ginn v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc.’s genericness test, which asks whether the
“relevant public primarily use or understand the term sought to be protected to refer to the genus
of goods or services in question.” 782 F.2d 987, 989-90 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). But
1800Mattress.com is not controlling authority, and the Fourth Circuit has not adopted H. Marvin
Ginn’s test for genericness. In addition, even under this test, whether a mark is used to refer to a
genus is certainly relevant; it simply is not dispositive. Importantly, in this de novo proceeding,
the evidence before the Court indicates that “[l]inguistic understanding is not some further
mental condition”; rather, in the words of Ludwig Wittgenstein, “meaning is use.” Leslie Rep.,

33

Pl. Ex. 2 [Dkt. No. 64-2] ¶ 78 (citing Philosophical Investigations § 43 (1953)).12 Accordingly,
the absence of evidence indicating that the consuming public uses the term BOOKING.COM to
refer to a class of services, is highly relevant.
What evidence defendants have produced shows that the types of services offered by
plaintiff are routinely referred to as “booking website(s),” “booking site(s),” etc. Def. Mem. at
21. According to defendants, “these same meanings are immediately conveyed by the term
‘booking.com,’” id. at 22; however, they offer no support for the argument that any composite
term that communicates the same meaning as a generic term is itself generic. Id. Further, because
domain names are unique, the Court is unpersuaded that BOOKING.COM has the same meaning
as “a booking website” or “booking websites,” both of which could refer to any number of
websites. Cf. Dial-a-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1346 (“[A] phone number is not literally a genus or a
class name.”).
Defendants also point to fifteen third-party websites that include “booking.com” or
“bookings.com.” Def. Mem. at 23; PTO-0148-65 (identifying examples such as
“dreamvacationbooking.com”; “vacationhomebooking.com”; and “bhutanbookings.com”). This
evidence is unpersuasive because including the characters “b-o-o-k-i-n-g-.-c-o-m” in a longer
domain name is not the equivalent of describing one’s service as a “booking.com.” Indeed, a

12

Defendants contend that the report of plaintiff’s linguistics expert, Dr. Sarah-Jane Leslie, must
be excluded because her research on generics in the field of linguistics has no bearing on
generics in the domain of trademark and is therefore inadmissible under Rule 702. Def. Mem. at
27. Although Dr. Leslie’s opinion is not relevant as legal expertise, her robust knowledge of
linguistics is certainly relevant to the ultimate inquiry, which, as explained by Judge Learned
Hand, “is merely one of fact: what do buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties
are contending?” Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).

34

brief review of these websites indicates that they do not describe themselves as such.13
Moreover, accepting the defendants’ logic would result in privileging trademark protection for
long SLDs over short ones simply because a shorter domain name’s set of characters is likely to
be included in longer domain names. This is not the USPTO’s practice, as evidenced by its
registration of marks like WORKOUT.COM, ENTERTAINMENT.COM, and
WEATHER.COM notwithstanding the multitude of other domain names that uses these strings
of characters. Therefore, the Court finds that defendants’ list of domain names does not
constitute evidence that BOOKING.COM is used to refer to a genus of services.14
Conversely, plaintiffs have adduced persuasive evidence that the consuming public
understands BOOKING.COM to be a specific brand, not a generic name for online booking
services. In particular, plaintiff produced a Teflon survey which revealed that 74.8 percent of
respondents identified BOOKING.COM as a brand name. Poret Rep. at 29. Teflon surveys,
which are the “most widely used survey format to resolve a genericness challenge,” 2 McCarthy
on Trademarks at § 12:16, provide survey respondents with a primer on the distinction between
the generic or common names and trademark or brand names, and then present respondents with
a series of names, which they are asked to identify as common or brand names. Plaintiff’s survey
was conducted by Hal Poret, a statistician with experience administering over 200 consumer
13

Defendants only included printouts of the websites’ home pages in their exhibits. To
understand the context of this evidence, the Court visited the websites and reviewed each page to
see how the proprietors of the sites described their services. None of the sites describes their
services as a “booking.com,” rather they describe themselves using proper nouns, such as
“Vacation Home Booking.”

14

In support of their argument, defendants cite Reed Elsevier, 482 F.3d at 1380, in which the
Federal Circuit found that eight third-party websites containing “lawyer.com” in their domain
names supported the finding that LAWYERS.COM was generic. Def. Mem. at 23. Based on the
reasoning set forth above, most notably the deferential standard of review applicable in the
Federal Circuit, the Court finds Reed Elsevier unpersuasive.

35

surveys regarding trademarks. The survey was administered online to 400 respondents from
March to April 2016. Poret Rep., Pl. Ex. 1 [Dkt. No. 64-1] at 8, 18, 25.
The survey began by explaining the distinction between “brand names” and “common
names” and provided consumers with examples of three brand names (TOYOTA, CHASE, and
STAPLES.COM) and three common names (AUTOMOBILE, BANK, and
OFFICESUPPLIES.COM). Id. at 9. The survey then tested consumer’s understanding of the
distinction between common and brand names by asking them to identify whether KELLOGG
and CEREAL were common or brand names. Id. at 10. Respondents who correctly answered that
KELLOGG is a brand name and CEREAL is a common name continued with the survey while
those who did not were excluded. Id. at 11. Following that initial screening, respondents were
shown a series of terms, one at a time, and for each term were asked to answer the following
question:


“Do you think this is a . . .
o Brand name
o Common name
o Don’t know”

Id. The list of terms and product descriptions shown to respondents were





The term at issue:
o “BOOKING.COM (Hotel and other lodging reservation services)”
Three brand names:
o “ETRADE.COM (Stock and investor broker services)”
o “PEPSI (Cola and other soft drinks)”
o “SHUTTERFLY (Photo-sharing and photo gift services)”
Three common names
o “SPORTING GOODS (Products used in sports and other physical activity)”
o “WASHINGMACHINE.COM (Review and sales of washing machines)”
o “SUPERMARKET (Retail sale of food and other groceries)”

Id. at 11-13. There were four separate rotations in which these terms were presented to the
respondents, in each of which the terms were ordered differently and with BOOKING.COM

36

placed in a different position on the rotation “so as not to bias the responses to the term
BOOKING.COM.” Id. at 13-14. There were also two versions of the survey language, one in
which the phase “brand name” always preceded the phrase “common name” (i.e., “This survey is
about brand names and common names.”) and one in which this order was reversed. Id. at 9, 15.
The following table displays the proportion of respondents who identified each trademark as a
brand name versus a common name, compared to BOOKING.COM:

Brand name
Common name
Don’t know

BOOKING.COM
74.8%
23.8%
1.5%

PEPSI
99.3%
0.8%
0.0%

ETRADE.COM
96.8%
3.0%
0.3%

SHUTTERFLY
96.8%
3.0%
0.3%

Id. at 28. The following table displays the proportion of respondents who identified each generic
term as a brand name versus a common name, compared to BOOKING.COM:
BOOKING.COM
Brand name
Common name
Don’t know

74.8%
23.8%
1.5%

SUPERMARKET
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

SPORTING
GOODS
0.5%
99.5%
0.0%

WASHINGMACHINE.
COM
33.0%
60.8%
6.3%

Id. Poret concluded that in his opinion “these results strongly establish that BOOKING.COM is
not perceived by consumers to be a generic or common name.” Id. at 29; see also E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 527 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that
survey results indicating that 68% of consumers viewed Teflon as a brand name rebutted the
claim that the mark was generic).
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s Teflon survey should be excluded pursuant to Hunt
Masters, 240 F.3d at 255, where the Fourth Circuit held that in a genericness inquiry consumer
surveys are not relevant “where a term was commonly used prior to its association with the
products at issue” whereas surveys are relevant where the term at issue “began life as a ‘coined
term.’” Def. Opp. at 12. Although “booking” is not a coined term, BOOKING.COM arguably is.

37

More importantly, defendants have presented no evidence that BOOKING.COM is in the
category of marks for which Hunt Masters forecloses reliance on consumer surveys, namely that
it “was commonly used prior to its association with the products at issue.” Id. Moreover, the
Court finds that because domain names marks are relatively new to trademark law, public
understanding is highly relevant to understanding how these marks are perceived. As a result,
this case is not on all fours with Hunt Masters and plaintiff’s Teflon survey, which sheds light on
how the composite mark BOOKING.COM is understood by consumers, is highly relevant.15
Defendants next attack the methodological soundness of plaintiff’s survey as a basis for
excluding the report. Def. Opp. at 13. Defendants rely primarily on a comment by Poret, posted
in a blog by a colleague in 2009, in which he remarked that because consumers often assume that
domain names have source identifying significance, surveys testing TLD marks should be
composed exclusively or primarily of TLD marks. Def. Ex. A at PTO-00366. During his
deposition, Poret explained that he has since revised his views. Recognizing that consumers
conventionally encounter an array of marks, including TLD and non-TLD marks, Poret is now of
the opinion that it is unnatural to test brand recognition with only TLD marks. Poret Tr., Pl. Ex.
A [Dkt. No. 72-1] at 18:8-19:21. Defendants make much of this change of opinion but point to
no case law, scholarly authority, or principled justifications for conducting Teflon surveys
comprised exclusively or even primarily of TLD marks. Def. Mem. at 26-27; Def. Opp. at 14-15.

15

Hunt Master’s holding has been criticized by the leading trademark treatise, which argues that
by categorizing marks as coined or non-coined before determining the relevance of survey
evidence, “[t]he Fourth Circuit assumed that which was to be decided. . . . It is an audacious
thing for a court to state that consumer perception is irrelevant when the issue is whether a
designation is perceived by the consuming public as a generic name or not.” 2 McCarthy on
Trademarks § 12:17.50.

38

Defendants also point to three alleged methodological flaws in Poret’s survey identified
by their expert, Dr. Edward Blair. Blair Rep., Def. Ex. B [Dkt. No. 61-3]. First, Dr. Blair
contends that the survey population is under-inclusive because it was restricted to consumers
who search for or make hotel or travel reservations online but plaintiff’s trademark applications
also reference services offered in person. Id. at 11-13. Poret’s supplemental expert response
explains that the survey focused on consumers who used online reservation services because the
USPTO determined that BOOKING.COM was generic for a website service, thus “measuring
consumer perception of BOOKING.COM in the online context squarely tested the context in
which the chance of consumers understanding a mark ending in ‘.COM’ to be generic was
greatest.” Poret Supp. Rep., Def. Ex. D [Dkt. No. 61-5] at 3.
Second, although Dr. Blair concedes that the survey explained and tested the distinction
between dot-com brand names and common names, he contends that this educational component
was insufficient because it did not focus specifically on dot-com names and respondents were not
tested on their ability to distinguish between dot-com brand names and dot-com common names.
Blair Rep. at 5-6, 14. Observing that 33% of respondents incorrectly identified
WASHINGMACHINE.COM, one of the test terms, as a brand name, Dr. Blair contends that the
educational portion of the survey was ineffective and respondents were predisposed to think that
any dot-com name was a brand name. Id. Without conceding that this is a flaw in the survey
design, Poret explains that one can control for this predisposition by removing the respondents
who answered that WASHINGMACHINE.COM is a brand name. Poret Supp. Rep. at 4. Even
with that adjustment, of the remaining respondents, 65 percent identified BOOKING.COM as a
brand name. Id. at 5.

39

Dr. Blair’s third critique is that the responses varied based on the order in which the
marks were presented, which he posits is an indication that respondents did not understand the
distinction between dot-com brand names and common names and were answering based on
context rather than actual knowledge. Blair Rep. at 19. Poret acknowledges that the results
exhibit order effects but explains that all Teflon surveys have order effects, irrespective of
whether they test dot-com or other marks. Poret Supp. Rep. at 8. “[T]he very reason that [Teflon]
surveys include various orderings of the terms,” he elaborates, “is because it is well known and
expected that responses to terms often vary in this manner” and “providing various orderings is
designed to control for this phenomenon.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The Court is persuaded by Poret’s responses and finds that Dr. Blair’s critiques do not
undermine the veracity of the survey results. “[N]o survey is perfect.” Selchow & Righter Co. v.
Decipher, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 1489, 1502 (E.D. Va. 1984). Poret’s decision to limit the survey to
online consumers was reasonable, the method used to instruct them on the distinction between
generic and brand names was sufficient, and the ordering effects are, as Poret explains, both
expected and appropriately controlled for by the survey design. In short, plaintiff’s Teflon survey
is reliable. It also provides the only actual evidence of consumers’ understanding of
BOOKING.COM, because defendants “had an equal opportunity to conduct [their] own survey
but chose not to” do so. Selchow & Righter, 598 F. Supp. at 1503.
Numerous courts agree that “direct consumer evidence, e.g., consumer surveys and
testimony is preferable to indirect forms of evidence” such as dictionaries, trade journals, and
other publications. See, e.g., Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982 (3d Cir.
1993). Even the Federal Circuit, the source of authority upon which the USPTO principally
relies, has held that “consumer surveys may be a preferred method of proving genericness.”

40

BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational Corp., 60 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Therefore, the
Court declines defendants’ invitation to rely on theoretical and indirect sources of consumer
understanding, such as dictionary definitions, over plaintiff’s Teflon survey.
In sum, defendants have not met their burden of proving by clear evidence that
BOOKING.COM is generic. To the contrary, the Court finds that the relevant consuming public
primarily understands that BOOKING.COM does not refer to a genus, rather it is descriptive of
services involving “booking” available at that domain name. Dial-a-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1346
(finding that 1-8-8-8-M-A-T-R-E-S-S “immediately conveys the impression that a service
relating to mattresses is available by calling the telephone number”). And, because “booking” is
a broad enough term to refer to both hotel and travel reservation services, the Court finds that
BOOKING.COM is descriptive of both the Class 39 and Class 43 services described in
plaintiff’s applications.
3. Acquired Distinctiveness
As with any descriptive mark, BOOKING.COM is eligible for protection only upon a
showing of secondary meaning or acquired distinctiveness. See Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at
1299. To make this showing, the burden shifts to the applicant to demonstrate that “in the minds
of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the
product rather than the product itself.” Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 851 n.11. “Saying that a
trademark has acquired secondary meaning is shorthand for saying that a descriptive mark has
become sufficiently distinctive to establish a mental association in buyers’ minds between the
alleged mark and a single source of the product.” Retail Servs., 364 F.3d at 539 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sara Lee, 81 F.3d at 464 (noting that “secondary
meaning” exists when, “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature

41

or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1990)
(“Secondary meaning is the consuming public’s understanding that the mark, when used in
context, refers, not to what the descriptive word ordinarily describes, but to the particular
business that the mark is meant to identify.”).
Proof of secondary meaning requires a “rigorous evidentiary” showing and courts
consider six factors: “(1) advertising expenditures; (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a
source; (3) sales success; (4) unsolicited media coverage of the product; (5) attempts to
plagiarize the mark; and (6) the length and exclusivity of the mark’s use.” Perini, 915 F.2d at
125. Secondary meaning exists if a “substantial portion” of the relevant consuming public
associates the term with the particular business, id., and the applicant bears the burden of proof,
U.S. Search, LLC v. U.S. Search.com, Inc., 300 F.3d 517, 525-26 (4th Cir. 2002).
As explained above, applications containing multiple classes are treated as separate
applications, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks § 19:56.50; therefore, the Court’s analysis of the
evidence of secondary meaning must assess Class 39 and 43 independently. But, in the interest
of efficiency, the Court will begin by summarizing the evidence in the record.
a. Evidence of Acquired Distinctiveness
With respect to advertising, plaintiff has submitted evidence of the number of visual
impressions of BOOKING.COM by consumers. Although the secondary meaning test refers to
“advertising expenditures,” Perini, 915 F.2d at 125, the Court is satisfied that the number of
visual impressions is equally, if not more, probative of secondary meaning because it more
closely approximates the number of consumers who have been exposed to a brand. Plaintiff aired
BOOKING.COM branded television commercials that received 1.3 billion visual impressions

42

from U.S. customers in 2015 and 1.1 billion impressions in 2016. Pl. Ex. A, Dunlap Decl. ¶ 9a.
Its internet advertisements during these years received 212 million and 1.34 billion visual
impressions from U.S. customers, respectively. Id. ¶ 9c. And its 2015 movie theater
advertisements received approximately 40 million visual impressions from U.S. customers. Id.
¶ 9b. This is compelling evidence of plaintiff’s advertising efforts and is considerably more
wide-reaching than the evidence used to satisfy the first factor in other Fourth Circuit cases. See
Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding
that the markholder had made “considerable advertising efforts and expenditure of money toward
developing a reputation and goodwill” for its mark through a “nationwide marketing campaign”
that involved “placing advertisements in numerous national golf publications such as Golf and
Golf Digest magazines” and aggressively “seeking out major professional golf tournaments”).16
As to the second factor, plaintiff cites two surveys. The first is a 2012 JD Power &
Associates survey recognizing plaintiff as having the highest customer satisfaction rate of any
travel site in the United States. Pl. Mem. ¶ 27; Pl. Opp. at 14. Defendants argue that the survey is
entitled to little weight because it does not reveal anything about what consumers understand
BOOKING.COM to mean. Def. Opp. at 26. Plaintiff contends that the survey is an admissible
form of evidence, Pl. Opp. at 14, but admissibility is not the problem. Surveys such as the JD
Power & Associates survey are designed to gauge the relative popularity of a product not the

16

In response, defendants argue that there “are no advertising materials that show how [p]laintiff
has sought to replace, in the minds of consumers, the general descriptiveness of the term with an
impression of a single-source identification.” Id. This argument is wholly without merit. First,
there is no legal basis for requiring a plaintiff to produce the content of its advertising materials
to prove that the public recognizes its mark as a brand. Second, this argument simply begs the
question, because notwithstanding the “general descriptiveness of [a] term,” whether consumers
associate “the term with an impression of a single-source identification” is the essence of the
secondary meaning inquiry.

43

source identifying effect of the mark. As a result, defendants are correct in arguing that the JD
Power & Associates survey is not probative of secondary meaning and is entitled to minimal
weight. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Chase Manhattan Fin. Servs. Inc., 681 F. Supp. 771,
780–81 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (explaining that survey evidence is entitled to “slight weight” when it
“derive[s] from questions that were not asked in a specific, limited and probative context, . . . and
did not probe the primary significance of the term” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff also relies on the Teflon survey conducted by Poret, which indicated that 74.8
percent of consumers of online travel services recognize BOOKING.COM as a brand. Pl. Mem.
¶ 4; id. at 29. Although primarily used to determine whether a mark is generic, Teflon surveys
are also a generally accepted way of measuring secondary meaning. See, e.g., Firefly Digital,
Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CIV.A. 6:10-0133, 2011 WL 6160222, at *5 (W.D. La. July 7, 2011);
Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1024 (D. Minn. 2005), aff’d, 460
F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2006); March Madness Athletic Ass’n L.L.C. v. Netfire, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d
786, 809 (N.D. Tex. 2003), aff’d,120 F. App’x 540, 2005 WL 147264 (5th Cir. Jan. 24, 2005);
see also Innovation Ventures, LLC v. NVE, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 703, 720 (E.D. Mich. 2015)
(finding a Teflon survey probative of the strength of a protectable mark). In this Circuit, “survey
evidence is generally thought to be the most direct and persuasive way of establishing secondary
meaning.” U.S. Search, LLC, 300 F.3d at 526 n.13. And Professor McCarthy has identified
survey evidence as one of a handful of types of direct evidence of consumer understanding—
along with consumer testimony—as compared to the other secondary meaning factors, which
offer circumstantial evidence of brand recognition. 2 McCarthy on Trademarks § 15:30. Because
plaintiff’s Teflon survey is the only evidence in the record that speaks directly to how consumers
understand plaintiff’s mark, it weighs heavily in the secondary meaning analysis and the survey’s

44

finding that approximately three out of four consumers recognize BOOKING.COM as a brand
indicates strong brand awareness. See IDV N. Am., Inc. v. S & M Brands, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d
815, 823 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that BAILEYS liqueurs had secondary meaning, based in part
upon a “51% consumer awareness rating”).
The third factor, record of sales success, is also well-established. Plaintiff’s public filings
reflect that its U.S. customers conduct billions of dollars’ worth of transactions each year, Pl.
Mem. ¶ 13,17 and, as of 2013, plaintiff’s total transaction value, both in the United States and
abroad, was over $8 billion, see Prakke Decl., A2522, which is substantially higher than the sales
success in other cases where courts in this Circuit have found secondary meaning. See, e.g.,
Worsham Sprinkler Co. v. Wes Worsham Fire Prot., LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869-72 (E.D.
Va. 2006) (citing annual revenues averaging $18-20 million); IDV N. Am., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d
at 823 (finding that BAILEYS liqueurs’ $1 billion in sales over the course of a decade supported
a finding of secondary meaning). In addition, plaintiff’s mobile app, which can be used to search
for hotels and make reservations, was downloaded approximately 1 million times in 2014, 1.9
million times in 2015, and 2.5 million times in 2016, Pl. Ex. A, Dunlap Decl. ¶ 7, which offers
additional, circumstantial evidence of sales success and consumer brand recognition.
The fourth factor is unsolicited media coverage. In 2015 and 2016 the number of news
articles published in the United States referencing BOOKING.COM was over 600 and 650,
respectively. Pl. Ex. A, Dunlap Decl. ¶ 10. This compares very favorably to other cases where
courts have found that media coverage demonstrated that a brand had achieved public
17

BOOKING.COM annual sales revenues and gross transaction value for the last three years
were filed under seal because this information is “competitively valuable and commercially
sensitive, and its disclosure is likely to cause harm to the competitive position of Booking.com.”
[Dkt. No. 67] at 2. The Court is satisfied, based on its review of the sealed filings, that
Booking.com has presented compelling evidence of sales success.

45

prominence. Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488,
496–97 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2000) (relying on evidence that a “news
database search offered by [the markholder] disclosed hundreds of articles specifically referring
to [the service] and its activities”).
Plaintiff identifies no evidence of the fifth factor, attempts to plagiarize the mark. Pl.
Mem. at 29. But, a party need not prove all six factors and the Fourth Circuit has concluded that
secondary meaning can exist even when “no attempts to plagiarize the mark were shown.”
Perini, 915 F.2d at 126.
With respect to the sixth factor, length and exclusivity of use, plaintiff, which has been
offering “online hotel reservation service” since 1996, operated from “1996 to June 2006 using
the mark BOOKINGS. In June 2006, [plaintiff] modified its mark to BOOKING.COM and has
been providing services under that mark since then.” Prakke Decl. A2522. Eleven years of
uninterrupted use, in conjunction with the other factors, weighs in favor of secondary meaning.
See Teaching Co. P’ship v. Unapix Entm’t, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 567, 579-80 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(finding that secondary meaning existed in a mark that had been used without interruption for
eight years).
In addition, there is no evidence in the record that “any other party offering travel agency
services refers to itself as a ‘Booking.com.’” Pl. Ex. C, Moskin Decl. ¶ 12. As previously
discussed in the genericness evaluation, defendants point to fifteen third-party websites that
include “booking.com” or “bookings.com,” Def. Mem. at 23, and one might argue that this is
evidence that plaintiff has not enjoyed exclusive use. This argument fails because the mere
existence of a registered domain name or even a website does not equate to its use as a “mark.”
“[A] domain name does not become a trademark or service mark unless it is also used to identify

46

and distinguish the source of goods or services.” 1 McCarthy on Trademarks § 7:17.50. Out of
the millions of domain names, only a fraction play the role of a mark. Id. Indeed, the websites
associated with the domain names cited by the defendants identify their services not by reference
to their domain name but by phrases such as “Dream Vacation Booking” and “Vacation Home
Booking.” Further, as explained above, these websites are not actually referring to themselves as
“booking.coms,” therefore they are not using the term either descriptively or as a mark.
Finally, plaintiff has adduced evidence of its substantial social media following. As of
2016, over 5 million consumers had “liked” BOOKING.COM on Facebook and over 100,000
“followed” BOOKING.COM on Twitter. Pl. Ex. A, Dunlap Decl. ¶ 12c.18 Although this
evidence does not directly relate to any of the Perini factors, those factors are non-exhaustive,
Shammas v. Rea, 978 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612 (E.D. Va. 2013), and, just as unsolicited media
coverage offers circumstantial evidence of consumer awareness of a brand, the size of a
producer’s social media following is indicative of the number of consumers who are familiar
with a brand, interested in receiving additional information about it, and presumably tend to feel
goodwill toward the producer.
In the face of this evidence, defendants argue that “although [p]laintiff has provided
documents related to its commercial success, they do not demonstrate actual market recognition
of ‘booking.com’ as a source indicator.” Def. Mem. at 30. This argument ignores the direct
evidence of consumer understanding established by plaintiff’s Teflon survey and appears to
challenge the very nature of the secondary meaning test, which acknowledges that five of the six
factors—advertising expenditures, sales success, media coverage, attempts to plagiarize, and
18

This number likely includes a number of non-U.S. consumers, but even if only a fraction of
these consumers were in the United States, this data point would still indicate widespread
awareness among U.S. consumers.

47

exclusivity of use—are all circumstantial evidence. 2 McCarthy on Trademarks § 15:30.
Professor McCarthy acknowledges direct evidence “is not a requirement and secondary meaning
can be, and most often is, proven by circumstantial evidence.” Id. In addition, it defies logic to
suggest that billions of consumer impressions through advertising, billions of dollars in sales,
and over 1,000 newspaper articles have no bearing on whether consumers understand
BOOKING.COM to be a source of reservation services.19
b. Class Specific Analysis
Having summarized the evidence of secondary meaning, the next step is to consider what
this evidence means for the two classes of marks set forth in plaintiff’s applications.
Unfortunately, the evidence does not clearly differentiate between Class 39—travel agency
services—and Class 43—hotel reservation services. Plaintiff’s evidence often speaks simply of
BOOKING.COM, and, where it does differentiate, it refers only to plaintiff’s hotel reservation
services. For example, the Dunlap Declaration, which is the source of plaintiff’s evidence
regarding advertising, sales success, and unsolicited media coverage, describes plaintiff as “the
worldwide leader in online accommodation reservation services” and reports that plaintiff
enables customers to make reservations at over “1,027,450 hotels and accommodation providers
throughout the world.” Pl. Ex. A, Dunlap Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5. Other than referencing Booking.com’s
receipt of the “World’s Leading Online Travel Agency Website” award in 2014 and 2015,

19

Defendants also argue that “[u]se of a company name does not demonstrate consumer
recognition as a brand.” Def. Mem. at 30. Defendants identifies no legal basis for drawing a
distinction between a company name and a brand, nor is the Court aware of any. See Sara Lee,
81 F.3d at 464 (recognizing that EXXON, POLAROID, and APPLE, all the names of major
companies, are also brands). Such a distinction might make sense in certain contexts. For
example, consumer recognition of the company name Procter & Gamble would not necessarily
be probative of consumer recognition of its brands, such as DAWN for dish soap. But, here, the
company name and the brand name BOOKING.COM are one and the same.

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Dunlap’s declaration makes no reference to travel agency services. In addition, the Prakke
Declaration, which establishes the length and exclusivity of use, also portrays Booking.com as an
“online hotel reservation service,” explaining that since 1996 plaintiff has been “providing hotels
and consumers alike with an online hotel reservation service through which hotels all over the
world can advertise their rooms for reservation and through which consumers all over the world
can make reservations.” A2522. Likewise, plaintiff’s Teflon survey characterized Booking.com
as providing “[h]otel and other lodging reservation services.” Pl. Ex. 1, [Dkt. No. 64-1] at B000055. In light of the total absence of evidence that either the consuming public, or even
Booking.com’s officers, associate BOOKING.COM with travel agency services, plaintiff has
failed to carry its burden of establishing secondary meaning as to Class 39.20
Conversely, the record demonstrates strong evidence of secondary meaning for Class 43
on five of the six secondary meaning factors: Plaintiff has established the existence of an
extensive nationwide advertising campaign; a strong public perception that BOOKING.COM is a
brand identifier, as evidenced by the Teflon survey; robust consumer sales; voluminous
unsolicited media coverage; and a decade of exclusive use. This evidence is more than sufficient
to demonstrate that “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of” BOOKING.COM
“is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself,” Sara Lee, 81 F.3d at 464,
and that plaintiff’s mark is entitled to protection for the services identified in Class 43, as a
descriptive mark.21

20

Plaintiff briefly argues that the mark BOOKING.COM is suggestive. Pl. Mem. at 28; Pl. Opp.
at 11-2. A suggestive mark is one that is “partially descriptive and partially fanciful.” Perini, 915
F.2d at 124. Plaintiff does not make a serious attempt to substantiate this claim, therefore the
Court has not addressed it.
21

Documents in the record indicate that plaintiff has trademark registrations in the United
Kingdom and New Zealand that are only for Class 43, although there is no evidence as to

49

III.

CONCLUSION

The question of whether a TLD has source identifying significance is a question of first
impression in this Circuit. After carefully reviewing the Federal Circuit’s precedent on this issue,
the purposes of the Lanham Act, and the competition-protecting features built into the structure
of trademark law, the Court has concluded both that a TLD generally has source identifying
significance and that a mark composed of a generic SLD and a TLD is usually a descriptive mark
eligible for protection upon a showing of secondary meaning. Applying these holdings to the
facts of this case, the Court holds that BOOKING.COM is a descriptive mark and that plaintiff
has carried its burden of demonstrating the mark’s secondary meaning as to the hotel reservation
services described in Class 43 but not as to the travel agency services recited in Class 39.
For these reasons, in an order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion, plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, the USPTO will be ordered to
register BOOKING.COM as to the Class 43 services in the ’998 Application and ’097
Application,22 and the Court will remand applications ’365 and ’366 to the USPTO for further
administrative proceedings consistent with the findings and conclusions of this Memorandum
Opinion to determine whether the design and color elements in those two applications, in

whether plaintiff sought protection for Class 39. A1557-60. In the European Union, Booking has
registered its mark in Classes 35, 39, and 43. A1548-53.
22

The ’998 Application sought registration for BOOKING.COM in standard characters, as to the
Class 43 services, therefore the Court’s analysis of the wordmark is sufficient to conclude that it
is entitled to protection. A1-6. The ’097 Application involved design elements, specifically “a
stylized depiction of the earth behind a briefcase,” and the examiner and the TTAB both found
that the stylized elements of the mark were registrable if plaintiff disclaimed the word mark.
A3765-66, A3801. Inferring that this requirement demonstrates that the USPTO concluded that
the stylized elements of the mark were eligible for protection, the USPTO will also be ordered to
grant the’097 Application as to the Class 43 services.

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