Goodwin v. Wilson et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER- it is hereby ORDERED respondent's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. It is hereby ORDERED that the petition be and is DISMISSED. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 6/30/2017. (dest, ) (copy sent as directed in the Order)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

James Goodwin,
Petitioner,

V.

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)
)
)

Eric Wilson, et al»,
Respondents.

)
)
)

l:17cv269(AJT/JFA)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

James Goodwin, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ ofhabeas
corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the Bureau ofPrison's ("BOP's") definition ofa

"crime of violence" as defined in 28 C.F.R. § 550.55 and Program Statement 5162.05. On May
18,2017, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lackof Jurisdiction, alongwith a supporting
memorandum with exhibits. Dkt. Nos. 4-5. Petitioner was giventhe Notice requiredby Local
Rule 7(K) and the opportunity to file responsive materials pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison. 528

F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), however, he has filed no reply. This matteris now ripe for disposition.
For the reasonsthat follow, respondent's Motionto Dismiss will be granted.
I. Background

For purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the record establishes the following as true. The

BOP's Residential Drug Treatment Program ("RDAP") was established after the passage of 18
U.S.C. § 3621(b) which states that the BOP "shall make available appropriate substance abuse
treatment for each prisoner the [BOP] determines has a treatable condition of substance addiction

or abuse." In order to incentivize participation in RDAP, "[t]he period a prisoner convicted of a
nonviolent offense remains in custody aftersuccessfully completing a treatment program may be
reduced by the [BOP], but such reduction may not be more than one yearfrom the term the

prisoner must otherwise serve." 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). Because the term "nonviolent

offense" was not defined, BOPpromulgated regulations defining the term and, among other
things, categoricallyexcluding fi*om eligibility for early release "[i]nmates who have a current
felony conviction for ... [a]n offense that involvedthe carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or

other dangerous weapon or explosives ..." or "[a]n offense that, by its natureor conduct, presents
a seriouspotentialrisk of physical force againstthe personor propertyof another ...." 28 C.F.R.

§§ 550.55(b)(5)(ii), (iii).' BOP also issued program statements, including Program Statement
5162.05, which preludes inmates convicted pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 922(g) from "receiving certain
[BOP] program benefits," including early release.

On August 26,2011, petitioner was sentenced pursuant to a conviction of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violationof 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), in the United States District Court
of the District of Maryland. United States v. Goodwin. 1:11 cr338. While incarcerated,

petitioner was determined to be eligible to participate in RDAP. Accordingly, he was evaluated,
first on October 27,2015 and again on June 22,2016, to determine if he waseligible for early

release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3621(e).^ John-Baptiste Aff. at

10-12. Both times, petitioner

was deemed ineligible for early release basedon the fact that he was incarcerated for violating 18

' In the petition, petitioner cites to 28 C.F.R. §550.58 (1995) and BOP Program Statement
5162.05 (July 24,1995). Section 550.58 of Title 28 of the Codeof Federal Regulations was
recodified at § 550.55 in 2009, and updated in 2016, although the language of subsections
(b)(5)(ii) and (iii) did not change. In addition, Program Statement 5162.05 was lastupdated on
March 16,2009. Tothe extent petitioner is challenging § 550.58 andthe 1995 version of Program
Statement 5162.05, those challenges are moot because he was convicted in 2011, and therefore,
was not evaluated for early release underthe 1995 versions of the code and program statements.
Construing the petition liberally, it vdll be taken as challenging the 2009 and 2016 versions of §
550.55 and the 2009 version of Program Statement 5162.05.

^The 2009 version ofBOP Program Statement 5331.02 was updated May 26,2016,
however, the changes did not alter petitioner's eligibility due to his currentoffense.

U.S.C. § 922(g), a crime which involves the "carrying, possession, or use of a firearm," and
preludes inmates from "receiving certain [BOP] program benefits," including early release. Id.

Petitioner now argues that he should be eligible for early release because (1) BOP's

definition of a nonviolent offense exceeds the original scope of 18 U.S.C. § 3621 and (2) the
decision to categorically exclude inmates "who have a current felony conviction for ... [a]n

offense that involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or
explosives" from early release is arbitrary and capricious. Dkt. No. 1. Petitioner also argues, in
passing, that his right to "Due Process and Equal Protection of Law" was violated because another

inmatewho was incarcerated for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) was determined to be eligible for
early release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621. Id.
II. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss those allegations which

fail "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A court may dismiss claimsbasedupon
dispositive issues of law. Hishonv. King& Spalding. 467 U.S. 69,73 (1984). The alleged facts
are presumed true, and the complaint should be dismissed only when "it is clear that no reliefcould

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistentwith the allegations." Hishon v.

King & Spalding. 467 U.S. 69,73 (1984). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaintmust
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblv.
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claimhas facial plausibility whenthe plaintiffpleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconductalleged." Id

However, "[tjhreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" to meet this standard, id, and a
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plaintiffs "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to reliefabove the speculative level
Twomblv. 550 U.S. at 55.

On the other hand, where, as here, a complaint is filed by a prisoner acting pro sq, it must be
construed liberally no matter how imskillfully it is pleaded. Haines v. Kemer. 404 U.S. 519

(1972). A pro ^ litigant thus is not held to the strict pleading requirements demanded of
attorneys. Estelle v. Gamble. 429 U.S. 97,106-07 (1976); Figgins v. Hudspeth. 584 F.2d 1345

(4th Cir. 1978),cert, denied. 441 U.S. 913 (1979). For these reasons,a court's "power summarily
to dismiss a prisoner's pro se complaint is limited." Figgins. 584 F.2d at 1347.
III. Analysis

A. Challenges to 28 C.F.R. § 550.55 and Program Statement 5162.05

Petitioner's arguments that (1) 28 C.F.R. § 550.55 and Program Statement 5162.05 are
contrary to the language and intent of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), and (2) there is no rational basis for the

categorical exclusion of inmates "who have a current felony conviction for ... [a]n offense that

involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives"
fi*om early release are meritless, as severalcourts have recognized. S^ Lopez v. Davis. 531 U.S.
230 (2001); Whitakerv. Stansberrv. No. 3:03cv662,2009 WL 3762320, at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 9,

2009); Savage V. Wilson. No. 3:13cv578,2014 WL 1902709, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 8,2014).

In

Savage, the court determinedthat "[§ 550.55] and its explanatory statement clearly satisfied the
BOP's obligation to provide a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice

made.'

S^ Lopez. 531 U.S. at 240."

There can be no doubt there is a link between the

potential for violent conduct by persons convictedof possession of a firearm by a felon and the
risk to public safety.

There is, therefore, a clear rational connection between an inmate's

ineligibility for discretionary early release and an inmate's record of the commission of a violent
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offense. Thus, as the court in Savage noted, "promulgation of the rule... [doesnot] violatethe
APA."

Savage. 2014 WL 1902709, at *5 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.

Auto Ins. Co.. 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983)). Put simply, there is a thoroughly rational connection

between the commission of a violent offense and ineligibility for discretionary early release. It
follows that the BOP acted well within its regulatory authority in promulgating § 550.55 and
Program Statement 5162.05.
B. Due Process Claim

To the extent petitioner raises a due process claim, his argument fares no better. To

establish a violation of the Due Process Clause, a petitioner for habeas relief must first identify a
liberty or property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Sullivan. 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). It is well establishedthat a convicted prisoner has no
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in early discretionary release. Sandin v. Conner. 515
U.S. 472,484 (1995); Greenholtzv. InmatesofNeb. Penal & Corr. Complex. 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979). Thus, if a statute permitting early release places no "substantive limitations on official
discretion" in granting such release, it implicates no liberty interest. Olim v. Wakinekona. 461
U.S. 238,249 (1983).

Here, the BOP is vested with virtually unfettered discretion to reduce the

sentence of a prisoner"convictedof a nonviolent offense" by § 3621(e). Thus, regardless of
whether petitioner had a conviction of a violent offense or not, his access to the sentence
reduction under RDAP still would be left to the BOP's sole and unreviewable discretion.

Accordingly, as several courts have held, denial of access to the RDAP program and its sentence

reduction opportunity is insufficient to triggera liberty interestsubjectto due process protection.
Savage. 2014 WL 1902709, at *5; see also. Cook v. Wilev. 208 F.3d 1314,1322-23 (11th Cir.

2000); Venegas v. Henman. 126F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 1997).
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Accordingly, because the BOP

acted within its statutory authority in denying petitioner early release, he suffered no violation of

his right to due process when he was denied eligibility for the discretionary sentence reduction.
C. Equal Protection Claim

Finally,to the extent petitionerraises a claim under the Equal ProtectionClause, this claim
also fails. The Equal Protection Clause of the FourteenthAmendmentprotects against arbitrary
classifications by state actors and ensures that all similarly situated individuals will be treated in

the same way. U.S. Const, amend. XIV. To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff
must show that (1) he was treated differentlyfrom others, (2) who were similarly situated, and
(3) that this unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposefuldiscrimination.

See

Plver V. Doe. 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Morrison v. Garraehtv. 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001).
Petitioner's claim fails because he asserts that he was treated differently than an inmate
convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). Accordingly, this inmate was not "similarly

situated" and petitioner's claim fails. Accordingly respondent's Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED, it is hereby
ORDERED that the petition be and is DISMISSED.

To appeal this decision, petitioner must file a written notice of appeal with the Clerk's

Office within sixty (60) days ofthe date of this Order.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A written

notice of appeal is a short statement stating a desire to appeal this Order and noting the date of

the Orderpetitioner wantsto appeal. Petitioner need not explain the grounds for appeal until so
directed by the Court. Failure to timely file a notice of appeal waives the right to appeal this
decision. Petitioner must alsorequest a certificate of appealability from a circuitjustice or judge.

28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). This Court expressly declines to issue such a
certificate for the reasons stated in this Order.

The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor ofrespondents Eric Wilson and
Unknown BOP Officials, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, to send a copy of this Memorandum

Opinion and Order to petitioner and counsel of record for respondents, and to close this civil
action.

Entered this

day of ^

^^

2017.

Alexandria, Virginia
AnthonyJ.
United States