Lifenet Health v. Lifecell Corporation
Filing
123
OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by District Judge Henry C. Morgan, Jr on 7/16/14. (afar)
JfJLED__
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COtRTI
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Norfolk Division
JUL 16 2014
I
f*51 jst88*
LIFENET HEALTH,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 2:13c\486
LIFECELL CORPORAHON,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
On Thursday, July 10. 2014, the Court conducted a Markman hearing for the purpose of
construing eight (8) disputed terms in the patent at issue. Upon consideration of the parties'
briefs, oral argument, and visual presentations in support thereof, the Court ruled from the bench
and hereby issues this Opinion and Order further detailing the Court's claim construction.
I.
Facitai. Backc;uoi nd A Puoci:m uai. Histokv
On September 6, 2013, Plaintiff LifcNct Health ("Plaintiff or "LifeNet") filed a one-count
Complaint, alleging that Defendant LifeCell Corporation ("Defendant" or "I.ifcCell") has
infringed U.S. Patent No. 6.569,200 ("the "200 Patent"). Doc. 1. Essentially, Plaintiff is alleging
that two of Defendant's products. AlloDcrm RTM Ready to Use and Strattice Reconstructive
Tissue Matrix, infringe certain claims in the '200 Patent,
Id. '"j 24-30.
The '200 patent was issued on May 27. 2003 and is titled "Plastici/.ed Soft Tissue Grafts,
and Methods of Making and Using Same."
The "200 patent generally describes and claims "a
plastici/.ed dehydrated bone and/or soft tissue product that does not require special conditions of
storage, for example refrigeration or freezing, exhibits materials properties that approximate those
properties present in normal hydrated tissue, is not brittle and does not necessitate rehydration
prior to clinical implantation."
*200 patent at 1:8-13.
Essentially, the patent relates to
improving the preservation method of soft tissue grafts, resulting in a lesser chance of the graft
failing.
Doc. 62 at 3-4. According to Plaintiff, this is done "by providing plasticized soft tissue
products that are similar in physical, chemical, and biological properties as compared to normal
tissue (fresh soft tissues) yet lack the inherent disadvantages ... of fresh-frozen, dehydrated, and
freeze-dried soft tissue products." Doc. 65 at 3. The '200 Patent contains fifteen (15) claims,
five (5) of which are independent (Claims 1-3, 7, and 15).
Defendant filed its Answer on November 22, 2013, denying it has infringed the '200
Patent, and additionally asserted the affirmative defenses of non-infringement, invalidity, laches,
failure to mark, limitations on damages, prosecution history estoppel, patent exhaustion/implied
license, and "other affirmative defenses."
Doc. 12. On March 27, 2014, the Court entered its
Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order. Doc. 29. The parties filed their claim construction briefs on June
10, 2014. Docs. 62, 65. Their reply briefs were filed on June 24, 2014. Docs. 83, 86. The
joint claim construction statement was filed on July 3, 2014. Doc. 95.
II.
Legal Principles of Claim Construction
A. General Principles
The purpose of a Markman hearing is to assist the Court in construing the meaning of the
patent(s) at issue. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371 (1996); Markman
v. Westview Instruments. Inc.. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), afTd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Patents
consist of "claims," and the construction of those claims is a matter of law, to be determined by the
Court.
Markman, 52 F.3d at 970-71.
A court need only construe, however, claims "that are in
controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy." Vivid Techs.. Inc. v.
Am. Sci. & Eng'g. Inc.. 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). To be clear,
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"[c]laim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify
and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the
determination of infringement. It is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy." NTP, Inc. v.
Research in Motion. Ltd.. 418 F.3d 1282, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting U.S. Surgical Corp. v.
Ethicon. Inc.. 103 F.3d 1554. 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Claim construction begins with the words of the claims. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptromc,
Inc.. 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Words in a claim are generally given their ordinary
meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art ("POSA") as of the effective date of
the patent. Phillips v. AWII Corp.. 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). This
"person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the
particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent,
including the specification."
Id. at 1313.
"In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim
language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges,
and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely
accepted meaning of commonly understood words."
Id at 1314. Often, however,
determining the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim requires examination
of terms that have a particular meaning in a field of art. Because the meaning of a
claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is often not immediately
apparent, and because patentees frequently use terms idiosyncratically, the court
looks to those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the
art would have understood disputed claim language to mean.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Further, the claims themselves can "provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of
particular claim terms." ]d_.
First, "the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can
be highly instructive." Id. In addition, other claims of the patent in question, both asserted and
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unasserted, can also be useful because claim terms are "normally used consistently throughout the
patent," and therefore "can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims." Id.
The claims should not be read alone, however, but rather should be considered within the
context of the specification of which they are a part. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. As the Federal
Circuit stated in Vitronics and restated in Phillips, "the specification is always highly relevant to
the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning
of a disputed term." Phillips. 415 F.3d at 1315 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Furthermore, a patentee is free to be his or her own lexicographer, and thus if the patentee defines
a term in the specification differently than its ordinary meaning, the patentee's definition controls.
Id. at 1316. The Court, however, must not read in limitations from the specification without clear
intent to do so.
Thorner v. Sony Comp. Entm't. Am. LLC. 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
In addition to consulting the specification, a court may also consider the patent's
prosecution history, if in evidence, because it provides information regarding how the United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1317.
It also enables the Court to determine if the inventor limited the invention
during the course of prosecution. Id. The Court may also consult prior art references in the
prosecution history.
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. "[W]here an applicant whose claim is rejected
on reference to a prior patent ... voluntarily restricts himself by an amendment of his claim to a
specific structure, having thus narrowed his claim in order to obtain a patent, he may not by
construction ... give the claim the larger scope which it might have had without the amendments."
I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co.. 272 U.S. 429, 444 (1926).
These elements of the patent itself—the claims, the specification, and its prosecution
history—constitute intrinsic evidence of claim construction.
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In addition to such intrinsic
evidence, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of disputed claims.
Phillips. 415 F.3dat 1317. Such extrinsic evidence "'consists of all evidence external to the patent
and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned
treatises.'" Id. (quoting Markman. 52 F.3d at 980).
However, the Court should not rely on
extrinsic evidence when the intrinsic evidence removes all ambiguity. Vitronics. 90 F.3d at 1583.
Such extrinsic evidence is generally held as less reliable than the intrinsic evidence and "is
unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context
of intrinsic evidence."
Phillips. 415 F.3d at 1317-18. With respect to expert evidence, for
example, "conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are
not useful to a court.. . [and] a court should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds
with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and the
prosecution history, in other words, with the written record of the patent." Id at 1318 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
With respect to general usage dictionaries, the Federal Circuit noted that "[dictionaries or
comparable sources are often useful to assist in understanding the commonly understood meaning
of words and have been used ... in claim interpretation," and further noted that "a dictionary
definition has the value of being an unbiased source 'accessible to the public in advance of
litigation.'" Id at 1322 (quoting Vitronics. 90 F.3d at 1585). However, the Federal Circuit
cautions that (1) '"a general-usage dictionary cannot overcome art-specific evidence of the
meaning' of a claimterm;" (2) "the use of the dictionary may extend patentprotection beyond what
should properly be afforded by the inventor's patent," and (3) that "[t]here is no guarantee that a
term is used in the same way in a treatise as it would be by the patentee." Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1322 (quoting Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. IntT Trade Comm'n. 366 F.3d 1311, 1321
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(Fed. Cir. 2004)).' Indeed, "different dictionary definitions may contain somewhat different sets
of definitions for the same words. A claim should not rise or fall based upon the preferences of a
particular dictionary editor,... uninformed by the specification[.]" Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322.
B. The "Canons of Claim Construction"
The Federal Circuit has recognized certain guideposts, or "canons of construction," to
assist a court in determining the meaning of disputed claim terms and phrases. These are merely
guideposts, however, and are not immutable rules:
1.
Doctrine of Claim Differentiation: Ordinarily, each claim in a patent has a different
scope. See, e.g.. Versa Corp. v. Ag-Bag Int't Ltd.. 392 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2004). Ordinarily, a dependent claim has a narrower scope than the claim from
which it depends. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. Ordinarily, an
independent claim has a broader scope than a claim that depends from it. See, e.g..
Free Motion Fitness. Inc. v. Cvbex. Int'l, Inc.. 423 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
2.
Ordinarily, claims are not limited to the preferred embodiment disclosed in the
specification. See, e.g.. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
3.
Ordinarily, different words in a patent have different meanings.
See, e.g..
Innova/Pure Water. Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Svs.. Inc.. 381 F.3d 1111,111920 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
4.
Ordinarily, the same word in a patent has the same meaning. See, e.g.. Phillips.
415 F.3d at 1314.
5.
Ordinarily, the meaning should align with the purpose of the patented invention.
See, e.g.. Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.. 260 F.3d 1326, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
1 In Phillips, the Federal Circuit thus expressly discounted the approach taken in Texas Digital Svs.. Inc. v.
Telegenix. Inc.. 308 F. 3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002), in which the court placed greater emphasis on dictionary
definitions of claim terms. Phillips. 415 F.3d at 1319-24. The Federal Circuit reaffirmed the approach in
Vitronics. Markman. and Innova as the proper approach for district courts to follow in claim construction, but
acknowledged that there was "no magic formula" for claim construction, and that a court is not "barred from
considering any particular sources ... as long as those sources are not used to contradict claim meaning that is
unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence." Phillips. 415 F.3d at 1324.
2 This list is derived from the one provided in the FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER. PATENT Law and PRACTICE, §
5.I.A.3.d (5th ed. 2006).
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6.
Ordinarily, general descriptive terms are given their full meaning.
See, e.g..
Innova/Pure Water. Inc.. 381 F.3d at 1118.
7.
If possible, claims should be construed so as to preserve their validity. See, e.g..
Energizer Holdings. Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n. 435 F.3d 1366,1370-71 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
8.
Ordinarily, absent broadening language, numerical ranges are construed exactly as
written. See, e.g.. Jeneric/Pentron. Inc. v. Dillon Co.. 205 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
9.
Ordinarily, absent recitation of order, steps of a method are not construed to have a
particular order. See, e.g.. Combined Svs.. Inc. v. Def. Tech. Corp. of Am.. 350
F.3d 1207, 1211-12 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
10.
Absent highly persuasive evidentiary support, a construction should literally read
on the preferred embodiment. See, e.g., Cytologix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Svs..
Inc.. 424 F.3d 1168, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
HI.
Agreed Terms
The parties reached agreement on the following terms and accompanying constructions:
1. internal matrix: the intercellular substance of such soft tissue including for
example ligaments and tendons, including collagen and elastin fibers and base matrix
substances
2. plasticizer composition: composition which includes one or more plasticizers and
one or more biocompatible solvents
3. biocompatible solvents: any solvent material which does not provoke an adverse
response in the patient
IV.
Disputed Terms
The parties dispute the following terms found in the '220 patent. The Court stated on the
record the reasons for its constructions, and now explains its reasoning in greater detail.
a.
"plasticized soft tissue graft"
The Court ORDERS that the proper construction of "plasticized soft tissue graft" is "a
load-bearing and/or non-load-bcaring soft tissue product, including skin, pericardium, dura
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mater, fascia lata, and a variety of ligaments and tendons composed of an internal matrix
where free and loosely bound waters of hydration in the tissue have been replaced with one
or more plasticizers without altering the orientation of the collagen fibers, such that the
mechanical properties, including the material, physical and use properties, of the tissue
product are similar to those of normal hydrated tissue."
The main issue before the Court was to determine how much language to pull from the
specification.
The Court was guided by the Federal Circuit's instruction that the inventor's
lexicography governs.
Phillips. 415 F.3d at 1316.
The '200 patent defines a "soft tissue graft" as:
load-bearing and non-load-bearing soft tissue products. Non load-bearing grafts
include cadaveric skin. Load-bearing soft tissue grafts include for example:
pericardium, dura mater, fascia lata, and a variety of ligaments and tendons. Soft
tissue grafts are composed of an internal matrix which includes collagen, elastin
and high molecular weight solutes where during cleaning cellular elements and
small molecular weight solutes are removed.
'200 patent at 8:4-12. Additionally, "plasticization" is defined as "replacing free and loosely
bound waters of hydration in a tissue(s) with one or more plasticizers without altering the
orientation of the collagen fibers and associated mineral phase." Id at 7:24-28. Thus, the Court
believed a combination of these two definitions results in the proper construction.
Defendant argued that Network Commerce. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.. 422 F.3d 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)) compels a different result.
However, that is not the case.
In Network Commerce, the
combination of two dictionary definitions there was "not a tenable theory in light of the
specification." Network Commerce. 422 F.3d at 1360. Here, in light of the specification, the
combination of the two definitions does make sense.
The Court declined to use the phrase "includes collagen, elastin and high molecular weight
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solutes" from the definition found in the specification because the parties agreed on the proper
construction of the term internal matrix, which varied somewhat from this language. See Phillips.
415 F.3d at 1314 ("claim terms arc normally used consistently throughout the patent"). The Court
also declined to use the phrase "and associated mineral phase of the tissue" because of expert
disagreement as to whether a tissue can have a mineral phase, and because the phrase does not
assist a jury in understanding the term at issue. See Badylak Deck ^ 32; Kaplan Deck ^ 42.
The Court included the language that "such that the mechanical properties, including the
material, physical and use properties, of the tissue product are similar to those of normal hydrated
tissue," because this language was also supported by the specification and clarified the term at
issue. "200 patent at 9:14-18
b.
"suitable for transplantation into a human"
After considering the parties' submissions and arguments, the Court ORDERED that this
term required no further construction. The main dispute centered on whether the claim was
limited to human-to-human transfers based on the use of the terms "implant" and "transplant" in
the patent. The Court FOUND that the patent uses these terms interchangeably and they could
cover both human and animal-derived tissue, and thus no construction was necessary. See 02
Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co.. Ltd.. 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2008) ("district courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation present in a
patent's asserted claims.").
c.
"cleaned"
The Court ORDERED that the proper construction of this term was that proposed by
Plaintiff, "a process during which cellular elements and small molecular weight solutes arc
removed."
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This construction is supported by the plain language of the specification. See '200 Patent
at 8:9-12 ("Soft tissue grafts are composed of an internal matrix which includes collagen, elastin
and high molecular weight solutes where during cleaning cellular elements and small molecular
weight solutes are removed."). The Court rejected Defendant's proposed additions of "some" and
"and/or" into the construction because it would lead to an indefinite claim, in violation of the
canons of claim construction.
d.
See, e.g.. Energizer Holdings. Inc., 435 F.3d at 1370-71.
"plasticizcr"
The Court ORDERED that the proper construction of the term was "biocompatible
compounds which are soluble in water and can easily displace/replace water at the
molecular level."
This construction was proposed by Defendant, and was defined in the specification. '200
Patent at 7:30-32. The Court rejected the additional language that Plaintiff proposed because it
included a reference to bone grafts and the word "preferably" was used, indicating that it was not a
requirement for a plasticizer. Id at 7:32-41.
e. "said one or more plasticizers are not removed from [an/said] internal matrix
of said plasticized soft tissue graft prior to transplantation into a human"
The Court ORDERED that this term required no further construction. Many of these
terms were construed, and thus the Court found a separate construction for this long phrase was
unnecessary. Additionally, "not removed" is easily understood by a person of ordinary skill in the
art to have its plain meaning that no plasticizers are removed prior to transplantation.
This requirement that no plasticizer be removed prior to transplantation is necessary in the
construction because during prosecution, Plaintiff was forced to amend the claim to its current
form to avoid a prior art rejection; the "not removed" limitation was not contained in the original
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patent application. See Doc. 63-3 (containing the initial application). The claim as initially
drafted was rejected by the USPTO because Patent No. 5,718,012 ("Cavallaro") anticipated the
claims.
Id. at 66.
The Examiner stated:
Cavallaro teaches a method of strength enhancement of collagen constructs
intended for implantation to replace or repair tissue or organs. Cavallaro forms
collagen threads from collagen harvested from a bovine common digital extensor
tendon. During processing, the formed thread is rinsed with purified water or
phosphate buffered saline (col. 5, lines 19-31). To improve tensile strength, a
collagen threat or bundle comprising collagen threads is plasticized with water or
aqueous solutions or buffers and/or glycerol.
Id. However, in order to preserve strength, "the plasticizer must also be removed." Cavallaro at
7:42-43. To overcome this objection, the claims were amended to include the limitation that is
the term at issue.
Doc. 63-3 at 72.
In addition to this intrinsic evidence, Defendant also provided an expert declaration stating
that a POSA would know that in Cavallaro it would be impossible to remove all of the plasticizer.
Badylak Deck ^| 38. Thus, a POSA would understand that to successfully distinguish Cavallaro,
in which not all of the plasticizer would be removed, none of the plasticizer would have to be
removed in the '200 patent.
Id K 42.
Therefore, a combination of the plain language,
prosecution history, and the expert declaration all led the Court to conclude that "not removed"
means that no plasticizer is removed, and that based on the plain meaning of "not removed" no
further construction of the term was necessary.
Plaintiff argues that some quantity of the
plasticizer may escape during formulation or transplantation, but such events may be distinguished
from deliberate removal.
f.
"impregnating" / "impregnated"
The Court ORDERED that the proper construction of these terms were the plain meaning,
"filling" or "filled." The Court rejected the arguments of both parties seeking to apply the
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definition found in the specification.
The claim language is clear that it applies to soft tissue grafts. '200 patent at 24:39-50.
However, the specification defined "impregnating" as "any processing conditions which result in
filling the internal matrix of a bone graft with a plasticizer composition."
Id. at 6:56-58.
Plaintiff argued that the Court should apply this definition to soft tissue grafts; however, the Court
rejected this invitation.
Defendant made arguments that under ChefAmerica. Inc. v.
Lamb-Weston. Inc.. 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). and Braintree Labs.. Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc..
749 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the Court was required to adopt the express definition
contained in the specification, even if the claim language was clear that the claim applied to soft
tissue grafts and not bone grafts.
However, Defendant's arguments are also unpersuasive.
In ChefAmerica. the Federal
Circuit found that a claim that required dough be "heated to a temperature range of 400° F to 850°
F" had to be interpreted as written, even though it was clear that the drafter meant "at." Chef
America. 358 F.3d at 1374. This was because the claim language was unambiguous and the
Federal Circuit has routinely held that "courts may not redraft claims, whether to make them
operable or to sustain their validity."
id.
Here, the Court is not redrafting the claim; it is
declining to accept Defendant's invitation to litigate validity at the claim construction phase. The
definition in the specification is clear in that it applies to bone grafts. The claim language applies
to soft tissue grafts. Thus, the Court would be mistaken to apply the definition in the specification
referring to bone grafts because the Court must treat soft tissue grafts and bone grafts differently,
unless the patentee states otherwise.
See, e.g.. Innova/Pure Water, Inc.. 381 F.3d at 1119-20
("when an applicant uses different terms in a claim it is permissible to infer that he intended his
choice of different terms to reflect a differentiation in the meaning of those terms.").
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Furthermore, Braintree does not compel a different conclusion.
The Federal Circuit
reversed the district court there because it modified two words despite "the clear language found in
the specification." Braintree. 749 F.3d at 1356. Again, the Court is not modifying any language;
it is simply declining to adopt a nonsensical construction that is not supported by the specification
language. Thus, with no guidance from the specification on what impregnating means in the
context of a soft tissue graft, the Court ORDERED that the term receive its plain meaning. See
Doc. 64-9 at 17 (defining impregnating as "to be filled").
g. "without rehydration"
The Court ORDERED that the proper construction of the term "without rehydration" is
"without hydrating a plasticized soft tissue graft prior to implantation into a patient." The
Court relied on the definition found in the specification, but without the word "dehydrated." '200
patent at 7:64-67. The parties agreed that the addition of the word dehydrated was redundant, and
thus unnecessary in the construction.
h. "incubating"
The same issue that arose for "impregnating" arose for "incubating." For the reasons
stated in section "f," the Court ORDERED that the construction of the term would be its plain
meaning, "soaking orotherwise exposing."3 See Doc. 64-9 at 18 (defining incubating in part as
"to maintain ... under conditions favorable for... reaction").
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated on the record and elaborated herein, the Court constructed the
3 The specification defined incubating as "processing a bone graft in for example a plasticizer composition by soaking
the graft in the composition, shaking the graft with the composition, subjecting the graft to flow of the composition
where the flow is induced by negative or positive pressure, subjecting the graft and/or the composition to negative or
positive pressure, or soaking the bone graft in a plasticizer composition in a negative pressure environment." '200
patent at 6:47-54.
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disputed terms as follows:
Disputed Term
The Court's Construction
a load-bearing and/or non-load-bearing soft
tissue product, including skin, pericardium,
dura mater, fascia lata, and a variety of
ligaments and tendons composed of an internal
matrix where free and loosely bound waters of
hydration in the tissue have been replaced with
one or more plasticizers without altering the
orientation of the collagen fibers, such that the
mechanical properties, including the material,
physical and use properties, of the tissue
product are similar to those of normal hydrated
"plasticized soft tissue graft"
tissue
"suitable for transplantation into a human"
No further construction needed
"cleaned"
a process during which cellular elements and
small molecular weight solutes are removed
biocompatible compounds which are soluble in
water and can easily displace/replace water at
"plasticizer"
the molecular level.
"said one or more plasticizers are not removed
from [an/said] internal matrix of said plasticized
soft tissue graft prior to transplantation into a
No further construction needed
human"
"impregnating" / "impregnated"
"without rehydration"
"incubating"
filling or filled
without hydrating a plasticized soft tissue graft
prior to implantation into a patient
soaking or otherwise exposing
The Clerk is REQUESTED to deliver a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.
It is so ORDERED.
/§/
Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.
Senior United Slates District Judge
HENRY COKE MORGAN. JR. fH'li
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT aUDGE
Norfolk, VA q/
Date: July /£v2014
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