The Radiance Foundation, Inc. et al v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Filing 89

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER issued after a bench trial to resolve trademark infringement and trademark dilution claims. As outlined in this MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Radiance's request for declaratory judgment is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court hereby ENTERS JUDGMENT FOR THE NAACP and awards the NAACP court costs and injunctive relief. An injunction against any use of "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" that creates a likelihood of confusion or dilutio n as to any National Association for the Advancement of Colored People trademarks will be entered in a separate order. (See Order and Footnotes for Specifics) Entered and filed 4/24/14. (Signed by District Judge Raymond A. Jackson on 4/24/14). (ecav, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Norfolk Division

THE RADIANCE FOUNDATION, INC. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13cv53

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE

ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Memorandum Opinion and Order is issued aftera bench trial in the above-styled
matter to resolve trademark infringement and trademark dilution claims.

On February 1, 2013, the Radiance Foundation, Inc. ("Radiance") and Ryan Bomberger
("Bomberger") brought this action for declaratory judgment against the National Association for

the Advancement of Colored People ("Defendant" or "NAACP"). Radiance and Bomberger
(together referred to as "Plaintiffs") moved this Court to enterjudgment declaring that their use

of certain marks allegedly owned by theNAACP was not infringing, tarnishing or diluting in
violation of common lawor the Lanham Act. Radiance and Bomberger also requested that the
Court declare their use of these trademarks protected under the First Amendment right to free
speech. The NAACP filed four counterclaims against Radiance and Bomberger, asserting it is
entitled to relief for trademark infringement and trademark dilution under the Lanham Act and

the Virginia Code. The NAACP claimed Plaintiffs' use of its federally registered trademarks
"NAACP" and "Image Awards" and as well as the unregistered "National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People" name and Scales of Justice Seal (referred to collectively as
"NAACP Marks") was unlawful.

The Court held a bench trial, which commenced on December 10, 2013. The parties have
filed post-trial briefs and this matter is now ripe for judicial determination. The Court issues the

following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as required by Rule 52(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth herein, Radiance and Bomberger's request
for declaratory judgment in their favor is DENIED. On the NAACP's counterclaims, the Court
FINDS that Plaintiffs are liable for trademark infringement and trademark dilution of the

"NAACP" and "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People" trademarks.
I. FACTUAL FINDINGS

A.

Factual and Procedural History

Radiance, a non-profit organization founded by Bomberger, educates the public about

social issues from a Christian perspective. Compl. KK 1, 8. The NAACP is a civil rights
organization that provides educational and outreach services to African Americans. Countercl.

KK 8-9. After NAACP executives publicly criticized Plaintiffs' anti-abortion billboards in 2010

and 2011, Bomberger wrote three news articles critiquing the NAACP's position on abortion,

employing the phrase "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People."1 Compl. KK
13-15. These articles were posted on Radiance's websites TooManyAborted.com and

TheRadianceFoundation.org as well as on a third party website LifeNcws.com. Compl. KK 1420. The first article, published June 21, 2011 on TooManyAborted.com, had a headline that read
"NAACP: National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" and discussed Defendant's

' Initially, California NAACP Chapter President Alice Huffman called Radiance's billboards "horribly racist." Trial
Transcript 107:16-108:2 (hereinafter "Tr."). Then, in June of 2011, the Huffington Post published an article about
Radiance's billboards in Georgia, quoting the NAACP's Washington Bureau Director and Senior Vice President for
Advocacy and Policy Hilary Sheltonas criticizingthe campaign for comparingabortion to slavery. Tr. at 108:6109:10.

endorsement of the 2004 March for Women's Lives. Compl. K15. The second article from July
6, 2011, published on LifeNews.com, included a graphic of the Scales of Justice Seal and stated

that National Association for the Abortion of Colored People would be a fitting moniker for the
NAACP. Compl. KK 19- 20. The third article, published on TheRadianceFoundation.org,
LifeNews.com and TooManyAborted.com in January of 2013, discussed the NAACP's Annual

Image Awards. Compl. KK 23-26.2 This article employed the phrase "National Association for
the Abortion of Colored People" throughout its text and headline. Id. Additionally, Bomberger
made a speech in December of 2012, during which he stated, "Groups such as the NAACP

(which has become The National Association for the Abortion of Colored People) and the
Congressional Black Caucus aid and abet this mass destruction of beautiful potential in the black
community," a statement that was later posted on TooManyAborted.com. Compl. K22.
The NAACP became aware of Radiance's use of its marks through a Google Alert that
identified the third article on LifeNews.com as a "hit" when a search for "NAACP" was

performed. On January 28,2013, the NAACP sent Plaintiffs a letter threatening to take legal
action if Radiance and Bomberger did not cease to use the NAACP Marks. Compl., Ex. 7. On

February 1, 2013, Radiance filed a Complaint for declaratory judgment, asserting that its use of

the NAACP Marks does not constitute infringement, tarnishment or dilution and is protected
speech under the First Amendment. On April 8, 2013, the NAACP filed counterclaims for

trademark infringement and federal unfair competition under the Lanham Act, trademark dilution

under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, and Virginia common lawtrademark infringement
and unfair competition.

2This third article, first published in January 2013, is the article upon which the NAACP bases its counterclaims.
See infra Part I, Section C, point 14.

On April 29,2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summaryjudgment simultaneously with
their Answer to the counterclaims, which this Court denied. Order, Oct. 15,2013, ECF No. 44.

On November 11, 2013, after the completion of discovery, the NAACP filed a motion for

summary judgment, which was also denied. Order, Dec. 6, 2013, ECF No. 70. This Court also
granted-in-part and denied-in-part the motion in limine filed by the NAACP on November 6,
2013, limiting the testimony of Plaintiffs' expert Tracy Tuten, Ph.D. to opinions regarding

general consumer survey principles and methodologies. Order, Dec. 11, 2013, ECF No. 76.
Lastly, this Court denied the NAACP's request for a directed verdict in its favor as to its
counterclaims. Order, Jan. 9, 2014, nunc pro tunc Dec. 12,2013, ECF No. 83. The bench trial
commenced on December 10,2013 and ended on December 12, 2013.

B.

Stipulated Facts

The parties have stipulated to the following facts, which the Court accepts and finds:
1. The NAACP is the nation's oldest and largest civil rights organization. It owns and
maintains the website at www.naacp.org. The principal stated objectives of the NAACP

are to ensure the political, educational, social, and economic equality of all citizens, and
to achieve quality of rights and eliminate racial prejudice among citizens of the United
States. The NAACP's leadership consists of prominent individuals in American society,
including lawyers, government officials, clergy, physicians, policymakers, and social
advocates.

2. The NAACP engages in and provides community outreach, informational, and
educational services activities on a range of issues of importance to the African American

community. With regard to health care issues, the NAACP has advocated for equal

access to quality health care for all Americans, including members of the African
American community.

3. The Black community is the focus of the NAACP's activities and programs.

4. The NAACP actively solicits contributions from, among others, members of the African
American community and other people of color to support its programs and outreach
activities.

5. The NAACP sponsors billboards for the purpose of promoting its campaigns and
outreach activities, which are focused on issues of pressing importance to members of the
Black community.

6. The NAACP mark (U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,188,182) is a valid and subsisting

federally registered trademark. By virtue of this registration, the registered NAACP mark
is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq.
7. The marks NAACP and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF

COLORED PEOPLE are owned and used by the NAACP, and are valid, protectable and
distinctive.

8.

The NAACP and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF

COLORED PEOPLE marks have achieved widespread recognition among the general
public of the United States.
9.

The NAACP and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF

COLORED PEOPLE are famous and strong marks.
10. The NAACP and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCMENT OF

COLORED PEOPLE marks were famous before Plaintiffs' first use of them.

11. Ryan Bomberger is a writer and media creator who, with his wife, Bethany Bomberger,
formed The Radiance Foundation in 2009.

12. Radiance is a non-profit corporation (501(c)(3)) dedicated to educating people about
social issues from its Christian perspective.

13. Among other things, Radiance provides informational, educational and community
outreach services related to race relations, diversity, adoption, fatherlessness, pop culture,

pluralism and the impact of abortion on the Black community.
14. Radiance owns and maintains the website at the URL www.theradiancefoundation.org

(the "Radiance Site").

15. Radiance launched its "TooManyAborted.com" campaign in 2010 for Black History

Month to help publicize the impact of abortion in the Black community.

16. In conjunction with this campaign, Radiance created, and continues to own and maintain
the website at the URL www.toomanyaborted.com (the "TooManyAborted Site").

17. Radiance provides community outreach services to organizations and individuals,
including outreach on education, character development, social issues, and racism against
the Black community. Through its "Shine" community outreach activity, Radiance takes
on various social issues, including poverty, educational choice, and civil rights.
18. The stated mission of Radiance's "TooManyAborted.com" campaign is to educate the

public about abortion's impact on the African American community.
19. Radiance purchases billboard space for the purpose of promoting and publicizing its
campaigns and outreach activities.

20. Radiance has provided t-shirts and onesies (i.e. a babies' garments) and novelty items
such as stuffed animals, pins, buttons, and stickers to individuals who have donated
money to Radiance.
21. "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" closely resembles "National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People."

22. Bomberger used the term "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" in
orderto convey to people that the actual NAACP is pro-abortion.
C.

Additional Factual Findings

The Court has made the following additional factual findings:

1. The NAACP has no formal or official position or policy regarding abortion because such

a position may create problems within its diverse membership and constituency, who
embrace a wide range of views on the controversial issue of abortion. The NAACP

generally supports full and equal access for all persons to all legally available forms of
healthcare.5

2. The "NAACP" trademark represents "[association services, namely, providing legal
assistance, technical assistance and other resources to achieve civil rights in education,

voting, housing, employment and economic opportunity."6 "NAACP" is an acronym of
the name of Defendant's organization, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People.

3. The "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People" trademark is the

name of Defendant's organization. The NAACP has extensively used "National
3The aforementioned Stipulated Facts represent the Undisputed Facts outlined inthe Final Pretrial Order in this
case. ECF No. 59.

4 Tr. at 243:4-25.
5 Tr. at 244:25-245:13.

6Countercl. f 11.

Association for the Advancement of Colored People" in interstate commerce since its

founding in 1909 to identify its organization and services.
4. The Scales of Justice Seal trademark represents theNAACP. The NAACP has

extensively used the Scales ofJustice Seal in interstate commerce since its founding in
1909 to identify its organization and services. The graphic ofthe Scales ofJustice Seal
includes "NAACP," "National Association for the Advancement ofColored People" and
the founding year of the organization.

5. The "Image Awards" trademark was federally registered on November 15, 2005. "Image

Awards" represents services such as "organizing and conducting the presentation of
awards recognizing exemplary works, people orprojects that promote a positive

impression ofpeople ofcolor; educational and entertainment services in the nature ofa

live show and broadcast of the presentation ofawards."9 The NAACP held its 44th
Annual Image Awards broadcast in 2013.

6. The NAACP has used the NAACP Marks in all available media, including telephone,

telegraph, faxes, magazines, newspapers, television and the Internet.
7. Radiance advocates its viewpoints on a number of social issues by preparing and

distributing media in a variety of forms, including short video messages, printed graphics
and news articles published on the Internet. Bomberger also makes personal appearances
at events and provides interviews for the media.

7Countercl. U12.

8Countercl. \ 12.
9Countercl. i 11.
10 Radiance Ex. 2045.
11 Tr. at 220:14-23.
12 Tr. at 49:20-51:11.

8. Radiance has never owned or operated awebsite with any of the NAACP Marks or

"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" in the domain name.13
9. Neither Radiance nor Bomberger own, maintain or operate the LifeNews.com website.
LifeNews.com is operated by a third party.

10. In January 2013, Bomberger wrote an article regarding the NAACP's Annual Image
Awards, bearing the headline "NAACP: National Association for the Abortion of

Colored People" (hereinafter "January 2013 Article"). This article was first posted on the
Radiance Site. This article also appeared on LifeNews.com. Radiance later posted the

article athird time on the TooManyAborted Site under the title "National Association for
the Abortion of Colored People."15

11. On the Radiance Site, the headline for the January 2013 Article appears in text and in a

graphic. The graphic headline included the phrase "NAACP: National Association for
the Abortion ofColored People" adjacent to an image ofaTooManyAborted billboard
with the text "Black &Beautiful" and a photograph ofan African American baby.

12. On LifeNews.com, the Scales ofJustice Seal was prominently displayed on the webpage

next to the text ofthe January 2013 Article.17 The webpage also contained alink to the

TooManyAborted Site.18 Bomberger gave LifeNews.com permission to reprint the

article and was aware that the Scales ofJustice Seal was displayed next to the text.19

13 Tr. 58:2-20.

14 Tr. 189:2-4; 190:11-20.
15 Radiance Ex. 2127; Tr. 122:4-11.
16 Radiance Ex. 2045; Tr. 77:4-12.
17 Radiance Ex. 2223.
18 Tr. at 132:15-19.
19 Tr. at 51:15-25; 200:1-14.

13. On the TooManyAborted Site, the January 2013 Article appeared with a graphic headline
that included the words "Civil Wrong" in large letters. Underneath the large letters is
"The National Association for the Abortion of Colored People."

14. On January 17,2013, the NAACP learned ofthe existence of the January 2013 Article
through an alert generated by the Google Internet search engine for the "NAACP"
trademark. The Google Alert presented a hyperlink to the January 2013 Article on
LifeNews.com.21 The hyperlink to the article appeared as the second "hit" in the Google
Alert results outof a total of 18 hits.22

15. On January 28,2013, the NAACP, through counsel, sent a cease and desist letter to
Radiance stating that Radiance's use ofthe NAACP Marks and "National Association for
the Abortion of Colored People" constituted a violation of the NAACP's trademark

rights. The letter demanded that Radiance cease such uses.

16. On January 28,2013, Bomberger sent an e-mail to Joseph A. Brinck seeking to raise
money to fund a public relations effort to generate publicity for Radiance and its dispute
with the NAACP.24

17. Members ofthe public who viewed the January 2013 Article called the NAACP to

express concern about the "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People"
moniker.25

18. The NAACP engaged Henry D. Ostberg, Ph.D., an expert in marketing, consumer

surveys and marketing communications, to conduct a survey to determine consumer

perception ofthe name "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" as
20 Radiance Ex. 2127.
21 NAACP Ex. 1030.
22 Id.
23 Radiance Ex. 2225
24 NAACP Ex. 1021.

25 Tr. at 262:22-263:1; 269:11-23.
10

used in the context ofthe challenged Bomberger article, including whether members of

the public interpreted the name as aparody or sarcastic criticism of the NAACP, or
whether it instead was viewed as a real name orreal organization thereby creating a
likelihood of confusion or dilution of one or more of the NAACP Marks.

19. The Radiance Site presents its visitors with an opportunity to donate to Radiance. An

orange box containing the word "Donate" appeared on Radiance Site webpages, through
which Radiance solicits and receives donations of money for its organization.

27

20. The TooManyAborted Site presents its visitors with the opportunity to donate to

Radiance or sponsor outdoor billboards with anti-abortion messaging.28 For additional
fees, the TooManyAborted Site offers other services related to billboards, such as

licensing ofartwork, research, content creation, and the opportunity to finance placement

of astate-specific anti-abortion webpage.29 Visitors can initiate afinancial transaction
with Radiance through the TooManyAborted Site by submitting their contact
information.30 Radiance then contacts the interested party to confirm the details and

sends a license agreement specifying the services to be rendered along with payment and
...

invoicing terms.

31

21. Radiance has erected billboards in seven states, along with seven state-specific anti-

abortion webpages. Seven different messages have appeared on billboards. The
billboards also include a reference to the TooManyAborted Site as well as a sponsorship

26 NAACP Ex. 1045.
27 Radiance Ex. 2045.
28 Radiance Ex. 2131.
29 Id
30 Tr. at 147:1-148:8.

31 Tr. at 149:9-150:13; NAACP Ex. 1015.
11

tagline identifying Radiance and any sponsoring organization.32 The seven state-specific

webpages appear under the "The Impact" section ofthe TooManyAborted Site.33
22. None ofRadiance's billboard artwork has displayed any ofthe NAACP Marks orhas

included the phrase "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People."34 None
ofthe NAACP Marks or "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" has

appeared on any webpage accessed via the "Take Action" menu item, including the
"Expose the Lies. Sponsor a Billboard" page.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) to hear
claims arising out offederal trademark laws. This Court also has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. §1332 because there is citizenship diversity between the parties and the matter in
controversy exceeds $75,000.

2. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs because Radiance's principal place of
business is in Virginia and Bomberger is domiciled in Virginia. This Court has personal

jurisdiction over Defendant because the NAACP conducts activities and derives revenue
in Virginia, and has a substantial number ofchapters and members throughout the
Commonwealth.

3. Venue is proper under § 1391 in any judicial district in which the defendant is properly
subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c). Venue is proper pursuant

to § 1391 because asubstantial part ofthe acts giving rise to the claims occurred in this
District, and Defendant has sufficient connection with the Eastern District of Virginia.

32 Tr. 84:9-86:13; 150:20-151:2.
33 Tr. 85:11-24.
34 Tr. 107:10-12.
35 Tr. 100:16-101:5.
12

Trademark Infringement

4. Pursuant to Section 32(1 )(a) the Lanham Act, "[a]ny person who shall, without the
consent ofthe registrant —use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation ofa registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,

distribution, or advertising ofany goods or services on or in connection with which such

use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be liable in a
civil action by the registrant

" 15 U.S.C. § 1114.

5. Pursuant to Section 43(a) the Lanham Act, "[a]ny person who, on or in connection with

any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation oforigin,
false or misleading description offact, or false or misleading representation offact,
which —is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, orassociation ofsuch person with another person, oras to the

origin, sponsorship, or approval ofhis or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to bedamaged by such act." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).

6. The party making the allegations ofinfringement has the burden ofproof to present
evidence in support ofthe allegations set forth in its complaint and to prove those

allegations by a preponderance ofthe evidence. Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp., 296
F.3d 778,783 (9th Cir. 2002); Eurotech, Inc. v. Cosmos European Travels
Aktiengesellschqft, 213 F. Supp. 2d 612, 623 (E.D. Va. 2002).

7. To establish an infringement violation of the Lanham Act for either a registered mark

under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 oran unregistered mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), "a plaintiff

13

must prove: (1) that it owns avalid mark; (2) that the defendant used the mark 'in
commerce' and without the plaintiffs authorization; (3) that the defendant used the mark

(or an imitation of it) 'in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or

advertising' of goods or services; and (4) that the defendant's use of the mark is likely to
confuse consumers." Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir.
2012) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a)).

8. To establish trademark infringement liability under Virginia law, a plaintiff must prove
that a defendant "uses in a manner likely to cause a consumer confusion, mistake, or

deception as to the source or origin of any goods or services, without the consent of the
owner ofaregistered mark, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of

aregistered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
ofsuch goods or services." Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-92.12(0 (West 2011).
9. For a trademark to be used "in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or

advertising ofgoods or services," the alleged infringer must offer goods or services in
commerce under the trademark without the consent of the mark holder. OBH, Inc. v.

Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
10. "Services" are defined as "a wide variety of non-commercial public and civic benefits,"

including donation solicitation, event hosting, information dissemination and
campaigning. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 314 (4th Cir. 2005).
11. The NAACP has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Radiance used the
NAACP Marks in connection with the offering for sale of services because the marks

appeared in connection with the NAACP's information services as well as Radiance's
fundraising, sponsorship and outreach efforts.

14

12. Likelihood ofconfusion involves potential consumers being confused about the source of

services as well as their sponsorship. Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 157. Likelihood of
confusion exists if the consuming public assumes upon viewing a mark that the service
offered under the mark is associated with a different service represented by a similar
mark. Harlem Wizards Entm 't Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1084,
1094 (D.N.J. 1997).

13. The Fourth Circuit "has articulated at least nine factors that generally are relevant to the

'likelihood of confusion' inquiry: (1) the strength or distinctiveness ofthe plaintiffs

mark as actually used in the marketplace; (2) the similarity ofthe two marks to
consumers; (3) the similarity ofthe goods or services that the marks identify; (4) the

similarity ofthe facilities used by the markholders; (5) the similarity ofadvertising used

by the markholders; (6) the defendant's intent; (7) actual confusion; (8) the quality ofthe
defendant's product; and (9) the sophistication ofthe consuming public." George &Co.,
LLC v. Imagination Entm 7Ltd., 575 F.3d 383,393 (4th Cir. 2009).

14. Parody is not an affirmative defense to trademark infringement "but only another factor
to beconsidered in determining the likelihood ofconfusion

The keystone of parody

is imitation, but must convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: 'that it is

the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.'" World Wrestling
Fed'n Entm 7 Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 431 (W.D. Pa. 2003)

(quoting Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993)).
15. First Amendment concerns regarding freedom of speech and expression must be balanced

against trademark rights and remedies, and an alleged infringer's use ofa mark as part of
a communicative message is entitled to First Amendment protection so long as it does not

15

mislead orcreate confusion. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d
658, 672 (5th Cir. 2000).

16. The NAACP has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that consumers are

likely to be confused about whether "National Association for the Abortion of Colored

People" is sponsored, authorized by or otherwise affiliated with the NAACP, and there is
ahigh likelihood of confusion involving Radiance's use of "NAACP" and acolorable
imitation of "National Association for theAdvancement of Colored People." The

NAACP has not established that the relevant confusion factors are indicative of any
likelihood that consumers would beconfused about the origin or sponsorship of any
services offered under Radiance's use of "Image Awards" and the Scales of Justice Seal.
Trademark Dilution

17. Pursuant to Section 43(c)(1) ofthe Lanham Act, "the owner ofa famous mark that is
distinctive, inherently orthrough acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an

injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner's mark has become
famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause

dilution by blurring or dilution by tamishment ofthe famous mark, regardless ofthe

presence or absence ofactual or likely confusion, ofcompetition, or ofactual economic
injury." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).

18. Dilution by tamishment denotes an "association arising from the similarity between a
mark or a trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark."

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). A trademark may be tarnished when it is "portrayed in an

unwholesome or unsavory context," resulting in "the public [...] associating] the lack of

16

quality or lack ofprestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiffs unrelated goods."
Deere &Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39,43 (2d Cir. 1994).

19. "To state aprima facie dilution claim ... the plaintiff must show the following: (1) that
the plaintiffowns afamous mark that is distinctive; (2) that the defendant has
commenced using amark in commerce that allegedly is diluting the famous mark; (3)
that a similarity between the defendant's mark and the famous mark gives rise to an
association between the marks; and (4) that the association is likely to impair the
distinctiveness ofthe famous mark or likely to harm the reputation ofthe famous mark."

Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 168 (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity
Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264-65 (4th Cir. 2007)).
20. The fair use defense to trademark dilution allows description and criticism that

incidentally involves the use ofa trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A). Fair use may
take the form of a nominative use or a parody.

21. A nominative use occurs when a defendant uses a plaintiffs mark to identify the

plaintiffs own goods and "makes itclear to consumers that the plaintiff, not the
defendant, is the source of the trademarked product or service." Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211,220 (3d Cir. 2005).
22. An unauthorized use of a trademark for news reporting and news commentary as well as

noncommercial use are exempt from liability for dilution by tamishment. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(3).

23. TheNAACP has established by a preponderance of the evidence thatRadiance has

engaged in conduct that constitutes dilution by tamishment because Radiance's use of
"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" is likely to harm the

17

reputation ofthe "NAACP" and "National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People" marks as it insinuates astance ofabortion that the NAACP has deliberately
avoided. Radiance has demonstrated by a preponderance ofthe evidence that itengaged
in a nominative use of"Image Awards" and the Scales ofJustice Seal, which did not
result in dilution by tamishment.
Consumer Survey Evidence

24. "A party introducing aconsumer survey bears the burden of establishing that it was
conducted in accordance with accepted principles of survey research, i.e., that (1) a

proper universe was examined; (2) arepresentative sample was drawn from that universe;
(3) the mode of questioning the interviewees was correct; (4) the persons conducting the
survey were recognized experts; (5) the data gathered was accurately reported; and (6)
the sample design, the questionnaire and the interviewing were in accordance with

generally accepted standards of procedure and statistics." Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp.
at 1098.

25. Although Radiance expert Dr. Tracy Tuten opined that Dr. Ostberg's survey ("Ostberg

Survey") suffers from reliability and validity issues such as improper sampling and lack
ofcontrols, the Court finds that the NAACP has demonstrated by a preponderance ofthe
evidence that the Ostberg Survey is reliable.
Remedies

26. Aparty seeking an injunction must demonstrate "(1) ithas suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) remedies available at law are inadequate; (3) the balance ofthe hardships favors the
36 Specifically, Dr. Tuten testified as to two main critiques ofthe Ostberg Survey. First, Dr. Tuten argues Dr.
Ostberg's sampling frame was improper because he did not use aprobability sample and he used self-recruited and
incentivized participants without assessing whether this nonprobability panel contributed bias. Tr. 436:5-448:1.
Second, Dr. Tuten noted that Dr. Ostberg used no controls to measure any change that occurred by the application of
his stimulus and did not address interrater reliability. Tr. 448:12-452:2, 458:6-25. The Court finds that the Ostberg

Survey was conducted in accordance with accepted principles ofsurvey research and is reliable. Tr. at 287:25-288:5.
18

party seeking the injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by the
injunction." PBM Products, LLC v. Mead Johnson &Co., 639 F.3d 111, 126 (4th Cir.
2011) (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
27. The NAACP has established that it is entitled to a permanent injunction because it

suffered irreparable reputational harm, the public has been confused or misled, and such
an injunction would not constitute content-based restriction on free speech.

28. Aplaintiffmay recover monetary damages based on profits obtained from the activity
constituting a violation of the Lanham Act. See generally Otis Clapp &Son, Inc. v.
Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1985).

29. The NAACP has not established that it is entitled to any gross profits obtained from
Radiance's infringement or dilution.

30. Reasonable attorney fees may be awarded in"exceptional cases" where the defendant's
conductwas malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate in nature and the defendant acted
in bad faith. RetailServs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ 'g, 364 F.3d 535, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).

31. The NAACP has not established by clear and convincing evidence that Radiance acted in

bad faith or engaged in conduct that was malicious, deliberate, willful or fraudulent to
support its request for attorney fees.
III. DISCUSSION

A.

Plaintiffs' Request for Declaratory Relief

Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 by which
they seek a declaration that they have not violated any rights of the NAACP regarding their
trademarks.

19

The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes federal courts to issue declaratory judgments to

"declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,"
except "with respect to Federal taxes." 28 U.S.C. §2201(a). Adeclaratory judgment is

appropriate "when the judgment will serve auseful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal
relations in issue, and ... when itwill terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty,

insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. Poston, 88
F.3d 255,256 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321, 325 (4th

Cir. 1937)). Acourt's authority to grant adeclaratory judgment is discretionary. Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277,282 (1995). "District courts 'have great latitude in determining

whether to assert jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions,' but should refuse to entertain a
declaratory judgment only for good cause." First Nationwide Mortgage Corp. v. FIS1Madison,
LLC, 219 F. Supp. 2d 669, 672 (D. Md. 2002) (citing Aetna Casualty &Surety Co. v. Quarles,
92 F.2d 321, 324 (4th Cir.1937)). Declaratory judgment actions are appropriate to allow "the

uncertain party to gain relief from the insecurity caused by a potential suit," United Capitol Ins.
Co. v. Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488,494 (4th Cir. 1998), but are disfavored when filed in anticipation
of a certain or imminent lawsuit to secure a more favorable forum or procedural posture. See

Learning Network, Inc. v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 11 F. App'x 297, 301 (4th Cir. 2001) ("It
has long been established that courts look with disfavor upon races to the courthouse and forum

shopping. Such procedural fencing is afactor that counsels against exercising jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action.").

Plaintiffs request declaratory judgment on four separate issues: (1) that they did not

infringe any NAACP trademarks under either the Lanham Act or common law; (2) that neither
Radiance nor Bomberger tarnished or diluted any famous mark owned by the NAACP; (3) that

20

Radiance and Bomberger's use of marks of the NAACP did not constitute unfair competition or

palming off; and (4) that their use ofthe NAACP's trademarks was protected by the First
Amendment rightto freedom of speech.

In view ofthe analysis ofthe trademark infringement and trademark dilution
counterclaims herein, the Court finds that Radiance has failed to establish that itis entitled to

declaratory relief. Declaratory judgment will not serve to settle the legal issues in this case
because the NAACP has filed counterclaims that require the Court to analyze and resolve the

infringement and dilution matters in controversy. Because declaratory reliefwill not terminate
the proceeding, the Court has good cause to find declaratory judgment inappropriate.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief is DENIED.
B.

Defendant's Counterclaims for Trademark Infringement and Dilution
i.

Counts I, II and IV: Trademark Infringement

To establish a claim for trademark infringement and unfair competition, the NAACP

must show that itpossesses a valid, protectable mark used by Radiance and Bomberger in
commerce in connection with the offering for sale of services in a manner likely to confuse

consumers. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114,1125(a); Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 152; Lamparello,

420 F.3d at 313. Virginia's common law standards for trademark infringement and unfair

competition mirror the Lanham Act test "because both address the likelihood ofconfusion as to
the source ofthe goods or services involved." Lone Star Steakhouse &Saloon, Inc., 43 F.3d at

37 The factual history ofthis dispute may support adetermination that Radiance filed this action in anticipation ofan
impending lawsuit. Specifically, Radiance did not respond to the cease and desist letter in the seven-day timeframe
during which the NAACP requested areply. Instead, Radiance filed suit. However, no persuasive evidence has
been presented to show that Radiance's Complaint was an improper anticipatory filing made under an apparent
threat oflegal action or to engage in forum shopping. Therefore, taken alone, the timing and motivation of
Radiance's filing ofthis action does not preclude this Court from considering a grant ofa declaratory judgment.
21

930 n. 10 (citations omitted).38 Accordingly, the Court will address Counts I, II and IV together.
Count III, the counterclaim for trademark dilution, will be addressed independently.
Counts I, II and IV assert that Radiance infringed the NAACP Marks through the manner
in which it used "NAACP," "Image Awards" and the Scales ofJustice Seal as well as avariation
of"National Association for the Advancement ofColored People" in the January 2013 Article.

39

The parties do not dispute that the NAACP possessed valid trademarks or that Radiance used
those certain marks "in commerce." The two key issues are whether Radiance used the NAACP
Marks in connection with the offering for sale ofservices and whether any likelihood of
consumer confusion exists. Based on the following analysis, Plaintiffs' use of"NAACP" as
well as "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" instead of"National
Association for the Advancement ofColored People" in all three website postings ofthe January
2013 Article constitutes trademark infringement as charged in Counts I, II and IV.
a. In connection with the offering for sale of services

The first issue the Court must resolve is whether Radiance used the NAACP Marks in

connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising ofany goods or services.

The requirement that an alleged infringer's use of the mark holder's trademark be made in
connection with goods or services "does not require the infringer to actually cause goods or

services to be placed into the stream ofcommerce. Rather, all that is needed is that the trademark
violation be 'in connection' with any goods or services." Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F.

Supp. 282, 309 (D.N.J. 1998) affd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
38 Federal courts sitting in diversity apply federal procedural law and state substantive law. Gasperini v. Cir. for
Humanities, /«c, 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).

.

39 Although Defendant did not explicitly address this distinction at trial, the Court recognizes that Defendant s

argument regarding infringement of the "National Association for the Advancement ofColored People" mark is
based on the alleged use of"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People," acolorable imitation of
Defendant's organization name. The term "colorable imitation" includes any mark which so resembles aregistered
mark as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake orto deceive. 15 U.S.C. §1127.
22

Services are defined as "a wide variety of non-commercial public and civic benefits."

Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 314. "Services" may consist of noncommercial benefits including
donation solicitation, event hosting, campaigning and dissemination of educational information

though public advocacy. Cf. United We StandAmerica, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New
York, 128 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant's political activities, including

political organizing, soliciting and endorsing candidates, and distributing press releases and
literature, were "services"). "Services" may also consist of commercial benefits such as an

organization providing hyperlinks to other websites offering goods or services. Peoplefor
Ethical Treatment ofAnimals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2001) (hereinafter
"PETA").

Radiance's conduct is subject to trademark infringement liability because itused the
NAACP Marks in connection with the information services ofboth parties. The connection with
the NAACP's services is evidenced by the fact that the January 2013 Article could be accessed

through aGoogle search for "NAACP," diverting Internet users to Radiance's article as opposed
to the NAACP's websites.40 See id. at366 (holding that the use ofa trademark is in connection

with goods and services ifit "is likely to prevent Internet users from reaching the [mark holder's]
own Internet web site" and services); see also Planned Parenthood Fed'n ofAm., Inc. v. Bucci,

97 CIV. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) affd, 152 F.3d 920

(2d Cir. 1998) ("Prospective users ofplaintiffsservices who mistakenly access defendant's web
site may fail to continue to search for plaintiffs own home page, due to anger, frustration, or the
beliefthat plaintiffs home page does not exist."). The connection with Radiance's own
information services is established because Radiance provided information to persuade Internet

users that abortion is "wrong." Compare id. ("[Defendant offers informational services for use
'NAACP Ex. 1030.
23

in convincing people that certain activities, including the use of plaintiffsservices, are morally

wrong. In this way, defendant offers his own set of services, and his use of plaintiffsmark is in
connection with the distribution of those services over the Internet.").

Additionally, liability under the Lanham Act may be imposed on Radiance for its
unauthorized use ofthe NAACP Marks as part ofsocial commentary or criticism for which they

solicit donations and sponsorship. The January 2013 Article was posted on the Radiance Site

and the TooManyAborted Site adjacent to orange boxes marked "Donate," which hyperlinked to
the "Donate Today" webpage with information on making contributions to Radiance through

PayPal.4I Also, all three postings of the January 2013 Article provided hyperlinks to the
TooManyAborted Site, which presented its visitors with the opportunity to support or sponsor
the erection ofanti-abortion billboards through the "Take Action" webpage. TooManyAborted

Site visitors may initiate fee-based transactions to secure billboard artwork and licensing services
for $950 and state-specific webpage content creation for $950.

Furthermore, the in connection with the offering for sale ofservices requirement is

established by Bomberger's fundraising activity in relation to the parties' dispute. Compare
Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313, at *6 ("[Defendant has testified that he solicits
contributions on his 'Catholic Radio' radio show and has solicited contributions on the air in
connection with the instant lawsuit.... Courts have found that fund-raising activities may bring
a defendant's actions within the scope of the Lanham Act."). Upon receipt of the NAACP's

cease and desist letter on January 28,2013, Bomberger e-mailed Joseph A. Brinck about
41 See Radiance Ex. 2045 (printed version ofarticle on the Radiance Site); NAACP Ex. 1012 (printed version of
article on the TooManyAborted Site with "Donate" box). But cf. Radiance Ex. 2127 (printed version ofarticle on the

TooManyAborted Site without "Donate" box). The Court finds that at some point in time, the "Donate" box was

presented next to the text ofthe January 2013 Article on the TooManyAborted Site, as evidenced by the NAACP's
exhibit. Paypal, Inc. is aperson-to-person online payment system through which auser may link his or her bank

account to facilitate online purchases and money transfers. Act II Jewelry, LLC v. Mu Ying Zhu, 2:09CV407,2010
WL 2521340 (E.D. Va. June 7, 2010).
42 Radiance Ex. 2131; Tr. at 85:22-88:4.
24

fundraising for apublic relations effort to generate publicity for Radiance's dispute with the
NAACP. This effort included arelaunch ofthe TooManyAborted Site on February 1,2013, the

same day that the January 2013 Article was posted on the TooManyAborted Site.43
The Court finds that there is asufficient nexus between Radiance's use of the NAACP

Marks and the offering of information services, donation solicitation and fee-based billboard
services such that the marks were used in connection with the offering for sale of services.
b. Likelihood of consumer confusion

The second issue the Court will address is whether Radiance's use ofthe NAACP Marks
was likely to confuse consumers:

Under the Lanham Act, a registered trademark holder has a right to prevent
another's use of a trademark that is"likely to cause confusion, orto cause

mistake, or to deceive." In other words, an unauthorized use of atrademark
infringes the trademark holder's rights ifit is likely to confuse an "ordinary
consumer" as to the source or sponsorship of the goods.

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 15 U.S.C.

§1114(l)(a». Likelihood of confusion is an "inherently factual issue." Petro Shopping Ctrs.,
L.P. v. James River Petroleum Inc., 130 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1997). The Court's analysis to

determine the likelihood ofconsumer confusion in atrademark infringement action includes the
consideration of nine non-exclusive and non-mandatory factors:

(1) the strength or distinctiveness of the plaintiffs mark as actually used in the
marketplace; (2) the similarity ofthe two marks to consumers; (3) the similarity
of the goods or services that the marks identify; (4) the similarity of the facilities

used by the markholders; (5) the similarity ofadvertising used by the
markholders; (6) the defendant's intent; (7) actual confusion; (8) the quality ofthe
defendant's product; and (9) the sophistication ofthe consuming public.

43 NAACP Ex. 1021; Radiance Ex. 21217; Tr. at 179:20-180:23. See generally Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL
133313 at *6 (holding that solicited contributions in connection with alawsuit may contribute to afinding that

"defendant's use of plaintiffs mark is sufficiently tied to defendant's fund-raising efforts for the use to be deemed
'commercial' within the meaning of § 1125(c)").
25

George &Co., LLC, 575 F.3d at 393. Because these nine factors are not all ofequal importance
and not all factors are relevant in every case, they serve as aguide rather than "a rigid formula
for infringement." Id.

The Court finds that the first factor, strength or distinctiveness ofthe trademark, weighs

in favor of alikelihood of confusion as to all ofthe NAACP Marks. The parties do not dispute

the strength of marks "NAACP" and "National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People."44 "Image Awards" and the Scales of Justice Seal marks are likewise strong marks. The
NAACP has employed the Scales ofJustice Seal to identify its organization since its founding in
1909.45 "Image Awards" is afederally registered mark that has been used for over forty years in
relation to the NAACP's annual awards broadcast.46 The NAACP Marks are strong marks as a
result of the NAACP's efforts to cultivate arespectable reputation and protect its intellectual

property rights. Since "[generally, the stronger the mark, the greater the likelihood that
consumers will be confused by competing uses of the mark," the fact that the NAACP Marks are

strong signifies that they are well-recognized and tend to identify services provided under the
mark as emanating from the NAACP. George &Co. LLC, 575 F.3d at 393.

The second factor, the similarity of the marks, weighs in favor oflikelihood of confusion
as well. "When considering the similarity oftwo marks, one must compare the appearance,
44 The NAACP Marks are not conceptually strong because they are not arbitrary or suggestive. See generally

Pterin Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (suggestive and arbitrary marks are deemed
str'ong and presumptively valid). The NAACP Marks are "descriptive;' marks that "define aparticular charactenst.c
ofthe product in away that does not require any exercise ofthe imaginat.on. George &Co LLC 575 F-3<» at fJ495 However, the NAACP Marks are commercially strong. See Wag TV Enterprises, LLC v. Untted Animal Nat.ons,
111CV955 LMB/IDD, 2012 WL 1633410 (E.D. Va. May 9,2012) ("Commercial strength is evaluated by
considering factors similar to those used in the analysis ofamark's secondary meaning, including (1) the plaintiff's
advertising expenditures; (2) consumer studies linking the mark to asource; (3) the plaintiffsrecord of sales
success; (4) unsolicited media coverage ofthe plaintiffs business; (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark; and (6) he
length and exclusivity ofthe plaintiffs use ofthe mark."'). The NAACP Marks have been^ssoc.ated with m.lhons
ofdollars in revenue and the NAACP has used its marks for decades. In addition, the NAACP is the subject of
unsolicited media coverage and undertakes efforts to enforce its intellectual property rights.

45 Countercl. H12.

„

_rt._

46 Countercl. Table, pp. 8-9. Last year marked the 44,h Annual Image Awards event. Radiance Ex. 2045.
26

sound and meaning ofthe marks, aswell as the manner in which they are used." Taj Mahal

Enters., Ltd. v. Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240,247 (D.N.J. 1990). Marks "are confusingly similar if
ordinary consumers would likely conclude that" the services presented under the marks "share a
common source, affiliation, connection or sponsorship." Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro

Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 477 (3d Cir. 1994). Radiance used "NAACP," "Image Awards" and
the Scalesof Justice Seal in an identical manner as the marks have been used by the NAACP.

The parties stipulated that "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" closely
resembles "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People." The NAACP Marks

and the marks employed by Radiance are highly similar ifnot identical and "[t]he high degree of
similarity between the marks weighs in favor ofthe likelihood of confusion among Internet
users." OBH, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 188.

The third factor, the similarity of the services the marks identify, again weighs in favor of
likelihood of confusion. The NAACP and Radiance have incorporated "NAACP," "Image

Awards" and the Scales of Justice Seal in references to the NAACP's services. "National

Association for the Abortion of ColoredPeople" does not refer to the actual services of the

NAACP, but refers to information services of a fictitious advocacy association targeted at people
of color, which is similar to the services the NAACP provides.

The fourth and fifth factors, the similarity of the facilities and the similarity of advertising

used by the mark holders, support a finding of likelihood ofconfusion. "When considering the

similarity offacilities, courts are trying to determine ifconfusion is likely based on 'how and to
whom the respective goods of the parties are sold,' and the key question is whether 'both

products [are] sold in the same channels oftrade.'" Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 155. The

27

parties stipulate that they use the Internet and billboards to engage in public outreach.47 The
parties also stipulate to targeting the African American community.48 Additionally, Radiance
and the NAACP reached the same audience-namely, Internet users searching for webpages

displaying "NAACP." Because the parties targeted and reached the same consumers through the
same channels, this market overlap creates "a stronger likelihood ofconfusion." Checkpoint

Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270,289 (3rd Cir. 2001); accord
Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay Inc., 506 F.3d 1165,1174 (9tbCir. 2007) ("[T]he Web, as a
marketing channel, is particularly susceptible to alikelihood ofconfusion since ... it allows for
competing marks to be encountered at the same time, on the same screen.").
As for the sixth factor that assesses the alleged infringer's intent, the Court finds that

Radiance and Bomberger intended to confuse the public through the use of"NAACP" in close

proximity to "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People." "[T]he relevant intent
in trademark cases is not merely an intent to profit... but an 'intent to confuse the buying

public.'" Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 962 F.2d at 321 (quoting Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 741
F.2d 1522,1535 (4th Cir. 1984)). Generally, intent is evidenced by an alleged infringer's efforts
to make his use ofthe mark resemble the mark holder's use in order to pass his services off as
the mark holder's services. See Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1535 ("[0]ne intending to profit from

another's reputation generally attempts to make his signs, advertisements, etc., to resemble the
other's so as deliberately to induce confusion."); Best &Co. v. Miller, 167 F.2d 374, 377 (2d Cir.
1948 ("If the defendant selects atrademark or trade name similar to the plaintiffs with intent to
47 See infra Part 1, Section B, points 1,5, 14, 19; cf. OBH, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at188 ("Because pla niffip web. site

and defendants' web site are both on the Internet, the parties are vying for users in the same market );Pla>>boy
Enters Inc v. AsiaFocus Infl, Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359, at *18 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2,

f998Xadopted by 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10459 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (same marketing channels exist when
"both parties use the Internet as afacility to provide goods and services").
48 See infra Part I, Section B, points 2, 3, 13, 15, 17, 18.
28

palm offhis wares as those ofthe plaintiff, proofofhis intent may be strong evidence of... the
likelihood of confusion.").

Radiance asserts that its use of"National Association for the Abortion of Colored

People" was meant as aparody to convey criticism ofthe NAACP.49 As will be discussed, the
Court is not persuaded that "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" is a

parody. Instead, the Court recognizes that Bomberger titled the January 2013 Article "NAACP:
National Association for the Abortion ofColored People," implying that the acronym "NAACP"

stood for his designation as opposed to the actual name ofDefendant's organization.30 Nowhere
in the January 2013 Article on the Radiance Site or the TooManyAborted Site does the
NAACP's actual name or web address appear.51 Plaintiffs did not include any signal or

suggestion that the confusingly similar name, "National Association for the Abortion ofColored
People," was anything other than the name ofareal organization or the name of the NAACP.
However, the NAACP has not presented persuasive evidence that Radiance used "Image
Awards" or the Scales ofJustice Seal with any intent to confuse. "Image Awards" was used only

twice in the January 2013 Article, each time in the context of the NAACP's annual event. The
Scales ofJustice Seal only appeared on the LifeNews.com posting of the January 2013 Article at
the selection ofathird party.53 The Court does not find intent to confuse regarding these marks.
49 The NAACP challenges Radiance's parody contention. The NAACP insists that Radiance revised its campaign to
include "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" knowing that the change would result in
additional funds raised from its supporters. However, evidence of financial gain alone is insufficient evidence of
intent to confuse. Anheuser-Busch, 962 F.2d at 322; see also Rosetta Stone Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 2d at 542 ("An

alleged infringer may intend to benefit from the trademark without ever intending to cause consumer confusion. ).

so Radiance Ex. 2223.

51 But cf. PETA 263 F3d at 363 (finding infringement where the website hosted under the infringing domain name
included a"phrase 'exit immediately' [which] contained ahyperlink to PETA's official website."). Radiance did
not include a link to the NAACP's official website or the actual name ofthe NAACP's organization in its articles.

52 Tr at 152-14-19

53 The Court notes that the Scales ofJustice Seal includes the real name ofDefendant's organization, which weakens

any inference of intent to cause confusion as to this particular mark. However, the inclusion ofthe Seal does not
preclude afinding of likelihood ofconfusion as to other uses ofthe NAACP Marks in the January 2013 Article
posted on LifeNews.com. Specifically, the Seal was not featured prominently on the LifeNews.com webpage. It
29

The seventh factor, actual confusion, offers the best evidence of likelihood ofconfusion
ifconsumers were actually confused by an infringer's use ofaprotected trademark. See Lone
Star Steakhouse &
Saloon, Inc., 43 F.3d at 937 (noting that the actual confusion factor is
"entitled to substantial weight as it provides the most compelling evidence oflikelihood of
confusion"). Actual confusion can be established by anecdotal evidence and survey evidence
because "[b]oth types ofevidence are relevant, and neither category is necessarily required to
prove actual confusion." Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 156.
There is anecdotal evidence of actual confusion. The NAACP received calls after
Internet users observed "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People." Eric

Wingerter, the NAACP Vice President for Communications and Digital Media, testified about
inquiries regarding the NAACP's possible name or mission change:

OUESTION: Are you aware of any damage or harm to the NAACP's reputation caused

by that Google alert or by the web page that line is taken to by clicking on the heading of

that alert?

[WINGERTER]: Iknow that it caused confusion among some members

QUESTION: And can you explain for the Court what the nature of the confusion was that
you became aware of?

[WINGERTER]- Well, my office receives anumber of phone calls. Because we are the
communications department, we have alot of public folks calling in asking us - the nice
ones were asking us why we were supporting abortion of people of color, and then there
were some angrier ones as well.

QUESTION: And what were the angrier ones saying?

[WINGERTER]: Just talking about, you know, Iused to be asupporter of the NAACP.
You had aproud history during the civil rights movement and Ican't believe that you are
supporting the genocide ofblack babies.
was the second graphic and appeared toward the end ofthe article. See Radiance Ex. 2223 Moreover, the inclusion

ofthScalesofJustice Seal was initiated by athird party, which does not underm ne afind.ng that Bomberger
mtended o ause confusion through the use of"NAACP" and "National Associat.on for Ac.Aborts.of^Colored
People." Bomberger did not use the Scales ofJustice Seal to clarify the real name ofthe NAACP to prevent

confusion. Tr. at 51:15-25; 200:1-14.
54 Tr. at 262:22-263:1; 269:11-23.
30

This anecdotal evidence demonstrates that the January 2013 Article wen. beyond criticizing the
NAACP's position on abortion. The January 20.3 Article employed the NAACP Marks in a
manner that confused the public regarding whether apro-abortion position was represented by
trademarks ascribed to theNAACP.

There is survey evidence ofactual confusion caused by Plaintiffs' use of"NAACP" and
"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People." Courts have considered survey
evidence in their determination of the existence of actual confusion:

Survey evidence may demonstrate evidence of actual confusion but only to the

extent "that the survey mirrors the real world setting which can create an instance

of actual confusion." 3J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition §23.01 [3][a]. Aparty introducing aconsumer survey bears the
burden ofestablishing that it was conducted in accordance with accepted

principles of survey research, i.e., that (1) aproper universe was examined; (2) a

representative sample was drawn from that universe; (3) the mode of questioning
the interviewees was correct; (4) the persons conducting the survey were

recognized experts; (5) the data gathered was accurately reported; and (6) the
sample design, the questionnaire and the interviewing were in accordance with
generally accepted standards ofprocedure and statistics.

Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1098 (citing Nat 7Football League Props., Inc. v. New Jersey

Giants, Inc., 637 F.Supp. 507, 513-514 (D.N.J. 1986). Dr. Ostberg used reliable methods

consistent with traditional survey methodology to define the universe ofrelevant respondents and

he employed screening questions to identify the respondents and determine their interests.55
The Ostberg Survey revealed that 8% of respondents believed there was an affiliation

between the people who use the term "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People"
and the real NAACP, and 5% of respondents believed that the NAACP's permission or approval
was required to use that term.56 Ten percent ofrespondents believed the initials NAACP actually
55 See supra note 36. The Court finds Dr. Ostberg qualified to serve as an expert in marketing research and
conducting consumer surveys for intellectual property cases.
56 Tr. at 312:12-24.
31

stood for "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" or some other name

containing the word "abortion."" Another 10% believed that the "National Association for the
Abortion ofColored People" was the name ofan actual organization or group." The NAACP
did not present evidence ofactual confusion regarding the "Image Awards" or Scales ofJustice
Seal marks.

The eighth factor, assessing the quality ofthe defendant's product, is not relevant and
does not support or preclude afinding of likelihood ofconfusion. Neither the quality ofthe
parties' services nor their websites can be compared. See OBH, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 189
("[T]he Court cannot compare the two web sites in terms ofsuperior or inferior quality.").
The ninth factor, the sophistication ofthe consuming public, weighs in favor of

likelihood ofconfusion. "Ifthe typical consumer in the relevant market is sophisticated in the
use of-or possesses an expertise regarding-a particular product, such sophistication or

expertise may be pertinent in determining the likelihood ofconfusion." Sara Lee Corp. v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc.,
915 F.2d 121,127-28 (4th Cir. 1990)). Also, "[i]t is widely accepted as true that consumers are

less likely to be confused about the origin of specific goods or services if such goods are

expensive because the amount ofcare and attention expended by consumers increases

proportionately as the price ofthe desired goods or services increases." Harlem Wizards, 952 F.
Supp. at 1097.

Here, both parties are non-profit organizations that offer no-cost information services to
the public. Because the average consumer would not make atime or financial investment to

access the parties' information services, the consumer is less likely to take care in investigating
57 Tr. at 315:15-316:4.
58 Tr. at 316:5-11.
32

the author or sponsor ofarticles using the NAACP Marks. Moreover, potential donors of
Radiance and the NAACP do not have to be sophisticated:

Persons wishing to donate are not likely to analyze in depth the credentials ofthe

charity Ser they are more likely to be generally familiar with the works ofa
S'foJSShey support and, when solicited, will contribute to such a

t^c^rZcVcu^Lc.s, potential contributors may easily confuse two
charities that resemble one another in name and function.

Am. Diabetes Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Diabetes Ass% F. Supp. 16,21 (E.D. Pa. 1981) affd, 681
533
F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1982).

Balancing all nine factors, the Court concludes the NAACP has established by a

preponderance ofthe evidence that Radiance used "National Association for the Abortion of
Colored People" and "NAACP" in the January 2013 Article as posted on the Radiance Site, the
TooManyAborted Site, and LifeNews.com in amanner highly likely to cause consumer

confusion. Radiance and the NAACP used similar and identical strong marks to reference
similar services within similar facilities, reaching the same unsophisticated Internet users.

Radiance achieved its intent to cause consumer confusion through its placement of"NAACP" in
close proximity to "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People." The relevant
factors weigh powerfully in favor ofafinding oflikelihood ofconfusion induced by Radiance's
use of"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" and "NAACP," and the Court
finds that the NAACP has met its burden of proofto establish trademark infringement.

The Court finds that there is no likelihood ofconfusion related to "Image Awards" and
the Scales of Justice Seal. These marks were used as apoint of reference, and there is scant
evidence ofintended or actual confusion regarding any use of these marks. The likelihood of
confusion factors as applied to "Image Awards" and the Scales of Justice Seal favor Radiance;

33

thus the NAACP has failed to sustain its burden on its trademark infringement claim for "Image
Awards" or the Scales of Justice Seal.
c. Parody

Radiance attempts to defend against afinding of likelihood of confusion by arguing that
its use of"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" is aparody of the NAACP.

Radiance argues that Internet users would not be confused or misled into believing that the
January 2013 Article was actually sponsored by the NAACP. The Court finds this argument
unavailing.

A"parody" is defined as a"simple form of entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the
irreverent representation of the trademark with the idealized image created by the mark's

owner." L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987).59 "Parodycan also be defined as "appropriate[ing] commonly known elements ofaprior work to make
humorous or critical comment on that same work" being parodied. Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v.

Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1567 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (referencing Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994)). The Fourth Circuit has previously held:
For trademark purposes, a"parody" is defined as a simple form ofentertainment

conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the trademark with the

idealized image created by the mark's owner. A parody must convey two
simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it

is not the original and is instead aparody. This second message must not only
59 Previously, commercial parodies were enjoined because they went beyond editorial or artistic expression. L.L.
Bean lnc 811 F2d at 32; see, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp.

1031(N D Ga 1986) (holding that the advertising of"Garbage Pail Kids" stickers harmed the Cabbage Patch Kids
trademark); General Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding that the use of
"Genital Electric" on clothing harmed the plaintiffs name trademark); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy &Co., 446 r.
Supp 838 (S DNY 1977) (holding the marketing of "Gucchi Goo" diaper bags harmed the plaintiffs trademark).
However, the Fourth Circuit more recently protected parodies even where used for commercial purposes because the
speech involved was expressive and did not mislead or confuse. See Louis Vuitton Mattetier, 507 F.3d 252.
Although the determination that "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" was used in connection
with the offering for sale ofservices does not preclude protection ofthe phrase as aparody under Fourth Circuit
precedent, this determination weakens the parody argument. The Court recognizes Radiance's critique of the
NAACP as more than acommunicative, expressive or artistic work. The critique was commercial commentary with
the tendency to confuse the public about the name and positions ofthe NAACP.
34

differentiate the alleged parody from the original but must also communicate
some articulable element ofsatire, ridicule, joking, or amusement. Thus, a parody
relies upon adifference from the original mark, presumably a humorous
difference, in orderto produce its desired effect.

Louis Vuitton Malletier, 507 F.3d at 260 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The

finding of asuccessful parody only influences the way in which the [likelihood of confusion]
factors are applied. Indeed, it becomes apparent that an effective parody will actually diminish
the likelihood ofconfusion, while an ineffective parody does not." Id. at 261. In Louis Vuitton

Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, the Fourth Circuit discussed elements ofasuccessful

parody to undermine afinding of alikelihood ofconfusion, including jokes, mockery,
irreverence, critique on seller or buyer, and presence ofother parodied goods or services:

[T]he juxtaposition ofthe similar and dissimilar—the irreverent representation
and the idealized image ofan LVM handbag—immediately conveys ajoking and
amusing parody. The furry little "Chewy Vuiton" imitation, as something to be
chewed by a dog, pokes fun at the elegance and expensiveness ofa LOUIS
VUITTON handbag, which must not be chewed by a dog. The LVM handbag is

provided for the most elegant and well-to-do celebrity, to proudly display to the
public and the press, whereas the imitation "Chewy Vuiton" "handbag" is
designed to mock the celebrity and be used by adog. The dog toy irreverently
presents haute couture as an object for casual canine destruction. The satire is
unmistakable. The dog toy is a comment on the rich and famous, on the LOUIS

VUITTON name and related marks, and on conspicuous consumption in general.

This parody is enhanced by the fact that "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys are sold with
similar parodies ofother famous and expensive brands—"Chewnel No. 5"
targeting "Chanel No. 5"; "Dog Perignonn" targeting "Dom Perignon"; and
"Sniffany & Co."targeting "Tiffany & Co."

Id. at260-61. The Fourth Circuit concluded that "the 'Chewy Vuiton' dog toys convey 'just

enough of the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate the point of parody,' but stop
well short ofappropriating the entire marks that LVM claims." Id.
"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" lacks many of the classic

elements ofa successful parody. First, "National Association for the Abortion ofColored

People" is almost identical to "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People"
35

except for the change of one word. Unlike the "Chewy Vuiton" mark that used different words
from the "Louis Vuitton" mark, "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" and
"National Association for the Advancement of Colored People" only have adifference of one
word and can both be abbreviated by "NAACP." Consequently, almost the entire trademark is
appropriated.

Second, the change in word from "Advancement" to "Abortion" does not create asatire
of the NAACP, its services or its consumers. That change creates source confusion because it is
used next to the famous and unaltered acronym for the original mark. "National Association for
the Abortion ofColored People" appears to be the name ofareal organization. It signifies that
the NAACP's name is something that it is not, especially in light ofits usage next to "NAACP,"
the trademark used most often to refer to the Defendant organization. In the January 2013

Article, Radiance does not clarify that "NAACP" stands for "National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People" or has not become the "National Association for the Abortion

of Colored People."60 Additionally, Radiance has not communicated alarger satirical objective
by employing other altered organization names.

Third, "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" does not clearly

convey two simultaneous and contradictory messages—that it is the NAACP, but also that it is
not the NAACP. The January 2013 Article does not attempt to convey that it is the original

organization because it did not poke fun, imitate or mock the NAACP. To the extent articulable
elements of ridicule, joking or amusement exist, they are difficult to ascertain. Instead, the

article implies that "NAACP" stands for "National Association for the Abortion of Colored
60 The Court notes that the LifeNews.com posting ofthe January 2013 Article incorporated the Scales ofJustice
Seal which includes the real name ofDefendant's organization. However, because the Scales ofJustice Seal is not

featured prominently in the January 2013 Article and was not incorporated by Bomberger to negate confusion or

communicate aparody, the Court does not believe that the appearance of"National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People" in the border ofthe Scales ofJustice Seal undermines its finding that "National
Association for the Abortion of Colored People" is not a parody.
36

People" without satire or irreverent representation. The article simply criticizes the NAACP
without pretending to be the NAACP.

Furthermore, even if the January 2013 Article title itself is assumed to be a parody, a

likelihood of confusion nonetheless exists because Internet users looking for webpages related to

or sponsored by the NAACP may initially encounter Plaintiffs' website and article by mistake
upon entering "NAACP" into a Google search. The consumer confusion factors regarding the

strength and similarity of themarks as well as the similarity of services, facilities and advertising
are not undermined by the parody argument. Additionally, the parody argument does not

mitigate any actual confusion that occurred. Only 5% of respondents to the Ostberg Survey
volunteered that they perceived "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People"to be

a parody or criticism.61 The Court is not persuaded that the message ofthe January 2013 Article
constitutes a parody. Radiance's assertion that its use of "National Association for the Abortion

of Colored People" is not likely to confuse consumers because the phrase is a parody fails.
d.

First Amendment Considerations

Radiance attempts to challenge any finding of trademark infringement by asserting that

its use of the NAACP Marks is protected speech under the First Amendment. "[I]n deciding the
reach of the Lanham Act in any case where an expressive work is alleged to infringe a
trademark, it is appropriate to weigh the public interest in free expression against the public

interest in avoiding consumer confusion." Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ g

Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989). Therefore, "Defendant's use ofanother entity's
mark is entitled to First Amendment protection when his use of that mark is part of a

communicative message, not when it is used to identify the source of a product." Planned

Parenthood, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1440; Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d
61 Tr. at 318:4-10.
37

658, 672 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[S]peech that misleads or creates confusion is not protected under the

First Amendment."). Intent to engage in social commentary does not provide absolute immunity
from liability under the Lanham Act. Christian Sci. Bd. ofDirs. ofthe First Church ofChrist,
Scientist v. Robinson, 123 F.Supp.2d 965, 970-71 (W.D.N.C. 2000) aff d sub nom. Christian Sci.

Bd. ofDirectors ofFirst Church ofChrist, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2001); cf.
MGM-Pathe Commc'ns v. Pink PantherPatrol, 774 F.Supp. 869, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The
seriousness and virtue of a cause do not confer any right to the use of the trademark of another").

Here, balancing First Amendment considerations against the degree of likely consumer

confusionrelated to "NAACP" and "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People,"
the Court does not find that a determination of trademark infringement violates Radiance's right
to free speech and expression because a high likelihood of confusion exists. Radiance's speech
is not restrained by a finding of likelihood of confusion. Radiance is not prevented from

criticizingthe NAACP's positions or activities, but may not present such critiques in a manner
that is likely to confuse the public regarding whether certain trademarks espousinga pro-abortion

viewpoint are authorized orsponsored by the NAACP.62 In other words, the law only insists that
Radiance refrains from using trademarks in a manner that violates the NAACP's intellectual

property rights. Because the "[u]se of a trademark in a way that is likely to cause confusionas to
the source or sponsorship of the expression is not protected conduct," First Amendment

considerations do not preclude a finding that Radiance's use of certain marks owned by the
NAACP constitutes trademark infringement. Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 790-91
(8th Cir. 2004).

Radiance hascriticized theNAACP on the issue of abortion in other ways and contexts without unlawfully using
the NAACP Marks. See Radiance Exs. 2125, 2126. Also, Radiance hascontinued to engage in criticism of the
NAACP since the filing of this action. See NAACP Ex. 1041.
38

ii.

Count II: Trademark Dilution

The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 ("TDRA") recognizes actionable forms of

trademark dilution, grounded in the notion that a trademark can lose its "ability... to clearlyand
unmistakably distinguish one source through unauthorized use." Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim
Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). The Court finds
that the NAACP Marks have been tarnished by being presented in the context of a position

supporting the abortion of African Americans, and Radiance is liable for dilution ofthe
"NAACP" and "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People" trademarks.
The TDRA provides in relevant part:

Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark ... shall be
entitled to an injunction against another commerce that is likely to cause dilution
by blurring or dilution by tamishment ofthe famous mark, regardless ofthe
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual
economic injury.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(emphasis added). A mark is "famous" when it is "widely recognized by
the general consuming public ofthe United States as a designation of source ofthe goods or
services of the mark's owner." Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A). "Dilution by tamishment" is the

"association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
harms the reputation ofthe famous mark." Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C). "Dilution through tarnishing can
occur where an accused, junior mark is used on unwholesome or inferior goods or services that

may create a negative association with the goods or services covered by the famous mark."
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. ofTravel Dev., 955 F.
Supp. 605, 614 (E.D. Va. 1997) affd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999). Stated another way,

dilution by tamishment "generally arises when the plaintiffs trademark is linked to products of

shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke

39

unflattering thoughts about the owner's product." Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39,
43 (2d Cir. 1994); e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Pubs., 28 F.3d 769, 777-78 (8th Cir.

1994) (enjoining defendant from using "MICHELOB OILY" because "the majority of those
surveyed construedthe ad parody as suggesting that Michelob beer contains oil. This relationship

obviously tarnishes the marks' carefully-developed images."); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v.
Helm, 205 F.Supp.2d 942,949-50 (N.D. 111. 2002) (holding a pornographic website's use of
"VelVeeda" tarnishes the plaintiffs "Velveeta" trademark); NBA Props, v. Untertainment

Records LLC, 99 CIV. 2933 (HB), 1999 WL 335147, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1999) (finding
trademark dilution where "[t]he NBA is bound to suffer negative associations from the

[defendant's] juxtaposition ofthe distorted NBA Logo containing the basketball player with a
gun in his right hand and the words "SPORTS, DRUGS, & ENTERTAINMENT.").
To state a dilution claim under the TDRA, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff
owns a famous mark that is distinctive; (2) that the defendant has commenced using a mark in

commerce that allegedly is diluting the famous mark; (3) that a similarity between the
defendant's mark and the famous mark gives rise to an association between the marks; and (4)

that the association is likely to impair the distinctiveness ofthe famous mark or likely to harm

the reputation ofthe famous mark. Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 264-65. The evidence supports a
finding that the NAACP has proved by a preponderance ofthe evidence the first three
requirements to show a violation of the TDRA. The primary issue to be analyzed is the fourth
element, whether an association between the NAACP Marks and the marks as used by Radiance

is likely to harm the reputation ofthe NAACP Marks to establish dilution by tamishment.
The Court recognizes that such an association exists and is likely to harm the reputation
ofthe NAACP Marks, and finds that the NAACP has established by a preponderance ofthe

40

evidence that dilution by tamishment occurred through Radiance's use ofthe NAACP Marks.

Dilution by tamishment is established by Radiance's negative statement about supposed proabortion services represented by trademarks ascribed to the NAACP. The NAACP has

intentionally refrained from taking astance on abortion, and certainly has not been alleged to
advocate for the abortion ofpeople ofcolor. However, the NAACP is bound to suffer negative

associations from the juxtaposition ofthe NAACP Marks with the "National Association for the
Abortion ofColored People" phrase. The use of"National Association for the Abortion of

Colored People" in close proximity to the NAACP Marks harms the marks' reputation by

associating the NAACP with apolitical position that supports abortion ofAfrican Americans.

Compare Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 786 ("It appears that [the defendant] registered many of
these domain names not because of stands the plaintiffs had taken onabortion, but rather to
divert Internet users to websites that could tarnish and disparage their marks by creating initial

confusion as to the sponsorship ofthe attached websites and implying that their owners have

taken positions on ahotly contested issue."). Indeed, the outrage generated in response to the
January 2013 Article indicates that Radiance represented the NAACP Marks in an unsavory

context in the eyes ofthe public. Any suggestion that the NAACP endorses the abortion of
African Americans will likely tarnish its reputation with the public at large.

Dilution by tamishment is also established through survey evidence. According to the

Ostberg Survey, there is a net dilution by tamishment of37% based on responses ofthose
surveyed who construed "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" as
suggesting that the NAACP Marks are associated with a mission ofactively promoting abortion
on a racially motivated basis.63 Forty-two percent ofrespondents to the Ostberg Survey said that
63 Dr. Ostberg calculated the net dilution by tamishment. In the dilution branch ofthe survey, 42% ofrespondents
said that the term "National Association fortheAbortion of Colored People" caused them to think ofthe real
41

the term "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" caused them to think ofthe

real NAACP.64 Dr. Ostberg testified about the narrative responses he received from respondents
evidencing the likelihood of tamishment:

[QUESTION]: Can you explain to the Court the tabulation ofthese results that you
performed in your report?

[OSTBERG]: Yeah. What is significant when we asked them what do you think was the
purpose - and we had the question at the bottom -- what do you think the people who use
"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" are trying to accomplish ...

They believed that what they [the NAACP] are trying to accomplish is that the NAACP
supports bigotry, discrimination, hatred and racism, which is 5percent. The NAACP
wants to wipe out colored people or reduce black population, 3 percent. Wants to steer up
trouble or create controversy by use ofthat name, 3 percent. NAACP support is
associated with abortion, 2 percent. And then a variety ofother comments, all adding

back to 22 percent, which casts doubt on the reputation, not only criticism, ofthe
NAACP as an organization and its activities, and is successful in doing so. In other
words, these are reflections ofbeliefs that they obtained as a result ofthe article and the
photograph ofthe billboard.65

Additionally, a21% ofrespondents from the relevant consumer group said or suggested that the

people who use the term "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" wanted to

harm or tarnish the name and reputation ofthe NAACP rather than to simply criticize its goals.66
The Court concludes that Radiance's moniker using "Abortion" instead of "Advancement" in the

NAACP's name is likely to harm the NAACP Marks' reputation; therefore, trademark dilution of
the NAACP Marks exists, subject to certain defenses.
a.

Defenses

The TDRA creates three defenses based on the defendant's (1) fair use; (2) news

reporting and news commentary use; and (3) noncommercial use ofanother's mark. 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(3). The first defense to a dilution claim is the fair use defense, which exempts use ofa
NAACP. Only 5% volunteered, on an unaided basis, that they perceived that term to be a parody or criticism.
Subtracting the 5% from the 42%, Dr. Ostberg calculated a37% net dilution by tamishment.
64 Tr. at 320:7-20.

65 Tr. at 324:7-13; 325:18-326:6.
66 NAACP Ex. 1045-16.
42

famous mark that does not indicate a source or origin for the user's own products or services and

negates the likelihood ofconfusion. The TDRA designates certain fair uses offamous marks
that would not be considered dilution:

including a nominative ordescriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, ofa
famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the
person's own goods or services, including use in connection with ... identifying
and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner orthe
goods or services ofthe famous mark owner.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A). Radiance argues that its use ofthe NAACP Marks is nominative fair
use and its use of "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" is a parody.
Nominative fair use occurs when a mark is used to describe or refer to a mark holder's

services. The Court recognizes Radiance's use of "Image Awards" and the Scales of Justice Seal
as nominative fair use. Little evidence has been offered to demonstrate any other use of "Image
Awards" and the Scales of Justice Seal besides in a description or reference to the NAACP's

services. However, while the majority of instances "NAACP" appeared in theJanuary 2013
Article was in reference to the NAACP, "NAACP" also appeared in the title ofthe January 2013
Article on the Radiance Site and LifeNews.com adjacent to "National Association for the

Abortion of Colored People." This particular use is not nominative fair use because "NAACP:
National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" neither describes nor references the
NAACP's services.

Parody fair use involves the use of a famous mark, usually in a humorous way, to
comment on or criticize the mark holder or its actions. As discussed previously in the trademark

infringement analysis, the Court is not persuaded that"National Association for the Abortion of

Colored People" isa parody.67
67 The parody defense to trademark dilution implicates the First Amendment's protection ofartistic expression and
speech but is not an absolute right to use an owner's marks in a parody. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 28 F.3d at775; see
43

The second defense to trademark dilution exempts all forms of news reporting and news

commentary from liability. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(B). The United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina analyzed the news reporting and news commentary defense in a

trademark dilution action by examining both the intent ofthe writer as well as the content ofthe
article. BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, 2007 WL 3119445 at *1, 6-7 (D.S.C., Oct. 22, 2007). In this
case where the defendant wrote an online blogcriticizing the plaintiffs' services, the district

court found thatthe defendant's use ofthe plaintiffs' mark in his article was in the context of
news reporting or news commentary forthe following reasons:

The article posted by Smith concerning the Plaintiffs is written for the purpose of
conveying information to the public. In the four installments ofthe article, Smith
describes his experience with BidZirk in great detail. In addition, Smith addresses
the positive and negative aspects, inhis opinion, of dealing with a [sic] aneBay
listing company, such as BidZirk. Further, Smith provides a checklist for using an
eBay listing company and tips for selling items on eBay. Smith felt that what he
learned from his experience with BidZirk would be helpful to others in dealing

with an eBay listing company. The fact that Smith reports negatively about his
experience with BidZirk does not dictate that the article's function or intent was
not news reporting or news commentary.

BidZirk, LLC, 2007 WL 3119445 at *6 (citations omitted).

The news reporting and news commentary defense is unavailing for Plaintiffs because
"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" is not the actual name ofthe

NAACP; thus, this phrase cannot refer to the NAACP in the news. This altered version ofthe
NAACP's name does more than recount a newsworthy experience or occurrence that is of

interest to the public. It is meant to associate the NAACP Marks with a position on abortion, as

stipulated by the parties. The use of"NAACP" in the title ofthe January 2013 Article is not
also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. &L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 327 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Only parody in this 'editorial
or artistic' sense serves sufficiently strong First Amendment values to override government interests intrademark

protection."). Because the Court does not find "National Association for the Abortion ofColored People" to be a
parody and does not find the NAACP's assertion ofits intellectual property rights to be an attempt to constrain free
speech, the Court does not recognize any First Amendment concerns that must be addressed in the parody defense to
trademark dilution.
44

covered by the news reporting and news commentary defense for the same reason. The direct
association between "NAACP" and "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People,"

separated only by a colon, demonstrates that Radiance did not use "NAACP" to report or
comment on news. To the contrary, "NAACP: National Association for the Abortion of Colored

People" insinuates that the acronym is short for aphrase that includes the word "Abortion" as
opposed to "Advancement." Radiance's use of"NAACP" in the title and graphic ofthe January
2013 Article as well as "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" throughout

the article goes beyond gathering and conveying newsworthy information but associates the
famous NAACP acronym with the name of a fictitious organization.

The third defense exempts noncommercial uses of a trademark from trademark dilution

liability. In the absence ofa definition of"noncommercial use" in the Lanham Act, the Court
looks to the statutory definition of a "use in commerce," codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1127:
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary

course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of
this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce—...
(2) on services when it is used or displayed inthe sale oradvertising of
services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are
rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign

country and the person rendering the services is engaged incommerce in
connection with the services.

The Court also considers the definition cited in the Congressional Record during the introduction

oflegislation to create these defenses to trademark dilution, which explained "noncommercial
use" to include "parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression that are not part ofa
commercial transaction." Dr. SeussEnter., L.P., 924 F. Supp. at 1573-74 (citing 141 CONG.

Rec. SI9310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch)).

As previously held, although the January 2013 Article was politically and ideologically
charged, the Court finds that "NAACP" and "National Association for the Abortion ofColored
45

People" were used inconnection with the offering for sale ofservices. While the politicallydriven speech is protectable under the First Amendment, the absence of an economic motivation

for the speech does not preclude a finding that the mark was used in commerce. See Greater

Baltimore Ctr.for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor &City Council ofBaltimore, 721 F.3d
264, 285-86 (4th Cir. 2013) (citingBolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66, 103

S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) ("[T]he potential commercial nature of speech does not hinge
solely on whether the Center has an economic motive, as even Bolger does not preclude

classification of speech as commercial in the absence ofthe speaker's economic motivation.").
Radiance offered various opportunities for visitors ofthe Radiance Site and the

TooManyAborted Site to donate to Radiance, pay to sponsor billboards, secure license content,
or erect state-specific anti-abortion webpages for a fee.

In sum, Plaintiffs' use of "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" and
"NAACP" constitutes trademark dilution by tamishment under Count III. However, because
"Image Awards" and the Scales of Justice Seal fall under the nominative fair use defense, the
NAACP has not established trademark dilution as to these marks.

C.

Damages

The standard for proof of damages for trademark infringement and trademark dilution
under the Lanham Act is set forth as follows:

When a violation of any right ofthe registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125 (a) or (d) of this title, or a willful

violation under section 1125 (c) of this title, shall have been established in any civil
action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of
sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles of equity, to recover
(1) defendant's profits,
(2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and
(3) the costs ofthe action....

In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only;
defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing damages the
46

court may enterjudgment, according to the circumstances ofthe case, for any sum above
the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the court
shall find that the amount ofthe recovery basedon profits is either inadequate or
excessive the court may in its discretion enterjudgment for such sum as the court shall
find to be just, according to the circumstances ofthe case. Such sum in either ofthe

above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty. The court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.
15 U.S.C. §1117(a).

The Court concludes that the NAACP is entitled to court costs for this action, pursuant to
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). This award of courtcosts is expressly granted by statute. The term "costs

of this action" must be interpreted with reference to"costs" defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which
includes fees and disbursements for the clerk, marshal, court reporter, experts, witnesses,
interpreters, printing, copies and transcript. See, e.g. PET 263 F.3d at 370-71.
A,

The NAACP requests an award based on Radiance's profits in the amount of

$127,903.00. This amount represents Radiance's gross revenue in 2012 from contributions,

gifts, grants, and similar amounts received.68 Aplaintiff may recover an award ofprofits against
the defendant based on the defendant's gross sales of products bearing the infringing mark even

though the defendant made no profit on the sales and actually lost money. See Otis Clapp &Son,
Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he plaintiff should not be

prejudiced by the defendant's inefficiency"). "A successful plaintiff in a trademark infringement
case is not always entitled to a monetary award in addition to injunctive relief, since any award

for damages is subject to the principles ofequity which give the court discretion based upon a
wide range ofconsiderations." Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Apple, 482 F.Supp. 753, 757-58 (D.S.C.
1980).

While the Court finds that the NAACP may have been entitled to monetary damages on

their trademark infringement and trademark dilution claims, its requested damages figure is
68 NAACP Ex. 1042.
47

insufficient. The NAACP seeks damages for infringement and dilution in an article published in

January of 2013, yet it requests a damage award ofRadiance's gross revenue for the previous
year. The NAACP has not demonstrated how Radiance's use ofthe NAACP Marks in 2013 can

be compensated by an award based on Radiance's revenue in 2012. Moreover, the NAACP has
not presented a reasonably certain accounting of any amounts traceable to Radiance's unlawful
activity or to damage the NAACP has sustained. Without any additional figures bywhich to
quantify a compensatory award besides Radiance's gross revenue in 2012, there is no evidence

to support monetary damages beyond costs. Because the NAACP has not shown that Radiance
profited from the infringing and diluting use and has not claimed that Radiance's conduct caused
any monetary losses other than the litigation costs themselves, an award to the NAACP of either
Radiance's profits or compensatory damages is inappropriate.
The NAACP also requests attorney fees. This Court "may award reasonable attorney
fees," but only in "exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The Fourth Circuit has interpreted

"exceptional cases" to include cases where "the defendant's conduct was malicious, fraudulent,
willful or deliberate in nature." Retail Servs., Inc., 364 F.3d at 550 (awarding attorney's fees
under the Lanham Act in view of defendant's "willful defiance and protraction of the judicial

processes attempting to stopthe illegalities"). The Fourth Circuit also requires the plaintiff to
establish that the Defendant acted in bad faith. Id. "Determination of whether this standard has

been satisfied is in the sole discretion ofthe Court." Agri-Supply Co., Inc. v. Agrisupply.com, 457

F.Supp.2d 660, 666 (E.D. Va. 2006) (citingShell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928
F.2d 104, 108 n. 6 (4th Cir. 1991) ("The court has broad discretion to award any monetary relief

necessary to serve the interests of justice."). In making this determination when the defendant

prevails, courts consider "the closeness ofthe case, tactics of counsel, the conduct ofthe parties,

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and any other factors that may contribute to a fairer allocation ofthe burdens oflitigation
between the winner and loser." McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 7:12CV578, 2014 WL

495748, *2 (W.D. Va. Feb. 6, 2014) (citing US Gates Intern., LLC v. Light Star Travel Agency,
Inc., 2010 WL 5300822, at *1 (E.D.Va. Dec. 22, 2010). Other considerations include:
economic coercion, groundless arguments, and failure to cite controlling law.
Thus, the focus tends to be on the plaintiffs litigation conduct or pre-litigation
assertion of rights. The question, however, is not whether snippets ofthe record or
isolated arguments clearly lack merit. We must determine, in light ofthe entire
case, whetherdefendants' claims and assertions were so lacking in merit that the
action as a whole was "exceptional."

Schwartz v. Rent A Wreck Am. Inc., 468 F. App'x 238,255 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citations

omitted). "Inshowing that an exceptional case exists, the prevailing party bears the burden of
showing defendant's malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate conduct by clear and convincing
evidence." Agri-Supply Co., Inc., 457 F.Supp.2d at 666.

The NAACP has not provided clear and convincing evidence that Radiance's declaratory

judgment suit and related conduct as a whole were exceptional. Radiance failed to negotiate,
reposted the January 2013 Article on the TooManyAborted Site after receiving the cease and
desist letter, and sought funds to initiate a public relations effort regarding the instant

controversy. However, these actions alone do not satisfy the clearand convincing evidence of
bad faith and malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate conduct standard. In the Court's view,

such conducton the part of Radiance does not constitute the sort of willful infringement

necessary to support a finding of bad faith and the award of attorney fees. It is not apparent from
the facts in the record that Radiance's claims were totally groundless or that Radiance did not
believe its use ofthe NAACP Marks was protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g, PETA,

263 F.3d at 370 (denying request for attorney fees where defendant thought he has a legitimate

right to express himself in the manner which was determined to be infringing); cf San Francisco
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Oven, LLC v. Fransmart, Inc., 222 F. App'x 235,237,2007 WL 737399 (4th Cir. 2007)

(awarding attorney fees where the losing party brought a Lanham Act claim without any factual
or legal support, solely to avoid dismissal). There is no clear and convincing evidence that

Radiance's conduct went beyond the norm of commercial dealing or aggressive litigation. See

Schwartz, 468 F. App'x at 255 (notingthat appellants were '"entitled to test the legitimacy ofthe
[trademark infringement] claim,' that appellants played 'hard ball' with Schwartz, and that

'they're entitled to do that. That's what happens in the commercial world.'"); McAirlaids, Inc.,
2014 WL 495748, *5 (denying request for attorney fees even in light of a "slash and bum"

motions practice and taking irrelevant depositions, finding the defendant did not engage in
"oppressive and vexatious litigation conduct"). Although a response to the NAACP's cease and

desist letter may have demonstrated an attempt to resolve the controversy before involving the
courts, it is notclear that Radiance's motivation for filing the lawsuit was completely improper,
especially since the NAACP presented Radiance with a choice between facing legal action or
ceasing present and future conduct which Radiance believed was protected. Therefore, applying
the Fourth Circuit dual standard requiring malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate conduct as

well as bad faith, the Courtdoes not find clearand convincing evidence that this case is an
"exceptional case" and the NAACP is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
Lastly, the NAACP requests a permanent injunction against Radiance's use ofthe

"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" phrase in any manner that creates a

likelihood of confusion or a likelihood of dilution among members ofthe public. 15 U.S.C. §
1116(a).

The TDRAentitles a prevailing mark holderto an injunction against uses of a famous

mark likely to cause confusion if the opposing party is found liable of trademark dilution. Id. at
The Lanham Act vests district courts with the "power to grant injunctions, according to the principles ofequity
and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to ... prevent aviolation under [§ 1125(a) ]." 15 U.S.C. §
1116(a).
50

§ 1125(c)(1). Before an injunction may issue, the party seeking the injunction must demonstrate
"(1) it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at laware inadequate; (3) the
balance ofthe hardships favors the party seeking the injunction; and (4) the public interest would

not be disserved by the injunction." PBMProducts, LLC, 639 F.3d at 126.70 The Court
recognizes irreparable harm through the evidence of reputational harm and actual confusion
caused by Radiance's use ofthe NAACP Marks. A permanent injunction will not prevent
Radiance from expressing its views regarding the NAACP, but would guard the NAACP's

trademark rights and protect the public from confusion regarding services offered under the
NAACP Marks. See Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 790-91 (rejecting a defendant's argument that a

permanent injunction would constitute a content-based restriction on his speech in violation of
the First Amendment, as an injunction would not restrict the ability of a defendant to express his
anti-abortion views in non-confusing ways). In addition, relief in the form of court costs does

not adequately address any future infringing or dilutinguse of "NAACP" with "National
Association for the Abortion of Colored People." The Court finds a permanent injunction

againstany use of "National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" that creates a
likelihood of confusion or dilution appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Radiance's request for declaratory judgment is DENIED.
After carefully considering the evidence introduced at trial, the arguments of counsel, and the
law pertaining to this matter, the Court FINDS that Radiance has violated the Lanham Act,
provisions 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125, as well as Virginia Code § 59.1-92.12(i). On Counts I,
II and IV, Radiance is liable for trademark infringement of trademarks "NAACP" and "National

70 Neither party addresses these factors with specificity. Radiance does notcontest the issuance of a permanent
injunction in its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (ECF No. 87).
51

Association for the Advancement ofColored People." On Count III, Radiance is liable for

trademark dilution by tamishment of trademarks "NAACP" and "National Association for the
Advancement ofColored People." Radiance is not liable for trademark infringement or

trademark dilution in regards to the "Image Awards" and Scales ofJustice Seal marks.

Accordingly, the Court hereby ENTERS JUDGMENT FOR THE NAACP and awards the
NAACP court costs and injunctive relief. An injunction against any use of"National
Association for the Abortion ofColored People" that creates a likelihood ofconfusion or dilution

as to any National Association for the Advancement of Colored People trademarks will be

entered in aseparate order. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send acopy of this Order to the parties
and counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Norfolk, Virginia

Raymond A. Jackson

April JU ,2014

United states District Judge

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