Newsome v. Watson et al
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. The Motion to Dismiss Count I is GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend his Amended Complaint w ithin twenty-one (21) days of the date of entry of this Order. The Motion to Dismiss Count II is DENIED. Plaintiff requests for hearing (ECF No. 8) is DENIED because a hearing would not assist the Court in the disposition of this matter. re 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Copies distributed to counsel of record as directed.Signed by District Judge Raymond A. Jackson and filed on 5/28/2014. (bgra)
FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
MAY 28 2014
Norfolk Division
CLERK, US DISTRICT COURT
BENJAMIN NEWSOME, Administrator of
NORFOLK. VA
Estate of Joshua Johnson
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:I4cv94
V.
MATTHEW WATSON et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
IVi
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Defendants
Matthew Watson and Malhew Williams ("Defendants" or "Officers"). Plaintiff Benjamin
Ncwsome ("Plaintiff'), the administrator of the estate of Joshua Johnson ("Johnson"), filed the
Amended Complaint to add an additional battery claim against Defendant Watson in addition to
his original allegations that Defendants violated Johnson's Fourth Amendment right to be free
from excessive force and unreasonable seizure in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants
request that the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff has not stated a claim
upon which relief may be granted. This matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for
determination. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED-IN-PART
and DEMED-IN-PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts, stated in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows: On May 20. 2013
at approximately 2:40 p.m., Johnson was operating a motor vehicle in a drive-through lane of a
bank around the 2000 block of Colonial Avenue in Norfolk. Virginia. Am. Compl. *{\ 4. Watson
and Williams, police officers for the City of Norfolk, arrived at the bank to arrest Johnson for a
non-violent property crime. Id. at ffl| 1,4. Defendants pulled their police vehicle in front of
Johnson's vehicle. Id. Officer Williams walked directly and closely behind Johnson's vehicle.
Id. Defendants "barricaded" Johnson's vehicle in the bank drive-through lane, and "reverse was
his only means of egress." Id. Officer Watson fired and shot Johnson and Officer Williams. Id.
Johnson was killed. Id.
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Officers Watson and
Williams, alleging that Johnson's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and
unreasonable seizure was violated by Defendants. The Complaint was originally filed in the
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk on February 4, 2014. On March 6, 2014, Defendants
removed the case to federal court. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) on March 13,2014. On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, which
Defendants now move to dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that, in addition to a statement of the
court's jurisdiction and a demand for relief, a complaint must contain a "short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of actions that fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Francis v. Giacomello, 588 F.3d 186,
192 (4th Cir. 2009). Courts will favorably construe the allegations of the complaint and assume
that the facts alleged in the complaint are true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
However, a court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts," nor "accept as
true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v.
J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint does not allege
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to demonstrate more than
a "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Id. As multiple district courts in this circuit have noted, these federal pleading standards are
"procedural," not "substantive," rules, and therefore govern state law claims raised in a diversity
case. E.g., McFadyen v. Duke University, 786 F. Supp. 2d 887, 920 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff'din
part, rev'dinpart, Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. 2012). See also Hat/ill v. New
York Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 337 (4th Cir. 2005).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants, in seeking dismissal of this legal action, argue that Plaintiffs causes of
action for Fourth Amendment violations and battery fail to state cognizable claims.
Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not established a causal connection between
Officer Williams' conduct and a constitutional violation, nor has Plaintiff plead sufficient facts to
establish that Officer Watson acted unreasonably in assessing any risk posed by Johnson and any
probable cause to use deadly force or engage in a battery.
A. Section 1983 Claim against Defendants Watson and Williams (Count I)
Count I of the Amended Complaint asserts that Defendants subjected Johnson to deadly
force, thereby depriving him of the constitutionally protected right to be free from excessive
force and unreasonable seizure by police officers conferred by the Fourth Amendment. See
Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants
unreasonably seized Johnson by barricading him and using deadly force, thus creating a situation
where Johnson's Fourth Amendment right was violated. Plaintiff also alleges that the officers
violated safety rules since Officer Williams walked closely and directly behind Johnson's car
knowing that its only means of egress was to back up and Officer Watson fired his weapon with
his fellow officer in the line of fire.
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code "provides a federal cause of action for
the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It
"afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms." Id. To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a
right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation
occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978);
Cornish v. Con. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).
In terms of the Constitutional right to be free from excessive force and unreasonable
seizure, a police officer may arrest a person if he has probable cause to believe that the person
committed a crime, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), but such seizure must be
conducted with a reasonable use of force. A police officer's use of deadly force is reasonable
only if "the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of
death or serious physical injury to the officer or others." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,3, 105
S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865,
104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Whether an officer's action was reasonable is heavily fact dependent,
and in determining whether force was excessive, a court must balance "the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" with "the countervailing
governmental interests at stake." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Balancing these
interests requires an examination of a totality of the circumstances, including (1) how severe the
crime being investigated is, (2) whether the individual in question poses an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or other people, (3) whether the individual is fleeing or actively
resisting arrest, and (4) the severity of the plaintiffs injuries. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202
(2001). These factors must be considered from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene; the good or bad intentions of the actual officer involved should not be considered in
determining the constitutionality of the use of force. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (noting that
because the nature of police work often requires expedited judgments "in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving," facts must be evaluated from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, without employing hindsight); Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640,
643 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is determined
based on the information available to the officer at the moment force is employed). There is no
question that if the use of force by officers during an arrest of a free citizen is excessive under
objective standards of reasonableness, then the officers violated the individual's Fourth
Amendment rights. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02.
Here, the parties do not dispute that Johnson was "seized" when he was shot for purposes
of Fourth Amendment analysis. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-27, 111 S.Ct.
1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). The relevant facts concern the officers' placement at the scene
and the movement of Johnson's vehicle immediately prior to the shooting. This evidence
directly bears on whether Officer Watson had probable cause to believe that Officer Williams
was in danger and whether shooting Johnson was reasonable under the circumstances. Without
alleging facts to demonstrate that the force was excessive or unreasonable under the objective
reasonableness standard, Plaintiff makes only conclusory statements that deadly force was used
in violation of the Constitution as well as safety and procedure rules.
Plaintiff does not indicate
that Johnson was trying to flee the scene in a manner that did not pose a significant threat of
serious injury to anyone by suggesting that Officer Williams was a sufficient distance from the
vehicle as it moved in reverse or that Johnson was not making any threatening gesture toward the
officers when he was shot. Plaintiff does not present factual content to establish that the officers
manufactured the circumstances giving rise to the shooting where a reasonable officer in Officer
Watson's position would not have probable cause to believe that Johnson posed a significant
threat of death or serious injury to the officer or others. The Amended Complaint falls short of
alleging that Defendants, either individually or in concert, engaged in conduct that is causally
connected to acts of excessive force or unreasonable seizure. Because Plaintiff has not plead
sufficient facts to establish that actions by Defendants constituted a violation of Johnson's Fourth
Amendment right, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to § 1983 and is
dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Amended Complaint within
twenty-one (21) days of the date of entry of this Order.1
B. Battery Claim against Defendant Watson (Count II)
Plaintiff makes no battery claim against Officer Williams, but Plaintiff maintains that he
sufficiently states a battery claim against Officer Watson, who shot Johnson during the arrest.
1The Court has notaddressed the qualified immunity defense in this Memorandum Order because Plaintifffailed to
state a § 1983 plausible claim that Defendants violated Johnson's Fourth Amendment rights. See Ashcroft v. alKidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074,2080 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (holding that qualified
immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages, unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing thai: (1)
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was "clearly established" at the time of the
challenged conduct). However, should Defendants assert the qualified immunity defense in their answer or other
response to the operable complaint in this case, the Court will then consider the applicability of the doctrine of
qualified immunity.
"A battery is the unlawful touching of the person of another by the aggressor himself." Lynch v.
Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762, 109 S.E. 427,428 (1921) (citation omitted). More specifically,
battery"is an unwanted touching which is neither consented to, excused, nor justified." Koffman
v. Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 574 S.E.2d 258,261 (2003) (citing Washburn v. Klara, 263 Va. 586, 561
S.E.2d 682 (2002); Woodbury v. Courtney, 239 Va. 651, 391 S.E.2d 293 (1990)).
Although Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the claim on the basis of Plaintiffs use
of boilerplate language for a battery cause of action, Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to establish
plausibility that Officer Watson's actions were notjustified. Plaintiffcontends that Officer
Watson fired upon Johnson without just cause or provocation based on several allegations in
paragraph 4 of his Amended Complaint, including that Officer Watson barricaded Johnson's
vehicle in the bank drive-through lane, Johnson's means of egress was to back up, Officer
Watson fired in the direction of Johnson and his fellow officer, and the firing occurred during an
arrest for a non-violent property crime. The Court may permissibly infer that Officer Watson
acted unjustifiably in committing harmful and offensive contact which caused Johnson's death
through shooting. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to the complainant, Plaintiff
has included enough factual content to state a battery claim against Officer Watson upon which
relief may be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is
GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. The Motion to Dismiss Count I is
GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend his Amended
Complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the date of entry of this Order. The Motion to
Dismiss Count II is DENIED. Plaintiff requests for hearing (ECF No. 8) is DENIED because a
hearing would not assist the Court in the disposition of this matter.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Norfolk, Virginia
Raymond A. lackson
May OY ,2014
Uniled States D,stnctJ g
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?