Two Men and a Truck/International, Inc. v. A Mover, Inc.
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER re: 29 Motion for Attorney Fees. Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. Defendant is ORDERED to pay Plaintiff $24,310.00 in attorneys' fees and $494.92 in costs. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Raymond A. Jackson and filed on 4/7/15. Copies distributed to all parties 4/7/15. (ldab, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Norfolk Division
TWO MEN AND A
TRUCK/INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv248
v.
A MOVER INC. (formerly TWO MEN & A
TRUCK, INC.),
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Plaintiffs
motion for attorneys' fees is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. The Court grants
in part Plaintiffs motion and awards attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $24,804.92
($24,310.00 in attorneys' fees and $494.92 in costs). The Court denies in part Plaintiffs motion
for attorneys' fees to the extent such motion requests attorneys' fees or costs beyond $24,804.92.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff owns the registered trademark "TWO MEN AND A TRUCK" as well as several
federal trademark registrations for its "TWO MEN AND A TRUCK" mark, including U.S.
Registration No. 4,340,844. On February 1, 2013, Plaintiff and Defendant's predecessor, Two
Men & A Truck, Inc., a competing moving business, entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement
("APA") whereby Plaintiff purchased the trademark "TWO MEN & A TRUCK" from
Defendant. Pursuant to the APA, Defendant agreed to permanently discontinue use of the
1
designation "TWO MEN &ATRUCK" in any print or Internet advertising, and ensuring there is
no residual use of "TWO MEN & A TRUCK" in those publications.
On February 18, 2014, Plaintifffiled a lawsuit against Defendant for trademark
infringement, false designation or origin, and unfair competition, and for breach of the APA as a
result of Defendant's unauthorized use of the name and mark "TWO MEN & A TRUCK" in
connection with the operation of its business. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that Defendant
continued to refer to itself as "TWO MEN & A TRUCK" on various Internet directories and
review websites such as Angie's List, SuperPages.com, YP.com, and Yelp. PL's Compl. ^ 19;
ECF No. 1. With respect to Yelp, the complaint specifically alleged that Defendant's continued
use of the mark associates Defendant's negative reviews, which include statements that
Defendant is "a scam," has "terrible customer service," and shows a "complete lack of
professionalism," with Plaintiff, thereby causing harm to Plaintiffs business, reputation, and
goodwill. PL's Comply 24.
On March 31, 2014, Defendant's counsel filed a Notice of Settlement, together with the
parties' fully endorsed Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction on Consent. ECF No. 8. Mr.
R. David Moore, listed on the order as Defendant's President and Secretary, signed the order on
behalf of Defendant on March 31, 2014. On April 3, 2014, the Honorable Leonie M. Brinkema
entered the Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction on Consent Order ("April 3,2014 Order")
and stated that the Norfolk Division of the Court shall retain jurisdiction over the matter to
enforce a violation of the Consent Judgment's terms. ECF No. 9.
On May 15, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Defendant to Show Cause in
response to Defendant's failure to comply with the April 3, 2014 Order. ECF No. 11. On
September 5,2014, this Court ordered Defendant to show cause why it should not be held in
contempt ofthis Court's April 3, 2014 Order. ECF No. 17. On October 2, 2014, the show cause
hearing was held and Defendant was found in civil contempt. Defendant was assessed a coercive
sanction of $350.00 for every day it failed to comply with the Court's April 3, 2014 Order.
Defendant was also ordered to pay Plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs associated with bringing
the show cause action. October 14,2014 Mem. Op. & Order; ECF No. 27. On October 14,2014,
a status hearing was held at which it was determined that Defendant had purged the contempt as
of October 6, 2014. Defendant was ordered to pay $1,400.00. On October 16, Defendant
submitted its payment to the Clerk of this Court. On October 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant
motion and accompanying memorandum for attorneys' fees and costs detailing billing for Mr. J.
David Mayberry (partner), Mr. James W. Faris, Jr. (associate), and Ms. Shelia Blackston
(paralegal). ECF Nos. 29 & 30. On November 7, 2014, Defendant filed its Memorandum in
Opposition. ECF No. 31. Plaintiff did not file a reply.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
As a general matter, "[hjours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not
properly billed to one's adversary." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,434 (1983). The
"'reasonableness' of a rate is a concept that does not vary depending on whether the hourly rate
(or the fee for that matter) is assessed for compensatory purposes or for punitive purposes."
SunTrust Mortg., Inc. v. AIG United Guar. Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d, 762, 768 (E.D. Va. 2013).
Thus, irrespective of whether it stems from a fee-shifting statute or a sanction, the touchstone of
any award of attorneys' fees and expenses is reasonableness. Id. at 769 (quoting E.I. DuPont de
Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09cv058, 2013 WL 458532, *2 (E.D.
Va. Feb. 6, 2013). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth Circuit")
has clearly set forth the method a court should use in determining a reasonable attorneys' fee
award. In McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Jan. 23, 2014), it
explained:
The proper calculation of an attorney's fee award involves a three-step process. First, the
court must "determine the lodestar figure by multiplying the number of reasonable hours
expended times a reasonable rate." Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235,
243 (4th Cir. 2009). To ascertain what is reasonable in terms of hours expended and the
rate charged, the court is bound to apply the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). Id. at 243^14. Next, the
court must "subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful
ones." Id. at 244. Finally, the court should award "some percentage of the remaining
amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff." Id.
(Footnote omitted). The Johnson factors used to determine the initial lodestar figure include: (1)
The time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill
required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in
pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations
at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8)
the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of
the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit
arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and
(12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases. Id. at 88 n.5.
The Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") has stated that there is a
"strong presumption" that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable attorneys' fee, which may
be overcome only "in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately take
into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee." Perdue
v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553-54 (2010).
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The "prevailing market rates in the relevant community" will determine whether the
proposed hourly rate is reasonable. Rum Creek Coal States, Inc., 31 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir.
1994). This rule applies unless the fee applicant demonstrates that the case at hand was
sufficiently complex or specialized such that the required services were not available in the
visited market. SunTrust, 933 F.Supp.2d at771. Thus, in the majority of cases, the relevant
market for determining the prevailing rate is the community in which the court where the action
is prosecuted sits. Rum Creek, 31 F.3d at 175.
Aside from "the attorney's own affidavits, the fee applicant must produce satisfactory
specific evidence of the 'prevailing market rates in the relevant community' for the type of work
for which he seeks an award." Grissom v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 323 (4lh Cir. 2008)
(quoting Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990)). Affidavits from local attorneys
attesting to the reasonableness of hourly rates will meet this requirement. Robinson v. Equifax
Info. Servs, LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 245 (4th Cir. 2009). "In addition to considering materials
submitted by the parties, the court may, on its own, review the billing statement for
reasonableness." Superior Form Builders v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply, 881 F. Supp. 1021,
1026 (E.D. Va. 1994).
Counsel "should exercise 'billing judgment' with respect to hours worked." Hensley, 461
U.S. at 437. Plaintiff, as the fee applicant, bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness
of its fee request, Kenney v. A Touch ofPatience Shared Hous., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 516, 525
(E.D. Va. 2011), and of "providing sufficient detail in their records to explain and support their
requests for fees and costs." Andrade v. Aerotek, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 637, 645 (D. Md. 2012).
Indeed, "the party who seeks payment must keep records in sufficient detail that a neutral judge
can make a fair evaluation of the time expended, the nature and need for the service, and the
reasonable fees to be allowed." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 441 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
"Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award
accordingly." Id. at 433.
"Proper documentation is the key to ascertaining the number of hours reasonably spent
on legal tasks." EEOC v. Nutri/System Inc., 685 F. Supp. 568, 573 (E.D. Va. 1988). Thus,
inadequate documentation, which may take the form of vague task entries or block billing,
impedes a court's reasonableness review. See In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., Civil Action No.
1:09cvl217, 2014 WL 4925782, *8 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29,2014). Blocking billing is "the practice
of grouping, or 'lumping,' several tasks together undera single entry, without specifying the
amount of time spent on each particular task." Project Vote/Votingfor Am., Inc. v. Long, 887 F.
Supp. 2d 704, 716 (E.D. Va. 2012) (quoting Guidry v. Clare, 442 F .Supp. 2d 282, 294
(E.D.Va.2006)). Though not prohibited, id., block billing is disfavored in this district. Courts
have reduced fee claims by 10% to 20% in order to address the deficiencies created by lumping.
See In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 2014 WL 4925782 at*9.
The Fourth Circuit reviews a district court's award of attorney's fees for abuse of
discretion. Grissom, 549 F.3d at 320. Appellate "review of the district court's award is sharply
circumscribed; [the Fourth Circuit]... recognize[s] that because a district court has close and
intimate knowledge of the efforts expended and the value of the services rendered, the fee award
must not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong." Id.(quoting Plyer, 902 F.2d at 277-78).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Attorneys' Fees
1. Lodestar Method
The first step in calculating the attorneys' fees is to determine the lodestar by multiplying
the reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours. In sum, Plaintiffsubmits that the
total fees expended are $32,510.50 for 79.7 hours. This represents an average hourly rate of just
over $470.00, a composite of the rates charged by each attorney and paralegal: $260.00 per hour
for one paralegal, $725.00 per hour for one partner in the law firm, and $425.00 per hour for one
associate. In determining the lodestar, the Court will consider the first, second, third, fifth, sixth
and ninth Johnson factors: "the time and labor expended," "the novelty and difficulty of the
questions raised; "the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered," "the
customary fees for like work," "the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation," and
"the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney."
Plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of demonstrating that the requested rates are
reasonable. Defendant raises two objects related to the reasonableness of the rate. First, the Court
should apply the hourly rate in Hampton Roads. Def.'s Br. in Opp. 1. Second, the services of
one, not two, attorneys were reasonably necessary for the two hearings. Def.'s Br. in Opp. 2.
a.
Hourly Rate
In support of its burden to establish the prevailing market rate of attorneys' fees in the
relevant community where the district court sits (i.e., the Eastern District of Virginia), Plaintiff
initially submitted: (1) the affidavit of its lead counsel and billing records for lead counsel, one
junior attorney, and one paralegal; and (2) a copy of a schedule of prevailing hourly rates for
intellectual property counsel in metropolitan cities across the country, including the Washington,
D.C. area, complied by the American Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA") and
found in its 2013 Report of the Economic Survey.
Indisputing Plaintiffs request, Defendant's counsel stated that highly qualified counsel
was available locally and submitted his own affidavit attesting to the billing rates in the Hampton
Roads legal market for large-firm intellectual property attorneys with experience commensurate
with Plaintiffs counsel.
In its review of Plaintiff s request, the Court agreed that this case was sufficiently routine
such that the required services were available in the local market. Therefore, the AIPLA report
was insufficient to carry Plaintiffs burden of proof. Plaintiff had provided no evidence that the
report, which pertains to hourly rates of litigation attorneys in major metropolitan cities such as
Washington, D.C, is a reliable indicator of the hourly rates of intellectual property litigation
attorneys in Norfolk, Virginia, or the larger Hampton Roads community.
Moreover, although Plaintiff detailed the backgrounds and experience of the attorneys
and their qualifications in intellectual property law, the affidavit of Plaintiffs lead counsel is
insufficient to establish that the rates sought are commensurate with the prevailing market rates
of attorneys in the Hampton Roads legal community, of similar skill and for similar experience,
handling intellectual property litigation matters before this Court. Similarly, the affidavit of
Defendant's lead counsel was unhelpful to the Court. Therefore, the Court directed the Parties to
file declarations from detached, neutral counsel with similar qualifications to Plaintiffs counsel
attesting to the prevailing rates charged in similar cases in the Hampton Roads area. ECF No.
32. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a declaration from Mr. Craig L. Mytelka, a partner in the
Virginia Beach office of Williams Mullen. ECF No. 34, Ex. 1. Mr. Mytelka stated the following
prevailing rates: attorneys with more than 25 years of experience ($500 to $800an hour);
attorneys with five years of experience ($325 to $450 an hour); and paralegals with more than 25
years of experience ($200 to $300 an hour). Defendant filed declarations from Duncan Glover
Byers and Brett A. Spain. ECF No. 35, Ex. 1 & 2. Defendant's submissions state rates that are
largely inconsistent with one another and therefore, provide little in the way of guidance.
However, at least one submission is somewhat consistent with the rates Plaintiff submitted:
attorney with 25 years of experience ($550), attorney with five years of experience ($385), and
paralegal with "significant experience" ($175 per hour).
After reviewing the Parties' submissions, the Court finds that the following hourly rates
are reasonable in this case: $600 for Mr. Mayberry, $400 for Mr. Faris, and $250 for Ms.
Blackston.
b.
Number of Hours Expended
Defendant argues that the services of one attorney, not two, were reasonably necessary
for attendance at the two hearings. "If more than one attorney is involved, the possibility of
duplication of effort along with the proper utilization of time should be scrutinized. The time of
two or three lawyers in a courtroom or conference when one would do, may obviously be
discounted." Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717. However, the Court does not agree that one attorney
would have been sufficient in this case.
First, there is noper se rule preventing more than one attorney from participating in
court; indeed, in the Court's experience, attendance of more than one attorney is not at all
uncommon. Second, Mr. Mayberry served as local counsel in this case. Local Civil Rule
83.1(D)(b) states that foreign attorneys "shall beaccompanied by a member of the bar of this
Court in all appearances before this Court." Local Civ. R. 83.1. Moreover, all pleadings filed
with the Court must be signed by local counsel, with whom the Court can, if it chooses, confer
with alone "in all matters connected with the case." Id. Although the Court has been known to
waive the requirement for local counsel's presence, it has done so sparingly and only in cases
where it is familiar with foreign counsel through previous appearances before this Court. Given
that this was Mr. Faris's first time appearing before this Court, the Court would not have waived
the appearance of local counsel, Mr. Mayberry. Thus, he should be compensated for either his
time or his travel costs in attending.
Though the "novelty and complexity" of the issues of a case are presumably reflected in
the number of billable hours, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984), "the trial judge should
weigh the hours claimed against his own knowledge, experience, and expertise of the time
required to complete similaractivities."Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717. Counsel who file show cause
motions stemming from alleged contempt violations are "charged with the knowledge: (a) that a
fee award is a possible sanction; (b) that the fee applicant must prove the reasonableness of the
time component of a fee application by clear and convincing evidence; (c) that to do so, the
applicant must have accurate time records; and (d) that block billing (or lumping) often results in
a fee reduction. If a party seeking sanctions disregards that knowledge, it must accept the
consequences." SunTrust, 933 F. Supp. 2d at 778 (footnote omitted). Determining the reasonable
number of hours expended requires separate consideration for each person billing hours.
Superior Form, 881 F. Supp. at 1025. Taking these principles into consideration, the Court finds
that nearly 80 hours for a routine contempt proceeding, which arose from Defendant's failure to
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comply with a consent order and involved two 10-minute hearings, is excessive. Moreover, the
reasonableness of the number of hours (79.7) expended by Plaintiffs counsel is not adequately
documented due to excessive use of block billing.
i.
Mr. Faris
Although all members of Plaintiffs legal team1 listed the entirety oftheir daily tasks in
single compound entries, Mr. Faris's billing presents the greatest challenge to the Court's
reasonableness review because he completed the bulk of the work on this case. For example, Mr.
Faris's October 2,2014 entry for 8.0 hours is described as:
Revise proposed orders in light of Ms. Bazar's declaration; review background materials
and previously-filed pleadings and other documents in preparation for show cause
hearing; outline arguments and statements for show cause hearing; confer with Mr.
Mayberry regarding arguments for show cause hearing; confer with Ms. Blackston about
additional edits to proposed orders; confer with accounting about receipt and clearance of
additional check from Mr. Moore; participate in show cause hearing; along with Mr.
Mayberry meet with Mr. Moore about show cause hearing and steps for him to purge
contempt and comply with April Order; review e-mails from Mr. Moore to Yelp support;
provide summary report to Ms. Wallace about hearing and discuss next steps; review
Court Order finding contempt; return travel.
This is entry insufficient. First, many of these tasks such as discrete conversations that
Mr. Faris had with Mr. Mayberry and Ms. Blackston, respectively, as well as the conversation he
and Mr. Mayberry had with Mr. Moore, could have easily been detailed separately. Second, the
notation "review Court Order finding contempt" is confusing as the Court did not issue its
written Order until October 14, 2014. Third, although the decision to compensate an attorney for
travel time is within the discretion of the Court, as a general matter, travel time should be billed
at a substantially lower than usual rate. Sun Pub. Co., Inc., v. Mecklenburg News, Inc., 594 F.
Supp. 1512, 1520 (E.D. Va. 1984). To allow travel time compensation at the same hourly rate as
' Mr. Mayberry's work is sufficiently documented and requires noanalysis by the Court.
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"in-court or other active time would be unreasonable." Id. Indeed, the failure to reduce the
hourly rate for travel time indicates a lack of billing judgment. See Project Vote, 887 F. Supp. 2d
at 716.
In this case, the mere notation of "return travel" does not allow the Court to decipher the
amount of time spent traveling in that eight-hour block. This failure to properly itemize and
account for travel time appears again in Mr. Faris's entry for October 14, 2014 where "[tjravel
for follow-up contempthearing" is lumped into a three-hour billing notation for other activities
such as:
[Rjeview background materials and as-filed documents in preparation for hearing;
prepare outline of arguments/statements for hearing; confer with Mr. Mayberry in
preparation for hearing; participate in hearing; review and analyze Order finding A
Mover in contempt.
PL's Mem. in Supp., Ex. 4. It would be futile for this Court to attempt to separate these "block
entries into their constituent tasks and apportion[] a random amount of time to each."
Abusamhadaneh v. Tyler, No. 1:1 lcv939 (JCC/TCB), 2013 WL 193778, *21 (E.D. Va. Jan. 17,
2013). Instead, "the Court will take the lack of specificity and delineation into account, and it
will exercise the discretion accorded it by the Hensley Court in enacting a reduction from the
total billable hours of counsel." Id.
In addition, this was a straightforward case about securing the last of three agreed-upon
payments and the removal of online material violating Plaintiffs trademark. Also, the show
cause hearing was a brief, 10-minute routine proceeding that did not require extensive
preparation. Thus, the Court finds that the notation for "[r]eview background materials and case
file" which appears in block entries lumped in with other tasks (such as various phone calls) on
September 3, 2014 (5.00 hours total), September 25,2014 (6.50 hours total), September 29, 2014
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(2.20 hours total), September 30, 2014 (5.00 hours total), and October 2, 2014 (8.00 hours total),
is duplicative and reflects a lack of billing judgment. Therefore in consideration of this and the
aforementioned deficiencies in Mr. Faris's billing, the Court will reduce Mr. Faris's total billable
hours by 10% or 5.2 hours.
ii.
Ms. Blackston
As for the billing entries for Ms. Blackston, typical paralegal tasks include "factual
investigation, including locating and interviewing witnesses; assistance with depositions,
interrogatories, and document production; compilation of statistical and financial data; checking
legal citations; and drafting correspondence." Missouri v. Jenkins byAgyei, 491 U.S. 274, n.10.
However, "purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless
of who performs them." Id. Indeed, courts in this circuit have determined that because purely
clerical tasks are ordinarily a part of a law office's overhead, (which is covered in the hourly
rate), they should not be compensated for at all. See Keesee v. Astrue, No. 2:08cv00029,2009
WL 1231006, *1 (W.D. Va. Apr. 30, 2009) (citing Keith v. Volpe, 644 F. Supp. 1312, 1316
(C.D.Cal.1986)); Abusamhadaneh, 2013 WL 193778 at *38. See also Coates v. Dougherty, Civ.
A. No. 90-1716-A, 1992 WL 220757, *1 (E.D. Va. June 18, 1992) (denying claim for 1.6 hours
of clerical time); Alexander S. By and Through Bowers v. Boyd, 929 F. Supp. 925, 939 (D.S.C.
1995) (reducing fees by 75% for secretarial work performed by project assistants). Examples of
clerical work include: collating and filing documents with the court, issuing summonses,
scanning and mailing documents, reviewing files for information {Johnson v. Weinstein & Riley,
P.S., No. 5:99-cv-377-JG, 2011 WL 1261578, *5 n.4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2011)); printing
pleadings and preparing sets of orders (In re Boyds Collection Ltd., No. 05-43793 DK, 2006 WL
13
4671849, *1 (July 10, 2006)); document organization (Burr v. Astrue, Civil Action No.
5:06CV35, 2008 WL 4693543, *6 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 23,2008)); creating notebooks or files and
updating attorneys' calendars (Muhler Co., Inc. v. Window World ofN. Charleston LLC, No.
2:1 l-cv-00851-DCN, 2014 WL 4269078, *9 (D.S.C. Aug. 28,2014)); assembling binders
(Superior Form, 881 F. Supp. at 1027)); emailing documents or logistical telephone calls with
the clerk's office or the judge's chambers (Gregory v. Belfor USA Group, Inc., No. 2M2CV11,
2014 WL 468923, *6 (E.D. Va. Feb. 4,2014)).
This was not a case which required typical paralegal tasks. See supra 13. Thus, the Court
finds that several of Ms. Blackston's entries amount to clerical or administrative tasks:
05/15/2014:
Assist with filing Motion to Compel / 0.80
05/21/2014:
Review pleadings as filed, update correspondence and pleadings files.
/0.90
05/27/2014:
Verify logistics for PHV application form; confer with Mr. Faris regarding
status of filing. / 0.80
09/04/2014:
Prepare and file Pro Hac Vice application2 for Mr. Faris; confer with court
clerk regarding signature requirements for PHV applications. /1.20
09/05/2014
Prepare updated PHV application for Mr. Faris.3 / 0.70
09/09/2014
File Amended PHV application for Mr. Faris. / 0.60
Review and file Notice of Additional Evidence re Motion to Compel;
10/01/2014
serve Notice of Additional Evidence to Mr. Moore and A Movers via
10/02/2014:
email and FedEx; download and review updated Docket Report from
PACER; download current pleadings from PACER; update pleadings
files; update Mr. Mayberry's Pleadings notebook. / 3.10
Confirm delivery of overnight packages to Mr. Moore and A. Mover and
forward confirmation of same to Mr. Faris; forward Court Order from
10/10/2014:
Show Cause Hearing to Ms. Wallace; review team correspondence and
update correspondence files; document/file management. / 3.30
Download current docket and 10/10/14 filings from PACER and forward
same to Mr. Faris; update pleadings file; update Mr. Mayberry's pleadings
*A Pro Hac Vice ("PHV") application is a form document that requires no specialized legal training to
complete.
3The Court also notes that includingthe preparation and filing of an amended PHV illustrates a lack of
billing judgment as it appears the amended form was needed as a result of an error in completing the first
form, despite conferring with the clerk's office on the signature requirements prior to submission. Just as
the client should not be billed for an error by counsel's team in completing a routine form document,
neither should Defendant be charged with that error.
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10/14/2014
binder; review and update team correspondence files. / 3.20
Download and review Order finding A Mover in Contempt and upload
same to DeskSite; forward Order to team for distribution. / 0.80
Turning to the entry for October2,2014, the Court finds that in addition to clerical work,
Ms. Blackstone's entry details forwarding a document that this Court had not yet filed. Indeed, as
noted above with respect to Mr. Faris's October 2, 2014, entry, the "Court Order from the Show
Cause Hearing" was not filed until October 14, 2014. Therefore, it could not have been
forwarded to the client on that day. This entry indicates that billing entries were not made
contemporaneously and will be reduced accordingly. See Nutri/System, 685 F. Supp. at 573
(documentation submitted should reflect "reliable contemporaneous recordation of time spent on
legal tasks").
Although the Court notes that the repeated entry of "[rjeview team correspondence and
update correspondence files" might be considered vague, it is not clear that such an entry is
purely clerical. Accordingly, in its discretion, the Court will not deduct these entries. Where the
notation appears lumped with clerical activities, the clerical activities are deducted and 0.50
hours are allocated for reviewing and updating team correspondence files. As a result, the hours
for Ms. Blackston's activities are reduced from 20.8 to 5.0 hours.
The remaining Johnson factors which the Court will consider as relevant in this case are
(7) "the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances" and (8) "the amount in
controversy and the results obtained." The Court finds that there were no special time limitations
in this case, and therefore gives little weight to the seventh Johnson factor. To avoid giving
double the weight to counsel's success, a key issue that the Fourth Circuit has directed courts to
consider after establishing the lodestar, the Court will give little weight to the eighth factor, the
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amount in controversy and results obtained. The parties present no information as to the fourth,
tenth, eleventh, and twelfth factors, so the Court accordingly gives those factors no weight.
In sum, the relevant factors weigh in favor of the reducing the number of hours to 59.5
from 79.7. Applying the applicable hourly rate to each team member, the Court finds that the
lodestar is $24,310.00.
2. Reduction for unrelated and unsuccessful claims
There were no unsuccessful claims so a reduction on this point is unnecessary. See
McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88.
3. Degree of success
Finally, the Court should consider reducing the fee to account for the degree of success
attained by Plaintiffs counsel. Given Plaintiffs success in achieving a finding of contempt, a
reduction is not necessary.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees is GRANTED-IN-PART and
Defendant is ORDERED to pay Plaintiff $24,310.00 in attorneys' fees.
B. Costs
Finally, the Court will turn briefly to the $2,005.70 in costs Plaintiffs requested. Because
the legal services needed in this case were available in the Norfolk or its surrounding area, the
Court will deduct travel expenses related to Mr. Faris's travel from Atlanta. The Court is also
concerned that more than two-thirds of the costs requested stem from Mr. Faris's travel which
amounted to $1,510.78. This is unreasonable. This was a ten-minute hearing which Mr.
Mayberry was fully capable of handling alone without incurring airfare, hotel expenses, and car
rental fees for an associate to travel from Atlanta. Indeed, Mr. Faris's billing entry on September
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25, 2014, contains the notation "confer with Mr. Mayberry about... possibility of engaging
local counsel." Given that this conversation occurred prior to incurring fees for his travel, it
appears to the Court that Plaintiffs counsel weighed the matter. In its discretion, however, the
Court declines to deduct travel expenses for Mr. Mayberry as he served as local counsel admitted
to practice before the Court. Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion for Costs is GRANTED-IN-PART
and DENIED-IN-PART and Defendant is ORDERED to pay Plaintiff $494.92 in costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs
is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. Defendant is ORDERED to pay Plaintiff
$24,310.00 in attorneys' fees and $494.92 in costs.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to all parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Norfolk, Virginia
April f, 2015
Raymond A. Jackson
United alates District Judge
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