IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT OF JACKSON CREEK MARINE, LLC AS OWNER OF THE TUG JACQUELINE A

Filing 81

ORDER Granting 41 Motion for Summary Judgment; Adopting Report and Recommendations re 67 Report and Recommendations. The Court, having reviewed the record and examined Perdue's objections to the Report and Recommendation, and having ma de de novo findings with respect to the portions objected to, does hereby ADOPT and APPROVE the findings and recommendations set forth in the Report and Recommendation. It is, therefore, ORDERED that Jackson Creek's Motion for Summary Judgmen t (ECF No. 41) as to Perdue's crossclaims be GRANTED. The remaining parties are ORDERED to participate in Court-assisted settlement efforts to attempt to resolve the claims that remain pending in this matter. Counsel are DIRECTED to contact t he Court's Docket Clerk at 757-222-7222, within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order to schedule a settlement conference before a United States Magistrate Judge.. Signed by District Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen on 8/16/17 and filed 8/17/17. Copies distributed to all parties 8/17/17. (ldab, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Norfolk Division - In Admiralty

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT

OF JACKSON CREEK MARINE, LLC, AS
OWNER OF THE TUG JACQUELINE A

Civil No. 2:16-cv-98

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment from Limitation Plaintiff Jackson
Creek Marine, LLC ("Jackson Creek") on the claims of cross-claimants Perdue Agribusiness,
LLC; Perdue Farms, Inc.; and Perdue Foods, LLC (collectively "Perdue"). See Mot. Summ. J.

(ECF No. 41). This Court referred the matter to a United States Magistrate Judge for report and
recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 72(b).

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation recommends that Jackson Creek's
Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. See R&R (ECF No. 67). In relevant part, the Report
and Recommendation concludes that there is no triable issues of fact regarding Perdue's
indemnity claims because, under the

circumstances presented,

proportionately liable only for its own negligence.

Perdue can

be

held

Perdue timely filed an Objection to this

portion of the Report and Recommendation, and Jackson Creek responded. See Objection (ECF
No. 76); see also Resp. (ECF No. 80).

This Court shall make a cle novo determination of those portions of the Report and

Recommendation or specified findings and recommendations to which objection is made. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The Court has reviewed the issue de novo and considered the Objection
and Response carefully.

The Magistrate Judge's conclusion regarding Perdue's claim to

contractual indemnity is sound.' The Report and Recommendation is adopted in its entirety.
CONCLUSION

The Court, having reviewed the record and examined Perdue's objections to the Report
and Recommendation, and having made de novo findings with respect to the portions objected
to, does hereby ADOPT and APPROVE the findings and recommendations set forth in the

Report and Recommendation. It is, therefore, ORDERED that Jackson Creek's Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 41) as to Perdue's crossclaims be GRANTED.

The remaining parties are ORDERED to participate in Court-assisted settlement efforts
to attempt to resolve the claims that remain pending in this matter. Counsel are DIRECTED to
contact the Court's Docket Clerk at 757-222-7222, within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order

to schedule a settlement conference before a United States Magistrate Judge.
The Clerk is REQUESTED to send a copy of this Order to the Magistrate Judge and to
all counsel of record.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

C/^" •
August /(p. 2017

ArendaTrrWfight Allen

United States District Judge

Norfolk, Virginia
' See 2 Thomas J. Schoi-nbaum, Admiralty and Maritimr Law § 5-9 {5th ed.) ("The [warranty of
workmanlike performance] doctrine is not fuily applicable to lowing contracts, however, at leasl insofar as it

conflicts with the admiralty rule imposing liability only for negligent conduct."); see also id § 12-4 ("Because of the
manifest unfairness of granting indemnity lo a parly guilty of concurrent negligence, the courts have abandoned

indemnity in favor of applying the rule of comparative fault, except in the context of Ryan itself, where the tow is
liable without fault and the lug is guilty of negligence.").