Bates v. Laurel Grove Baptist Church, Inc. et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Claude M. Hilton on 07/06/2017. (dvanm, )

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division REV. DR. GEORGE A. BATES, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. V. 1:17-cv-00593 LAUREL GROVE BAPTIST CHURCH, INC., et al.. Defendants. Menorandiam Opinion THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff s Motion to Remand to the Circuit Court in Prince William County for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Defendants' Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a The claim. Court first considers Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Plaintiff originally filed this case in Prince William County Circuit Court on April 26, 2017. Defendants Patricia Barbour and James E. 24, Scott were served with process on May 3, 2017, Defendants federal court because Plaintiff's there is on Barbour the basis claim supplemental and of arises Scott federal under jurisdiction for removed 2017. this question 42 U.S.C. the state On May case to jurisdiction § law 1981 and claims. Both Defendant Barbour and Defendant Scott consented to removal. At the time of removal. Defendant Laurel Grove Baptist Church had not yet been served with process. Defendant Laurel Grove Baptist Church was served with process on May 26, 2017. In his motion to remand. Plaintiff argues that removal was improper because Defendant Laurel Grove Baptist Church had not consented to removal. This argument is without merit because Defendants Barbour and Scott satisfied the requirement of the law, which is that all served defendants consent to the removal action. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2011); see also May v. Board of Educ. Of Prince George^ s County, 713 F.3d 735, 742 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus, this case was properly removed to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Next, the Court considers Defendants' pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This case is about a disbarred attorney's attempt to charge a church for legal services. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff was licensed to practice law in Virginia until 2005 when he was disbarred after Defendant Laurel being convicted Grove Baptist of a Church, felony. is a The modest church. sized African-American congregation in Prince William County pastored by Defendant James E. trustee at the church. Scott. Defendant Patricia Barbour is a Plaintiff and Defendant Barbour have been friends since the 1970s, and Defendant Barbour would occasionally hire Plaintiff to provide legal services for the church, but Plaintiff was not employed by the church. The church employed Michael Hadeed, Jr. as its general counsel. In April or May of 2016, Plaintiff about some Defendant Barbour talked with problems the church building contract for its new sanctuary. the name of the architect that the was having on a Plaintiff recognized church was using, and he asked Defendant Barbour about the building contract the church had signed with the architect. told Defendant Barbour to Plaintiff alleges that he then send him all of the documentation associated with signing the building contract. In December 2016, Defendant Barbour sent Plaintiff Over the next several months. contract occasions. with both the requested documentation. Plaintiff discussed the building Defendants Barbour and Scott on multiple Plaintiff then asked the church to pay for his legal services. In February 2017, Plaintiff sent Defendants a bill for his legal fees although Plaintiff did not have a written contract with Defendants. The church time consulting on the refused building to pay contract. Plaintiff In for March his 2017, Plaintiff had a heart attack, which he alleges was caused by the stress of not being paid for his legal services. In April 2017, Plaintiff sued Defendants, arguing that Defendants discriminated against him by not paying him because he is African-American while Defendants did , pay Caucasian or Caucasian-looking professionals. The Court construes Plaintiff's pro se Complaint to present three causes of action: U.S.C. § 1981; intentional (2) or (1) a claim for violating 42 a quantum meruit claim; and (3) negligent Defendants moved to infliction dismiss for of failure a claim for emotional to state a distress. claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. See Republican Party of N.C. v. Cir. must 1992). The complaint Martin, 980 F.2d 943, provide a short 952 and (4th plain statement showing that the pleader has a plausible claim and is entitled to relief. 556 U.S. 662, 679 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, (2009). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-pled facts as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 678. The court inferences, Markets, Cir. does not unreasonable Inc. v. J.D. accept as conclusions, true or Associates Ltd., any ''unwarranted arguments." 213 F.3d 175, E. 180 Shore (4th 2000). First, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for racial discrimination in making or enforcing a contract. the To state a following claim under § elements: (1) he 1981, belongs a plaintiff must prove to a racial minority group; (2) defendant intended to discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination relates to a contractual relationship covered under § 1981. See Pitts v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 2013); Hewlett v. 553-JAG, claim § relationship. 476 Permanent Gen. 2016 WL 3919460, under 546 F. App'x 118, 120 1981 Assurance Corp., No. 3:15-CV- at *2 must (E.D. identify Domino's Pizza, (4th Cir. Va. an July 20, impaired Inc. v. McDonald, 2016). A contractual 546 U.S. 470, (2006). Here, Plaintiff cannot identify an impaired contractual relationship because he did not have a contract with Defendants to provide them legal services. More importantly, however. Plaintiff is not licensed to provide legal services because he was disbarred, unauthorized and for practice him to provide of law. legal Further, services Plaintiff is the does not plausibly state how a predominantly African-American church and two African-American individuals employed by the church intended to discriminate against Plaintiff on the basis of his race as an African-American. Lastly, Plaintiff does not present a similarly situated person outside the protected group who received more favorable Mr. treatment. Hadeed, Plaintiff attempts but the comparison fails to compare because Mr. himself to Hadeed is a licensed attorney unlike Plaintiff. Accordingly, Mr. Hadeed and Plaintiff are not similarly situated. Thus, state a claim under § Plaintiff fails to 1981. Second, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for quantum meruit. To recover on a meruit theory, a plaintiff must prove: benefit on the defendant; (2) quantum (1) that he conferred a that the defendant knowingly accepted; and (3) under circumstances making it inequitable for the defendant value. See to retain Raymond, the Colesar, benefit without Glaspy paying & Huss, P.C. for v. its Allied Capital Corp., 961 F.2d 489, 491 {4th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiff cannot prove that he provided a benefit to Defendants under circumstances for which he could expect payment. Plaintiff was not licensed to provide legal services, and for him to provide practice of law, § 54.1-3904 authorized misdemeanor."). services is the which is a criminal offense. (''Any or legal person licensed who practices be Plaintiff Thus, shall has no See Va. law guilty unauthorized Code without of claim a for being Class legal 1 fees under a quantum meruit theory. Third, negligent Plaintiff fails to state a claim for intentional or infliction of emotional distress. To recover intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, must prove with clear and convincing evidence wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or reckless; a that: on an plaintiff (1) the (2) the conduct was outrageous or intolerable; (3) there is a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional S.E.2d 160, 162 distress is severe. Russo v. White, 400 (1991) . A defendant may be found liable only if his wrongful conduct is ^''beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, civilized community." Id. A and utterly intolerable in a non-client's refusal to pay an unlicensed attorney's legal fees does not satisfy this rigorous standard. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Likewise, infliction of Plaintiff fails to emotional state a distress. The claim for standard for negligent negligent infliction of emotional distress is even more rigorous than the standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff must also prove a physical injury along with Sissler, severe S.E.2d 463, emotional 466 distress. (1990). See Myseros v. 387 The plaintiff's physical injury must be the natural result of fright or shock proximately caused by the defendant's alleged negligence. Corp., 523 S.E.2d 826, Here, impact Plaintiff proximately 834 argues that he suffered a sufficient facts Columbia/HCA Healthcare (2000). cannot caused Delk v. prove by that he Defendants' heart attack, to prove that his heart suffered a physical conduct. Plaintiff but he does not plead attack was a natural result of fright or shock from Defendants' legal fees. Thus, Plaintiff has no failure to pay his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. For the foregoing reasons, was properly removed to federal failed to state a the Court finds that this case court, claim upon which but that Plaintiff has relief may be granted and this case should be dismissed. An appropriate order shall issue. CLAUDE M. HILTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Alexandria, Virginia July (p , 2017

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