Certusview Technologies, LLC v. S & N Locating Services, LLC et al
Filing
57
OPINION and ORDER the Court DENIES Defendants'motion to transfer venue. Signed by District Judge Mark S. Davis and filed on 12/12/2013. (rsim, )
IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Norfolk Division
CERTUSVIEW TECHNOLOGIES,
LLC,
Plaintiff,
Civil No.
S & N
LOCATING SERVICES,
2:13cv346
LLC,
and
S & N
COMMUNICATIONS,
INC.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion to transfer venue
filed
by
defendants
Communications,
S
Inc.
&
N
Locating
(collectively
Services,
LLC,
"Defendants"
or
and
"S
S
&
&
N
N").
Defendants' motion seeks transfer of this patent infringement action
to Defendants'
Plaintiff
Certusview
"Certusview")
below,
home forum of the Middle District of North Carolina.
Technologies,
opposes such transfer.
the Court DENIES Defendants'
LLC,
("Plaintiff"
or
For the reasons set forth
motion to transfer venue.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed its complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on May 29, 2013.
the Court granted Defendants'
After
unopposed motion to extend the time
to file pleadings or a motion in response to the Complaint, Defendants
filed the instant motion to transfer venue.
a motion requesting additional time,
The parties again filed
and this Court extended the
briefing schedule on the instant motion.
Nearly a month after this
matter was fully briefed, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file
a surreply.
Defendants'
motion
for
briefed on November 4, 2013.
leave to
file
a surreply was
fully
On November 9, 2013, Magistrate Judge
Lawrence Leonard issued an order denying Defendants' request to file
a surreply.
Accordingly,
this matter is ripe for review.
II. Standard for Discretionary Transfer of Venue
Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1404, establishes
that,
"[f]or
the
convenience
of
parties
and
witnesses,
in
the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought
or to any district or division to which all parties have consented."
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Such statute "is intended to place discretion
in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer of venue
according
to
an
^individualized,
convenience and fairness.'"
U.S. 22, 29 (1988)
case-by-case
consideration
of
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
(quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622
(1964) ); see Brock v. Entre Computer Ctrs., Inc., 933 F.2d 1253, 1257
(4th Cir. 1991) ("Decisions whether to transfer a case pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404 are committed to the discretion of the transferring
judge").
In a patent infringement action, such motions to transfer
venue pursuant to Section 1404(a)
are governed by the law of the
regional circuit in which the Court sits.
See Winner Int'l Royalty
Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
To determine whether a
transfer of venue to another district
is appropriate under § 1404(a),
"a district court must make two
inquiries:
(1) whether the claims might have been brought in the
transferee
forum,
and
(2)
whether
the
interest
of
justice
and
convenience of the parties and witnesses justify transfer to that
forum."
Koh v. Microtek Int'1, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (E.D.
Va. 2003) ; see 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) ; TechnoSteel, LLC v. Beers Constr.
Co., 271 F.3d 151, 160 (4th Cir. 2001)
(indicating that a § 1404(a)
transfer is merely a "discretionary change to another district where
the action could have been brought") (internal citation and quotation
marks
omitted).
In
conducting
the
second
inquiry,
the
Court
considers several factors to determine whether to transfer venue,
including:
"MD
ease
of
access
to
sources
of
proof;
(2)
the
convenience of the parties and witnesses; (3) the cost of obtaining
the attendance of witnesses;
process;
home;
(6)
(4)
the availability of compulsory
(5) the interest in having local controversies decided at
in diversity cases,
the
court's
familiarity with the
applicable law; and (7) the interest of justice.'"
One Beacon Ins.
Co. v. JNB Storage Trailer Rental Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828
(E.D. Va. 2004)
(quoting BHP Int'l Inv., Inc. v. Online Exch., Inc.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 493,
to consider,
however,
498
(E.D. Va. 2000)).
are:
(1)
Plaintiff's
The principal factors
choice
of
forum;
(2)
witness
convenience
and
access
to
sources
convenience; and (4) the interest of justice.
of
proof;
(3)
party
Koh, 250 F. Supp. 2d
at 633; see Praqmatus AV, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 991,
994-95 (E.D. Va. 2011).
movant
to show "that
Ultimately, the burden of proof is on the
transfer does more
inconvenience to the other party.'"
Supp. 2d 731,
Corp.,
736 (E.D. Va. 2007)
617 F. Supp.
76,
77
A.
JTH Tax,
'shift the
Inc. v. Lee,
482 F.
(quoting DMP Corp. v. Fruehauf
(W.D.N.C.
III.
than merely
1985)).
Discussion
Venue in Transferee Forum
"As an initial matter,
the court must determine whether the
proposed transferee court is one in which the action originally may
have been brought."
BHP Int' 1 Inv., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 4 98.
If the
claims could have been brought in the transferee court initially,
the subsequent decision to transfer venue is within the discretion
of the court.
One Beacon Ins. Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d at 828 (citing
Verosol B.V. v. Hunter Douglas,
Va.
Inc.,
806 F. Supp. 582, 591
(E.D.
1992)).
Under 28 U. S.C. § 1400(b), venue in patent infringement lawsuits
is proper in any "district where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business."
added).
28
U.S.C.
§
1400(b)
(emphasis
A corporate defendant resides in any district in which it
is subject to personal jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c).
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that Plaintiff's patent
infringement action could have initially been filed in the Middle
District
of
North
district
and
Carolina
their
Accordingly,
as
corporate
Defendants
are
headquarters
residents
are
located
of
such
therein.
the Court finds that venue would have been proper in
the proposed transferee court.
B.
Section 1404(a)
Although
there
are
Convenience and Justice Factors
various
ways
to
formulate
the
relevant
considerations for determining whether a discretionary transfer is
appropriate, the primary considerations are: (1) Plaintiff's choice
of forum;
(3)
(2) witness convenience and access to sources of proof;
party convenience; and (4)
F. Supp.
2d at 633; Lee,
1.
Koh,
250
482 F. Supp. 2d at 736.
Plaintiff's
"Generally,
the interest of justice.
Initial Choice of Venue
the first factor - a plaintiff's choice of venue
- is given substantial weight as '[i]t is well settled that a court
should rarely disturb
a plaintiff's
choice
of
forum unless
balance of hardships clearly favor transfer . . . .'"
Scis.,
Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
928 F.
the
Va. Innovation
Supp. 2d 863, 868
(E.D.
Va. 2013) (quoting Verizon Online Servs. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d
601, 623-24)
(E.D. Va. 2002)
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
(alteration in original); see Akers v.
378 F.2d 78, 80
(4th Cir.
1967)
(recognizing
"the primary right of the plaintiff to choose his forum, a selection
not
easily
to
be
overthrown").
However,
the
"weight
given
to
plaintiff's choice of venue varies with the significance of the
contacts between the venue chosen by plaintiff and the underlying
cause of action."
Bd.
Baylor
Air
1256
Heating
(E.D.
Va.
&
1988)
of Trs.,
Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Fund v.
Conditioning,
[hereinafter
Inc.,
Baylor
702
F.
Supp.
Heating];
see
1253,
Agilent
Techs., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 327 ("[T]he greater the connection
between a plaintiff's chosen forum and the plaintiff's cause of
action, the more weight a court will give to the plaintiff s choice") .
Furthermore, a plaintiff's selection of a foreign forum is typically
given less weight than a plaintiff's selection of its home forum.
Baylor Heating,
702 F. Supp. at 1256.
This is so because "'it is
often more difficult for the plaintiff to show why such a forum is
more convenient for the plaintiff.'"
Koh,
(quoting 17
James Wm.
Moore's
111.13[1] [c]
(3d ed.
Here,
Florida,
it
is
Moore,
et al.,
250 F. Supp. 2d at 634
Federal
Practice §
2002)).
undisputed that Plaintiff's "home forum"
in
Accordingly,
not the Eastern District of Virginia.
is
to
determine whether substantial weight should be given to Plaintiff's
chosen
forum,
connection
this
between
Court's
inquiry
Plaintiff's
cause
focuses
of
on
action
the
and
degree
the
of
Eastern
District of Virginia.
The parties present vastly divergent pictures of the connection
between the instant dispute and the Eastern District of Virginia.
Plaintiff
contends
that
Defendants
are
engaged
in
large-scale
infringement of Plaintiff's various patents almost exclusively in
the
Commonwealth
allegation by
electronic
of
Virginia.
explaining that
mapping
of
Commonwealth of Virginia,
companies,
methods.
utility
is
Plaintiff
at
the
In contrast,
companies
in
the
seeks
to
justify its
disputed technology involves
underground
utilities
and
that
the
through several of its largest utility
forefront
of
adopting
electronic mapping
Plaintiff asserts that it is unaware of any
North
Carolina
that
are
utilizing
such
electronic mapping services.
In
response,
Defendants
note
that
Plaintiff's
alleged
unawareness of sales by Defendants of their products or services in
North
Carolina
is
"irrelevant" and
indicate
that
they
perform
electronic mapping services in several states, including Virginia,
North Carolina, Maryland, and Ohio.
that
the facts-not
Plaintiff's
Although Defendants are correct
knowledge or lack thereof-should
drive the inquiry, curiously, Defendants offer no sales data or other
information to refute Plaintiff's suggestion that the vast majority
of all (purported) infringement is occurring in Virginia.
250 F. Supp.
Cf. Koh,
2d at 635-36 (considering the percentage of domestic
sales in Virginia in determining the "relation between this district
and the claims against [the defendants]").
Defendants' efforts to
refute Plaintiff's claim that the instant suit bears substantial ties
to Virginia falls flat because: 1) prior to discovery,
are the sole possessors of any such evidence;
2)
Defendants
Defendants have
submitted no such data or evidence; and 3) Defendants bear the burden
of proving that venue should be transferred.
The Court further notes that Defendants seek to demonstrate the
lack of a connection to Virginia by citing case law indicating that
"[f]ederal
courts
are
not
solicitous
of
plaintiffs
claiming
substantial weight for their forum choice where the connection with
the forum is limited to sales activity without more."
Creatine Patent Co. v. Met-Rx USA,
Inc.,
387 F.
Original
Supp. 2d 564, 568
(E.D. Va. 2005) (quoting Acterna, L.L.C. v. Adtech, Inc., 129 F. Supp.
2d
936,
938
(E.D.
Va.
2001)).
However,
the
instant
facts,
as
presented to this Court by Plaintiff, involve infringement that is
occurring almost exclusively in Virginia.
At least based on the
information before the Court at this time, this is not a case where
an infringing physical device is designed and manufactured in one
state and the connection to the state in which suit is filed is merely
claimed retail sales.
See,
e.g.,
GTE Wireless,
Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 517, 519 (E.D. Va. 1999)
to
California
where
"the
central
issues
Inc.
v. Qualcomm,
(transferring the case
concerning the
accused
activity revolve around the cellular phones which are designed and
manufactured in San Diego")
that
Plaintiff's
primary
(emphasis added).
allegation
of
Rather, it appears
infringement
is
that
Defendants are currently, on a daily basis, infringing Plaintiff's
patent in Virginia by using Plaintiff's patented method of creating
electronic
maps
of
utility
lines
8
in
Virginia,
and
that
such
electronic maps are specific to land surveyed in Virginia.
Intercarrier Commc'ns v. Glympse,
Inc., No.
Cf.
3:12-CV-767, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 113572, at *8 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2013) (declining to give
substantial weight to foreign plaintiff's choice of venue in Virginia
where
"nothing
demonstrates
that
Virginia
residents
use
this
software proportionately more than residents of any other state").
It
is
also notable
that
Defendants
have more
Virginia which, according to Defendants,
purportedly infringing activities,
than ten offices
in
support both the accused
as well as unrelated clearly
non-infringing construction activities.1
Although
infringement
System"
-
Defendants'
stems
which
from
was
filings
Defendants'
designed
and
suggest
that
"product"
created
in
-
the
the
North
claimed
"SN LocSys
Carolina,
Defendants fail to articulate the type of product (i.e., software
or hardware) and fail to effectively refute Plaintiff's assertion
that the focus of the instant suit
infringed in Virginia,
is on "method" claims being
rather than an infringing apparatus being
designed and manufactured in one state and merely being sold in
another.
For example,
in Beam Laser Sys.,
Inc.
v. Cox Commc'ns,
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 515, 518-19 (E.D. Va. 2000), another Judge of
this Court rejected the defendants' attempts to demonstrate a lack
of significant ties to the Eastern District of Virginia.
1 It appears at this time that,
The Court
in addition to their corporate
headquarters, Defendants have, at most, one additional location in North
Carolina.
9
began by noting that "[u]nder patent law, 'whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within
the United States . . . during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent."'
Id^ at 518 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)).
Although in some cases, the "hub of activity" where an infringing
product is designed and manufactured will have the strongest ties
to the cause of action, such is true when the "patent infringement
action alleg[es] violation of the 'makes' prong of the statute."
at 518-19.
Id.
In contrast, the "center of the accused activity" in Beam
Laser Systems
plaintiffs
was
had
the
Eastern
asserted
District
large-scale
"infringing . . . system."
of
Virginia,
use
of
the
where
the
purportedly
Id. at 519.
Considering the above, as in Beam Laser Systems, the Court finds
that
Plaintiff
has
advanced
"significant
ties"
to
the
Eastern
District of Virginia such that Plaintiff's choice of forum should
be given substantial weight.
Although various factors lead to such
conclusion, most notable is the fact that the alleged infringement
involves the use of a method (and/or apparatus) within the Eastern
District
of Virginia
in
order
located within Virginia.
to map underground utility lines
Furthermore,
Defendants fail to present
any sales data or other evidence to refute Plaintiff's assertion that
Virginia is at the forefront of adopting the disputed technology and
is
the
primary
locus
of
the
use
of
electronically map underground utilities.
10
the
patented
method
to
Accordingly, the Court
finds
that
Plaintiff
has
demonstrated
sufficient
ties
to
this
district to afford "substantial weight" to its selection of forum
for litigating the instant lawsuit.
2. Parties/Witness Convenience and Access
The Court next performs a combined analysis of considering the
convenience to the parties and witnesses in litigating in the instant
venue rather than the proposed transferee venue.
Assessment of this
factor requires the court to consider, among other things, the "ease
of access to sources of proof, the costs of obtaining witnesses, and
the availability of compulsory process."
499 F. Supp. 2d 685, 693 (E.D. Va. 2007)
v. Rambus,
Inc.,
386 F. Supp. 2d 708,
Lycos, Inc. v. TiVo, Inc.,
(quoting Samsung Elecs. Co.
717 n.13
(E.D. Va 2005)).
A party asserting witness inconvenience "has the burden to
proffer, by affidavit or otherwise, sufficient details respecting
the witnesses and their potential testimony to enable the court to
assess the materiality of evidence and the degree of inconvenience."
Koh,
250 F.
Supp.
2d at
636.
Additionally,
"the convenience of
non-party witnesses should be afforded greater weight
[than the
convenience of party witnesses] in deciding a motion to transfer."
Rambus, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
As the moving party, Defendants must
demonstrate that the Eastern District of Virginia is "an inconvenient
forum in which to litigate, not simply that the [Middle District of
North Carolina]
would be more convenient."
Id.
at 718 n.15.
Here, Defendants motion and memoranda at best demonstrate why
11
the Middle District of North Carolina would be more convenient for
its witnesses and provide for easier access to Defendants' corporate
files.
Defendants do
not,
however,
demonstrate why this Court,
which is only 235 miles from the Middle District of North Carolina,
Greensboro
Division,
is
an
"inconvenient
forum."
Notably,
Defendants do not proffer, by affidavit or other evidence, sufficient
details regarding the potential testimony of its proposed witnesses
such that the Court can assess the materiality of such testimony
and/or the extent of the inconvenience.
Rather,
Defendants focus
primarily on the number of miles that need to be driven by Defendants'
potential witnesses,
lodging.
single
as well as the assumed expense of meals and
Furthermore,
witness
courthouse,
Defendants
who
not only do Defendants fail to identify a
is
located
more
than
miles
from
this
but four of the eleven S & N witnesses identified by
are
actually
closer
to
this
courthouse in Greensboro, North Carolina.
No. 41.
250
courthouse
than
to
the
Defs.' Reply at 14, ECF
As to the seven potential witnesses who are far closer to
Greensboro,
Defendants broadly assert that those individuals have
"relevant knowledge . . . regarding the development, maintenance,
advertising, and/or sales" of the accused technology.
SI
5,
ECF.
No.
36-2.
As
the
parties
asserting
Defs.' Aff.
inconvenience,
Defendants' broad statements fall far short of the requirement that
they
"proffer
by
affidavit
or
otherwise,
sufficient
details
respecting the witnesses and their potential testimony" to permit
12
the Court to assess whether such testimony is "central to a claim,"
as well as whether it is "merely cumulative" to testimony offered
by other witnesses.
Rambus, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 718.2
Although Defendants have identified one third-party witness
located 90 miles
this
Court,
witness
from the Greensboro courthouse and 240 miles from
Defendants
suggesting
that
"inconvenient."
third-party
actually
not
included an
traveling
Defendants
witnesses
closer
have
to
who
live
Greensboro,
to
vaguely
in
affidavit
Norfolk
North
would
identify
Roanoke,
from that
additional
Virginia
Carolina
than
be
to
(which
is
Norfolk,
Virginia); however, Defendants' own facts suggest that one or more
of those witnesses live more than 100 miles from Greensboro and would
thus be outside the subpoena power of the Greensboro Court, but would
still
be
within
the
subpoena
power
of
this
Court.
Finally,
Defendants do not persuasively demonstrate that air travel from
2 Curiously, Defendants attack Plaintiff's affidavits submitted in
opposition to the pending motion to transfer as being "self-serving," when
Defendants themselves primarily rely on a similarly "self-serving"
affidavit from S & N's vice president.
Moreover,
Defendants'
affidavit
does not even include a sworn assertion that "it would be inconvenient"
for S & N, or its vice president, to appear in Norfolk.
Rather, the
affidavit includes numerous facts attempting to demonstrate that
Greensboro would be "more convenient and less expensive" than Norfolk for
Defs.' Aff. f 7, ECF No.
S & N and many of its potential party witnesses.
36-2 (emphasis added).
However, the affidavit acknowledges that the S &
N employees responsible for advertising and selling the purportedly
infringing products and services are located either in Kernersville, North
Notably,
Carolina, Troy, Virginia, or Louisa, Virginia.
Id. fl 5.
Defendants do not include affidavits from such party witnesses with an
individualized explanation as to any inconvenience that each would
purportedly suffer.
Furthermore, although Defendants contend that the
claimed inconvenience to third parties should garner greater weight than
the inconvenience to party witnesses, Defendants do not submit an affidavit
from a single third-party witness or potential party witness.
13
Florida to Greensboro, North Carolina, as compared to air travel from
Florida to Norfolk, Virginia, is any different in length of travel,
price, or inconvenience.3
Regarding "access to sources of proof," Defendants also assert
that "S & N related documents" are housed in North Carolina and would
need to be transported to Virginia.
However,
Defendants fail to
identify such documents with any degree of particularity, fail to
quantify the scope of the relevant documents, and fail to indicate
whether the documents are paper or electronic. 4
Defendants
fail
to
provide
any
evidence
Furthermore,
rebutting
Plaintiff's
assertion that the bulk of the alleged infringement is occurring in
Virginia, or that Defendants have more than ten offices in Virginia.
Considering the above information,
instant prong,
District
at
of North
best,
the Court finds that the
slightly favors
Carolina.
That
said,
transfer to
the
the
Middle
limited information
provided by Defendants does little to distinguish the facts of this
case from almost any other lawsuit because transferring a case to
a defendant's home forum is almost always more convenient for that
3 Defendants submitted numerous exhibits consisting of Internet
printouts of flights from Florida into the Greensboro, North Carolina
airport and the Norfolk, Virginia airport.
Such exhibits demonstrate that
on the day of such searches, the frequently-changing price of air travel
resulted in a higher fare of only $80 to fly to Norfolk.
4 Although it has no bearing on this Court' s ruling, the fact that
Defendants' counsel are based outside of North Carolina suggests that this
case does not involve an unwieldy number of documents or other difficulty
in transferring physical evidence that can only be effectively managed in
the twenty miles between Defendants' corporate office in Kernersville,
North Carolina and the Greensboro courthouse.
14
defendant's witnesses.
3.
Interest of Justice
"The interest of justice category is 'designedly broad,'" and
"is intended to encompass all those factors bearing on transfer that
are unrelated to
convenience of witnesses and parties."
Heating, 702 F. Supp. at 1260.
Baylor
To place a more practical framework
on such a designedly broad test, district courts generally consider
the following eight factors:
(2)
(1) the pendency of a related action,
the court's familiarity with the applicable law,
(3)
docket
conditions, (4) access to premises that might have to be viewed, (5)
the possibility of an unfair trial,
parties,
(6) the ability to join other
(7) the possibility of harassment, and (8) the interest of
having local controversies decided at home.
Supp. 2d at 996; Rambus,
interest-of-justice
Praqmatus AV, 769 F.
386 F. Supp. 2d at 721.
factor
"encompasses
public
Ultimately, the
interest
factors
aimed at 'systemic integrity and fairness,'" with the most prominent
considerations
being
"judicial
inconsistent judgments."
F. Supp. 2d 627,
economy
and
the
avoidance
of
Byerson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 467
635 (E.D.
Va. 2006)
(quoting Rambus,
386 F. Supp.
2d at 721) .
Here,
Defendants
focus
solely
on
factor
eight
(local
controversies decided at home), asserting that the other factors are
"not at issue" in this case.5
The central dispute is which state has
5 Defendant asserts that the "docket conditions" factor cannot be
15
a
"local"
Carolina
interest
has
Defendants
a
in
the matter.
"local"
are
interest
headquartered
Defendants
in
assert
this
matter
and
because
there
that North
solely
the
because
allegedly
infringing technology was researched, designed, and developed there.
Plaintiff offers an effective counterargument,
that,
however,
asserting
regardless of Defendants' physical location, Defendants are
engaging in large-scale infringement in Virginia as they utilize
patented technology on a daily basis to create electronic maps of
underground
utilities
companies in Virginia.
headquartered
in
located
in
Virginia
for
large
utility
In other words, although Defendants may be
North
Carolina,
their
alleged
infringement
is
occurring in Virginia.
Defendants
asserting
that
attempt to counter Plaintiff's
they
perform
services
in
point by
other
states
vaguely
as
well,
including North Carolina, but Defendants fail to quantify in any way
their activities in other states.
It appears to this Court that the
state with the most direct interest in the instant action is the state
addressed because statistics for median time to trial are not available
for
the
Middle
District
of
North
Carolina.
In
response,
Plaintiff
highlights that statistics are available for median time from filing to
disposition in a civil case, and that such period is approximately twice
as long (10 months as compared to 5 months) in the Middle District of North
Carolina
than
in
this
Court.
This
Court
further
notes
that
the
same
statistics cited by the parties reveal that there are slightly more civil
cases filed in the last year per judgeship in the Middle District of North
Carolina than in this Court, and that there are substantially more pending
cases in that Court per Judgeship as compared to this Court.
Accordingly,
to the extent that this Court considers docket conditions, the interest
of justice would not favor the transfer of venue that Defendants seek.
See
Federal Court Management Statistics:
District Courts - June 2013,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/di
strict-courts-june-2013.aspx (last visited Dec. 9, 2013).
16
where its utility companies rely daily on the services of an alleged
infringer rather than the state where such infringer has its home
office.
favors
Accordingly,
the
interest-of-justice
factor
slightly
Plaintiff.
In sum, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that transfer to
the Middle District of North Carolina is warranted,
relevant factors present in this case.
based on the
As detailed above, a transfer
to the Middle District of North Carolina would simply shift the
inconvenience
from Defendants
to
Plaintiff,
and
Defendants
have
failed to demonstrate that "the interest of justice and convenience
of the parties and witnesses justify transfer to" the Middle District
of North Carolina.
Defendants'
Koh,
250
F.
Supp.
2d at
630.
Accordingly,
motion to transfer venue is DENIED.
Ill.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendants'
motion to transfer venue.
The Clerk is REQUESTED to send a copy of this Opinion and Order
to all counsel of record.
IT IS
SO ORDERED,
/.TftiafeMark S.
UNITED STATES
Norfolk, Virginia
December
I3L
, 2013
17
Davis
DISTRICT
JUDGE
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