Davis v. William G. Truesdale Adult Detention Center et al

Filing 51

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 38 is GRANTED with respect to all claims against Defendant City of Alexandria. Signed by District Judge Gerald Bruce Lee on 4/12/17. (gwalk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

MERCEDES DAVIS,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:16-cv-00810-GBL-JFA
WILLIAM TRUESDAL ADULT

DETENTION CENTER, et <d.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant City of Alexandria, Virginia ("City of

Alexandria")'s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc.
38.) This case concerns Plaintiff Ms. Mercedes Davis's allegation that while she was an inmate
at William G. Truesdale Adult Detention Center, correctional officer Bryant Pegues sexually

assaulted her. (Doc. 32.) Plaintiff alleges claims that under Defendant City of Alexandria's

policies or customs, William G. Truesdale Adult Detention Center operated in a manner which
enabled Pegues to sexually assault Plaintiff in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, et seq. ("§ 1983"), and should, thus, be held vicariously liable for
Pegues' acts (Counts DC and XII). (Id at 10,11,15.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts state law tort
claims for negligence and gross negligence alleging that Defendant failed to ensure her safety by

instituting a custom or policy which permitted Pegues to have access to Plaintiffs cell prior to
sexually assaulting her (Counts X and XI). (Id at 12-14.)
There are three issues before the Court. The first issue is whether Plaintiffs Amended

Complaint plausibly alleges a respondeat superior claim against Defendant City of Alexandria
where Plaintiff alleges that Pegues was an agent or employee of the City at the time of her

alleged injuries. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs respondeat
superior claim against Defendant (Count XII) because as a correctional officer, Pegues was not
employee of the City of Alexandria, but was employed by the Sheriff of the City of Alexandria
who is a constitutional officer employed by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Moreover, even if
Pegues was an employee of the City, municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory for the acts of their employees.
The second issue is whether Plaintiffs Amended Complaint plausibly alleges an Eighth

Amendment violation pursuant to § 1983 where Plaintiff states that Defendant City of
Alexandria's official policies or customs permitted William G. Truesdale Adult Detention Center
to be designed and operatedin such a manner to facilitate the conditions in the Critical Care Unit
that caused the injuries to the Plaintiff. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against Defendant (Count IX) because the Sheriff, not the City of
Alexandria, determines the policies and customs of William G. Truesdale Adult Detention
Center, and the Sheriff makes these determinations based on the mandatory minimum standards
established by the State Board of Corrections.

The third issue is whether Plaintiffs Amended Complaint plausibly alleges state law tort

claims of negligence and gross negligence against Defendant City of Alexandria where Plaintiff

alleges Defendant had a duty to the inmates at Truesdale Detention Center to prevent sexual
assault, and willfully disregarded a duty to ensure Plaintiffs safety while at Truesdale Detention
Center.

The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs negligence claim

(Count X) and gross negligence claim (Count XI) because the doctrine of sovereign immunity

protects Defendant from tort liability arising from the exercise of governmental functions, such
as maintaining a jail.

I.

BACKGROUND

In May 2014, Plaintiff Ms. Mercedes Davis was incarcerated at the William G. Truesdale
Adult Detention Center ("Truesdale") in Alexandria, Virginia and was assigned to Truesdale's
Critical Care Unit due to her history of mental illness. (Doc. 32 at 3.) Defendant Bryant Pegues

was a deputy at Truesdale assigned to supervise and maintain the Critical Care Unit. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 27, 2014, Pegues walked by her cell while looking at her in
a 'threatening and menacing manner." (Id) Plaintiff further alleged that on the same day,
Pegues entered her cell and sexually assaulted her. (Id at 4.)

On January 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint and asserted the following

claims against Defendant City of Alexandria, inter alia: violation of the Eighth Amendment

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, etseq. (Count IX); negligence (Count X); gross negligence (Count
XI); and respondeat superior (Count XII). (Doc 32.)
This matter is now before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. On March 2,

2017, Defendant City of Alexandria filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 38). Plaintiffs opposition
was due on March 17, 2017. Plaintiff, however, has not filed a response to Defendant's motion,
and that motion is now before this Court.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move for dismissal by

challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiffs complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A 12(b)(6)
motion should be granted where the plaintiff has failed to "state a plausible claim for relief
under Rule 8(a). Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, a claim must be facially plausible, meaning the complaint contains sufficient

factual allegations, which if taken as true, "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and
"nudg[e] [the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," allowing "the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Vitol, S.A. v.

Primerose Shipping Co., 708 F.3d 527, 543 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)); Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 554 (4th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

The requirement for plausibility does not mandate a showing of probability but merely

that there is more than a possibility of the defendant's unlawful acts. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588
F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). As a result, a complaint must
contain more than "naked assertions" and "unadorned conclusory allegations" and requires some
"factual enhancement" in order to be sufficient. Id (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557). Thus, in reviewing a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, a court must separate factual

allegations from legal conclusions. Burnette v. Fahey, 698 F.3d 171, 180 (4th Cir. 2012).
Further, a court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, "documents

incorporated into the complaint by reference," and those matters properly subject to judicial
notice. Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); Matrix CapitalMgmt.

Fund v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Counts XII and IX - Federal Law Claims

1. Count XII —Respondeat Superior

The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs respondeat superior

claim because correctional officer Pegues was an employee of the Sheriff, not the local

government of the City of Alexandria.

Even if Pegues was an employee of the City,

municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory for the acts of
their employees.

Correctional officers are employees of the sheriff, not the local government. See Roop v.

Whitt, 289 Va. 274, 279-80 (2015). Sheriffs and their employees are constitutional officers of
the state, and while state constitutional officers "may perform certain functions in conjunction

with local government, they are neither agents of nor subordinate to local government." Id. at

280 (citing Carraway v. Hill, 265 Va. 20, 24 (2003)) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly,
Pegues is not an employee of the City of Alexandria because, at the time of the sexual assault, he
was a correctional officer and employee of the Sheriff of the City of Alexandria, not the City
itself.

Furthermore, even if Pegues was an employee of the City of Alexandria, "a local

government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or
agents," and thus cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Carter v.
Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Monell v. Dep't ofSoc. Services ofCity ofNew
York, 436 U.S. 658, 691,694 (1978)).

Here, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant City of Alexandria should

be held vicariously liable for the actions of Defendant Pegues because he was acting as an
"actual and/or apparent agent, servant, employee, representative and/or independent contractor of
Defendant City of Alexandria" (Count XII). (Doc. 32 at 15.) The Court finds that Pegues was
an employee of the Sheriff at the time of the sexual assault, not the City of Alexandria.

Moreover, even if Pegues was an employee of the City, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeatsuperior theory. Therefore, the

Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs respondeat superior claim because it
is not a claim upon which relief may be granted.

2. Count IX- Municipal Liabilityfor Eighth Amendment Violations Pursuant to § 1983
The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss because the City of Alexandria is an

improper party to the case, where the Sheriff is an elected constitutional officer employed by the
Commonwealth of Virginia, not the City of Alexandria, and acts independently of the City in
determining the policies and customs of Truesdale.

To state a plausible claim against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must
show that the city "deprived [her] of a constitutional right through an official policy or custom"

adopted and promulgated by municipal officers. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Moody, 93 F. Supp. 3d
516, 529 (E.D. Va. 2015). Plaintiffs Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant City of
Alexandria's official policies or customs permitted Truesdale to be designed and operated in
such a manner to "facilitate the conditions in the Critical Care Unit that caused the injuries to the

Plaintiff." (Doc. 32 at 10 H50.) However, under Virginia law, the City has no control over the
internal administration of detention centers therein. See Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 697 (4th

Cir. 1999); see also Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1390 (4th Cir. 1993) (asserting that the

administration of a jail does not "embody an official policy of the City"). Rather, the State
Board of Corrections establishes the standards for the construction, administration, and operation

of local correctional facilities. Va. Code. Ann. § 53.1-68(A) (2016). Here, the Court finds that
the City of Alexandria has no control over the policies and customs in place at Truesdale and
bears no responsibilities for the injuries which result from these policies or customs.

See

Grayson, 195 F.3d at 697. For this reason, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant City of Alexandria violated her Eighth Amendment rights
(Count DC).

B. Counts X and XI - State Law Torts Claims (Negligence & Gross Negligence)
The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs state law tort claims

against Defendant City of Alexandria because the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects
municipalities from tortliability arising from the exercise of governmental functions.
The Virginia Supreme Court has asserted that "the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
'alive and well' in Virginia." Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307 (1984). The doctrine of

sovereign immunity protects municipalities from tort liability arising from the exercise of
governmental functions. Niese v. City ofAlexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238 (2002); Hoggardv. City

ofRichmond, 172 Va. 145,147-48 (1939). A function is governmental if it is directly tied to the
health, safety, and welfare of citizens, and the Virginia Supreme Court has held that the
maintenance of a jail is a "purely governmental function." Niese, 264 Va. at 239 (citing

Edwards v. City ofPortsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 171 (1989)); Franklin v. Richlands, 161 Va. 156,
163 (1933).

Here, Plaintiff asserts state law tort claims of negligence (Count X) and gross negligence

(Count XI) against Defendant City of Alexandria. However, these claims arise from her alleged
assault by Pegues which occurred during Defendant's exercise of the governmental function of

maintaining Truesdale Detention Center. As a result, the doctrine of sovereign immunity

precludes Plaintiff from obtaining any relief under these claims against the City, even assuming
the allegations in Plaintiffs Complaintto be true. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss as to the tort law negligence (Count X) and gross negligence (Count XI)
claims against Defendant City of Alexandria.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss federal law respondeat superior

claim against Defendant (Count XII) because correctional officer Pegues was notan employee of
Defendant City of Alexandria at thetime of Plaintiffs injury. Further, even if Pegues was a City

employee, municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory for
the acts of their employees.
The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs federal law claim that

Defendant violated her Eighth Amendment rights pursuant to § 1983 (Count DC) because the

City of Alexandria has no control overthe policies and customs in place at Truesdale and, thus,
bears no responsibilities for Plaintiffs injuries.
The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs state law tort claims

against Defendant (Counts X and XI) because the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects
municipalities from tort liability arising from the exercise of governmental functions.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 38) is GRANTED with respect to all claims against Defendant City of Alexandria.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED this // ^day ofApril, 2017.
Alexandria, Virginia

4/^2017

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