York Amateur Softball Association v. Virginia Legends Elite Softball Organization, LLC et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM ORDER - Defendant Jeffrey Standish's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Rebecca Beach Smith and filed on 10/31/12. (jcow, )

FILED
UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

OCT 3 1 2012

Norfolk Division

CLERK, US DISTRICT COURT

YORK AMATEUR SOFTBALL

NORFOLK, VA

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO:

v.

VIRGINIA LEGENDS

2:12cv475

ELITE

SOFTBALL ORGANIZATION,

LLC,

and

JEFFREY STANDISH,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This matter comes before the court on the Motion to Dismiss

of Defendant Jeffrey Standish ("Motion to Dismiss"), pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Dismiss is ripe for review,

and,

Defendant's Motion to

for the reasons below,

it is

DENIED.

I.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff,

York Amateur Softball Association

("York"),

brings claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition
against
("VLESO")
(ECF No.

Virginia

Legends

Elite

and Jeffrey Standish
1.)

York claims to be

Softball

("Standish").

Organization,
Compl.

LLC

HSI 22-33.

the owner of the service marks

'VIRGINIA LEGENDS FASTPITCH AND DESIGN" and "VIRGINIA LEGENDS;

it has also filed an application for the "VIRGINIA LEGENDS LOGO"
mark.

Id.

SESl 8-11.

In

its

Complaint,

York

alleges

that

the

Defendants have copied York's service marks and the color scheme

of

York's

several

uniforms

allegations

including

that

Standish

makes

operations.

On
No.

and

equipment.

about

Standish

all

Id.

York

filed

(ECF

Nos.

business

alter

ego

decisions

its

Plaintiff

filed

Memorandum

6,

the

and

York

VLESO's
of

makes

conduct,

VLESO

and

surrounding

VLESO's

the

in

Memorandum

7,

&

filed

instant

Support

in

9.)

its

Motion

on

to

Dismiss

(ECF
and

September 19, 2012,

Opposition

Standish

Complaint.

on

12

an

and

October 3, 2012.

requested

a

hearing

October 5, 2012,2 and filed his Reply on October 9, 2012.
Nos.

that

flf 3, 14-21.

Standish

accompanying

SESl 17-18.

Standish's

is

August 22, 2012,

1.)

Id.

on

(ECF

& 13.)
II.

Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides, in pertinent
part,

"[a]

pleading that states a claim for relief must contain

. . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader
detailed

is entitled
factual

to

relief."

allegations,

but

The
Rule

complaint
8

need

"requires

not have
more

than

1 After full examination of the briefs and the record, the court
has determined that a hearing is unnecessary, as the facts and
legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional
process would not be aided significantly by oral argument.
See
Fed. R. Civ.

P. 78(b); E.D.

Va. Loc. Civ.

R. 7 (J) .

labels

and

conclusions ....

[A]

formulaic

elements of a cause of action will not do."

v.

Twombly,

dismiss,

550

a

U.S.

complaint

accepted as

true,

on its face.'"

to

for

must

550

the

U.S.

reasonable

the misconduct

contain

Iqbal,

at

It is,

facts

demonstrating

Bell Atlantic Corp.

sufficient

129 S.

content

inference

therefore,

not

a

Id.

Ct.

Facial

that

factual

1937,

matter,

that

the

enough

"sheer

for

1949

(2009)

plausibility means
allows

defendant

(citing Twombly,

the
is

550

court
liable

U.S.

at

a plaintiff to allege

possibility"

consist[ency]" with unlawful conduct.
U.S.

the

"To survive a motion to

570).

factual

alleged."

556) .

(2007).

of

^state a claim to relief that is plausible

a "plaintiff pleads

draw

555

Ashcroft v.

(quoting Twombly,
that

to

544,

recitation

Id.

or

"mere[]

(citing Twombly,

550

at 557) .

The

Supreme Court,

in Twombly and Iqbal,

offered guidance

to courts evaluating motions to dismiss:

In
keeping
with
these
principles
a
court
considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.
When there are
well-pleaded
factual
allegations,
a
court
should
assume
their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal,
alleged

129

S.

in

the

Ct.

at

1950.

complaint

as

That
true

is,

the

and views

court
those

accepts
facts

facts
in

the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.
417

F.3d

whether

418,

a

420

(4th

complaint

. . .

be

a

court

to

draw

Iqbal,

129 S.

Cir.

states

on

Ct.

its

2005).

a

context-specific

Venkatraman v. REI Sys.,
Overall,

plausible
task

judicial

claim

that

" [d] etermining
for

requires

experience

relief

the

and

will

reviewing

common

sense."

at 1950.

Ill. Analysis

Standish argues that York has

not

alleged facts sufficient

to support piercing VLESO's corporate veil
Standish

Supp.

should

at 4.

Under

business

be

dismissed

(ECF No.

this

action.

therefore,
Def.'s

Mem.

7.)

Virginia

entity

from

and that,

law,

when

it

ownership" between the

a

court

finds

may

(i)

"a

pierce

unity

the

of

individual and the entity,

veil

of

interest

and (ii)

a

and

that

the individual used the entity "to evade a personal obligation,
to

perpetrate

gain

an

Virtual

fraud or

unfair

advantage."

City

Vision,

cert, denied,

132 S.

First

Ltd.,

Flight

a crime,

Inc.,

to

Newport
650

F.3d

Ct. 575 (2011)
306

commit

F.3d

126,

an

News
423,

injustice,

Holdings
434

(4th

Corp.
Cir.

(citing C.F. Trust,
132

(4th

Cir.

or

to

v.

2011)

Inc.

2002)).

v.
The

decision to pierce a corporate veil "is to be taken reluctantly
and

cautiously."

(4th Cir.

1979)

In

re

County

Green

Ltd.,

604

F.2d

289,

292

(citing DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming

Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir. 1976)).

No single factor

is determinative when analyzing unity of interest and ownership,
but

the

Supreme

considerations
assets

were

[business]
business

entity

316

(4th

"(i)

(ii)
their

own

2003)

(quoting

207,

213

that

the

the

individual

pockets,'

C.F.

643

held

following

whether personal and business

undercapitalized,

2d 628,

234 Va.

has

whether

observed.'"

Supp.

Cir.

Supply Co.,

into

was

were

F.

Virginia

are relevant:

assets

140

of

commingled,

formalities

Ltd.,

Court

or

(iv)

Trust,

(E.D.

Va.

Cheatle

(iii)

whether

whether

Inc.

v.

2001)

v.

xsiphoned

business

First

aff'd,

the

Flight

F.3d

Swimming

Rudd's

338

Pool

(1987)).

Standish argues that York has not

sufficiently pled facts

to show that he and VLESO are united by interest and ownership.
Def.'s Reply at 2-4.

York

characterizes

(ECF No.

Standish

13.)

as

Standish acknowledges that

the

Standish argues that more is required.

that

Id.

ego

of

VLESO,

but

Standish is correct

an allegation that he is the alter ego of VLESO would not

be sufficient,

without further factual allegations,

motion to dismiss.
124

alter

(E.D.

however,

Va.

operations,

The

of

assumed

favorable to York,

Standish

v. Woolf,

2011).

when

if not sole,

See S.E.C.

wealth

true

and

that

other

viewed

F.

Supp.

facts

in

York

the

2d

111,

offers,

light

most

paints a picture of Standish as the primary,

force behind VLESO.

makes

835

to survive a

all

decisions

Standish

For example,
regarding

incorporated

York alleges that
VLESO's

VLESO,

that

business
Standish

filed an abandonment of VLESO's application to the United States
Patent

and

Trademark

allegations as

SI SI 3,

Office,

along

with

several

other

to VLESO's and Standish's joint conduct.

14, 16-21.

Compl.

The ultimate decision of whether to pierce the

corporate veil will largely turn on the resolution of questions
of

fact,

not

In re County Green,

require

structure

York

and

to

604

F.2d at 292,

more

allege

relationship

and the court will

VLESO's

about

with

Standish

that

York

at

this

corporate

early,

pre-

discovery juncture.

Standish
support the
Mem.

Supp.

also

argues

second prong of
at

4.

(ECF No.

has

not

the veil-piercing
7.)

To

survive

a

pled

facts

inquiry.

to

Def.'s

motion to dismiss,

York must allege that Standish used VLESO "to evade a personal
obligation,

injustice,
F.3d

at

trademark

to

perpetrate

or to gain an

434.

York

or

a

done

to

so

here.

satisfy

the

inquiry into piercing the corporate veil.
Roy Corp.

1999)
that

v.

Parts

(unpublished
Standish

and

R

crime,

unfair advantage."

has

infringement

fraud

Parts,

Inc.,

173

to

commit

Newport News,
Courts

second
See,

F.3d 851,

table

opinion).

Because

VLESO

committed

trademark

have

prong

an

650

allowed

in

the

e.g.,

id.; Sea-

at

(4th Cir.

York

*4

has

alleged

infringement

and

unfair

competition,

along

with

supporting

factual

allegations,

dismissal is not appropriate at this juncture.2
IV.

For

the

reasons

Dismiss is DENIED.

set

Conclusion

forth

above,

Defendant's

Motion

to

The Clerk is DIRECTED to forward a copy of

this Order to counsel for all parties.
IT

IS

SO ORDERED.

bL

Rebecca Beach Smith

United States District Judge •$&•
REBECCA

BEACH

CHIEF UNITED

SMITH
STATES

DISTRICT

JUDGE

Norfolk, Virginia

October ^\ , 2012

2 The determination of whether to pierce VLESO's corporate veil
may ultimately be moot since it is "well-established that an
individual corporate officer or director can be held personally
liable for trademark infringement."
Stafford Urgent Care, Inc.

v. Garrisonville Urgent Care, P.C., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 106566 (E.D. Va. 2002) {discussing Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587
F.2d 602,

606

(3d Cir.

1978)).
7