Roxanne Adams, Administrator of the Estate of Jamycheal M. Mitchell v. Naphcare, Inc. et al

Filing 165

OPINION entered and filed 3/3/17: This matter comes before the court on the Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") and Memorandum in Support filed by Defendants Kelly Boyd ("Boyd") and Lenna Jo Davis ("Davis") on June 8, 2016 . ECF Nos. 12 , 13 . The Plaintiff filed a Response on June 22, 2016, ECF No. 23 , and Boyd and Davis filed a Reply and a Request for Hearing on June 29, 2016. ECF Nos. 32 , 33 . On July 5, 2016, this court referred the Motion to a Unit ed States Magistrate Judge, as outlined, for the disposition of the Motion. ECF No. 38 . Having conducted a hearing regarding the Motion on October 19, 2016, ECF No. 139 , the Magistrate Judge filed the Report and Recommendation ("R&R" ;) on January 24, 2017. ECF No. 151 . The Magistrate Judge recommended granting the Motion. R&R at 1. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, Davis and Boyd's Objections, regarding the Magistrate Judge's findings on quasi-judicial a nd statutory immunity, are OVERRULED, and the Plaintiff's Objection, regarding the Magistrate Judge's finding that Defendant Boyd owed no duty toward Mitchell, is SUSTAINED. The Magistrate Judge's 151 R&R is hereby ADOPTED AND A PPROVED with respect to dismissing the claims of negligence and gross negligence against Davis, but REJECTED with respect to dismissing the claims of negligence and gross negligence against Boyd, and with respect to the basis of the findi ng, but not the ultimate finding itself, on quasi-judicial immunity. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with respect to the claims of negligence and gross negligence against Davis, and DENIED with respect to the claims of negligence a nd gross negligence against Boyd. The Plaintiff's claims of negligence and gross negligence against Davis are hereby DISMISSED, and the Plaintiff may proceed on the claims of negligence and gross negligence against Boyd. (Signed by Chief District Judge Rebecca Beach Smith on 3/3/17). (See Opinion and Foot Notes for Specifics) Copies provided as directed 3/3/17. (ecav, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OP VIRGINIA
Norfolk Division

ROXANNE ADAMS,

ADMINISTRATOR OF

THE ESTATE OF JAMYCHEAL M.

MITCHELL,

Plaintiff/
CIVIL ACTION NO.

V.

NAPHCARE,

INC.,

2;16cv229

et a l . ,

Defendants.
OPINION

This matter comes before the court on the Motion to Dismiss

("Motion")

and Memorandum in Support filed by Defendants Kelly

Boyd

("Boyd")

and Lenna Jo Davis

Nos.

12,

The

EOF No.

13.

23,

Plaintiff

("Davis")

filed a

on June 8,

2016.

Response on June

22,

EOF

2016,

and Boyd and Davis filed a Reply and a Request for

Hearing on June 29, 2016. EOF Nos.

On July 5, 2016,

32,

33.

this court referred the Motion to a United

States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§

636(b)(1)(B)

and

conduct hearings,
and

to

findings

submit

of

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

including evidentiary hearings,
to

fact,

the

if

undersigned

applicable,

District

and

72(b),

to

if necessary,
Judge

proposed

recommendations

for

the

Motion

on

filed

the

disposition of the Motion. ECF No. 38.

Having
October 19,

conducted
2016,

a

hearing

ECF No. 139,

the

regarding

the

Magistrate

Judge

Report

and

No. 151.

Recommendation

("R&R")

January

2017.

ECF

to

file

written

the parties were advised of their

objections

to

the

recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge.
February 3,

2017,

154.

findings

See id.

and

at 21.

On

the Plaintiff filed an Objection, ECF No. 153,

and on February 6,
No.

24,

The Magistrate Judge recommended granting the Motion.

R&R at 1. By copy of the R&R,
right

on

2017,

Davis and Boyd filed Objections.

On February 14,

2017,

the

ECF

Plaintiff responded to the

Objections by Davis and Boyd. ECF No. 160. On February 16, 2017,
Boyd filed a response to the Plaintiff's Objection. ECF No. 161.
The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.
I.

This action was brought by the Plaintiff in her capacity as
the

administrator

("Mitchell"),

who

of

died

Roads Regional Jail
the

Complaint

District

that

court,

order
health

("CRO")

of

treatment,

a

to

Compl.

that

send

Davis,
and

a

Eastern State
and

that,

of

pretrial

Portsmouth,

failed

to

as

estate

("HRRJ").

alleges

Court

the

as

detainee

HH 1,
as

in

20.

Clerk

Boyd,

judge's

as

a

result,

for

Mitchell

the

Hampton

Relevant here,
of

the

deputy

competency

Hospital
a

Jamycheal

General
clerk

of

restoration

Mitchell's mental

Davis

and

Boyd

were

negligent and grossly negligent in causing Mitchell's death,

as

well as injury to him and his surviving beneficiaries. Id. flU 2,
34,

172,

194,

203,

205,

206,

208-210.

The instant Motion, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6),

seeks dismissal of the claims against Davis

and Boyd because "[t]he Complaint fails to state sufficient and
plausible

claims

against

quasi-judicial
Davis

and

simple

and

[Davis

of

Boyd],

immunity

Boyd

negligence
and

bars

further

the

these

argue

and

gross

doctrine

claims."

that

the

of

Mem.

claims

negligence
absolute

Supp.

1.

barred

are

at

by

statutory immunity under Virginia Code § 16.1-69.40. Id. at 13.

In

the

R&R,

quasi-judicial
Plaintiff's

the

Magistrate

immunity

claims

nor

against

Judge

found

statutory

Davis

and

that

immunity

Boyd,

but

neither

bars

the

nonetheless

recommended that the claims against them be dismissed. R&R at 1,

8-10.

Davis

and

Boyd have

objected

to

the

Magistrate

Judge's

findings on quasi-judicial immunity and statutory immunity,
Defs.'

Obj.,

Judge's
though

and the

Plaintiff has

recommendation
not

to

the

of

objected to the Magistrate

dismissing

recommendation

see

the
of

claims

against

dismissing

the

Boyd,
claims

against Davis, See PI.'s Obj.
II.

Pursuant

Procedure,

entirety,

to

the

Rule

72(b)

court,

shall make a ^

of

having

the

Federal

reviewed

the

Rules

record

P.

Civil

in

its

novo determination of those portions

of the R&R to which a party has specifically objected.
Civ.

of

72(b). The court may accept,

reject,

or modify,

Fed.

R.

in whole

or

in

part,

recommit

the

the

recommendation

matter

to

him

of

the

with

magistrate

judge,

instructions.

28

or

U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C).

Pursuant

to

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(6),

a

complaint must be dismissed when a plaintiff's allegations fail
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ.
P.

12(b)(6).

sufficiency

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

of

a

complaint;

importantly,

contests surrounding the facts,

it

does

the merits of a

tests the

not

resolve

claim,

or the

applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin,
980

F.2d

dismiss,

943,

a

952

complaint

accepted as true,
on

its

face.'"

that

the

that

defendant

(citing Twombly,

for

a

or

contain

"To

survive

sufficient

v.

means
the

is

to

"mere[]

Iqbal,

556

v. Twombly,
that

court

liable

550 U.S.

plaintiff

possibility"
Id.

Corp.

allows

1992).

a

motion

factual

to

matter,

'state a claim to relief that is plausible

Ashcroft

plausibility

content

Cir.

must

to

(quoting Bell Atl.
Facial

(4th

a

allege

550 U.S.

662,

544,

"plaintiff

to

draw

for

the

at 556) .

U.S.

the

facts

(2007)).

pleads

factual

reasonable

inference

alleged."

therefore,

with

Id.

not enough

demonstrating

consist[ency]"

(2009)

570

misconduct

It is,

678

a

unlawful

"sheer
conduct.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

The

Supreme

Court

has

offered

courts evaluating a motion to dismiss:

the

following

guidance

to

[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose
to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they
are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the

assumption of
truth.
While
legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations,
a court should assume
their
veracity
and
then
determine
whether
they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id.

at

679.

complaint
favorable
Inc. ,

417

That

as

is,

true

the

and

views

to the plaintiff.
F.3d

418,

court

420

accepts

those

See,

facts

e.g.,

{4th Cir.

facts

alleged

in

the

light

Venkatraman v.

2005).

After

in

the
most

REI Sys.,

doing

so,

the

court should not grant the defendant's motion if the plaintiff
"demonstrate[s]
defendant

has

more

than

violated

when accepted as true,

his

*a

sheer

rights,

that 'show'

F.3d

at 678)

186,

193

(4th

Cir.

by

that

"articulat[ing]

the

facts,

that the plaintiff has stated

a claim entitling him to relief . .
588

possibility'"

.

2009)

Francis v.
{quoting

Giacomelli,

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

(as only quoting "a sheer possibility").
III.

Defendants

Davis

and

Boyd

have

both

objected

to

the

Magistrate Judge's findings that neither quasi-judicial immunity

nor

statutory

action.

immunity

shields

them

from

liability

On the issue of quasi-judicial immunity,

in

this

the Magistrate

Judge found that Davis and Boyd are not protected because "they

are

alleged

to

have

failed

to

perform

which they had no discretion"—that is,

a

ministerial

act

for

the transmission of the

CRO.

R&R at 9

{citing McCray v.

Maryland,

456 F.2d 1,

Cir. 1972)). On the issue of statutory immunity,

4

(4th

the Magistrate

Judge found that Davis and Boyd are not protected because the
statute

where

in

question

clerks

"reserves

'provid[e]

such

immunity

information

or

to

circumstances

assistance,'"

while,

"[a] s alleged here, the court clerks purportedly did not provide
assistance." Id. at 10 (quoting Va. Code § 16.1-69.40).
The
immunity

above,

court
and

will

address

statutory

the

immunity

the court reviews ^

issues

in

turn.

Due

Objection,

to

the

quasi-judicial

Moreover,

as

stated

novo each part of the Magistrate

Judge's R&R to which the parties object.
72(b)(3).

of

court's

ruling

See Fed.

below on

R.

the

Civ.

P.

Plaintiff's

the court will address two remaining matters that are

necessary for resolving the instant Motion.
A. Quasi-Judicial Invmvinity

Davis

and

recommendation
"the

Court

obedience

to

Boyd

argue

that

on quasi-judicial

Defendants,
and

District Court]."
"Clerk

Boyd

under
Defs.'

transmitted

through
the
Obj .
the

the

immunity
Clerk

general

is

incorrect

Boyd,

of

act.

Clerk Boyd's

the

July

31,

2015,

to

in

[General

Eastern

" [a] 1 though the

to operate under the guise of a
undeniable

because

Davis and Boyd note that

State Hospital." Id. at 3. They then argue that,

Complaint attempts

Judge's

functioned

direction

at 2-3.
CRO on

Magistrate

transmission betrays

failure

to

such attempt

and reveals the true spirit of the Complaint's theory—that the
Court

Defendants

allegedly

acted

late."

Id.

{citing

Compl.

1 172)

These arguments fail for several reasons. Most importantly,
the

Defendants

quasi-judicial
Circuit's

base

immunity,

opinion

Magistrate Judge
(citing McCray,
has noted,
not

apply

their

in

relying

McCray.

likewise
456

arguments

a

federal

principally

See

applied

F.2d at 4).

on

Defs.'

this

on

Obj.

the
at

standard.

Nonetheless,

standard

of

Fourth

2-3.

The

See R&R at

as

the

9

Plaintiff

the federal standard of quasi-judicial immunity does
here.

See

Pl.'s

Resp.

to

Mot.,

ECF

No.

23,

at

24;

Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Obj., ECF No. 160, at 4.

In

McCray,

the

Fourth

Circuit

addressed

quasi-judicial

immunity for a Maryland state court clerk in an action brought

under

42

U.S.C.

§ 1983.

immunity in question,

S^

therefore,

was being applied to a

federal

McCray,

456

F.2d

at 3-4.

The

while borrowed from common law,
cause of action.

See

id.

at 4

^ Davis and Boyd also argue that quasi-judicial immunity
protects them because "the
[P]laintiff's own September 2015
'Timeline' . .
supports the R&R's reasonable inference that
some person at the [General District Court] mailed the CRO on
May 27, 2015," upon its issuance from the judge. See Defs.' Obj.
at 3 n.2 (citing R&R at 15). However, that argument is not
relevant

to

the

instant

Motion,

because

the

Plaintiff

has

emphatically alleged that the CRO was not transmitted to Eastern
State Hospital until more than two months after i t was issued,

see Compl.

II 65,

and,

at this

juncture,

the court accepts the

Plaintiff's facts as true. See supra Part II.

{"Immunities which have been read into section 1983, derive from

those existing at common law.")

547,

554-55

(1967)).

Here,

{citing Pierson v. Ray,

by contrast,

386 U.S.

the Plaintiff's claims

of negligence and gross negligence against Davis and Boyd are

brought under state law,
205-206,

208-211,

or pendent

not federal

and "when a

law,

see Compl.

fH 203,

federal court exercises diversity

jurisdiction over state-law claims,

'the outcome of

the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the
same,

so

far

litigation,
V.

Casey,

V.

York,

as

legal

rules

determine

as i t would be if tried in a
487 U.S.

326 U.S.

131,
99,

151
109

(1988)

Boyd

sovereign

state law.

See,

{E.D.

2011)

law,

State court.'"

of

a

Felder

(1945)).

Accordingly,

a

reliance

on

as extended to federal

would be in error, because any protection for Davis and

under

Va.

[for a

outcome

(quoting Guaranty Trust Co.

the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity,
claims,

the

immunity
Harbeck v.

e.g.,

doctrine
Smith,

{noting

that

"the

§ 1983

Accordingly,
quasi-judicial

the

immunity
court

immunity

is

will
for

have

814 F.

sovereign

state law claim of negligence]

while

would

Supp.

to

lie

2d 608,

in
631

immunity argument

is governed by Virginia

governed
not

apply

federal

claims

by
the
to

federal

law").

doctrine
the

state

of
law

claims at issue here.^

^ Were the federal standard in McCray applicable here, the
court would agree with the Magistrate Judge's analysis.

Under
immunity

the

may

applicable

extend

to

law

other

of

Virginia,

public

"quasi-judicial

officials

acting

within

their jurisdiction,

in good faith and while performing judicial

functions."

v.

(citing

Yates

Moorman,

80

judicial
Supreme
court

Harlow

v.

Va.

Clatterbuck,

Ley,

121

131,

function,

139

Va.

Court's
determines

whether

has

"functional

of

Harlow,

at 494

230 Va.

the

265,

(1885)).

Virginia

characteristics

230

Va.

270

To

(1917);

determine

adopted

task

judicial process"
(quoting Butz v.

Economou,

United

States

Supreme

role

of

administrative

the
law

modern

judge,"

federal

whose

subpoenas,

rule on proffers of evidence,

hearing,

at 513.

The

importantly,

and make

or

Supreme

Court

the

structured so as
his

those

"powers

comparable

independent

process

of a

trial

are

478,

the

if

may

in
or
not

issue

regulate the course of
Butz,

explained

that,

agency

adjudication

is

judgment on the

immunity.

often,

further

to assure that

the

In Butz,

He

of

the

of

examiner

judge:

recommend decisions."

of

wherein

comparability

hearing

generally,

the

to

functional

v.

States

438 U.S.

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

"the

scope

to warrant

(1978)

found

Johnston

enough

512-13

Court

(1986)

United

test,

"shares

493

the

the

comparability"
the

490,

438

U.S.

"[m]ore
currently

the hearing examiner exercises
evidence before him,

free

from

pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency."
Id.

(emphasis added).

Applying Virginia's standard for quasi-judicial immunity to
the

instant

case,

the

are

protected under

court

that

finds

that

doctrine.

neither Davis nor Boyd

Critically,

alleged by the Plaintiff,

do not support a

and

a

Boyd

under

were

the

Virginia.

performing

Butz

The

judicial

functional

ministerial

of

facts,

function,

as

test

transmitting

a

envisioned
adopted

court

does not entail the exercise of independent judgment,

comparable

to

those of

a

judge.

Therefore,

as

finding that Davis

comparability

task

the

by

order

or powers

the application of

quasi-judicial immunity for the claims against Davis and Boyd is

not warranted under Virginia law.^ Accordingly, Davis and Boyd's
objection based on quasi-judicial immunity is hereby OVERRULED.
B. Statutory Immunity

Davis

and

Boyd

object

to

the

Magistrate

Judge's

finding

that they are not entitled to statutory immunity under Virginia
law.

Defs.'

"[n]o

clerk

Obj.
or

at

5.

The

deputy

provision

clerk

shall

in question

states

that

be

liable

for

civilly

providing information or assistance that is within the scope of

his duties." Va.

Code § 16.1-69.40. Davis and Boyd contend that

this provision applies to them,

^

The

reasonable

Plaintiff
inference

argues
of

because they "actually provided

that

bad

the

faith

facts
and

demonstrate
action

a

beyond

jurisdiction. See Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. at 27-28. However, because
the lack of judicial function is sufficient to dispose of
quasi-judicial immunity,
the court declines to address the
issues of bad faith and acting outside of the Defendants'
jurisdiction.
10

assistance in the context of the CRO." Defs.'

Obj . at 5.

Davis

and Boyd argue that "Clerk Boyd transmitted the CRO to [Eastern
State

Hospital]

on

allegedly untimely,

July

31,

2015,"

and

liable for

later."

" [a]Ithough

this transmission was still assistance, and,

contrary to the Complaint's allegations,
not be

that,

[Davis and Boyd]

should

the decedent's unforeseeable death three weeks

Id.

The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Davis and
Boyd's

interpretation

meaning

of

these

of

words

Va.

beyond

at 10.

"As alleged here,"

court

clerks

Because
timely

the
to

have

the

has
CRO

§

16.1-69.40

reasonable

"stretches

the

interpretation."

R&R

the Magistrate Judge

purportedly
Plaintiff

Code

did

not

alleged

that

transmitted

Davis

upon

"the

assistance."

provide

explained,

Id.

and

its

Boyd

failed

issuance,

the

immunity offered through this statute is not applicable to the

negligence and gross negligence claims against them,

and their

objection based on statutory immunity is OVERRULED.
C. Plaintiff's Objection

The

Plaintiff

recommendation

negligence

that

against

objects
the

Boyd

to

claims

should

11

be

the
of

Magistrate
negligence

dismissed.

See

Judge's

and

Pl.'s

gross

Obj.

at 1/

The

finding

Magistrate

that the

Judge

based

Complaint fails

this

recommendation on his

to make a

plausible showing

that Boyd owed a duty toward Mitchell. R&R at 14. However,
Plaintiff

argues

otherwise.

See

"Timeline,"
the

that

Pl.'s

Obj.

provides a

Portsmouth

a

document
at 5-10.

District

Court,

name and signature at the bottom.

Motion,

as

the

This

by

Boyd

document,

shows

called

the

list of events in the Mitchell case at

General

The Magistrate Judge

created

the

it

carries

Boyd's

See Timeline,

ECF No.

139-1.

considered the

document

was

and

Timeline

explicitly

in reviewing

referenced

in

the
the

Complaint and offered by the Plaintiff as an exhibit "integral
to

the

Complaint"

objection

from

at

the

Magistrate Judge

the

hearing

Defendants.

found

that

on

this

matter,

at

7-8.

Nonetheless,

R&R

the Timeline failed

with

no
the

to demonstrate

that Boyd owed any duty to Mitchell. Id. at 14-15. Specifically,
the Magistrate Judge found that

of

Boyd's duties

or

"the Timeline mentions nothing

responsibilities,

or any

facts

supporting

the conclusion that she personally had a duty to forward the CRO
in May 2015 and failed to do so." Id. at 15.
The

Plaintiff

challenges

Timeline document permits a

this

finding,

reasonable

arguing

inference

that

"the

that Boyd was

charged with the handling of Mitchell's case and CRO from

the

^ The Plaintiff has not objected to the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation of dismissing the claims of negligence and gross
negligence against Davis. See Pl.'s Obj. at 3 n.2.
12

outset," Pl.'s Obj. at 8, and that a reasonable factfinder could
make

this

conclusion

based

the

following

evidence

from

the

Timeline:

(1) Boyd was selected from among all deputy clerks to
summarize Mitchell's case in a signed document after
Mitchell's death and when there was an ongoing state
investigation into his death,
(2)
Boyd summarized
Mitchell's case by referring to herself but not to any
other Clerk's Office employee, and (3) Boyd admitted
to being personally charged with handling Mitchell's
case and specifically his CRO by at least July 31, but
did

not

indicate

that

Overall,

she

the

took

over

the

case

from

another.

Id.

at

8-9.

Timeline

suggests

charged

with

judge's

CRO

Boyd,

handling
to

Plaintiff

and

not

Mitchell's

Eastern

State

argues

that

case

the

deputy

another

because

clerk,

was

transmitting

the

and

Hospital,

the

Plaintiff

has

satisfied her pleading burden. Id. at 9-10.

For

the

purpose

of

evaluating

contains "sufficient factual matter,
a

claim to relief

U.S.
that

at 678
the

asserted
Mitchell's

Hospital.

was

that

that

Boyd

case

The

ostensibly

has

and

was

the

Timeline

created

the

her

deputy

transmission of

is

by

face,'"

550 U.S. at 570),

satisfied

the

burden
clerk

the

CRO

mentions no other deputy clerk,

13

alone.

Iqbal,

and

556

plausibly

responsible
to

Moreover,

and appears

to *state

the court agrees

signed by Boyd alone,

Boyd

Complaint

accepted as true,

is plausible on its

(quoting Twombly,
Plaintiff

whether

for

Eastern State

and,

the

thus,

it

Timeline

to state that Boyd

herself faxed the CRO to Eastern State Hospital in July 2015. At

least

in

terms

argument

of

plausibility,

compelling

that,

the

had

another

responsible for the Mitchell case,
been mentioned in the Timeline,

court

also

deputy

finds

the

clerk

been

that deputy clerk would have

or would have actually created

the Timeline. Additionally, given that the Complaint asserts the
Timeline

see

was

Compl.

Timeline

"added

^

65,

after-the-fact"

the

mentioned

incentive

another

for

deputy

to

Mitchell's

Boyd

to

clerk

court

ensure

file,

that

responsible

the
for

Mitchell's case would have been especially strong.

For these reasons,

the Timeline provides sufficient support

for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Boyd was the deputy

clerk assigned to Mitchell's case,
duty

to

forward

sufficiently
negligence

the

pled
and

the
gross

CRO.

and therefore owed Mitchell a

Accordingly,

element

of

negligence

duty

the

Plaintiff

for

against

the

claims

Boyd,

and

has
of
the

Plaintiff's Objection is SUSTAINED.®
D. Remaining Matters

The
Motion

court's
itself,

rulings
because

on
the

the

Objections

Magistrate

do

not

Judge,

resolve
due

to

the
the

® Although the Magistrate Judge noted that the Timeline, by
twice mentioning a transmission of the CRO to Eastern State
Hospital, actually undermines the Plaintiff's claim that the CRO
was never sent, see R&R at 15, this does not affect the question
of Boyd's duty to send it. Rather, the factual dispute over the
CRO's transmission lies beyond the instant stage of review.
14

recommendation
plead

the

address

of

element

whether

cause,

granting

and

of

negligence.

See

duty,

the

whether

the

Motion

found

Plaintiff
the

R&R

that

had

Plaintiff

at 20.®

based
it

on

adequately
had

failure

to

unnecessary

was

a

to

pled

adequately

However,

since

proximate

pled

the

gross

court

has

sustained the Plaintiff's Objection on the issue of Boyd's duty
to Mitchell,

the court now addresses

the

two remaining matters

of proximate cause and gross negligence, as they relate to Boyd.
i.

Proximate Cause

In the Motion, Boyd states that the Plaintiff has failed to
plead

the

element

of

proximate

cause

for

the

claims

of

negligence and gross negligence against Boyd. Specifically, Boyd
argues

that

which are,
were

in

"the

alleged

mistreatment

no

way

2015

alleges

no

foreseeable

and August

facts

to

19,

the very least,

® The

to

Magistrate

[Boyd]

2015,"

demonstrate

Boyd further argues that she
at

death

of

Mitchell,

respectively, horrific as pled and undeniably tragic,

May 27,

that,

and

and

at

that

otherwise."

point

"[t]he

Mem.

between

Complaint

Supp.

at

10.

"could not have possibly foreseen

re-transmitting a

Judge

any

did

note

copy of

that

the

the CRO to

question

of

proximate cause "was addressed, however, along with the question
of
foreseeability,
in
the
undersigned's
Report
and
Recommendation with respect to Defendant Hart, and by the Chief
District
Judge
in her
January 19,
2017
Memorandum Order
overruling Defendant Hart's objections thereto." R&R at 20 n.4
(citing ECF Nos. 147, 150).
15

Eastern State Hospital by facsimile on July 31, 2015, which was
still

three

stuffed

weeks

away

into

consequences

a

Mitchell's

desk

alleged."

Plaintiff has
Mitchell's

before

failed

Id.

drawer

and

"that

and

the

would

lead

Additionally,

to allege

mistreatment

death,

to

naturally be

the

avoidable

Boyd argues

.

.

.

that

the

Boyd was aware of

extent

of

his

personal

situation." Id. In response, the Plaintiff argues that "[i]t was
reasonably foreseeable that grave consequences could result from

the

failure

mentally
remand

to

timely

incompetent,

to

a

state

transmit
that

a

mental

an

order

judge

hospital

concerning a

ordered
and

.

.

immediate

.

man

so

immediate
in-patient

hospitalization therein." Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. at 18.

Under Virginia law,

"[t]he proximate cause of an event is

that act or omission which,

in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
and

v.
Va.

without

519,

that

event

251 Va.

Payne,

which

122,

128

522

(1970)).

would

(1996)

Furthermore,

proximate cause of an event." Id.
Va.

60,

65

defendant's

not

produces the event,

have

occurred."

(quoting Beale v.

defendant's

Jones,

210

"(t]here may be more than one
(citing Panousos v. Allen,

245

(1993)). Although "negligence intervening between the
negligent

act

and

the

injury"

defendant of liability for his negligent act,"
negligence

Jenkins

"must

so

entirely

negligence

that

supersede

it alone,
16

the

without

may

"relieve

a

that intervening
operation

of

the

any contributing

negligence by the defendant in the slightest degree,

causes the

injury."

Coleman v.

Id.

at 29

(citing Panousos,

Blankenship Oil Corp.,
V.

Gay,

103 Va.

Applying

320,

221 Va.

324

these

124,

245 Va.

131

at 65;

(1980) ; City of Richmond

(1905)).

standards,

the

court

finds

that

the

Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the element of proximate cause
for the claims of negligence and gross negligence against Boyd.
At this juncture,
was

issued for Mitchell's immediate medical needs,

therefore

be

even death,
to

taking the Plaintiff's facts as true,

reasonably

foreseeable

to result from a

the proper authorities.

intervening cause,
desk

drawer"

at

Eastern

consequences

withstand

the

Plaintiff
alleged

after

in

its

court,

the

failure

consequences,

failure timely to transmit the CRO
Importantly,

State

Boyd's

of
based

Complaint,

to

issuance

transmit

was

Hospital,

alleged,"

scrutiny

The

negative

and i t would

argument

for an

such as the CRO's being "stuffed away into a

"avoidable

proceeding.

for

the CRO

a

Mem.

and

Supp.

review

at

on

facts

the

may
the

at

as

proximate

subsequent

10,

does

not

stage

this

reasonably
CRO

other

of

the

alleged

infer

by

the

more

cause

of

Boyd's

two

months

Mitchell's

for

that

death.

than

The court may also reasonably infer that the alleged failure to
process

the

CRO

at

alleged

mistreatment

Eastern

of

State

Mitchell

17

Hospital,

at

the

as

jail,

well

were

as

the

other

proximate causes of his death, but not events that "so entirely
supersede[d]
[they]

alone,

defendant

extent

the

251

Va.

221 Va.

to

operation of
without

in

Jenkins,
Coleman,

the

any

at

129

a

degree,

(citing

subsequent

negligence

negligence

cause[d]

Panousos,

City of Richmond,

weeks before Mitchell's death,

all,

defendant's

contributing

slightest

at 131;

which

the

of

the

injury."

Va.

103 Va.

transmission

by

the
245

that

at 65;

at 324) .

the

The

CRO,

three

relieves Boyd of liability,

if at

is a question of fact to be resolved beyond this stage of

the proceeding.

For these reasons,

burden

for

the

the Plaintiff has satisfied her pleading

element

of

proximate

cause

in

negligence and gross negligence against Boyd.

the

claims

In doing so,

of
the

Plaintiff has also satisfied her burden for pleading the claim

of

ordinary

Tallow Co.,

negligence
192 Va.

negligence

there

consequent

injury.

against

776,

must
An

780

be

a

Boyd.

(1951)

duty,

accident

See

Trimyer

v.

Norfolk

("To constitute actionable

a

which

violation
is

not

thereof,

reasonably

and

a

to

be

foreseen by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence is not
sufficient

ground

for

a

negligence

action.").

However,

the

question remains whether the Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the
remaining claim of gross negligence against Boyd.

18

ii. Gross Negligence

In Virginia,
showing

gross negligence is

indifference

to

prudence that amounts

another

to a

"a degree of negligence

and

an

(2004)

disregard

of

complete neglect of the safety of

such other person." Elliott v. Carter,
(quoting Cowan v.

utter

292 Va.
Inc.,

Hospice Support Care,

618,

622

268 Va.

(2016)

482,

487

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Gross negligence "is

a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the
rights

of

others

which

amounts

to

the

absence

diligence, or the want of even scant care." Id.
V.

City of

negligence

Va.

Beach,

"requires

fair-minded persons,
willful

a

186,

of

190

(quoting Chapman

(1996)).

negligence

slight

Indeed,

gross

would

shock

that

although demonstrating something less than
Id.

quotation marks

gross

Va.

degree

recklessness."

(internal
whether

252

of

negligence

fact to be decided by a

(quoting

Cowan,

has

been

Va.

"Ordinarily,

omitted)).

268

the

established

is

a

at

487

question
matter of

jury," but "when persons of reasonable

minds could not differ upon the conclusion that such negligence
has not been established,

it

Id.

City

(quoting

Frazier

v.

is

the
of

court's

Norfolk,

duty to
234

Va.

so rule."
388,

393

(1987)).

Boyd has argued that the claim of gross negligence against

her must be dismissed because
to

show,

sufficient [ly]

or

"[t]he Complaint alleges nothing

plausibly,
19

that

.

.

.

Clerk

Boyd

deliberately acted to violate prudence and Mitchell's rights and

safety."

Mem.

Supp.

at 11."'

Boyd further

states that

"[t]he

positive act of re-transmitting a copy of the CRO by facsimile
on July 31,
Mitchell's

2015,
death,

itself,

which was

sufficiently

still

defeats

three weeks before
a

claim

of

gross

negligence as a matter of law." Id. Finally, Boyd adds that "the

Complaint does not allege that

[Davis and Boyd]

were aware of

Mitchell's alleged mistreatment and situation at [the jail] and,
thus, could not have acted in deliberate neglect." Id. at 11-12.

In response,

the Plaintiff argues that "Boyd's actions and

inactions clearly constituted gross negligence," as she "failed
every

day

[CRO]

to Eastern State

The

for

Plaintiff

known,

that

could

cause

approximately

further

[her]

6 0 - day

[Hospital]."

argues

repeated

imminent,

a

that

period

to

Pl.'s Resp.

"Boyd knew,

failure

significant

to

to Mot.

or

carry out

harm

to

transmit

the

at

the
23.

should have

[her]

duties

mentally

ill

Mitchell as he languished in jail and was not sent to a hospital
for
at

court-ordered

treatment

because

of

their

failures."

Id.

24.

At this stage of the proceeding,
begun,

reasonable minds

before discovery has even

can differ over whether Boyd's alleged

^ Although Boyd argues that she transmitted the CRO on two
occasions, and that this shows "the presence and exercise of
care and diligence," see Mem, Supp. at 11, once again, such an
argument does not comport with the standard of review for the
instant Motion. See supra note 1.
20

failure

to transmit the CRO amounted to an

prudence

that amounts

to a

complete neglect of

such other person." Elliott,
Va.

at 487) .

Accordingly,

"utter disregard of

292 Va. at 622

the

Plaintiff

the safety of

(quoting Cowan,

has

268

sufficiently pled

gross negligence against Boyd to survive the instant Motion.
IV.

For

the

reasons

above,

Davis

and

Boyd's

Objections,

regarding the Magistrate Judge's findings on quasi-judicial and
statutory

immunity,

Objection,

are

OVERRULED,

and

the

Magistrate

Judge's

regarding

Defendant Boyd owed no duty toward Mitchell,

Magistrate
respect

Judge's

to

negligence

R&R

is

dismissing
against

hereby

the

ADOPTED

claims

Davis,

but

of

the

Plaintiff's
finding

is SUSTAINED.

AND

APPROVED

negligence

REJECTED

that

with

and

The

with
gross

respect

to

dismissing the claims of negligence and gross negligence against
Boyd,

and with respect to the basis of the finding,

but not the

ultimate finding itself, on quasi-judicial immunity.
Accordingly,

the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with respect

to the claims of negligence and gross negligence against Davis,
and DENIED with respect
negligence

against

to

Boyd.

the

The

claims

of

Plaintiff's

negligence
claims

of

and gross
negligence

and gross negligence against Davis are hereby DISMISSED,

Plaintiff

may

proceed

on

the

claims

negligence against Boyd.
21

of

negligence

and the

and

gross

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a

copy of

this Opinion to

counsel for all parties.
IT IS

/S/

SO ORDERED.

Rebecca Beach Smith
Chief Judge
REBECCA BEACH SMITH
CHIEF JUDGE

March

O
3,,

2017

22