Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION in re Plaintiff Francesca Jones's Objections to the Report & Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 24) (Objections), and Defendant Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administrations response (Dkt. No. 25). Signed by District Judge Michael S Nachmanoff on 11/13/2023. (dvanm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

FRANCESCA JONES,
Plaintiff,
No: 1:21-cv-01005-MSN-IDD
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Francesca Jones’s Objections to the Report
& Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 24) (“Objections”), and Defendant Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s response (Dkt. No. 25). For the reasons set
forth below, the Court OVERRULES the Objections; APPROVES and ADOPTS in full the
Report & Recommendation (Dkt. No. 23) (“R&R”); DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. No. 16); and GRANTS the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 19).
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge accurately detailed the

procedural history and factual background of this case in the R&R, and neither party has objected
to those portions. Accordingly, the Court adopts those findings in full and will not recount them
beyond what is stated immediately below.
On September 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court appealing the decision of
the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) to deny
Plaintiff’s applications for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits (“DIB”). (Dkt. No. 1)

(“Compl.”). On March 7, 2022, Plaintiff submitted her motion for summary judgment and
memorandum in support. (Dkt. Nos. 16, 17). On April 7, 2022, the Commissioner filed its motion
for summary judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (Dkt. Nos. 19, 20). On April 21,
2022, Plaintiff filed her Reply in support of her Motion and in opposition to the Commissioner’s
motion. (Dkt. No. 22). On July 25, 2023, Magistrate Judge Davis filed his R&R (Dkt. No. 23)
recommending that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied and that the
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment be granted, thereby upholding the Administrative
Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) ruling denying Plaintiff’s claim for DIB. The parties then had fourteen (14)
days to file written objections to the R&R. On August 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Objections (Dkt.
No. 24), and Defendant filed a response to objections on August 17, 2023 (Dkt. No. 25).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A district court “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that

has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A
proper objection is “sufficient[ly] specific [ ] so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true
ground for the objection.” Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). For
portions of the R&R for which no proper objection is made, a district court need review only for
clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
In reviewing a final administrative decision, a reviewing court “must uphold the factual
findings of the [ALJ] if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through
application of the correct legal standard.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). Substantial evidence thus requires “more than a mere scintilla,” but requires no
more than “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Biestek v. Berrhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citations omitted). “‘In reviewing
for substantial evidence, [district courts] do not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make
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credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment' for the ALJ’s.” Arakas v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 95 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.
1996)).
III.

DISCUSSION
The ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis to evaluate whether an

individual has a requisite disability for benefits under the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The sequential analysis includes the following assessments: (1) whether the claimant
is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) the severity of the claimant’s medically determinable
physical and mental impairments; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals
one of the Social Security Administration’ official impairments; (4) whether an impairment
prevents the claimant from performing any past relevant work in light of the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) whether the claimant has an impairment that prevents her
from any substantial gainful employment. Id.
Following this five-step inquiry, the ALJ in Plaintiff’s case found under step one that
Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of November
15, 2016. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 13. The ALJ found under step two that Plaintiff had
severe impairments, including degenerative disc disease, hypertension, and obesity. Id. The ALJ
found under step three that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. Id. at 14-15. The ALJ
then concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with the following limitations: lift
and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit, stand and/or walk for six hours
out of an eight-hour workday; push and/or pull as much as could lift and/or carry; occasionally
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
Id. at 15. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a
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merchandise clerk as actually performed. Id. at 19-20. The ALJ thus found Plaintiff not disabled
as defined in the Act from November 15, 2016—Plaintiff’s alleged onset date—through the date
of the ALJ’s decision on December 29, 2020. Id. at 20-21.
Appealing the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination was
unsupported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion
evidence. In his R&R, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence, and recommended granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the ALJ found the opinions of Dr.
Williams and Dr. Jafferji to be unpersuasive, and the Magistrate Judge agreed.1
In her Objections, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the ALJ’s
RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence is erroneous. At its core, Plaintiff’s
Objections are merely restatements of the same arguments raised in her motion for summary
judgment and as Defendant correctly argues, amount to nothing more than disagreement with the
conclusions reached by the ALJ. Compare Dkt. No. 17 at 6–13 with Dkt. No. 24. The Court
therefore is required only to conduct a review for clear error, for which there is none. See John R.
v. Kijakazi, No. 2:22cv47, 2023 WL 2682358, at *1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2023) (“In situations where
no proper objection is made, the district court need only review the [R&R] for clear error.” (citation
omitted)).
Even on de novo review, however, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion
that the RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence to be sound. Plaintiff first argues

Relevant here, “a medical opinion” is a statement from a medical source about the
claimant’s abilities or limitations in terms of physical, mental, and other work activities. See 20
C.F.R § 404.1513(a)(2). The ALJ does not “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight” to a
medical opinion. Rather, the ALJ assesses the persuasiveness of medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a). In evaluating a medical opinion’s persuasiveness, “the most important factors”
are “supportability” and “consistency.” Id.
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in her Objections that the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion—that Dr. Williams’s opinion regarding
off-task time and absenteeism is inconsistent with her inability to attend medical appointments
without displaying distress—“lacked sufficient explanation.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 2). She argues that
the Magistrate Judge “fail[ed] to explain how Plaintiff’s level of distress during the appointments
she attended related to her ability to attend those appointments.” Id. The Court finds that the ALJ
properly evaluated the opinion of Dr. Williams when determining that the opinion was not
persuasive. As the Magistrate Judge noted, the ALJ accurately found that Plaintiff was consistently
noted to be in no distress during her medical appointments, which at times lasted up to two hours.
AR at 380. This finding is supported by substantial evidence, including multiple instances in the
record in which Plaintiff was not in distress during medical appointments. Id. at 369, 381, 478,
554, 580, 777, 784, 792, 800, 812, 826. Plaintiff’s lack of distress during medical appointments is
relevant because it is evidence of Plaintiff’s ability to perform certain basic activities.
Plaintiff also objects to the finding by the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ did not cherrypick evidence in concluding that the opinion of Dr. Williams—that Plaintiff could only stand or
walk for one hour of an eight-hour workday—was inconsistent with other normal strength and
range of motion findings in the record. A review of the record supports the conclusion that the ALJ
did not “cherry-pick” evidence that would merely support its conclusion; rather, the ALJ evaluated
Dr. Williams’ assessed limitations alongside the medical record and the other medical opinion
evidence.
Indeed, the ALJ’s conclusion was supported by medical opinions the ALJ found to be
persuasive—those of state agency medical consultants Dr. McGuffin and Dr. Surrusco. The
opinions of these physicians were that Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently and sit, stand and/or walk for six hours out of an eight-hour workday and could
occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and/or climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps, or stairs.
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AR at 18, 79-80, 93. The ALJ found that the medical opinions of these state agency consultants
were “consistent with and supported by the objective medical evidence of record.” Id. at 18. The
ALJ also found that “the findings that [Plaintiff] has the capacity to stand/walk for six hours and
carry up to 20 pounds are supported by the numerous findings of [Plaintiff] possessing a normal
gait and strength in both her medical appointments and Consultative Examination.” Id. The ALJ
further found that “the limitations with regard to [Plaintiff’s] postural movements are consistent
with and supported by the mild to moderate findings reflected in her diagnostic image and the
potential limitations from [Plaintiff’s] obesity.” Id. Lastly, Dr. Jafferji’s May 2019 consultative
exam that stated Plaintiff had 5/5 strength in her upper extremities in all muscle groups, 5/5
strength in her lower extremities, range of motion within normal limits in all extremities and spine,
and a normal walking gait. Id. 17-18, 462-63. Upon review of the record, the Court agrees with
the Magistrate Judge and concludes that the ALJ satisfied the regulations and substantial evidence
supports his findings when evaluating Dr. Jafferji’s and Dr. Williams’s opinions.
Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Jafferji’s
medical opinion contradicted his own findings, Plaintiff objects to the R&R on the grounds that
the Magistrate Judge “merely rubber stamp[ed]” the ALJ’s “practice of cherry-picking evidence
and failing to provide proper explanations for his reasoning.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 3). Upon a review of
the record, the Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the opinion of Dr. Jafferji but
concluded that his report was not entirely internally consistent and thus rendered less persuasive.
Although Dr. Jafferji opined Plaintiff could stand or walk for two hours each per eight-hour
workday and sit for four hours per eight-hour workday; she could lift up to ten pounds
occasionally; and she could bend or stoop occasionally. AR 464. He also noted that Plaintiff had
full strength in her upper and lower body, full range of motion, a normal walking gait, and no
issues with heel or toe walking. Id. at 463. The Court agrees with the ALJ’s determination that Dr.
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Jafferji’s opinion “is markedly more restrictive than what is supported by or consistent with the
medical evidence of record.” AR at 18. As the ALJ explained, the opinion was not supported by
Dr. Jafferji’s own treatment notes, “which noted full 5/5 strength in her upper extremities, lower
extremities, and grip, full range of motion, and no issues with tandem, heel, or toe walking.
(Exhibit 3F/4).” Id. Dr. Jafferji’s findings of carrying no more than ten pounds or walking longer
than two hours are inconsistent with both Plaintiff’s conservative treatment history and numerous
observations of Plaintiff in no acute distress with few deficiencies in strength or gait. Id. The Court
therefore finds that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Jafferji’s
opinion “[was] not persuasive” because the purported restrictions identified by him were “not
supported by or consistent with the objective medical evidence.” Id.
V.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons stated above, the Court will approve and adopt the Magistrate Judge’s

R&R, deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; grant Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment motion (Dkt. No. 19); and affirm the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration in an order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/
Hon. Michael S. Nachmanoff
United States District Judge
Alexandria, Virginia
November 13, 2023

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