Prison Legal News v. Stolle et al

Filing 106

OPINION AND ORDER: granting 88 Motion for Attorney Fees. After making a downward adjustment to both the total hours and the hourly rate requested by Plaintiff, the Court hereby AWARDS attorney's fees to Plaintiff in the amount of $85,18 9. Such total figure represents a fee of $60,214 to Plaintiff's outside counsel and a fee of $24,975 to Plaintiff's in-house counsel. As to litigation expenses, the Court AWARDS $2,683 to Plaintiff's outside counsel and $6,048.10 to Plaintiff's in house counsel. Copies distributed as directed. Signed by District Judge Mark S. Davis on 9/8/2015. (bgra)

FILED
UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT

EASTERN DISTRICT

OF

COURT

VIRGINIA

SEP "8 2015

Norfolk Division

CLERK, US DISTRICT COURT
PRISON LEGAL NEWS,
of

the

HUMAN

NC-'.FO'-K. VA

a project

RIGHTS

DEFENSE

CENTER,

Plaintiff,
Civil

v.

No.

2:13cv424

KEN STOLLE, Sheriff for Virginia
Beach, Virginia, et. al,
Defendants.

OPINION

This

matter

is

before

AND

the

ORDER

Court

on

attorney's fees and litigation expenses
News,

a

project

("Plaintiff,"

U.S.C.

§

1988,

obtaining
through

or

and

is

deputies

predicated

judgment

Virginia,

(collectively,

Human

as

on

relief
well

as

motion

seeking

filed by Prison Legal

Rights

Such motion

injunctive

negotiated consent decree.
Virginia Beach,

the

"PLN").

permanent
summary

of

a

is

Defense

filed pursuant

Plaintiff's

on

its

to 42

success

§

securing

Center,

1983
a

in

claims

subsequent

Defendant Ken Stolle, the Sheriff of
and the individually named Sheriff's
"Defendants"),

filed

a

joint

brief

acknowledging that a fee award is appropriate, but challenge the
extent

of

the award

requested by

Plaintiff.

For

the reasons

discussed

GRANTED,

below,

Plaintiff's

motion

although the amount of

seeking

fees

attorney's

requested is

fees

is

reduced from

the amount sought by Plaintiff.
I. Factual and Procedural Background

The

Court

"Factual

and

incorporates

Procedural

herein

Background"

the
in

sections

its

entitled

December

8,

2014

Opinion and Order and March 31, 2015 Opinion and Order.
Nos.

65,

84.

In

short,

PLN

is

the

publisher

of

a

ECF
monthly

magazine titled "Prison Legal News," which is marketed mainly to
inmates.

Over the past several years,

Beach Correctional Center {"VBCC"),

Stolle and

not

been

magazine

the

Virginia

permitted
due

explicit"

to

to

its

Plaintiff's

lawsuit

which is operated by Sheriff

Beach Sheriff's

receive

alleged

materials

inmates at the Virginia

the

and

of

the

"ordering

challenged Defendants'

("VBSO"),

Prison

monthly

violation

policy

Office

have

Legal

VBSO

News

"sexually

forms"

policy.

exclusion of

Prison

Legal News magazine from VBCC.
In

in

this

Court's December 8, 2014 Opinion,

Defendant's

News

magazine

favor

from

regarding

VBCC

the

Court ruled

Prison

the

exclusion

of

on

the

"ordering

based

VBSO

Legal

forms"

policy, and reserved ruling on the "sexually explicit" materials

policy.1

In this Court's March 31, 2015 Opinion, the Court found

1The Court did, however, conclude that Defendants were shielded by qualified

immunity as to money damage claims involving their maintenance/enforcement of
the "sexually explicit" materials policy.

that

the

VBSO

overbroad

such

had

previously

"sexually

policy

litigation,

had

explicit"

been

maintained
materials

amended

an

unconstitutionally

policy,

during

the

of

the

the Court entered a permanent injunction precluding

found

that

Defendants

process violations
decisions,

although

course

the VBSO from returning to its former policy.
Court

and

in

their

had

Additionally,

previously

handling

of

and although such procedures

engaged

magazine

had

in

the
due

censorship

been modified and

corrected during the course of the litigation, the Court entered

a permanent injunction precluding the VBSO from returning to its

prior notification and censorship practices.
of the Court's March 31,

After the issuance

2015 Opinion, the parties continued to

dispute the degree of nominal damages that should be awarded to
PLN for the due process violations, as well as whether punitive

damages

should

be

awarded.

Prior

to

a

bench-trial

being

conducted to resolve such remaining dispute, the parties reached
a

settlement

thereafter

and

filed

a

consent

this

motion

decree
as

was

the

entered.

consent

Plaintiff

decree

did

not

include an agreement regarding attorney's fees.
II. Standard for Attorney's Fee Award
A. Right to Fees
The

§ 1983

instant

seeking

civil

to

constitutional rights,

case

remedy

was

filed

the

pursuant

alleged

to

42

U.S.C.

depravation

and it is undisputed that:

(1)

of

pursuant

to

42

U.S.C.

reasonable

198 8,

this

attorney's

"prevailing

qualifies
entitled

§

party"

as
to

litigation

a
at

Court

has

discretion

fees

litigation

a

in

and

1983

action;

§

"prevailing
least

party"

and

(2)

case

of

fees,

is

thus

as

42

U.S.C.

§ 1988;

see

S-l

well

&

S-2

Through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N. Carolina,
49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994)
be

awarded

a

PLN

and

award

to

that

this

partial

award

expenses

in

a

expenses.

to

as

By

&

21 F.3d

(indicating that a "prevailing party" may

attorney's

fees

if

it

obtains

"an

enforceable

judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal
relief sought in a § 1983 action"
U.S.

103

(1992))).

It

(citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506

is well-established that the purpose of

fee shifting under § 1988 is to "'ensure effective access to the

judicial process,' for persons with civil rights grievances."
Lefemine v. Wideman,

758

Hensley v. Eckerhart,

F.3d 551,

555

(4th Cir.

461 U.S. 424, 429

2014)

(1983)).

(quoting

Accordingly,

"[i]n light of Section 1988's language and purpose, a prevailing
plaintiff

'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless

special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'"

(quoting

Hensley,

entitlement

expenses

to

an

461

U.S.

award

at

of

429).

attorney's

is well-supported by

the record,

Here,
fees

and

Id.

Plaintiff's

and

thus,

litigation

the only

remaining task is determination of a "reasonable fee award" that
is appropriate in this case.

Id. at 559.

B.

Calculation of

"Reasonable"

Fee Award

The Fourth Circuit has outlined a three step framework for
calculating a reasonable attorney's fee:

First, the court must "determine the lodestar figure
by multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended
times a reasonable rate."
Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235,
ascertain

what

is

Robinson v. Equifax Info.
243 (4th Cir. 2009).
To

reasonable

in

terms

of

hours

expended and the rate charged, the court is bound to
apply the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974).

Id. at 243-44.

Next,

the court must "subtract

fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated
to successful ones."

Id.

at

244.

Finally,

the court

should award "some percentage of the remaining amount,

depending on the
plaintiff."

McAfee v.

degree

of

success

enjoyed by the

Id.

Boczar,

738 F.3d 81,

88 (4th Cir.

2013),

as amended

(Jan. 23, 2014) (footnote omitted).

The calculation of a lodestar figure is "[t]he most useful

starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee,"
because it "provides an objective basis on which to make an
initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services."

Hensley,

461 U.S. at 433; see Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S.

542, 551 (2010)

(characterizing the lodestar calculation as "the

guiding light of . . . fee-shifting jurisprudence")
marks and citation omitted).

(quotation

The fee applicant bears the burden

of proving the reasonableness

of

the hours

expended and the

requested hourly rates, which generally requires submission of
the

attorney's

own

affidavit

and

timesheets

as

well

as

"'satisfactory specific evidence of
in

the

relevant community for

attorney]

seeks

F.3d 313,

321 (4th Cir.

273,

(4th Cir.

1990)).

determine

both

order

277
to

an

award.'"

prevailing market rates

type

Grissom

2008)

a

the

the

of

v.

work for which
The

Mills

Corp.,

(quoting Plyler v. Evatt,

In evaluating
reasonable

the

rate

[the
549

902 F.2d

submissions

and

a

in

reasonable

number of hours expended, the lodestar analysis is guided by the
following twelve factors (the "Johnson factors"):
(1)

the time and labor expended;

(2)

the novelty and

difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill
required to properly perform the legal services
rendered;

(4)

the

attorney's

opportunity

costs

in

pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee
for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the
outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations

imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount
in controversy and the results obtained;
(9) the
experience, reputation and ability of the attorney;
(10)

the undesirability of the case within the legal

community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and
length of
the professional
relationship between
attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards
in similar cases.

Barber v.

1978)

Kimbrell's

(adopting

Inc.,

577

the twelve

F.2d

factors

216,

226

n.28

identified

by

(4th Cir.

the

Fifth

Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc.); cf. Perdue,

559

U.S.

at

approach is

550-52 (explaining

superior to

the

why

the

objective

lodestar

subjective approach outlined

in

Johnson, but failing to hold that it is improper to be informed

by the Johnson factors when performing a lodestar analysis).
Because

Fourth

Circuit

precedent

requires

this

Court

to

be

guided

by

the

figure,

"to

already

been

factor(s)

Johnson

the

factors

extent

that

incorporated

should not

any

into

later be

in

determining

of

the

the

Johnson

lodestar

considered

the

a

lodestar

factors

analysis,"

second

time

has

such

to make

an upward or downward adjustment to the lodestar figure because
doing so would "inappropriately weigh" such factor.
F.3d at

McAfee,

73 8

91.

The second step in the fee calculation requires the Court
to exclude fees for counsel's time spent on unsuccessful claims
that are unrelated to the successful claims.

at 244; see Hensley,

461 U.S. at 435

to

prevailing

limit

awards

[unrelated claims

to

Robinson,

560 F.3d

("The congressional intent

parties

based on different

requires

facts

that

and legal theories]

be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits,

and

therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful

claim[s]").

The

Supreme

Court

has

recognized

that

"[i]t may

well be that cases involving such unrelated claims are unlikely
to

arise

with

great

frequency,"

because

"[m]any

civil

rights

cases will present only a single claim," and in other cases, the
claims

"will involve a

related legal

common core of

theories."

latter circumstance,

Hensley,

"[m]uch of

facts or will be based on

461

U.S.

counsel's

generally to the litigation as a whole,

at

time

435.
will

In such
be

devoted

making it difficult to

divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis," with the

nature

of

the

lawsuit

series of discrete

precluding

claims."

it

from

being

"viewed

as

a

Id.

The third and final step,

after a lodestar calculation has

been made and any unsuccessful efforts on unrelated claims have

been excluded,

requires the Court to award "'some percentage of

the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed

by the plaintiff.'"
v.

City of Aiken,

Grissom,

54 9 F.3d at 321 (quoting Johnson

278 F.3d 333,

337 (4th Cir.

2002)).

It is

appropriate for the Court to reduce an award at the third step
of the analysis if "'the relief, however significant, is limited

in comparison
McAfee,

to the scope of the litigation as a whole.'"

738 F.3d at 92 (quoting Hensley,

"What the

court must ask

level

success

of

that

satisfactory basis

is whether

makes

the

for making

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434) .

expended

on

hours

a fee

reasonably

award.'"

Accordingly,

the

at 439-40) .

'the plaintiff achieved a

litigation

expended

Id.

a

(quoting

when "a plaintiff has

achieved only partial or limited success,

reasonably

461 U.S.

the product of hours

as

a

whole

times

a

reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount" even in cases

"where the plaintiff's claims were interrelated,

nonfrivolous,

and

at

raised

in

good

faith."

Hensley,

461

U.S.

436.

An

attorney's fee award under § 1988 is therefore not driven by
whether

it was

reasonable

counsel litigated the case

to file

suit

or

whether plaintiff's

"with devotion and skill";

rather,

"the most

critical

factor

is

the

degree

of

success

obtained."

Id.

III.

Discussion

A. Lodestar Analysis
1. Number of Reasonable Hours Expended

As

indicted

above,

"prevailing party"

fee

award

case.
fee

to

Defendants
Plaintiff

to

do,

undisputed

however,

argue

do

Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's

further
seeks

is

Defendants

compensate

Defendants
award

and

it

that

many

are

Plaintiff

contest

outside

challenge

in-house

compensation

not

that

the

the

duplicative

a

a reasonable

counsel

in

this

propriety of

counsel.

of

is

any

Additionally,

hours

for

hours

which

spent

in

conferences, time spent on tasks not sufficiently related to the

litigation,

including

pre-complaint

time,

inappropriately billed at full hourly rates.

and

travel

time

Defendants also

seek an overall reduction due to the degree of success obtained
in this case.

In analyzing Defendants'
the Court considers

challenges to the hours expended,

the relevant Johnson factors,

including the

time and labor expended by the attorneys of various skill levels
and

experience,

the

difficulty of

the questions

skill required to perform the services rendered,

raised,

and any time

limitations imposed by the circumstances of this case.
577

F.2d at 226 n.28.

the

Barber,

a. In-House/Nonprofit Counsel
The

law

services

establishes

that

organization,

litigation

related

counsel

or

work

at

in-house

that

is

a

nonprofit

counsel,

otherwise

legal

performing

compensable

is

entitled to an attorney's fee award at prevailing market rates.
See Nat'l Wildlife

1988)

Fed'n v.

(addressing

(citing Blum v.
Hospitality,
2:07cv530,

"nonprofit

LLC v.
2009

WL

fee

for

859

F.2d 313,

legal

Stenson, 465 U.S.

(explaining that

hourly

Hanson,

319

service

892-96

organizations"

(1984)));

Lake Wright

Holiday Hospitality Franchising,
4841017,

at

*10

in-house

counsel

litigation

tasks

(E.D.

may

Va.

be

"that

(4th Cir.

Oct.

Inc.,
23,

compensated

ordinarily

No.

2009)

at

an

would

be

performed by outside counsel" but should not be compensated when
merely

acting

as

representative).

a

liaison

Here,

or

Plaintiff's

corporate

amended

contact

complaint

or

self-

identifies PLN as "a project of the Human Rights Defense Center
('HRDC')"

and

organization.

identifies

Amend.

HRDC

Compl.

submitted by Lance Weber,
that HRDC provides
No.

91.

as

2,

a

non-profit

ECF No.

legal

17.

"general counsel"

while

entities is somewhat unclear,

the

legal

The affidavit

for HRDC indicates

legal services to PLN without

Accordingly,

charge.

relationship

for simplicity,

services

ECF

between

the HRDC attorneys

who worked on this case will be referred to herein as PLN's "inhouse counsel."

10

To the extent Defendants make broad objections to the Court

awarding

any

ECF

100,

No.

record

not

attorney's
at

before

merely

the

tasks

otherwise

have

6-7,

Court

acting

performing

drafting

3-4,

fees

such

a

argument

client

necessary

discovery

Plaintiff's

demonstrates

as

been

to

to

that

by

objections,

is

in-house

but

drafting

as

the

counsel

was

was

litigation

outside

counsel,

rejected

liaison,

the

performed

in-house

that

counsel,

briefs

instead

or

would

such

as

portions

thereof, performing legal research associated with the case, and

preparing

or

suggestion

editing

that

declarations.

Plaintiff's

compensated because

the

Similarly,

in-house

counsel

two outside attorneys

point-of-contact for Defendants'

Defendants'

should
were

not

the only

attorneys is not supported by

any citation to case law nor is it otherwise persuasive.
experienced

attorneys

be

regularly

perform

compensable

Less
legal

research and similar litigation tasks that assist lead counsel,

yet these assisting attorneys may never interact directly with
opposing

counsel—indeed

participated
contact

if

in conference

would

likely

be

they
calls

attended

any

meetings

with opposing counsel,

subject

to

attack

as

or
such

constituting

unnecessary duplication of efforts.

Although

Defendants'

blanket

objections

are

rejected,

consistent with additional arguments advanced by Defendants, the
Court

does

consider

the

nature

of

11

the

activities

performed

by

Plaintiff's

in-house

counsel

(and

outside

counsel)

in

making

adjustments to the hours claimed in Plaintiff's motion.
forth

below,

number

of

such

internal

that appears

to

adjustments

include

conferences

constitute

consideration

billed,

general

As set

in-house

monitoring

of

counsel's

of

the

counsel's

time

was documented, appears

that,

based on

the manner

in

time

case—as

contrasted with the performance of necessary litigation
in-house

the

tasks,

which

it

to have been spent performing PLN's or

HRDC's general missions, as well as other matters.
b. Pre-Complaint work

Defendants

argue

in

their

brief

in

opposition

that

the

Court should not allow the recovery of fees

for work performed

prior

other

to

the

filing

of

the

complaint

specifically devoted to drafting the complaint.
9-10.

Defendants

are

correct

that

"it

is

than

hours

ECF No. 100, at

difficult

to

treat

time spent years before the complaint was filed as having been
'expended on the litigation'

or to be fairly comprehended as

'part of the costs' of the civil rights action."

Webb v. Bd. of

Educ.

of

(1985) .

That

said,

the Supreme Court

recognized that,

"[o] f

course,

Dyer

some

Cnty. , Tenn. , 471

of

the

has

services

U.S.

likewise

234,

performed

242

before

a

lawsuit

formally commenced . . . are performed 'on the litigation'
[including]

the work

associated with

12

the development

is

. . .

of

the

theory of

the

case."

Id.

at

243.

Moreover,

in Webb,

Justice

Brennan explained as follows in his separately authored opinion:
There is certainly nothing in § 1988 that limits fee
awards to work performed after the complaint is filed
in
court.
For
example,
it
is
settled
that
a
prevailing party may recover fees for time spent
before the formal commencement of the litigation on
such
matters
as
attorney-client
interviews,
investigation of the facts of the case, research on
the viability of potential legal claims, drafting of
the
complaint
and
accompanying
documents,
and

preparation

for

motions

discovery

Wolf,

dealing

with

expected

requests.

2

M.

preliminary
Derfner

&

A.

% 16.02[2][b],

p.

Court Awarded Attorney

Fees

(1984) .

16-15

the
433

and

"reasonably

This

time

is

expended

litigation," Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
(1983),
in
part
because
careful

on

U.S. 424,
prefiling

investigation of the facts and law is required by the
ethical rules of our profession, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the realities of civil rights
litigation.

Id.

at 250

(Brennan, J.,

concurring in part

and dissenting in

part) (footnotes omitted).
as argued here by Plaintiff,

In addition to the above,

the extent that Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

and

its

courts,

progeny,

modified

the

pleading

to

550 U.S. 544

(2007),

standard in

federal

there is arguably now an even greater need to conduct a

thorough

pre-filing

investigation.

Moreover,

Twombly,

an opinion

from a unanimous

Supreme

subsequent
Court

to

favorably

cited Justice Brennan's analysis in Webb, explaining that "[t]he
fact that some of the claimed fees accrued before the complaint

was

filed

preliminary

is

legal

inconsequential"

research,

because

drafting
13

"[investigation,

of demand

letters,

and

working on the initial complaint are standard preliminary steps
toward
Fund

litigation."

of

Int'l

Employers,

Ray

Union

Haluch Gravel

of

Operating

134 S. Ct. 773,

Based on

the

Co.

v.

Central

Engineers

&

Pension

Participating

782-83 (2014).

above,

to

the

extent

that

Defendants

advance

a blanket challenge to all pre-filing work other than time spent

actually drafting
That

said,

the

the complaint,
Court

agrees

such challenge is rejected.

with

Defendants

that

certain

activities in this case performed by counsel or paralegals more

than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, as documented
on the exhibits before

the Court,

appear to involve activities

that are not reasonably tied to the litigation.

involve,

among

prisoner

other

things,

subscribers,

subscribers,

and

exchanging

compiling

seeking

out

communications

contact
new

Such hours

information

potential

with

of

subscribers.

Accordingly, as set forth below, a review of the case-specific
record

reveals

that

some

pre-complaint

hours

are

not

compensable, while other time spent investigating the facts and
researching the law are compensable.
c. Reduction of Hours to Reflect Duplication of Efforts,

Hours Appearing Unrelated to the Litigation, and Hours
Lacking Sufficient Documentation

Although
sufficient

the

evidence

Court
to

finds

that

demonstrate

Plaintiff
that

a

has
fee

submitted
award

is

appropriate as to all counsel that worked on this case, as well
14

as

two paralegals,

Plaintiff

reveals

a review of
that

the billing records submitted by

Plaintiff

has

failed

to

demonstrate

that

all of the claimed hours are both "reasonable" and performed "on
the

litigation."

by

the

various

performed by

In considering the

attorneys,

such

and

individuals,

the
the

"time and labor expended"

explanation
Court

finds

of
that

the

tasks

there

was

some degree of unnecessary duplication of efforts, certain hours
that appear on their face to be unrelated to the litigation, and
certain hours for which inadequate documentation was provided.

Having

carefully reviewed Plaintiff's

evidence,

the Court

makes the following adjustments to the hours requested in order
to eliminate hours that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate were

reasonably billed to this case.
adjustments,

the

Court

In making such relatively minor

notes

that

Defendants

have

not

specifically identified entries they believe to be improper, nor
have they tallied the hours they believe to be improper in order
to suggest a specific reduction to the Court.
however,

find that Defendants'

The Court does,

blanket objections coupled with

this Court's obligation to allow an attorney's fee award only to
the extent it is "reasonable" warrants some degree of adjustment
to the hours claimed.

Cf.

364, 373

(4th Cir. 1996)

context,

that

"[a]

In re A.H.

Robins Co.,

Inc.,

86

F.3d

(noting, in a case outside the § 1983

court abuses

15

its discretion if it allows a

fee without

carefully considering

compensation."

the

factors

relevant

to

fair

in

this

(citing Barber, 577 F.2d at 226)).

i. Jeffery Fogel, Lead Outside Counsel
Mr.

Fogel

matter.

requests

compensation

The vast majority of

Fogel

appears

entries,

some

internal

conferences

SDR,"

of

directly

That said,

which predate
with

249.8

hours

the billed time submitted by Mr.

well-documented,

litigation, and reasonable.

for

the

to

the

there are various time

complaint,

co-counsel

"emails w/ SDR," etc.).

related

Steven

ECF No. 89-1.

which reference

Rosenfield

("confer

Such time entries

suggest a degree of duplication of efforts, particularly because
both

attorneys

Moreover,

many

have
of

approximately

such

entries

forty

fail

years

of

to document

were discussed, how they were related to the case,
advanced the efficient litigation of this matter.
some of

the conferences

with

"SDR"

were

experience.
what

matters

or why they
Additionally,

included within blocks

of time spent on multiple tasks such that the time spent in the
internal

conference

Accordingly,
hours

to

Mr.

account

cannot

Fogel's
for

be

specifically

hours are reduced

work

that

was

not

by a

identified.

total of

adequately

10

documented

and/or suggested a duplication of efforts that a paying client

would likely have reasonably disputed upon receiving a bill.2

2 Plaintiff's outside counsel

that

(Mr. Fogel and Mr. Rosenfield) represent

they reduced their hours

by an estimated 10% to account
16

for

See

Hensley,

billed

to

461

one's

U.S.

at

client

434

also

("Hours

are

not

that

properly

adversary pursuant to statutory authority."
citation omitted));

2d

667,

Lilienthal v.

670
have

counsel

(E.D.
not

reasonableness
conferences

of

Va.
borne

the

between

386 F.

Supp.

court's

the

substantial

2d 362,

fact

hours

373

that
of

(finding

claimed"
and

the

the
time

of

to

one's

with

the

respect

Tlacoapa

2005)

322

F.

Supp.

"plaintiff's

establishing
to
v.

the

numerous
Carregal,

(factoring into the

billed by more

plaintiff's
to

billed

properly

(quotation marks and

that

client);

hours

not

Suffolk,

burden

(S.D.N.Y.

reduce

amounts

City of

their

counsel

decision to

third

2004)

are

cursorily

than one-

attorneys

"billed

described

internal

conferences with each other").
ii.

Steven Rosenfield,

Outside Counsel

Mr. Rosenfield requests compensation for 58.7 hours in this
matter.

The

majority

of

the

billed

time

submitted

by

Rosenfield appears directly related to the litigation.
said,

Mr.

That

there are multiple time entries in the bills submitted by

Mr. Rosenfield,

some of which pre-date the complaint,

not sufficiently specific
additional

internal

that are

to be compensated in this matter or

conferences,

whereas

Plaintiff's

in-house counsel

has specifically identified timesheet entries, including some multiattorney conferences, for which compensation is not being requested.
The

Court

considers

these

facts

in making

adjustments

to

the

hours

claimed by all of Plaintiff's counsel, but notes that multiple entries
for which compensation is requested still
lack a sufficient
explanation as to the tasks being performed and/or suggest a
duplication of efforts.
17

that reflect internal conferences with Mr. Fogel ("conf w/Jeff,"
"email

fr/Jeff,"

etc.).

While

"emails
some

fr/to

of

this

various

time

appropriate strategic discussions,
of both outside attorneys,

rates

of

$450

duplicative

per hour,

and/or

is

PLN

people

surely

&

Jeff,"

compensable

as

with the years of experience

as reflected by their claimed billing

a portion of

inadequately

this

time

documented.

Rosenfield's hours are reduced by a total of

is needlessly

Accordingly,

Mr.

8 hours to account

for time entries that suggest unnecessary duplication of efforts

and/or

lack

sufficient

detail

to

demonstrate

that

they

were

reasonably expended on this litigation.
iii. Lance Weber,

Mr.

Weber,

counsel
this

for

experienced

Plaintiff,

matter.

multiple

an

A

Lead In-House Counsel

requests

review

of

conferences

his

attorney

compensation
time

with

and

entries,

other

lead

for

72

in-house
hours

however,

in-house

in

reveal

attorneys,

communications with outside counsel that suggest some degree of

general

monitoring

sufficiently

specific

of

the

to

case,

render

entries

them

that

are

not

compensable,

and

pre-

complaint work dating back more than a year before the case was
filed

that

administrative

appears,

at

monitoring of

least

in

censorship

part,

to

activities

constitute
that

formed

the factual underpinnings for this case, as contrasted with work

spent preparing for litigation of this case ("review letter from
18

prisoner," "review returned mail from jail," etc.).
all

of

Mr.

Weber's

entries

and

the

above

stated

Considering
concerns,

Mr.

Weber's hours are reduced by a total of 8 hours.
iv. Sabarish Neelakanta,

Ms.
bulk

Neelakanta

of

Ms.

compiling

requests

Neelakanta's

time

records

in

In-House Staff Attorney

compensation for 10.5 hours.
time

appears

support

of

to

have

PLN's

been

fee

The
spent

petition,

compiling documents in support of declarations, and assisting in
revising a brief.

However, it also appears that Ms. Neelakanta

spent time in conferences and sent internal emails,

to include

telephone/conference calls regarding this Court's first ruling
on summary judgment, yet she does not appear to have performed

any additional work on such matters subsequent to those calls.
Accordingly, Ms. Neelakanta's hours are reduced by a total of 1
hour.

v.

Robert Jack,

In-House Staff Attorney

Mr. Jack, an in-house staff attorney, requests compensation
for 88.3

hours.

internal emails,

Mr.

Jack's

time includes

time spent in a settlement conference where he

was the second attorney for PLN

spent

traveling

conference,

and

internal conferences,

from Florida
various

(Mr.

Fogel was present),

time

to Virginia for the settlement

hours

spent

representing

PLN

in

activities associated with censorship of PLN's monthly magazine

(such

as

responding

to

prisoner
19

correspondence,

drafting

letters,

and

appealing

censorship

relevant to this litigation,

the litigation.

decisions)

which,

while

does not appear to directly advance

Stated differently,

while Mr.

Jack was

likely

providing necessary legal services to PLN when he was drafting
appeal notices of individual censorship decisions,
notices

is

conceptually

distinct,

at

least

to

a

drafting such
degree,

from

performing research or other tasks that are necessary to advance

or otherwise support the litigation of this case.
all of

the above,

Mr.

Considering

Jack's hours are reduced by a total of 12

hours.3
vi. Alissa Hull,

Ms. Hull,
for

8.2

In-House Staff Attorney

an in-house staff attorney,

hours.

All

of

Ms.

Hull's

requests compensation

time

spent

on

the

case

occurred prior to the filing of the complaint, the bulk of which
involved drafting and editing an internal memorandum regarding
censored materials,

a

task

less experienced attorney

that

is

plainly

to perform

counsel in drafting a complaint.

appropriate

to aid

more

"case

strategy"

conference

before the complaint

was

Although Ms. Hull spent time

that

filed,

a

experienced

in internal conferences and reviewing internal emails,
a

for

occurred

it appears

more

including

than

a

that Plaintiff

already written off a substantial portion of the time Ms.

year

has

Hull

3 Approximately eight hours of Mr. Jack's time was associated with
traveling to Norfolk and participating in, and/or observing, the
settlement conference.
20

recorded on her timesheets.

Accordingly,

no reduction is

made

as to the 8.2 hours claimed by Ms. Hull.
vii.
Ms.

Monique Roberts,

Roberts,

an

In-House Staff Attorney

in-house

compensation for 21.3 hours.

staff

All of Ms.

attorney,

Roberts' time spent on

the case occurred after the filing of the complaint,

which

appears

requests.

to

involve

document

requests

production

the bulk of

and

discovery

While Ms. Roberts appears to have participated in few

internal conferences,

she does bill for time that appears to be

associated with Plaintiff's overall mission and matters

forming

the factual underpinnings for this case, as contrasted with work

spent preparing for litigation of this case (such as drafting a
letter

to

subscribers

to

inform

them

of

the

filed

complaint,

researching and updating subscriber addresses, and responding to
prisoner mail).

Considering the above,

Ms.

Roberts'

hours are

reduced by a total of 3 hours.
viii.

In-house
request

paralegals

compensation

respectively.

No

Paralegals

Zach
for

affidavit

Phillips
26.3

was

and

hours

submitted

Jeff
and

by

Antoniewicz
hours,

19.3

either

of

such

individuals seeking to explain their experience or their role in

advancing this litigation; rather,

their hours are documented on

a composite time record submitted by Mr. Jack.

It appears from such record that all of Mr.
21

ECF No.

91-2.

Phillips time was

spent

prior

to

the

filing

of

the

complaint,

with

substantial

time being incurred more than a year prior to the filing of the

complaint.

Additionally,

numerous

time

entries

for

both

Mr.

Phillips and Mr. Antoniewicz either include insufficient detail
to

demonstrate

that

such

hours

are

reasonably

related

to

the

litigation, or reveal on their face that they are administrative
in nature and/or lack a clear tie to this litigation ("research

background information
letter

from

potential

LW,"

re

"Assess

and

subscribers,"

subscribers;

Considering

enroll

the

new

subscribers,"
compile

"Assemble

new

a

contact

outreach

subscribers

above,

"draft

for

substantial

mail

information

mailing

trial

and

to

for

new

subscription").

reduction

of

hours

is

necessary as to both paralegals as Plaintiff failed to carry its
burden

to

Phillips'

demonstrate

hours

that

such

are therefore

time

is

reduced

by

compensable.

16

hours,

Mr.

and Mr.

Antoniewicz's hours are reduced by 8 hours.
2.

As outlined above,
fees

under

§

198 8

Reasonable Rate

a party entitled to recover attorney's

"bears

reasonableness

of

the

McDaniel,

824

F.2d

generally

accomplished

the

hourly

1380,

burden

rates

1402

(4th

of

establishing

requested."

Cir.

"through affidavits

Spell

1987).

from

the

v.

This

is

disinterested

counsel, evidence of awards in similar cases, or other specific
evidence that allows the court to determine
22

'actual rates which

counsel

can

Vote/Voting

command

for

710 (E.D.

Va.

relevant

in

the

America,

2012)

market

Inc.

[relevant]

v.

Long,

(quoting Spell,

for

887

824

determining

market.'"

F.

F.2d

the

Project

Supp.

at

2d

704,

1402).

prevailing

"The

rate

is

ordinarily the community in which the court where the action is
prosecuted sits."
F.3d

169,

175

submitted

hourly

Rum Creek Coal
(4th

affidavits

rates

they

Cir.
from

Sales,

1994).

Here,

disinterested

purport

to

Inc.

be

v.

Caperton,

both

counsel

parties

have

indicating

reasonable.

31

the

Additionally,

Plaintiff has submitted resumes for their in-house attorneys.

In

determining

considered

expended,

the

the

relevant

reasonable
Johnson

rates,

factors,

the

Court

including

the

has
labor

the novelty and difficulty of questions raised,

the

skill required to perform the legal services of

the various

attorneys

in pressing

(and paralegals),

the litigation,
the

asserted

the opportunity

costs

the experience and reputation of each attorney,

(but not

proven)

undesirability of

the

case,

the

nature and length of the relationship between PLN and outside
counsel,

226

and fee awards

n.28.

Having

in similar cases.

considered

affidavits from outside counsel,
Vollette

v.

23, 2013),

Watson,

No.

all

of

Barber,

these

577

F.2d at

factors,

the

the awards in Project Vote and

2:12cv231,

ECF No.

128

(E.D.

Va.

July

the following chart documents the requested rate and

the rate determined to be reasonable by the Court:
23

Attorney Name

Rate Requested

Rate Awarded

Jeffrey Fogel

$ 450

$ 400

Steven Rosenfield

$ 450

$ 400

Lance Weber

$ 350

$ 325

Sabarish Neelakanta

$ 275

$ 230

Robert Jack

$ 225

$ 200

Monique Roberts

$ 225

$ 200

Alissa Hull

$ 225

$ 190

Zach Phillips (para)

$ 125

$ 100

Jeff Antoniewicz (para)

$ 100

$ 90

Several

of

the

hourly

rates adopted

by

the Court

fall

within the overlapping portions of the rate ranges proposed by
the disinterested attorneys relied on by the parties.

Those

rates that fall outside the parties' proposed ranges do so by no
more than twenty dollars per hour.

The above rates apply to all of the hours awarded in this
case with the exception of the 33.6 hours that Mr. Fogel seeks
to recover for his travel time.

The fact that Mr. Fogel asserts

that he should be compensated $5 0 more per hour than his typical

billing rate based on market conditions in this District, yet
still seeks compensation at his full hourly rate for the time he

spent driving

from the Western District

Eastern District,

suggests

a

lack of
24

of

billing

Virginia

to the

judgment.

See

Project
should

Vote,
not

887

recover

F.

Supp.

their

offices in Washington,
failure

to

reduce

full

D.C.,

this

2d

at

716

market

(holding

rate

for

that

travel

indicates

a

lack

777,

790

(E.D.

Va.

2014)

(noting

that

the

their

and that

of

judgment"); see also In re Outsidewall Tire Litig.,
3d

from

to Norfolk and Richmond,

time

"counsel

billing

52 F.

Supp.

"decision

to

compensate an attorney for his or her travel time is within the
district court's discretion,"

and discussing various

approaches

taken by courts to address travel-time billed at full rates).
Moreover,

Plaintiff's

response

to Defendants'

challenge

full-rate billing for travel time is uncompelling.

to the

Accordingly,

the Court hereby reduces Mr. Fogel's hourly fee for travel time
from $400 to $200, which adequately compensates him for the time

he spent traveling.
J.,

See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 443-44 (Brennan,

concurring in part and dissenting in part)

manifests

a finely balanced

congressional

("Section 1988

purpose

to provide

plaintiffs asserting specified federal rights with 'fees which
are adequate

to attract competent counsel,

but which do not

produce windfalls to attorneys.'" (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976))).

In the instant case, $200 per

hour for travel time strikes an appropriate balance between the

task billed,

driving a car (which requires no legal skills of

any kind), and counsel's opportunity costs of such travel-time,

25

giving

due

consideration

to

the

prior

relationship

between

Plaintiff and Mr. Fogel.
3. Lodestar Summary

The

following

calculation,

which is

award

to

prior

any

table

the

reflects

the

starting point

adjustments

in

Court's

lodestar

for an attorney's fee

step

two

or

three

of

the

required analysis.
Rate

Total

239.8

$400

$89,2005

58.7

50.7

$400

$20,280

Lance Weber

72

64

$325

$20,800

Sabarish Neelakanta

10.5

9.5

$230

$2,185

Robert Jack

88.3

76.3

$200

$15,260

8.2

8.2

$200

$1,640

Monique Roberts

21.3

18.3

$190

$3,477

Zach Phillips (para)

26.3

10.3

$100

$1,030

Jeff Antoniewicz (para)

19.3

11.3

$90

$1,017

TOTALS

554.4

488.4

n/a

$154,889

Attorney Name

Hours Req.

Jeffrey Fogel

249. 84

Steven Rosenfield

Alissa Hull

Hours

Award.

4 Mr. Fogel's and Mr. Rosenfield's total hours include the time spent
drafting both the opening brief and the reply brief in support of the
instant
motion.
Defendants
make
no
objection
regarding
the
reasonableness of the time spent pursing fees, and it is "well settled
that the time spent defending entitlement to attorney's fees is

properly compensable under § 1988."

Trimper v. City of Norfolk, Va.,

58 F.3d 68, 77 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

5 Mr. Fogel's lodestar fee calculation of $89,200 includes 206.2 hours
compensated at $400 per hour and 33.6 hours of travel time compensated
at $200 per hour.
26

B. Adjustment for Unsuccessful Unrelated Claims

After

a

lodestar

determine whether the

figure

fee

is

calculated,

award should be

the

Court

must

reduced to reflect

the

time counsel spent on unsuccessful claims that are unrelated to
the

successful

Defendants

do

claims.

not

Robinson,

assert

that

a

560

fee

F.3d

at

reduction

is

244.

Here,

required

at

this step, likely because they recognize that all of the claims
"involve

a

Notably,

because

explicit"

common

core

the

materials

of

facts."

"ordering

ban

Hensley,

forms"

litigated

simultaneously invoked by Defendants

461

U.S.

ban and the

in

this

at

435.

"sexually

case

were

to justify exclusion of

Plaintiff's monthly magazine from VBCC,

the interrelated nature

of the facts and claims appear to prevent the case from being

effectively "viewed as a series of discrete claims."

Id.

In

the absence of any argument asserting that a downward adjustment
should be made at the second stage of the analysis,

makes no adjustment and moves

the Court

on to considering Plaintiff's

overall success on the merits.

C. Adjustment for Degree of Success

The final step in determining a reasonable fee award is

calculating a percentage of the lodestar figure that takes into
account

the

"'degree

of success

enjoyed

by the

plaintiff.'"

Grissom, 549 F.3d at 321 (quoting Johnson, 278 F.3d at 337).

described in greater detail above,
27

As

when a plaintiff achieves

only

"partial

or

limited

lodestar figure may be
all

claims were

faith."

success,"

as

in

this

excessive notwithstanding

"interrelated,

Hensley,

such

461

U.S.

nonfrivolous,
at

436.

In

case,

the

fact

the

that

and raised in good
concluding

that

an

adjustment to the lodestar figure is appropriate in this case,
the

Court notes

that

the

Johnson factor addressing

the

"amount

in controversy and the results obtained" was not subsumed within
the prior analysis determining the lodestar figure.
F.3d at 89-90

Here,

(emphasis added).

it

Defendants

McAfee, 738

is

readily

succeeded

in

apparent

certain

Defendants demonstrated that

that

aspects

they were

both
of

Plaintiff

this

and

litigation.

qualifiedly immune

from

money damages resulting from any of their acts associated with
the

long-term

Defendants'

maintenance

"ordering

policy.

censorship

forms"

of
and

policy

Moreover,

Plaintiff's

publications

application

and

"sexually

of

both

explicit"

through

the

VBSO

materials

Defendants demonstrated that Plaintiff did

not suffer money damages based on the exclusion of its monthly

magazine

from

VBCC

because

the

banned

issues

were

constitutionally excluded pursuant to the VBSO "ordering forms"

policy.

While,

prior

questions

remained

as

to

the

entry of

to

the

amount

of

the

consent

nominal

decree,

damages

on

Plaintiff's due process claims and whether punitive damages were
recoverable

on

such

claims,

these
28

matters

were

resolved

by

consent

decree

Accordingly,

in

a

manner

Plaintiff

compensatory,

or

that

failed

punitive

avoided

to

any

recover

damages

monetary

any

sought

award.

of

the

nominal,

in

its

amended

complaint.6
More

central

to

the

litigation,

sought in the amended complaint,

"ordering

forms"

judgment that
Defendants'

policy,

as

as measured by the

was Defendants'

this

Court

success on the

concluded

on

to

exclude

all

monthly

issues

Legal News (and other PLN brochures)

such

willing

of

from the VBCC.

modify

the

summary

such policy provided a valid justification for

decision

ruling,

relief

unless

format

Plaintiff

of its

was

monthly

to

publication

Prison

Based on

substantially

(something

the

case-record suggests that it was unwilling to do) , such ruling
would have

allowed

Defendants

to

continue

to

lawfully

exclude

Plaintiff's publications from VBCC.

6 Although Plaintiff seeks to downplay its efforts to collect monetary

damages,

this

Court

is

required to compare

"what

[the plaintiff]

sought with what was awarded." McAfee, 738 F.3d at 93. Here, even as
late as April 2015, Plaintiff reiterated its desire to proceed to
trial

in

an

effort

to

recover

both

nominal

and

punitive

damages.

Accordingly, while a fair reading of the amended complaint does not
suggest that money damages were the motivator behind this litigation,
Plaintiff pursued money damages at all stages of the case. Cf. Mercer
v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 205-06 (4th Cir. 2005) (indicating that
while a court must consider "the purpose of the lawsuit" in that it
must

examine whether the

relief,

lawsuit seeks

injunctive relief or monetary

"the subjective motives of the plaintiff" are not relevant to

"prevailing party" status nor relevant to determining "the extent of
the relief obtained," noting that " [i]f the rule were otherwise, then

every plaintiff recovering only nominal damages would claim that the
only thing he was really ever interested in was a liability finding").
29

Notwithstanding

these

significant success,

matters

where

Defendants

enjoyed

it is clear from the record that Plaintiff

is a "prevailing party" based both on its securing of permanent

injunctive

polices

relief

and

as

through

to

two

separate

ultimately

unconstitutional

succeeding

in

ending

censorship of its publication via consent decree.
Duke Univ. , 401 F.3d 199, 205

(4th Cir.

a § 1983 case seeks injunctive relief,

2005)

VBSO

future

See Mercer v.

(noting that when

"the relevant comparison,

of course," for the purpose of gauging degree of success is "the

scope of the injunctive relief sought to the relief actually

granted").7

First, Plaintiff succeeded in establishing that the

VBSO maintained an unconstitutionally broad "sexually explicit"

materials policy which was applied against Plaintiff to exclude
issues

of

Prison

Legal

News.

Through

the

course

of

this

litigation, the VBSO modified its policy to remove the offending
provisions

and Plaintiff

secured permanent

injunctive

relief

precluding Defendants from returning to the prior policy.
Second,
claims

Plaintiff

associated

clearly

with

the

succeeded

VBSO's

on

its

publication

due

process

review

policy.

Such policy, as implemented at least for a period of time by the
VBSO, violated published Fourth Circuit precedent as Defendants
7 Plaintiff's amended complaint pursues several forms of declaratory

and injunctive relief,
violated the United

including seeking a finding that Defendants

States

Constitution through

their publication

review policy and "sexually explicit" materials policy, as well as an

injunction requiring Defendants

to allow VBCC

future issues of Prison Legal News.
30

inmates to receive

Am. Compl. 8-9, ECF No. 17.

were

not

sending

when

the

VBSO

inmate

notices

was

to

Plaintiff,

refusing

subscribers.

to

deliver

Additionally,

for a period
Plaintiff

of time was

demonstrated

magazine

monthly

even

publication review policy was modified

to provide adequate notice,

a

publisher,

magazines

after

the

that

its

Through this

due

VBSO

(during this litigation)

the review/appeal process
illusory.

to

process

in place

litigation,

rights

had

been

violated in two different ways and secured permanent injunctive

relief

precluding

Defendants

from

returning

to

their

prior

unconstitutional policies.

Third, although Plaintiff never recovered any money damages

as to the due process violations, Plaintiff appeared entitled to
nominal

damages

punitive

had

damages.

favorable
claims,

and

"ordering

well

as

holding

forms"

to

its

as

least

appears

position as

as

judgment

It

at

to

the

policy,

that

§ 1983

intent

the

to

potential

Plaintiff

damages on
appeal

recover

leveraged

its

the due process

this

Court's

constitutionality

to secure

to

a consent

of

summary

the

decree

VBSO

whereby

Defendants agreed to permit future issues of Prison Legal News
magazine

into

(indicating

in

the

the

VBCC.

prayer

Cf^

Am.

Compl.

for relief

that

9,

ECF

Plaintiff

No.

17

sought

"[p]reliminary and permanent injunction requiring Defendants to
allow

receipt

of

the

PLN

magazine").

Accordingly,

while

Plaintiff does not have a monetary judgment by which to measure
31

its

success

ultimately

in

dollars

succeeded

and

in

cents,

putting

Plaintiff's

an

end

to

§

1983

two

case

separate

unconstitutional policies/practices that applied to all mail and
publications

entering

the

VBCC

and

obtained

a

settlement that leveraged Plaintiff's position as

bargained
to its

for

§ 1983

claims to secure a consent decree ending the ongoing censorship

of Plaintiff's monthly magazine.8
Considering all of

the above,

45% reduction in attorney's fees

reflect Plaintiff's

the

concludes

that a

is appropriate in this case to

tangible and substantial victories

of its § 1983 claims,

success in avoiding

the Court

on some

while also taking into account Defendants'

any monetary damages

constitutionality

of

their

prior

as well as defending

exclusion

of

all

of

Plaintiff's publications from the VBCC based on the lawful VBSO

"ordering forms" policy.

The total attorney's fee award in this

case is therefore reduced from $154,889 to $85,189.

Such total

8 There appears to be little doubt that, but for entry of the consent
decree, Plaintiff would have succeed in obtaining nominal damages as

to the due process violations.
In Mercer, 401 F.3d at 203-04, the
Fourth Circuit approved and applied the three factor test set forth in
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Farrar v. Hobby,

506 U.S.

103 (1992)

to determine if a § 1983 plaintiff should recover attorney's fees when

the plaintiff's success is limited to nominal damages.

Here, although

Plaintiff's success was plainly not limited to nominal damages, to the
extent the three-part test is still instructive, all three factors
favor

an

legal

import of

award

(extent

the

of

relief

obtained

claim on which

the

that

requested,

the

plaintiff

vs.

succeeded,

and

whether the litigation served a public purpose or merely vindicated
the litigant's individual rights).
32

figure represents a fee of $60,214 to outside counsel9 and a fee
of $24,975 to Plaintiff's in-house counsel.

D. Litigation Expenses
"Because

attorneys

meritorious

general

civil

enforcing

rights

important

plaintiffs

are

congressional

private

policies,

§ 198 8 is intended to encourage them to bring suit by shifting
the costs of litigation to defendants who have been found to be

wrongdoers."

Daly v. Hill,

(internal quotation marks

790 F.2d 1071,

1084 (4th Cir. 1986)

and citation omitted).

Accordingly,

Fourth Circuit precedent "clearly establishes that a prevailing

plaintiff is entitled to compensation for reasonable litigation
expenses under § 1988."

Id.

Here, Defendants made no challenge

to the recoverability or the reasonableness of the litigation

expenses

sought

by

Plaintiff.

As

Plaintiff's

unchallenged

expenses are supported by affidavits and other evidence,

the

9 Although having no bearing on this Court's determination of the
appropriate attorney's fee award in this case, this Court observes
that even after the modest reduction in outside counsel's compensable

hours, the reduction to more reasonably compensate Mr.

Fogel for his

travel time, and the 45% reduction in fees to reflect mixed success,
outside counsel is still recovering an effective rate of $195 per hour
for all of the 308.5 hours claimed in this action (including travel
time) . As the Fourth Circuit has recently observed, "hourly rates of

court-appointed counsel in federal criminal cases are substantially
less" than the rate sought in most § 1983 cases, and help lend some
context, even if not directly relevant.
McAfee, 738 F.3d at 91 n.8.

During the pendency of this action, appointed federal criminal defense
attorneys were compensated at various rates between $110 and $127 per
hour, with such rate applying to seasoned attorneys with decades of

experience litigating federal felony cases.
Accordingly, "[v]iewed
from that perspective," Plaintiff's outside counsel was more than
adequately compensated for all hours devoted to this case, especially
when considering the fact that only partial success was achieved.
33

Court AWARDS

to

$2,683

Plaintiff's

to Plaintiff's

in-house

outside

counsel

for

counsel

and $6,048.10

litigation

expenses,

representing the full amount requested by Plaintiff.
IV.

Having

performed

considered all

of

the

the

success achieved"

required

appropriate

and having adjusted the
of

Conclusion

"lodestar
factors

lodestar figure

by Plaintiff,

analysis,"

set

forth

to reflect

the Court

and

the

AWARDS

Such

hourly

attorney's

total

outside

requested

fees

figure

counsel

counsel.

to

GRANTS

a

fee

a

of

fee

Plaintiff's

outside

counsel

and

ECF No. 88.

the

Court

amount

of

in

the

of

$60,214

$24,975

"degree

to both the total hours

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff

represents

and

by

As to litigation expenses,

Plaintiff's
house

rate

in Barber,

the

motion for attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

After making a downward adjustment

having

to

to

hereby

$85,189.

Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's

in-house

the Court AWARDS $2,683 to

$6,048.10

to

Plaintiff's

in-

counsel.

The Clerk is REQUESTED to send a copy of
Order to all
IT

IS

SO

counsel

of

this Opinion and

record.

ORDERED.

mitfe-

/a/
Mark
UNITED

Norfolk, Virginia

September 8

2015
34

STATES

S.

Davis

DISTRICT

JUDGE