Giron de Reyes et al v. Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership et al

Filing 56

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge T. S. Ellis, III on 09/01/2016. (mpha)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

ROSY GIRON DE REYES, et al..
Plaintiffs,
Case No. l:16-cv-563

V.

WAPLES MOBILE HOME PARK

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, et aL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs, eight current or former residents of Waples Mobile Home Park ("the Park"),

filed a six-count Complaint against the Park's owners and operators' in response to defendants'
enforcement of a policy that, in plaintiffs' view, (i) impermissibly discriminates on the basis of
race, national origin, alienage, and citizenship, (ii) violates the terms of their lease agreements,

and (iii) violates Virginia law regulating mobile home parks. Specifically, the Complaint alleges
the following causes of action:

•

Count I: Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 el seq.\

•

Count II: Violation of the Virginia Fair Housing Law, Va. Code § 36-96.3 et seq.;

•

Count III: Violation of the Manufactured Home Lot Rental Act, Va. Code § 55248.41 etseq.-,

•

Count IV: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981;

•

Count V: Breach of contract; and

•

Count VI: Tortious interference with contract.

' Defendants are Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership, Waples Project Limited
Partnership, and A.J. Dwoskin & Associates, Inc. These parties are referred to collectively as
"defendants."
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But at this stage, the allegations arc sufficient to state a plausible claim that can proceed to the
mcrits.19
Accordingly, Count IV states a plausible claim for relief under § 1981, and defendants'
motion to dismiss Count IV must therefore be denied.

v.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants· partiaJ motion to djsmiss Counts I, II, and IV must
be denied.
An appropriate Order will issue.
Alexandria, Virginia
September t, 2016

T. S. Ellis, Ill

United States D strict Judge

Defendants als o argue that plaintiffs' § 1981 claim, like plaintiffs' FHA cause of action,
requires the recognition of a new protected clau--illegal aliens-which would create a conflict
between § 1981 and federal immigration law. D. Reply at 17. Defendants are correct in
observing that § 1981 does not protect illegal aliens as a class, but incorrect in arguing that
plaintiffs' § 198 l claim in this case requires the creation or recognition of such a class. Rather, a
person's alienage and citizenship are distinct from that person's immigration status. Of course. as
previously stated. defendants are free to argue at the merits stage that the Policy was intended
to discriminate only against illegal aliens, and thus does not run afoul of§ 1981.
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