Roxanne Adams, Administrator of the Estate of Jamycheal M. Mitchell v. Naphcare, Inc. et al

Filing 173

MEMORANDUM ORDER entered and filed 3/24/17: This matter comes before the court on the Motion to Dismiss {"Motion") and Memorandum in Support filed by Defendant Natalya Thomas ("Thomas") on August 15, 2016. ECF Nos. 109 , 110 . The Plaintiff filed a Response on September 12, 2016, ECF No. 129 , and on September 30, 2016, Thomas filed a Reply. ECF No. 135 . On October 3, 2016, this court referred the Motion to United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leonard, as outlined. Having conducted a hearing regarding the Motion on October 19, 2016, ECF No. 139 , the Magistrate Judge filed the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") on February 22, 2017. ECF No. 164 . The Ma gistrate Judge recommended denying the Motion. On March 8, 2017, Thomas filed Objections to the R&R. ECF No. 168 . On March 20, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a Response to the Objections. ECF No. 170 . The matter has been fully brief ed and is ripe for review. In conclusion, Defendant Thomas's Objections are OVERRULED, the Magistrate Judge's R&R is ADOPTED AND APPROVED IN FULL, and Defendant Thomas's 109 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, as outlined. (See Memorandum Order and Foot Notes for Specifics) (Signed by Chief District Judge Rebecca Beach Smith on 3/24/17). Copies provided as directed 3/24/17. (ecav, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Norfolk Division

ROXANNE ADAMS,

ADMINISTRATOR OF

THE ESTATE OF JAMYCHEAL M.

MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,
V.

CIVIL ACTION NO.

NAPHCARE,

INC.,

2:16cv229

et a l . .

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER

This matter comes before the court on the Motion to Dismiss

{"Motion")

Thomas

and Memorandum in Support filed by Defendant Natalya

("Thomas")

Plaintiff filed a

on August

15,

2016.

ECF Nos.

Response on September 12,

109,

2016,

110.

ECF No.

The
129,

and on September 30, 2016, Thomas filed a Reply. ECF No. 135.
On

October

3,

2016,

this

court

referred

United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence R.

the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
Civil

Procedure

72(b),

evidentiary

hearings,

undersigned

District

applicable,

and

Motion.

ECF No.

Having
October 19,

§ 636(b)(1)(B)

if

to

conduct

necessary,

Judge

proposed

recommendations

for

the

Leonard,

Motion

pursuant to

and Federal Rule of
hearings,

and

to

findings
the

to

including

submit
of

to

the

fact,

if

disposition

of

the

137.

conducted
2016,

ECF

a

hearing

No. 139,

the

regarding

the

Magistrate

Judge

Motion

on

filed

the

Report

and

No. 164.

Recommendation

("R&R")

on

February

22,

2017.

ECF

The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the Motion.

R&R at 1. By copy of the R&R, the parties were advised of their
right

to

file

written

objections

to

the

findings

and

recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. See id. at 17-18.
On

March

No. 168.

8,

2017,

On March

the Objections.

Thomas
20,

filed

2017,

ECF No.

the

Objections
Plaintiff

to

the

filed

a

R&R.

Response

ECF
to

170. The matter has been fully briefed

and is ripe for review.
I.

This action was brought by the Plaintiff in her capacity as
the

administrator

("Mitchell"),

who

of

died

the

as

a

estate

pretrial

Roads Regional Jail ("HRRJ"). Compl.
period of pretrial detention.

of

Jamycheal

detainee

in

Mitchell

the

Hampton

1, 20. During Mitchell's

Defendant Thomas was

"a licensed

registered nurse and the Health Services Administrator at HRRJ,"

employed by Defendant NaphCare,
Under a

contract

services

to

supervised,

with HRRJ,

the

HRRJ

directed,

the jail.

Id.

and other

Defendants

referred

to

H 21.

as

Complaint alleges

the
the

and

Inc.

NaphCare

inmates,
controlled

{"NaphCare").

worked

"NaphCare

for

H 27.

provided on-site medical
including
health

NaphCare

Defendants."

Mitchell,

care

Throughout the Complaint,
who

Id.

personnel

and
at

Defendant Thomas
are
Id.

collectively
32.

The

following claims against Defendant Thomas

in

particular:

wanton

negligence,

negligence

202-211;
delay,

gross

under

deprivation

negligence,

Virginia

of

civil

law

willful

and

One),

id.

{Count

rights

and withholding of medical care,

and

through

the

denial,

under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983

(Count Two), id. HH 212-223; deprivation of civil rights due to
conditions

of detention,

under 42

U.S.C.

§

1983

(Count

Three),

id. IIH 224-238; and a general deprivation of civil rights, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983
In
Civil

the

(Coiint Five),

instant Motion,

Procedure

aforementioned

claim

upon

Magistrate
Plaintiff's

Judge,

filed pursuant

12(b)(6),

claims

which

HH 252-258.

due

relief

to

Thomas
the

can

Complaint

as

seeks

granted.

the

true,

facts

found

Federal Rule

of

dismissal

of

failure

Plaintiff's

be

accepting

to

state

See

as

that

Mot.

to

at 1.

alleged

a

The

in

the

Plaintiff

the

sufficiently stated these claims against Thomas,

the

has

and recommended

denying the Motion. See R&R at 13-17.
II.

Pursuant

Federal

Rule of

Civil

Procedure

72(b),

the

having reviewed the record in its entirety, shall make a ^

court,

novo

determination of those portions of the R&R to which a party has
specifically objected.
accept,

reject,

recommendation of

or

Fed.
modify,

R.

Civ.
in

72(b).

whole

the Magistrate Judge,

to him with instructions. 28 U.S.C,

P.

or

The
in

court may
part,

the

or recommit the matter

§ 636(b)(1)(C).

Pursuant

to

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(6),

a

complaint must be dismissed when a plaintiff's allegations fail
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
P.

12(b)(6).

sufficiency
contests

"A motion to dismiss under Rule

of

a

complaint;

surrounding the

importantly,

facts,

Fed. R.

12(b)(6)

it

does

the merits of a

tests

not

F.2d

dismiss,

943,

a

952

complaint

accepted as true,
on

its

face.'"

that

the

that

for

a

defendant

Id.

or

contain

"To

survive

sufficient

v.

Iqbal,

means
the

is

that

court

liable

a

556

v. Martin,

a

motion

factual

U.S.

550 U.S.

to

"mere[]

allege

662,

544,

"plaintiff

to

draw

for

the

the

to

matter,

facts

678

(2007)).

pleads

factual

reasonable

inference

alleged."

therefore,

with

Id.

not enough

demonstrating

consist[ency]"

(2009)

570

misconduct

550 U.S. at 556) . It is,

plaintiff

possibility"

1992).

Corp. v. Twombly,

allows

(citing Twombly,

must

Ashcroft

plausibility

content

Cir.

or the

to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible

(quoting Bell Atl.
Facial

(4th

the

resolve

claim,

applicability of defenses." Repxiblican Party of N.C.
980

Civ.

a

unlawful

"sheer
conduct.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The

Supreme

Court

has

offered

the

following

guidance

courts evaluating a motion to dismiss:
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose
to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they
are no more

than conclusions,

assumption of
truth.
provide the framework

are not entitled to the

While
legal conclusions can
of a complaint, they must be

to

supported by
factual
allegations.
When
there
are
well-pleaded
factual
allegations,
a
court
should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id.

at

679.

complaint

That

as

is,

true

the

and

court

views

favorable to the plaintiff.
Inc.,

417

F.3d 418,

420

accepts

those

See,

(4th

facts

e.g. ,

Cir.

facts
in

alleged
the

Venkatraman v.

2005) .

After

in

light

the
most

REI Sys.,

doing

so,

the

court should not grant the defendant's motion if the plaintiff
"demonstrate[s]
defendant

has

more

than

violated

his

'a

sheer

rights,

possibility'"
by

that

"articulat[ing]

the

facts,

when accepted as true, that 'show' that the plaintiff has stated

a claim entitling him to relief . .
588

P.3d

at 678)

186,

193

{4th

Cir.

2009)

.

Francis v. Giacomelli,
(quoting

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

(as only quoting "a sheer possibility").
III.

Thomas has submitted four
No.

168.

(4) Objections to the R&R.^ ECF

Having reviewed the record in its entirety,

herein makes a ^

the court

novo determination of those portions of the

R&R to which a party has specifically objected.

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

72(b). The court will address each of the Objections in turn.

^ Although Thomas objected to the R&R for "three reasons,"
Thomas divided the third reason, regarding the various degrees
of negligence claims against her, into two parts, and the court
addresses them separately. See Objs. at 4-5; infra Parts III.C, D.

A. First Objection

In the First Objection, Thomas argues that Counts Three and
Five are duplicative of Count Two,

constituting "the same cause

of action arising out of the same set of facts labelled by three
different
the

names,"

same

cause

duplicative
Love-Lane

that

"claims

action

should

Martin,

Specifically,

alleging

of

and
v.

and

Thomas

against

be

355

F.3d

asserts

same"

are

the

766,

that

the

the

claim

.

claim

of

in

F.2d

standard
medical

987,
to

991

show a

care

law,

(4th

that

Cir.

amounts

(Count

failure

to

provide

{Count

[Two]),"

restatement

Count

5

(citing

Cir.

2004)).

Count

Three,

confinement,

in Count

[Three] )

medical

the

[Two],"

Count

of

particular
1992),

to

court

"duplicative" of Count Two.
because

in

violation under

confinement

that

are

Two,

is

alleging

serious medical

Id. at 6. Thomas further asserts that the Magistrate Judge

misconstrued applicable
979

essentially

at

{4th

unconstitutionally deliberate indifference to a
need.

.

defendant

Objs.

783

conditions

as

.

same

dismissed."

unconstitutional

"substantively the

that

Five

an

is

the

that,

v.

Nicodemus,

because

"the

Fourteenth Amendment

unconstitutional

for

condition

of

the same as the standard for the

care

under

should

Id.

be

the

Eight[h]

dismiss

at 7-8.

"cannot

Plaintiff's

and

Hill

Moreover,

construed

deliberate

Count

as

Amendment
Three

as

Thomas argues
more

indifference

than

claim

i t should also be dismissed. See id. at 8-9.

a

in

In response,
support
Resp.

for

the

to Objs.

the

Plaintiff argues

proposition

at 2,

that

duplicative

lacks legal

counts,

see

Pl.'s

and that the Magistrate Judge was correct

in obsei-ving that Thomas
proposition

of

that Thomas

a

"failed to cite any authority for the

claim

dismissed solely on th[is]

which

overlaps

ground,

another

should

be

or for the proposition that

counts which seek duplicative relief are appropriately dismissed
at

the

Rule

(alteration

12(b)(6)
to

stage."

at

language

match

Id.

8

in

R&R).

(quoting
The

R&R

Plaintiff

at

17)

further

argues that the cases cited by Thomas are "inapposite," because

they

"concern

the

implication

of

suing

a

public

official

his/her official capacity," not the instant matter,
and that

failure

the

to

medical

care

claim

is

id.

at 13,

"concedes

language of Thomas's objection

provide

in

that a

different

from

a

conditions-of-confinement/detention claim." Id. at 14.

The

court

agrees

with

the

Plaintiff,

and

the

Magistrate

Judge was correct in recommending not to dismiss claims based on
Thomas's argument that the claims are "duplicative." Coiints Two,
Three,
proof

and
for

themselves

Five

present

each claim,
the same.

different

shared or not,

that

Love-Lane,

the

the

does

and

the

not make

standard of
the

claims

Thomas does not provide any legal support

for her argument to the contrary,

Plaintiff

claims,

cases

Fourth

Thomas

Circuit

and the court agrees with the

provided

recognized

are
that

inapposite.
a

§

1983

In

claim

brought

against

essentially
itself.

a

the

public

same

Love-Lane,

473 U.S.

159,

Thomas's

165-66

a

against

as

claim

(1985)).

here

the

demonstrated that

in an official

355 F.3d at 783

argument

substantively

official

public

(citing Kentucky v.

entity
Graham,

This principle has no bearing on

that

same,

the

capacity is

Counts
and

Two,

Three,

Thomas

has

and
not

they are substantively the same.

Five

are

otherwise

Accordingly,

the First Objection is OVERRULED.
B. Second Objection

In the Second Objection,

Thomas argues

has not plausibly alleged

in Count Two

knowledge

serious

at 9-10.

of

Mitchell's

Specifically,

that the Plaintiff

that

Thomas

medical

had actual

needs.

Thomas argues that "[t]he

See

Objs.

[c]ourt cannot

infer from a job title and description of responsibilities" that
she had such knowledge.
3:13cv572,

response,

2014 WL 1493569,

Magistrate

Judge

from Reid.

See id.

condition.

at *6

by Thomas go

responsibilities,"

Complaint

at 10

(citing Re id v.
(E.D.

Va.

Apr.

Newton,

14,

No.

2014).

In

the Plaintiff argues that the "specific allegations of

actual behavior"

The

Id.

Pl.'s
was

"well beyond a

Resp.

correct

to
to

Objs.

at

distinguish

job title or job
17,
the

and

that

instant

the
case

a t 14-19.

Magistrate

plausibly

Judge

was

alleges

In the R&R,

correct

Thomas's

to

find

knowledge

that

of

that

Mitchell's

the Magistrate Judge noted that
8

the

"Thomas

served on a committee tasked with monitoring and evaluating the
care provided to inmates," and that "[t]he Complaint is replete
with

allegations

manifested
Reid,

the

alone

Mitchell's

themselves

is

court

in

held

above

the

superintendent,
allege

that

jail

more
had

ways."

R&R

needs

at

which

14-15.

In

"job

the

allegation

of

actual

Reid,

WL

1493569

level."

Thomas's

medical

superintendent's

raise

speculative

but,

Thomas

a

to

(emphasis added).

serious

noticeable

that

insufficient

knowledge

at *6

of

2014

job is different

importantly,

knowledge

by

the

from a

Plaintiff

virtue

of

title

her

jail

does
job

not

title

alone. As the Magistrate Judge explained:

Thomas' knowledge is alleged to have come from more
than just her job title. Her role on the quality
assurance committee charged her with actually knowing
the care the inmate population, including Mitchell,
received . . . . Moreover, Plaintiff alleged eight
examples of information she would have known given her
role as Health Services Administrator.

R&R at 15 n.l (citing Compl. H 128).
Given the Plaintiff's specific allegations that Thomas knew
of Mitchell's condition through her conduct,

her

job

title

alone,

the

instant

rather than through

Complaint

differs

allegations in Reid. At this stage of the proceeding,

from

accepting

the Plaintiff's facts as alleged in the Complaint as true,
Plaintiff

Mitchell's

has

raised

serious

a

reasonable

medical

Objection is OVERRULED.

inference

needs.

that

Thomas

Accordingly,

the

the

the

knew of

Second

C. Third Objection

In the Third Objection,

Thomas argues that the Plaintiff's

claim of simple negligence in Count One is based on an alleged
breach of Thomas's duty to supervise,
duty under Virginia law,

be dismissed.

See Objs.

which is not a

and that the claim,

at 12-14

Although Thomas notes that she
to

all

people,

including

therefore,

(citing Keck v.

No. 3;10cv555, 2011 WL 4589997, at *21

recognized
should

Commonwealth,

(E.D. Va. Sep. 9, 2011)).

"owes a

Mitchell,"

reasonable duty of care
Thomas

asserts

that

the

Magistrate Judge characterized her duty as seeing that someone
else,

but not Thomas herself,

at 13-14.

provided Mitchell with care.

Id.

Because this "defines the duty at issue in this claim

as a duty to supervise," Thomas argues,

the Plaintiff's claim of

simple negligence should be dismissed. Id. at 14.

In

response,

the

Plaintiff

states

that

"[t]he

Magistrate

Judge properly rejected Defendant Thomas's assertion that Count
[One]

asserts

a

negligent

supervision

claim,"

because

Complaint "makes allegations regarding Thomas's own,
duties

and actions."

Pl.'s Resp.

to Objs.

at

19.

the

independent
For support,

the Plaintiff notes the Magistrate Judge's reliance on Thomas's
service

on

a

special

included monitoring,

id.

at 19-20

through

this

(citing

HRRJ

committee,

evaluating,

R&R

committee,

at

10

which

her

tasks

and improving inmate care.

13) .

Thomas

for

had

The
an

Plaintiff

argues

independent

See

that,

"duty

and

opportunity"

to

affect

supervising

others,

administrator,"

Id.

the

jail's

"but
at

20.

by

medical

care,

independently

Overall,

the

not

acting

Plaintiff

through

as

asserts

an
that

because the claim of negligence addresses Thomas's own failures,

the claim of negligence should not be dismissed.

The

Magistrate

dismiss

the

claim

Judge
of

was

correct

negligence

argument that it constitutes a
At

a

threshold

level,

in

against

recommending
Thomas,

not

to

on

an

based

claim of negligent supervision.

Thomas

is

mistaken

to

assert

that

"Virginia forbids the cause of action for negligent supervision
of sxibordinate employees." Objs. at 13. In a case relied upon by
Thomas,

see

id.

at

13,

the

Virginia

Supreme

Court

held

that

"there is no duty of reasonable care imposed upon an employer in
the supervision of
we

will

Va.

V.

not

create one here."

Dowdy,

holding,

the

possibility of
foreclosed

its employees under these circumstances and

235

Va.

Virginia
a

such

55,

Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.

61

(1988)

Supreme

Court

claim for negligent
a

claim

ruling was thereby limited,

under

(emphasis

did

added)

not

supervision,

those

Co.

of

In

so

foreclose
but,

circumstances.

the

rather,
Dowdy's

and while the Virginia Supreme Court

^ In the Memorandum in Support, Thomas recited this language
from Dowdy in full. See Mem. Supp. at 8. In the Reply, Thomas
also recited this language, but omitted the language "under
these circumstances and we will not create one here." See Reply
at 8-9. In the Objections, Thomas did not recite any of this
language from Dowdy when relying upon it for the present
argument.
11

"has

not

yet

recognized

a

cause

of

action

for

negligent

supervision," it has also not "completely ruled out such a cause
of action under Virginia law."
Va.

Cir.

210,

2011

Hernandez v.

WL

8964944,

Lowe's Home Ctrs.,

Inc.,

83

at

*5

(Va.

2011)

(allowing a claim for negligent supervision to survive a

demurrer based on facts distinguishable from Dowdy);
V.

Wendy's

Intern.,

Inc.,

41

F.

Supp.

2014).

Accordingly,

Thomas's

claims

of

supervision does

negligent

3d 487,

statement

that

not

Cir.

see Parker

492

(E.D.

Virginia

reflect

Ct.

Va.

forbids

the

present

state of Virginia law.

Regardless,

rely on a
Judge

the

theory of

explained,

the

Plaintiff's

claim of

negligence does

negligent

supervision.

Plaintiff

"plausibly asserts

As

not

the Magistrate
that

Thomas

owed a duty to Mitchell to see that he was provided quality and
appropriate
plausible

medical
inference

care,"
that

and

the

Complaint

Thomas

was

familiar

"permits
with

the

the
care

provided to each inmate at HRRJ, since it was part of her job to
evaluate that very thing." R&R at 13. The court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, the Third Objection is OVERRULED.
D. Fourth Objection

In

the

Fourth

Objection,

Thomas

argues

that

Magistrate

Judge erred in finding that the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged
claims of gross

negligence,

and willful

and wanton negligence,

against Thomas under Virginia law. See Objs. at 15. Thomas bases
12

her

argument

Objections,
knowledge

on

the

of

"two

first

reasons

being

Mitchell's

already

the

serious

discussed"

plausibility

medical

needs,

of

and

in

the

Thomas's
the

second

being the Plaintiff's supposed reliance on a theory of negligent
supervision.
arguments

See

id.

in favor of

The
the

court

has

Plaintiff.

already

resolved

these

See supra Parts III.B,

C.

Thomas does not provide other reasons to object the Magistrate

Judge's

recommendation on

reviewed the matter ^
recommendation

that

these

novo,
the

claims,

finds

court

and

the

court,

having

no reason to question his
should

not

dismiss

them.

Accordingly, the Fourth Objection is OVERRULED.
IV.

In conclusion. Defendant Thomas's Objections are OVERRULED,
the Magistrate Judge's R&R is ADOPTED AND APPROVED IN FULL,

and

Defendant Thomas's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 109, is DENIED.

The

Clerk

is

DIRECTED

to

send a

copy of

this

Order to counsel for all parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/
Rebecca Beach Smith

-m

Chief Judge

REBECCA BEACH SMITH
CHIEF JUDGE

March

2017

13

Memorandum