Andreana v. Virginia Beach City Public Schools et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 9 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Defendant's Motion To Dismiss COUNT II pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is DENIED and COUNT III is GRANTED. Defendant's Motion To Dismiss COUNT II pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is DENIED and COUNT III is MOOT. Signed by District Judge Raymond A. Jackson on 5/9/18. (afar)

ED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR'

MAY - 9 2018

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINI
CLEHK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Norfolk Division

fvC=FO_K. VA

JOSEPH H. ANDREANA,
On behalf of himself and all others

similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No.: 2:17-cv-574

V.

VIRGINIA BEACH CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
and

SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY OF

VIRGINIA BEACH,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Both parties have filed memoranda supporting their respective
positions and these matters are now ripe for judicial determination. Having reviewed the parties'
filings, the Court finds that a hearing is not necessary. For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is DENIED in part and
GRANTED in part; the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over PlaintifTs disparate impact

claim (Count II), but not the pattern and practice discrimination claim (Count III). Finally,
Defendant's motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case alleges that the Virginia Beach Public City Schools and the School Board of

the City of Virginia Beach discriminated against Plaintiffand others similarly situated on the

basis ofage. ECF No.l.' For background, Plaintiff has been an employee ofDefendant for over
twenty-eight years where he has primarilyworked as a computerresources specialist (CRS). Id.
at 2. In March of 2015, Defendant reorganized these positions and informed staff that the CRS

positions would be reduced from 104 to 84, and would become information technology specialist
(ITS) positions. Id. All CRS employees were required to reapply and the positions were also
publicly posted. Id. at 3.

According to Plaintiff, ninety-nine CRS employees applied for the ITS positions. Id. Of
the 99 CRS employees who applied, 74 were initially selected for the ITS positions, but 22 were

not selected.^ Id. Moreover, ofthe twenty-two not selected, three retired, and four were offered
ITS positions. Id. Plaintiff contends that Defendant offered the four ITS positions after these
individuals confronted Defendant about its discriminatory practices on the basis of age, but that

Defendant failed to provide any remedy for the discrimination against Plaintiff and others
similarly situated. Id. As a result, Plaintiff argues that he and other older CRS employees were

forced to retire or accept lower paying positions. Mat 5.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant's screening and evaluation process for the ITS positions
discriminated against candidates based on age and did not evaluate applicants fairly. Id. at 3. As

such, older CRS employees that met all of the required qualifications for the positions and had
more experience in the relevant position and field were systematically rejected in favor of
younger and less qualified applicants. Id. at 3.

' The Court will address whether Plaintiff legally named the proper defendant to state a cause ofaction, see
infra Section II. A.3.i. but for consistency, the Court will refer to the entities in the singular as "Defendant"
because they are practically the same.

^According to the complaint, respectively, the 99 CRS employees who applied for the ITS positions as of
March 2015 had an average age of 48.1 years, the 74 who were selected had an average age of 45.6 years,
and the 22 who were denied ITS positions had an average age of 56.1 years.

On August 13,2015, Plaintifffiled a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission ("EEOC") for age discrimination against Defendant. ECF No. 12. Subsequently, on
November 7,2017, Plaintiff filed this action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 e/ seq. (West 2018), and seeks relief from disparate treatment,

disparate impact, and pattern and practice discrimination on the basis of age. ECF No. 1 at 2.
On November 20,2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Conditional Class Certification. ECF

No. 4. Defendant filed a response in opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply. ECF Nos. 20, 24.
Additionally, Defendant filed Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF Nos, 10, 16. Plaintiff filed responses in opposition and Defendant
filed replies. ECF Nos. 19,21, 22,25. The motions to dismiss are now ripe for judicial
determination and the Court will address each motion.
n. DISCUSSION

A. Motion To Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant first moves to dismiss Plaintiff's ADEA claims for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. In support. Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies
because he did not file an EEOC charge against the School Board of the City of Virginia Beach,
but instead named the Virginia Beach City Public Schools ("VBCPS").

ECF No. 10 at 4.

Defendant also contends that Plaintiff only asserted a disparate treatment claim and failed to
assert a disparate impact or pattern and practice claim. Id. at 2. In opposition. Plaintiff contends
that although he named the VBCPS as a party in the EEOC charge. Defendant had notice of the
EEOC charge and therefore Defendant's argument is without merit. ECF No. 19 at 9. Moreover,

Plaintiff contends that his EEOC charge encompassed both disparate impact and pattern and

practice discrimination. Id. at 10-14. Having reviewed the parties' arguments and evidence

presented, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs disparate impact

claim (Count II). But, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the pattern and
practice discrimination claim (Count III), because even liberally constructed, the Court cannot
find that Plaintiff asserted the claim in the EEOC charge.
1. Rule 12 (b)(1) Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(1), a party may move to dismiss an action

for lack of subject jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(1). When a defendant asserts that the
complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647

(4th Cir. 1999). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, "the district court is to regard the pleadings
as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without

converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Id. (quoting Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)). The
court must however "view[ ] the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, similar

to an evaluation pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.
1999). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in
dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Evans, 166 F.3d at 647
(quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 945 F.2d at 768).
2. Administrative Exhaustion

The ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and was enacted as part of a
congressional effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace and protect employees.
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995) Indeed, "the substantive,
antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA are modeled upon prohibitions of Title VII." Id.

(citing Trans WorldAirlines, Inc., v. Thurston, 469 U.S. Ill, 121 (1985)). Before a civil action
may be brought, the ADEA requires a plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d) (West 2017). As such, a "failure to exhaust administrative remedies
concerning an [ADEA] claim deprives the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction over the

claim." Jones v. Calvert Grp. Ltd., 551 F.3d 297,300-01 (4th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the scope of
any claims plaintiff can raise in any subsequent litigation is determined by the scope of the
charges brought in the EEOC charge. Id. at 300.
3. Analysis
/.

Plaintiffsatisfied the naming requirement in the EEOC charge

Defendant's first ground is that Plaintiff failed to name the proper party, the School

Board OfThe City Of Virginia Beach, in his EEOC charge. Although Plaintiff named the
VBCPS, the Court finds that Defendant had notice of the claim and therefore Plaintiffs EEOC

charge was sufficient to satisfy the naming the requirement.
A plaintiff must specifically identify the parties involved in the alleged discrimination

when an EEOC charge is filed. Jones, 551 F.3d at 300. But, given that "Title VII does not
require procedural exactness from lay complainants," "EEOC charges must be construed with
utmost liberality since they are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of formal
pleading."zl/varot/o v. Bd. ofTrs., 848 F.2d 457,460 (4th Cir. 1988) {quotingKaplan v. Int'l
Alliance ofTheatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1975)). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Foiulh Circuit ("Fourth Circuit") has held that the naming
requirement has two primary purposes — notifying the charged party of the violation and

providing an opportunity for the charged party to comply with the law before formal litigation.
Id. at 458-59 (citations omitted).

Here, although Plaintiff named the VBCPS in his EEOC complaint, Plaintiff satisfied the

naming requirement. Clearly the VBCPS is an entity of the Virginia Beach City Public School
Board. Moreover, the primary purposes of the naming requirement were fulfilled. Defendant
does not argue that it did not have notice of the EEOC claim, but instead argues that Plaintiff
named the school as the employer, not the school board. See ECF No. 10 at 4. The Court is not
persuaded given the liberal construction required in the review of EEOC charges and the
principal purposes of the naming requirement. To hold otherwise would require "an
unnecessarily technical and restrictive reading of Title VII... where there is substantial, if not

complete identity of parties before the EEOC and the court." Alvamdo, 848 F.2d at 461 (citation
omitted) (holding that employee could maintain Title VII action against a community college

board of trustees although the community college was named in the administrative charge).

Therefore, a charge is acceptable if it is "sufficiently precise to identify the parties." Chacko v.
Patuxent Ins., 429 F.3d 505, 508 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds
that Plaintiff satisfied the naming requirement in his EEOC charge.

a.

The Court has subject matterjurisdiction over Plaintiff's disparate impactclaim
but not the pattern and practice claim

Defendant also contends that Plaintiff only asserted a disparate treatment claim and failed
to assert a disparate impact or pattern and practice claim in his EEOC charge. ECF No. 10 at 7. It

is well settled "the allegations contained in the administrative charge of discrimination generally
operate to limit the scope of any subsequent judicial complaint." Evans v. Techs. Applications &
Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1996). Generally, "only those discrimination claims

stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the complaint, and those developed by

reasonable investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent Title VII

lawsuit." Id. Thus, if the claims "exceed the scope of the EEOC charge ..., they are procedurally
barred." Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., 711 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted).

The Fourth Circuit has addressed the scope of this rule in various scenarios. For example,
"[a] claim in formal litigation will generally be barred if the EEOC charge alleges discrimination
on one basis, such as race, and the formal litigation claim alleges discrimination on a separate

basis, such as sex." Jones, 551 F.3d at 300 (citations omitted). Similarly, "a claim will also

typically be barred if the administrative charge alleges one type of discrimination such as
discriminatory failure to promote, and the claim encompasses another type such as
discrimination in pay and benefits." Chacko, 429 F.3d at 509 (citation omitted).

Furthermore, "the allegation of a discrete act or acts in an administrative charge is

insufficient when the plaintiff subsequently alleges a broader pattern of misconduct." IdM 509;
see also, Dennis v. Cty. Fairfax, 55 F.3d 153, 156-57 (4th Cir. 1995) (charge alleging

discrimination in defendant's disciplining did not cover broader pattern of discrimination in
hiring, training and promotion). Thus, a claim will be procedurally barred if the factual
allegations in the administrative charge are too vague to support the claim in subsequent
litigation. See Taylor v. Va Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 239 (4th Cir. 1999)(en banc) (finding no

exhaustion of administrative remedies where facts incorporated into the charge, including afterhours phone calls and touching, were too inconclusive to suggest sexual harassment), abrogated
on other grounds by. Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). With this framework, the

Court must next determine if the factual allegations in the EEOC charge are reasonably related to
the factual allegations in the complaint.

In this action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated on the basis of age in three

ways: disparate treatment (Count I); disparate impact (Count II); and pattern and practice

discrimination (Count III).^ ECF No. 1 at 8. Disparate impact claims involve "employment
practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that, in fact, fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." Hazen Paper

Co. V. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993). No discriminatory motive is required, but the

employee must isolate and identify "the specific employment practices that are allegedly
responsible for any observed statistical disparities." See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.

324, 325-26 n.l5 (1977); then quoting

v. City ofJackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228,241 (2005).

On the other hand, to demonstrate pattern or practice of discrimination, it must be shown that
"discrimination was the [employer's] standard operating procedure." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336

n.l6. Such proof requires "more than the mere occurrence of isolated[,] accidental or sporadic
discriminatory acts." Id. Rather, the discrimination must have been the employer's regular
practice as opposed to an unusual occurrence. Id.

Here, Plaintiffs EEOC charge alleges that 80 applicants were selected out of

approximately 110, and that "many of the applicants selected were less qualified an[d] younger."
EEOC Compl., ECF No. 12. Also, "as a class, individuals over the age of 40 were denied hire
for the Instructional Technology Specialist in violation of the ADEA." Id. Turning to the
complaint, Plaintiff essentially pleads the same allegations. He provides the same background
including the number of applicants and the general allegation that Defendant's selection process

resulted in older and more experienced applicants being excluded from the ITS positions because
of their age in favor of younger applicants. See Compl. TJ 13,15, ECF No. 1 at 3 (comparing ages

' Defendant does not allege that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies with his disparate
treatment claim (Count I).
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of CRS applicants and those selected for ITS positions). Reviewing the facts alleged in the

EEOC charge and the complaint with the "utmost liberality," the Court finds that the claims are
reasonably related and therefore Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies with his disparate
impact claim.
On the other hand, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies

in relation to the pattern and practice discrimination claim. The Court cannot find, despite
applying the "utmost liberality" to Plaintiffs EEOC charge, any language alleging that
Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. As previously discussed, a pattern

and practice claim involves discrimination that is "regular" or an employer's "standard operating
procedure." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.l6. Here, Plaintiffs EEOC charge does not contain

any reference to any other practice or custom of discrimination besides the allegations

surrounding Defendant's reorganization of die CRS positions in March 2015. Without more, the
Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs allegations of pattern and practice discrimination are
reasonablyrelated to the EEOC charge. See Taylor v. Va Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219,239 (4th
Cir. 1999) (holding that a claim will be procedurally barred if the factual allegations in the

administrative charge are too vague to support the claim in subsequent litigation), abrogated on
other grounds by, Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Therefore, because Plaintiff
failed to exhaust administrative remedies with the pattern and practice discrimination claim, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim.
The Court finds that Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies on the claim for

disparate impact (Count II), and therefore the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
claim. But, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the pattern and practice
discrimination claim (Count III) because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Count II is DENIED, and the Motion to Dismiss
Count ni is GRANTED.

B. Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State A Claim For Which Relief Can Be Granted

Defendant also filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) and argues that Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action for

disparate impact and pattern and practice discrimination. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff opposes the
motion and argues that the allegations exceed the required pleading standard to survive a motion
to dismiss. ECF No. 21. The Court will limit its analysis to the disparate impact claim (Count II)

given that Defendant does not dispute the disparate treatment claim (Count I) and the Court

dismissed the pattern and practice discrimination claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

See, supra. Section 11, A. Having reviewed the parties' arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiff
pleads sufficient facts to state a cause of action for disparate impact discrimination.
1. Rule 12 (b)(6) Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of actions that fail to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts

may only rely upon the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or
incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 32 (4th
Cir. 1985). Courts will favorably construe the allegations of the complainant and assume that the
facts alleged in the complaint are true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007);
Mylan Laboratories. Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). A court will only grant

a motion to dismiss if "it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim." Johnson v. Mueller, 415
F.2d354(4thCir. 1969).

10

Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, "[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true." Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). If
the factual allegations alleged by the plaintiff do not nudge the plaintiffs claims "across the line
from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Id. at 570. A plaintiff
however is generally permitted to plead facts based on "information and belief if such plaintiff
is in a position of uncertainty because the necessary evidence is controlled by the defendant. See
Raub V. Bowen, 960 F. Supp.2d 602, 615 (E.D. Va. 2013).
2. Analysis

To state a cause of action for disparate impact, a plaintiff must show that "employment
practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that, in fact, fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." Hazen Paper

Co. V. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993). No discriminatory motive is required, but the
employee must isolate and identify "the specific employment practices that are allegedly
responsible for any observed statistical disparities." Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,

325-26 n.l5 (1977); then quoting Smith v. City ofJackson. Miss., 544 U.S. 228,241 (2005).
Here, Plaintiffs complaint states that Defendant reorganized its computer resources
positions in the spring of 2015. Compl. H 10, ECF No.l at 2. As a part of this process, the
Defendant "implemented a screening and evaluation process [that] did not evaluate applicants

fairly[,] but instead discriminated against candidates based on age," and "CRS employees who
were substantially older and with vastly more experience in the position and field were
systematically passed over for the ITS positions in favor of younger, less-qualified applicants" as

a result. Id. ^ 12, ECF No. I at 3. Plaintiff further alleges that "Defendants' ITS selection process

11

had a disparate impact on the basis of age," Id. ^42, 13 ECF No.l at 8, and supports the
allegations with statistical data highlighting the respective ages of the applicants and those
selected, see id. ^ 13, ECF No.l at 3 ("The 99 CRS employees who applied for the ITS positions
had an average age as of March 2015 of 48.1 years. 74 were initially selected for ITS positions;
those 74 had an average age of 45.6 years. 22 applied for and were initially denied ITS positions;
those 22 had an average age of 56.1 years.").

In opposition. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not stated a cause of action because

Plaintiffs allegation of the "selection process" or "screening and evaluation process" is not a

specific employment practice. ECF Nos. 16 at 6-7; 25 at 3. Defendant further contends that the
complaint does not identify that the discriminatory employment policy was the "personnel
reorganization to reduce 104 CRS positions to 84 ITS positions," and that Plaintiffs allegations
fail to specify the employment practice within the screening and interview process that resulted
in the alleged discrimination such as a disregard of years of service, experience, longevity, etc.
See ECF No. 25 at 4-8. Finally, Defendant challenges the veracity of Plaintiffs statistical data to
support the claim of disparate impact and argues that Plaintiffs data only analyzes the pool of
former CRS employees and not the total population of applicants. See ECF No. 16 at 6-7.
Moreover, Defendant contends that these age comparisons show only a slight decrease in the

average ages of CRS employees and do not demonstrate a significant disparity. See ECF No. 25
at 10-11. The Court finds Defendant's arguments unpersuasive because it ignores the procedural
posture of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

At this stage of litigation, the Court must determine whether there are "enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The Court must

also favorably construe the allegations of the complainant and assume that the facts alleged in

12

the complaint are true. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94 (emphasis added). Therefore, in this
case, although Plaintiff did not specifically allege that the "discriminatory employment policy
was the personnel reorganization to reduce 104 CRS positions to 84 ITS positions," the Court
can look at complaint in its entirety and infer that Plaintiffs disparate impact claim relates to
Defendant's reorganization of the computer resources positions in March 2015. In fact, Plaintiff
incorporates this information in his pleading. See Compl. H 39, ECF No.l at 8 (Count Two-

Disparate Impact In Violation Of The ADEA 39. "The allegations in paragraphs 1 through 38

above are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein."); see also Simons v. Montgomery
Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 32 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that for purposes of a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, courts may rely upon the complaint's allegations and those documents attached
as exhibits or incorporated by reference).

Lastly, Defendant's arguments concerning the weight and veracity of Plaintiffs statistical

data to support the disparate impact claim is without merit. As discussed, a disparate impact
claim involves an employment practice that falls more harshly on one group than another. See
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993). At this stage of the litigation, the Court
must only grant a motion to dismiss if "it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be
entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim."
Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1969). So, while the weight and sufficiency of the

statistical data Plaintiff presents in support of the disparate impact claim is relevant in proving
the cause of action, the Court need not dive into an analysis of this data at this stage. On the
contrary, the Court's purpose at this juncture is to test the sufficiency of the complaint and not to
resolve contests surrounding the merits of the claim. Presley v. City ofCharlottesville, 464 F.3d
480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted) ("The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6)

13

is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the
merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.") As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a
cause of action for disparate impact discrimination.
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Count II is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, Defendant's Motion To Dismiss COUNT II pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is DENIED and COUNT HI is GRANTED.
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss COUNT II pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
is DENIED and COUNT III is MOOT.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to electronically provide a copy of this Order to all parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Norfolk, Virginia

May^, 2018

RaymonJTOackson
United States District Judce

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