Stone et al v. SRA International, Inc.
Filing
39
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 17 Motion to Certify Class Pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA. ORDERED that the Defendant shall provide to Plaintiffs' counsel the names, last known mailing addresses, home and/or mobile phone numb ers, and email addresses of all potential members of the conditionally certified class within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order the parties shall provide the C ourt with a joint proposed form of notice to potential members to be approved by the Court. IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that any consents to joinder in this action by which additional persons join this litigation as plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) must be filed with the Clerk of the Court no later than ninety (90) days after the date of this Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Miller and filed on 10/22/14. (tbro)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Norfolk Division
JEFFREY W. STONE,
GEORGE WILLIAMS BURT
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
Plaintiffs,
No. 2:14cv209
v.
SRA INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' "Motion for Certification of Collective Action Pursuant to
§ 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act." (ECF No. 17); see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs
brought this action, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, to recover overtime
compensation that they were allegedly entitled to under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").
See 29 U.S.C. § 207.' The parties entered consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate
Judge, and all further proceedings in the case were referred in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 11).
Plaintiffs now ask the Court to conditionally certify a collective action class and facilitate
notice to potential class members. Plaintiffs filed their motion to certify a collective action on
September 3, 2014. Defendant SRA International, Inc. ("Defendant" or "SRA") filed a detailed
1Because "courts generally allow opt-ins to be filed at any time in the action ," the Court will refer to
"Plaintiffs" to include not only Jeffrey Stone and George Burt, but also the persons who have filed
consent to join this suit as a party plaintiff. Piper v. RGIS Inventory Specialists. Inc.. C-07-00032, 2007
WL 1690887, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2007). However, for the sake of factual clarity, the Court will
refer to Stone and Burt as "Named Plaintiffs."
opposition, Plaintiffs replied, and the Court granted Defendant leave to file a sur-reply. The
Court heard argument on this motion, among others, on October 14, 2014. For the reasons stated
on the record and as set out below, Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify (ECF No. 17) is
GRANTED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are employees and former employees of SRA, "a leading provider of IT
solutions and professional services to government organizations." Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 27, at
10). SRA employed the Named Plaintiffs, Stone and Burt, to work pursuant to the Military
Sealift Command Afloat Contract ("Afloat") out of SRA's Chesapeake, Virginia office. See id
Stone worked as a "Network Administrator," while Burt worked as a "Systems Administrator."
PL's Br. (ECF No. 18, at 3); Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 27, at 11). Plaintiffs allege that SRA failed to
pay overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207. SRA classified all
Network Administrators, such as Stone, as exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions because
they were "professionals" within the meaning of the Department of Labor's regulations
governing the FLSA. Def.'s Br., Ex. R (ECF No. 27-19, at 1); e^, 29 C.F.R. § 541.301. SRA
classified all Systems Administrators, such as Burt, as exempt from the FLSA's overtime
provisions because they were "Computer Programmer[s] and System Analyses]" exempt under
the regulations. Def.'s Br., Ex. O (ECF No. 27-16, at 1); see 29 C.F.R. § 541.400.
Plaintiffs allege that Systems Administrators "essentially . . . only apply and work within
technological parameters already designed and established by an unassociated party" - their
tasks essentially involve implementing "plug-and-play technology." PL's Br. (ECF No. 18, at 6).
Plaintiffs allege that they "performed no managerial duties or exempt tasks" and "do not have the
requisite specialized training to be exempt for their job duties." Compl. f 20 (ECF No. 1, at 4).
Instead, Plaintiffs allege that their "primary job duties involve manual labor and adherence to
standard operating procedures."
PL's Reply (ECF No. 33, at 5).
Additionally, Plaintiffs
maintain that the core duties were and are "essentially the same" for all Systems and Network
Administrators working nationwide. Id. at 10.
As a government contractor, SRA provides its services pursuant to more than 130
contracts negotiated with various government agencies. Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 27, at 8). The
company alleges that although "an employee's job title may remain the same, his or her duties
can vary significantly depending on the type of tasks necessitated by a particular contract."
Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 27, at 11) (citing Decl. of Chris Herndon). SRA proffers that among its
thirty-five Network Administrators at fifteen locations and 119 Systems Administrators at thirty
locations, "[t]he type of work performed by Network and Systems Administrators is wideranging."
Id. at 12-13.
SRA alleges that "[frequently, members of the purported class
encountered complex and unique systems issues, resolution of which required the use of their
experience, judgment, and discretion" and that Administrators also "author or contribute to"
standard operating procedures. Id. at 15. (citing Decks of Saqib Raheem and Thomas Mullan).
As a result, SRAargues that Plaintiffs have not made even the modest factual showing necessary
to conditionally certify a nationwide class under the FLSA.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The FLSA makes employers liable to employees for unpaid overtime compensation in
violation of its provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also id. § 207. A wronged employee can
maintain an action "to recover the liability ... for and in behalf of himself . . . and other
employees similarly situated." 2 § 216(b). To join a suit as a party plaintiff, the other employees
must be "similarly situated" and give their written consent to "opt-in." See id.; Allen v. Cogent
Commc'ns. Inc., I:14cv459, 2014 WL 4270077, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2014). The collective
action serves the objectives of the FLSA "by facilitating a resolution in a single proceeding of
claims stemming from common issues of law and fact, and [aiding] in the vindication of
plaintiffs' rights by lowering the individuals* costs by pooling claims and resources." Houston v.
URS Corp.. 591 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. Va. 2008).
Assembling a class under § 216(b) involves two stages: the notice or conditional
certification stage and the decertification stage.
Gregory v. Belfor USA Grp., Inc.. No.
2:12cvll, 2012 WL 3062696, at *2 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2012); Purdham v. Fairfax Cntv. Pub.
Sch., 629 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (E.D. Va. 2009). The discovery process typically divides the two
stages.3 At the first stage, the court decides whether to provide initial notice to potential
collective action members. Choimbol v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 557, 562 (E.D.
Va. 2006); see generally Hoffmann-LaRoche. Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989)
("District courts have discretion in appropriate cases to implement . . . Section 216(b) ... by
facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs."). The plaintiffs carry the evidentiary burden at this
stage, but it is "fairly lenient" because the court often has only "minimal evidence" without the
2"Section 216(b) does not define "similarly situated," and the Fourth Circuit has not yet interpreted the
term. However, courts in this district have adopted a two-stage analysis to determine when plaintiffs are
similarly situated." Allen. 2014 WL 4270077, at *2 (citing Houston. 591 F. Supp. 2d at 831).
3Here, Defendant argues that this case is closer to the second stage than the first because "Plaintiffs have
already engaged in significant discovery" including three corporate depositions, and receipt of
Defendant's responses to interrogatories, requests for admissions, and request for production of
documents. Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 27, at 21).
aid of discovery.4
Id (citations omitted).
"On the other hand, the 'similarly situated'
requirement is not 'invisible'" - "[m]ere allegations will not suffice." Gregory, 2012 WL
3062696, at *2 (quoting Houston. 591 F. Supp. 2d at 831); Bernard v. Household Int'l. Inc., 231
F. Supp. 2d 433, 435 (E.D. Va. 2002). "The primary focus in this inquiry is whether the
potential plaintiffs are 'similarly situated with respect to the legal and, to a lesser extent, the
factual issues to be determined.'" Houston, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (quoting Choimbol, 475 F.
Supp. 2d at 563). "There must be sufficient reason to believe that there are issues common to the
proposed class that are central to the disposition of the FLSA claims and that such common
issues can be substantially adjudicated without consideration of facts unique or particularized as
to each class member." Id at 832.
If the defendant files a motion for decertification "after discovery is virtually complete,"
then the court proceeds to the second stage of certification. Id. Upon such a motion, the court
applies a "heightened, fact-specific standard" to determine whether the collective plaintiffs are
sufficiently similarly situated to warrant proceeding as a class. Id If they are not, the court
decertifies the collective action and the original plaintiffs may pursue their individual claims. Id
In seemingly rare cases, the court may collapse the two-stage certification process and deny
certification outright when there is sufficient evidence in the record at the notice stage to reveal
that certification of the collective action is not appropriate. Purdham, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 547.5
This is not one of those cases.
4 "Because the statute of limitations continues to run on unnamed class members' claims until they opt
into the collective action, see 29 U.S.C. § 256(b), courts have concluded that the objectives to be served
through a collective action justify the conditional certification of a class of putative plaintiffs early in a
proceeding, typically before any significant discovery, upon an initial showing that the members of the
class are similarly situated." Houston v. URS Corp., 591 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
5 In Purdham, the putative class of plaintiffs was Fairfax County Public Schools employees, "who
performed security, athletic coaching, after school monitoring, [and] ticket-taking at athletic events." 629
5
Here, the Court will apply the traditional, "fairly lenient" standard to this stage one
review. Choimbol, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 562. Courts within this Circuit have consistently applied
the two-stage approach to collective action class certification.
See, e.g., Allen, 2014 WL
4270077, at *2; Houston. 591 F. Supp. 2d at 831; Gregory, 2012 WL 3062696, at *2; Butler v.
DirectSAT USA, LLC. 876 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566 (D. Md. 2012); D'Anna v. M/A-COM. Inc.,
903 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D. Md. 1995). Collapsing the two stages is reserved for those cases when
it is clear to the Court that certification is not appropriate. In fact, collapsing the two stages does
not involve a different standard of review for conditional certification, but rather performing two
analyses in one decision. See Purdham, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 547. Indeed, decertification, the
second stage, occurs only "[ajfter most of the discovery has taken place and the matter is ready
for trial." Id "At that point, the court makes a factual determination as to whether the class is
truly 'similarly situated.'" Id This case is not at that point.6 To the contrary, it does not appear
that anyone has deposed or obtained discovery from the seven plaintiffs who filed notice of their
consent to join during the pendency of Plaintiffs' motion. Most importantly though, the evidence
before the Court is not sufficient to warrant denying certification outright. As discussed below,
F. Supp. 2d at 546. The court found: "No county-wide guidelines enforce a uniform distribution of
supplements or regulate the number of hours that employees can devote to coaching and other volunteer
activities. And the number of hours that different coaches work varies widely between sports and between
coaches at different schools within the same sport. The amount of money that different coaches at
different schools receive as a 'supplement'—and the amount they receive per hour of coaching—also
varies significantly." Id. at 549. " Because of the probable necessity of an individualized FLSA coverage
determination for each member of the potential class" the court denied certification. Id By contrast
here, there are common guidelines, job titles, and job descriptions that are at least applicable to the
putative class members. See, e.g., Dep. of Natasha Caines (ECF No. 33-1, at 5, 8); Dep. of Jennifer
Peacock (ECF No. 27-2, at 6) ("[T]he job description gives a framework for the job. The general
responsibilities helps create the job level or the grades that they are at. And then specifically we use
requisitions to say more specifically based on the contract, the program, what those specific duties are.").
6 Plaintiffs' counsel could have conducted additional discovery to bolster their argument for nationwide
class certification, but that deficiency does not transform the case's factual progress into one that calls for
collapsing the stages and denying certification outright. Instead, it affects the scope of certification and
notice. See infra Part. III.
Plaintiffs need only make "some preliminary factual showing that a similarly situated group of
potential plaintiffs exists." Id (quoting D'Anna, 903 F. Supp. at 894); see also Butler, 876 F.
Supp. 2d at 572 (requiring "some factual nexus connecting them to other potential plaintiffs as
victims of an unlawful policy").
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant has pressed two arguments in opposing Plaintiffs request for nationwide
certification and notice. First, Defendant maintains that there is an "essential prerequisite" that
Plaintiffs "establish that they and the putative class members are victims of a common policy or
plan that violated the law." Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 27, at 17-18) (emphasis in original). Second,
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to carry their factual burden of showing that the
putative class and two Named Plaintiffs themselves are similarly situated. See, e.g., Def.'s Br.
(ECF No. 27, at 22-23).
Conversely, Plaintiffs rely on Defendant's use of company-wide job descriptions to
classify all Systems and Network Administrators as exempt, to argue that they "certainly have
enough evidence at this stage to merit such notice" to all SRA Network Administrators and
Systems Administrators nationwide. PL's Reply (ECF No. 33, at 6) (citing Dep. of Natasha
Caines, former compensation analyst for SRA who conducted a FLSA review). Because Ms.
Caines made exemption decisions nationwide allegedly without assessing employees' activities
under individual contracts, all Network and Systems Administrators nationwide were subject to
the same allegedly unlawful classification. However, Plaintiffs have only presented evidence of
the activities performed by Named Plaintiffs on a single contract - the Afloat contract servicing
the IT needs of the Navy's Military Sealift Command.
Importantly, whether Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA is
not before the Court. See, e.g., Choimbol, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 563. The only question before the
Court is whether the Named Plaintiffs have carried their burden to show that there are persons
sufficiently similarly situated to Named Plaintiffs to raise similar legal issues as to coverage,
exemption, or nonpayment of overtime "arising from at least a manageably similar factual setting
with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions." De Luna-Guerrero v. N.C. Grower's
Ass'n. Inc.. 338 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (E.D. N.C. 2004) (quoting Kearns, The Fair Labor
Standards Act, § 18.IV.D.3). Because the Court finds that the Afloat Contract teams constitute a
manageably similar class of potential plaintiffs, it will GRANT IN PART Plaintiffs motion.
A. Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated the Existence of a Manageable Class.
Plaintiffs seek to certify a collective action for all Systems and Network Administrators
who work or have worked for SRA.7 Plaintiffs allege that, at least with respect to the Afloat
team members, "they perform(ed) essentially the same duties, working similar hours, with
similar travel requirements to work onboard MSC ships, where their primary job duties involve
manual labor and adherence to standard operating procedures." PL's Reply (ECF No. 33, at 5).
Plaintiffs further allege that the rest of SRA's Systems and Network Administrators nationwide
perform similar duties and are thus, similarly misclassified as exempt. The evidence on the
record is sufficient, under the lenient standard involved, to demonstrate that Systems and
Network Administrators working on the Afloat contract are similarly situated in that they
perform the same core duties and allege the same legal claims under the FLSA.
7By using these terms, Plaintiffs assert that they seek to include all SRA Senior Network
Administrators, NetworkAdministrators, Associate Network Administrators, Master-System
Administration, Senior System Administrators, System Administrators, and Associate System
Administrators. PL's Reply (ECF No. 33, at 5 n.2).
8
Again, the notice stage of conditional certification merely requires that there be evidence
of similar legal issues in a "manageably similar factual setting." Choimbol, 475 F. Supp. 2d at
563. The differences that Defendant points out between Named Plaintiffs Burt and Stone is
largely irrelevant. Defendant argues that because Burt is a Systems Administrator and Stone is a
Network Administrator and they have different duties, Plaintiffs plead themselves out of
certifying a class. See Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 27, at 29-30). Instead, what Plaintiffs have shown is
that they are representatives of two subclasses: Network Administrators and Systems
Administrators.
Indeed, the two job titles have different job descriptions, and Defendant
classified them as exempt under two different Department of Labor regulations. See Def.'s Br.,
Ex. R (ECF No. 27-19, at 1); 29 C.F.R. § 541.301; Def.'s Br., Ex. O (ECF No. 27-16, at 1); 29
C.F.R. § 541.400. The distinctions between the two subclasses though "do not work to subject
Plaintiffs to factually distinct defenses which would work to undermine the benefit associated
with collective actions." Choimbol, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 564. In order to prove its defenses,
Defendant will need to present evidence of the same facts: on-the-job activities and duties and
pay provisions of the plaintiffs. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 ("The exempt or nonexempt status of any
particular employee must be determined on the basis of whether the employee's salary and duties
meet the requirements of the regulations in this part."); Arnold v. Ben Kanowskv. Inc., 361 U.S.
388, 392 (1960) ("[Exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to
assert them . ..."); Koppinger v. Am. Interiors. Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 797, 800 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
("The issue of how an employee spends his time is a question of fact, while the issue of whether
his activities fall within an exemption is a question of law.").
Moreover, Plaintiffs need not prove the merits of their claims or oppose decertification at
this stage as Defendant appears to contend. The issues and arguments raised by Defendant,
"though certainly pivotal to the Court's ultimate determination of whether Plaintiffs will proceed
to trial as a collective class, [are] not essential to 'stage one' analysis for conditional
certification."
Choimbol, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
Defendant's proffered requirement of
"establish[ing] that [Plaintiffs] and the putative class members are victims of a common policy or
plan that violated the law" begs a resolution on the merits, i.e., whether Defendant's
classification of Plaintiffs as exempt was unlawful. Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 27, at 17-18) (emphasis
in original); see also Gregory, 2012 WL 3062696, at *5 ("[T]he Court declines Defendant's
invitation to engage in resolving factual disputes, decide substantive issues going to the merits of
the case, or make credibility determinations.") (marks omitted). It is true that Plaintiffs do need
to "make a modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and potential plaintiffs
together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law." Choimbol, 475 F.
Supp. 2d at 564 (citing De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, 130 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662-63 (E.D. Pa.
2001); Giurovich v. Emmanuel's Marketplace. Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
However, the operative burden on Plaintiffs at this stage is only the "modest factual showing"
that they were denied overtime compensation such as by a "common policy or plan" to classify
them as exempt. Id. To require more would force Plaintiffs to disprove Defendant's affirmative
defense that Plaintiffs were, in fact, exempt. See Arnold, 361 U.S at 392; Turner v. Human
Genome Science. Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 738, 744 (D. Md. 2003). Hence, Defendant's focus on
Plaintiffs alleged failure to prove a violation of the FLSA is inapposite at this stage.
Indeed, Plaintiffs have supplemented the allegations in their Complaint with declarations,
deposition testimony, and other evidence sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant's policy may
have subjected them to violations of the FLSA. Both Named Plaintiffs and every other SRA
employee with their same job title on the Afloat contract did not receive overtime compensation
10
for hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek because of SRA's human resources policy to
exempt those employees from overtime pay provisions. See, e.g., Choimbol, 475 F. Supp. 2d at
564; De Luna-Guerrero, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 654 (requiring a "manageably similar factual setting
with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions"). Defendant argues that an "alleged
misclassification, in and of itself cannot be the alleged 'common policy or plan' that violates the
law." Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 27, at 26).8 Here, however, Plaintiffs have presented more than just
the paragraphs of allegations in their complaint.
If the classification resulted in SRA's nonpayment of overtime wages and the
classification was unlawful because Plaintiffs were not exempt under the FLSA, then that
allegation would appear to state a claim for relief under 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 216(b). Their
misclassification would be a "policy or plan that violated the law." Purdham, 629 F. Supp. 2d at
548; Gregory, 2012 WL 3062696, at *5 (quoting Longcrier v. HL-A Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1218,
1240 (S.D. Ala. 2008) (noting that with respect to the plaintiffs' allegation of misclassification,
the defendant's "denial of a common plan or policy . . . 'should not be conflated into a failure by
8 See Colson v. Avnet. Inc.. 687 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927 (D. Ariz. 2010) ("As a matter of both sound public
policy and basic common sense, the mere classification of a group of employees—even a large or
nationwide group—as exempt under the FLSA is not by itself sufficient to constitute the necessary
evidence of a common policy, plan, or practice that renders all putative class members as "similarly
situated" for § 216(b) purposes."). But cf. Gregory v. Belfor USA Group. Inc., No. 2:12cvl 1, 2012 WL
3062696, at *5 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2012) (holding that misclassification alone could serve as a common
policy or plan); Montova v. S.C.C.P. Painting Contractors, Inc., No. CCB-07-455, 2008 WL 554114, at
*3 (D. Md. Feb. 26, 2008) ("[T]he potential misclassification of the plaintiffs [as independent
contractors], in violation of FLSA's mandate that 'employee' be interpreted broadly, could be enough for
class certification."); Pelczvnski v. Oranage Lake Country Club, 284 F.R.D. 364, 368 (D. S.C. 2012)
("[W]hether the plaintiffs 'were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law' is a key factor
to consider.") (quoting Purdham, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 548) (emphasis added)); Slavinski v. Columbia
Ass'n. Inc.. CIV. CCB-08-890, 2011 WL 2119231, at *1-2 (D. Md. May 27, 2011) (clarifying, in ruling
on a motion to reconsider, that the court did not deny the plaintiffs motion for conditional certification
solely because she relied on her own affidavits, but because the affidavits lacked facts to show whether
any other employees were similarly situated); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 380 (D. N.J. 1987)
(holding that, in an ADEA claim, simply filing a complaint with allegations does not satisfy the "similarly
situated" requirement).
11
Plaintiffs to identify any such policies."'). To the extent that Plaintiffs need to allege a more
coherent, pervasive, or systematic policy, the Court finds that the consistency with which SRA
applied FLSA exemptions to its job titles on the Afloat contract, combined with the sworn
testimony of the Named Plaintiffs regarding their actual duties, is enough. See, e.g., Houston v.
URS Corp., 591 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834 (E.D. Va. 2008).
In Houston this Court held that "Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a 'common policy or
plan' in that all inspectors were classified as independent contractors rather than employees, that
all inspectors were compensated in a similar manner on a 'per inspection' basis, and that all
inspectors were required to conduct inspections in accordance with FEMA guidelines." Id. It
further acknowledged that, "[i]ndeed, at least one court has concluded that an alleged
misclassification as independent contractors alone could be enough for conditional certification."
IcL (citing Montova v. S.C.C.P. Painting Contractors. Inc., No. CCB-07-455, 2008 WL 554114,
at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 26, 2008)).
In Choimbol it was enough for class certification that: the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant "engaged in a common policy and scheme which violated the FLSA, whether done by
requiring 'deposits' or withholding of wages," the named plaintiffs consisted of over sixty
individuals, all immigrant workers alleging common violations, and the plaintiffs "provided the
Court with Affidavits of at least one [defendant] manager suggesting a common policy affecting
Plaintiffs." 475 F. Supp. 2d at 564.
In Gregory v. Belfor USA Group, Inc., this Court granted conditional class certification
based on the evidence presented by two named plaintiffs challenging their employer's classifying
them as exempt under the administrative professional exemption. 2012 WL 3062696, at *1-3.
The Court found the plaintiffs similarly situated upon their allegations and supporting
12
declarations that they performed strictly administrative tasks and consistently worked more than
forty hours per week, without compensation. Id. at *4.
Moreover, the Gregory plaintiffs
"assert[ed] that the mechanism Belfor employed to deprive them of their overtime pay was to
misclassify them as 'Exempt' ...." Id.
Just like the plaintiffs in Houston, Choimbol, and Gregory, Plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts and presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate similarity with respect to others
employed on the Afloat contract asserting claims under the FLSA. Although their evidence may
be limited and subject to genuine dispute by Defendant, Plaintiffs have "made a sufficient
showing that the nature of the work performed by other [Network and Systems Administrators]
is at least similar to their own." Houston, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 834. The two Named Plaintiffs
have also provided sworn testimony that thejob descriptions upon which their classifications are
based do not accurately reflect their actual duties. See Burt Dep. (ECF No. 33-3, at 8-13); Stone
Dep. (ECF No. 33-2, at 2). They both maintain that their duties, as Afloat team members
working on and off ships, require more physical labor, less formal education and research, and
routine application of standard operating procedures. See, e.g., Burt Dep. (ECF No. 33-3, at 9,
13). Moreover, Ms. Caines testified in her deposition that across SRA facilities, employees in a
given position have the same core responsibilities and duties. Caines Dep. (ECF No. 33-1, at 5).
With respect to the similarity of other Afloat team members, the particular duties of employees
like Systems and Network Administrators are defined at the contract-level. See Peacock Dep.
(ECF No. 27-2, at 6). Ms. Peacock, of SRA's human resources department, stated:
A. No. So a network administrator is - the job description gives a framework for
the job. The general responsibilities helps create the job level or the grades that
they are at. And then specifically we use requisitions to say more specifically
based on the contract, the program, what those specific duties are.
13
Q. So if I'm a systems administrator not working in Chesapeake under the Afloat
contract, I am in, I don't know, your Arlington office, I'm still going to be
basically the same person in terms of background and responsibilities as a systems
administrator in the Chesapeake office?
A. I would say the general background and responsibilities would be the same,
specific duties would probably be different.
Q. Daily tasks would be different because of whatever is called for under the
contract and all the other variables?
A. Correct.
Peacock Dep. (ECF No. 27-2, at 8-9). Thus, within the MSC Afloat contract there is no evidence
that the duties and pay provisions of Systems and Network administrators deviated so much so
that they were not similarly situated. They all performed similar information and technologybased services and were classified as exempt based on the company's written description of
those "core duties."
Additionally, it is probative that seven additional plaintiffs from the Afloat contract have
opted in during the pendency of this motion. These seven employees or former employees
affirmed by agreeing to join the suit filed by their Afloat colleagues, Burt and Stone, that they
were employed by SRA as Systems or Network Administrator at some time between May 7,
2011 to present, they regularly worked more than forty hours per week and were not paid
overtime, they followed standard operating procedures at least 75% of the time as an employee,
they did not earn a salary over $100,000 per year, and they did not supervise two or more people
for at least eighty hours per pay period or did the same work as those supervised. (ECF No. 33-5,
at 4). At the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged that multiple opt-in plaintiffs had
reviewed the Complaint. With seven additional opt-in plaintiffs, nine of the thirty-nine Systems
14
and Network Administrators employed on the Afloat contract out of Chesapeake9 have at least
averred that they are similarly situated.
Finally, Plaintiffs have shown sufficient evidence of a common policy or plan that
allegedly violates the law. Natasha Caines, SRA's former compensation analyst with the human
resources department, testified that she determined SRA's position on which job titles of
employees would be exempt from the FLSA. This policy - to classify certain employees as
exempt - from among alternatives, applies equally to all members of the purported class.
Although Defendant labors in its briefs to defend its method of assessing exemptions - which it
contends is not an unlawful policy or plan - the method's propriety is not at issue at this stage,
only its existence. See Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 27, at 18 n.9); Def.'s Sur-Reply (ECF No. 34-2, at 67). Obviously, Plaintiffs must identify more than a uniform system of defining exemptions.
Here, they have. If Plaintiffs worked at the tasks they describe more than forty hours per week
and were denied overtime compensation, SRA's policy of classifying that work as exempt
allegedly caused Plaintiffs FLSA injury. See Oetinger v. First Residential Mortg. Network,
Inc.. No. 60-381, 2009 WL 2162963, at *3 (W.D. Ky. July 16, 2009).10 Finally, Plaintiffs have
shown that others are similarly classified as exempt, perform similar duties, on the same SRA
contract, and also worked more than forty hours per week. Seven plaintiffs have filed consents
to join the suit.
9This figure is based on thestatement of Defedant's counsel at the hearing.
10 The Oetinger court explained: "an employee's classification as an administrative employee is a defense
to a claim for unpaid overtime wages, not a basis for the cause of action under the FLSA. Merely being
classified as exempt does not give rise to a right of action under 29 U.S.C. 216(b). Such right under the
FLSA only accrues once the employee is owed unpaid amounts. 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The Court believes
that companies may indeed apply company-wide policies to their employees, but these policies must
cause the alleged FLSA violation for the policy to be considered as a factor in determining whether
employees are 'similarly situated' for purposes of bringing a collective action." 2009 WL 2162963, at *3.
15
In sum, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the duties of Network and Systems
Administrators working on the Afloat contract team are similar enough to give the Court
"sufficient reason to believe that there are issues common to the proposed class that are central to
the disposition of thefir] FLSA claims and that such common issues can be substantially
adjudicated without consideration of facts unique or particularized as to each class member."
Houston. 591 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
B. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Present Evidence to Warrant a Nationwide Class.
Although Plaintiffs have met their burden with respect to Afloat contract teams, they
have not met their burden with respect to the rest of SRA's employees and locations. As such,
the Court will limit its certification to a more narrow and manageable class involving the Afloat
contract only.
Again, the "lenient standard" for conditional certification allows for some differences
among class members and recognizes that an individualized inquiry may be necessary in
fashioning the specific reliefor damages to be awarded to each class member. Houston, 591 F.
Supp. 2d at 832. However, the Court's role at this stage requires screening unmanageable or
judicially inefficient classes. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 170-71 ("[T]he court has
a managerial responsibility to oversee the joinder of additional parties to assure that the task is
accomplished in an efficient and proper way.") (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as incorporated
in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). A chiefconcern is whether the common issues
allow the Court and litigants to address the class-wide claims without "becoming bogged down
by individual differences among class members." Houston. 591 F. Supp. 2d at 832. Here,
certifying a class beyond the Afloat contract would not be a step towards judicial efficiency for
several reasons.
16
First, geography limits what class will be manageable. SRA has more than thirty work
locations in seventeen states. n It works on over 130 different contracts. SRA currently employs
approximately 154 individuals as Systems or Network Administrators across its facilities. The
geographic scope of SRA's operations simply disfavors nationwide certification because it will
hinder the goals of the collective action: aiding in "the vindication of plaintiffs' rights by
lowering the individuals' costs by pooling claims and resources." Houston, 591 F. Supp. 2d at
831. Conducting discovery across the country in an effort to maintain or decertify the class as
the case proceeds would be expensive and inefficient for all litigants and their counsel. In
addition, many of these contracts involve relatively few members of the purported class.
Second, Plaintiffs have presented no real evidence of the actual job duties of Network
and Systems Administrators outside the Afloat teams. Notably, Plaintiffs have failed to offer
even an affidavit from anyone involved with a different SRA contract or location despite the
ample opportunity to conduct discovery. At the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged that
Defendant had not resisted any request for discovery. To the contrary, SRA permitted corporate
depositions and produced over 3,500 pages of written material. Decl. of Russell Bruch (ECF No.
27-14, at 2). Plaintiffs plainly have not sought to gain any evidence outside of the Afloat
11 The MSC Afloat contract includes small teams based out of San Diego, California, (the Afloat Network
Operations Center "ANOC" Team) and Pensacola, Florida (the Backup Network Operations Center
"BNOC" Team), but the C4S Team based out of Chesapeake, Virginia includes almost ninety percent of
the purported class members. Decl. of Kevin Brunner (ECF No. 27-12, at 2-3). The Systems and
Network Administrators on these three different teams may perform different work.
As Mr. Brenner
stated, "because Systems Administrators and Network Administrators on the ANOC team provide remote
support to part of the MSC fleet, and do not actually go out to ships to provide support, those individuals
do not perform certain tasks that members of the C4S team may perform onboard MSC ships." Id. at 4.
However, to the extent that there is variation in job duties among the Systems and Network
Administrators in the three different locations, its effect on the feasibility of the proposed class is de
minimis. The ANOC and BNOC teams constitute a small number of additional potential class members
who work on the same contract for the same customer.
17
contract and instead, rested entirely on Ms. Caines' deposition testimony in their effort for
nationwide certification.
Third and in contrast, Defendant has presented countervailing evidence that the Systems
and Network Administrators perform different work in their daily activities on the Afloat
contract compared to other locations and other contracts. See, e.g.. Peacock Dep. (ECF No. 27-
2, at 6-7); Decl. of Amit Puthran (ECF No. 27-8, at 2-3) (averring that he works out of Bethesda,
Maryland on a National Institute of Health contract and that his work experience has involved
"little to no travel"); Decl. of Tim Boyer (ECF No. 12-9, at 2-4) (averring that his primary work
location is Boyers, Pennsylvania working exclusively on the OPM Network Operations &
Security Services Project where he supervises more than ten Systems Administrators who
"frequently exercise discretion andjudgment" ); Decl. of Saqib Raheem (ECF No. 12-10, at 2-4)
(averring that he has worked exclusively on the Windows server operations team within the
Information Technology Services group based out of Fairfax, Virginia, which "does not provide
support to an external client, as with many SRA contracts; instead [its] client is essentially SRA
itself); Decl. of Ryan Bess (ECF No. 12-11, at 2-4) (averring that he works out of Rockville,
Maryland on a National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases contract where he writes
standard operating procedures for the "relatively new application" Microsoft Lync he works with
exclusively).
Ms. Peacock testified:
Q. So if you have a network administrator under a different contract, am I to
understand you are saying that they could be doing completely different things
than, say, a network administrator under the Afloat contract?
A. Their specific duties could be different.
Q. So it's obvious that a networkadministrator working in, say, your California
office could have a different daily task than someone working in the Chesapeake
18
office. But if they're labeled a network administrator, then they're generally going
to be responsible for the same types of tasks regardless of the contract and they're
goingto have the same type of background and education and whatnot; is that
correct?
A. I would say that their level of responsibility and their general duties and the
level of work being performed would be the same, and then their specific duties
would be different based on the contract and the program.
Q. And that also applies to systems administrators?
A. Correct
Peacock. Dep. (ECF No. 27-2, at 7).
Thus, it is clear that the class of similarly situated individuals warranted by Plaintiffs'
evidence ends with the Afloat contract. Beyond that contract, SRA's Systems and Network
Administrators are too disparately located and perform too disparate duties to be considered
similarly situated for a FLSA collective action class. Their inclusion would render this litigation
"bogged down by individual differences among class members." Houston, 591 F. Supp. 2d at
832. However, the Afloat team members represent almost a third of SRA's Systems and
Network Administrators, all work for the same customer, on the same contract, using the same
job description.
Nearly all work out of the Chesapeake office within the Eastern District of
Virginia. As a result, their claims arise from "a manageably similar factual setting" from which
the Plaintiffs can seek to have others opt-in. De Luna-Guerrero, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 654.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the
Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Conditional Class Certification and Notice under the FLSA to include
the following similarly situated employees in the collective action:
19
All individuals who are or were employed by SRA at some time between May 7,
2011 and the present and worked on SRA's MCS Afloat Contract with the job
title of:
Associate Network Administrator,
Network Administrator,
Senior Network Administrator,
Associate Systems Administrator,
Systems Administrator,
or Senior Systems Administrator.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall provide to Plaintiffs' counsel the
names, last known mailing addresses, home and/or mobile phone numbers, and email addresses
of all potential members of the conditionally certified class within fifteen (15) days of the date of
this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order the
parties shall provide the Court with a joint proposed form of notice to potential members to be
approved by the Court. The form of Notice and Consent shall specify that the matter has been
referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge by consent of the parties. If the
parties cannot agree on the terms ofNotice, they shall each submit a draft by the deadline and the
Court will issue approved Notice.
IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that any consents to joinder in this action by which
additional persons join this litigation as plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) must be filed with the
Clerk of the Court no later than ninety (90) days after the date of this Order.
20
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to
counsel and parties of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Douglas E. Miller
United States Magistr'e Judge
DOUGLAS E. MILLER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Norfolk, Virginia
October M/2014
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