Cheatham v. Johnson et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 2/18/10. (jtho, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION SHAWN DARNELL CHEATHAM, Plaintiff, v. GENE M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION THIS MATTER is before the Court on Motions to Dismiss filed individually by Defendants Gene Johnson (Dock. No. 8), Jack Lee (Dock. No. 18), and Michael Manning (Dock. No. 4). In the alternative, Defendants Lee and Manning have also filed Motions for Summary Judgment (Dock. Nos. 6, 20). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Johnson's Motion and GRANTS Lee's and Manning's Motions for Sum mary Judgment. I. BACKGROUND This case arises out of allegations of constitutional violation s and false imprisonment in connection with Plaintiff Shawn Darnell Cheatham's period of incarceration in various penal institutions in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Defendant Gene M. Johnson is the director of the Virginia Department of Corrections ("DOC"). Defendant Jack Lee is the superintendent of the Middle River Regional Jail, located in Staunton, Virginia. Defendant C aptain Michael Manning is the a ssistant division commander for confinement at the Loudoun County Office of the Sheriff and is responsible for the Loudoun County Adult Detention Center, located in Leesburg, Virginia. The 1 Action No. 3:09­CV­649

Complaint also names numerous John Doe defendants, which encompass personnel of the Department of Corrections, Middle River Regional Jail, or Loudoun County Adult Detention C e n t e r t h a t w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r C h e a t h a m ' s i m p r i s o n m e n t a l l e g e dly beyond that authorized by law. In 1997, the Loudoun County Circui t C o u r t s e n t e n c e d C h e a t h a m t o f i f t e e n y e a r s i n prison, with all but three years, eight months suspended, conditioned on compliance with the terms of his release.1 In October 2003 and May 2004, the Loudoun County Circuit Court h e l d p r o b a t i o n v i o l a t i o n h e a r i n gs i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h a t s e n t e nce. On March 3, 2005, Cheatham states that he was released because he had successfully completed the Detention and Diversion Center Programs as required by the Loudoun County Circuit Court. In November of 2006, Cheatham was arrested and on the thirteenth of that month, he appeared before the Loudoun County Circuit Court, which concluded that he was in violation of his probation and imposed the previously suspended sentence. Cheatham remained incarcerated, but the court stayed his delivery to the DOC pending further review by the court. I n A p r i l 2 0 0 7 , t h e L o u d o u n C o u n t y C i r c u i t C o u r t f u r t h e r r e v i e w e d C h e a t h a m ' s violations and resuspended all but one year on each of the thr e e c a s e s f o r a t o t a l a c t i v e sentence of three years. The April 11, 2007 Order stated that in the event the Virginia Department of Corrections deems the defendant eligible and acceptable f o r e n r o l l m e n t i n t h e D e t e n t i o n C e n t e r

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These facts are taken from Cheatham's Complaint and are assumed true for purposes of the Motions to Dismiss. See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). 2

I n c a r c e r a t i o n P r o g r a m s a n d t h e D i v e r s i o n C e n t e r I n c a r c e r a t i o n P rogram, so much of his three (3) year active period of confinement therewith imposed in these cases will be suspended upon his transport to said programs and upon his successful completion of said programs and of the term of probation. On August 11, 2008, the Virginia DOC transferred Cheatham from Greensville Correctional Center to Coffeewood Correctional Center and then to the White Post Center Detention Program. Asserting that he had already served his sentence, Cheatham declined to participate in the Detention Center Program. Some time thereafter the DOC transferred Cheatham back to the Loudoun County Adult Detention Center. The DOC subsequently transferred him to the Middle River Regional Jail. Cheatham alleges that he continued to a d v i s e a l l a p p r o p r i a t e a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t h e w a s b e i n g h e l d u n l a w fully. He reports that M i d d l e R i v e r R e g i o n a l J a i l a u t h o r ities told him that they could n o t r e l e a s e h i m b e c a u s e h e was a DOC Prisoner. On August 27, 2008, the Loudoun County Circuit Court ordered that Cheatham "serve the three (3) year [sic] previously imposed for the violation with credit given for time served since his incarceration on June 6, 2006 for the offenses accrued in the City of Charlottesville and upon the instant show cause." In December 2008, Cheatham filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Loudoun County Circuit Court. In February 2009, the Loudoun County Circuit Court found that "the Department of Corrections has erroneously interpreted this Court's Order as imposing an additional three (3) year sentence commencing on August 27, 2008." The court determined that Cheatham had "already served, in its entirety the three year sentence this Court imposed April 9, 2007 (and affirmed August 27, 2008)" and "is being

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held in custody incorrectly." The court ordered that Cheatham be released and the Defendants complied. A s a r e s u l t o f t h e s e e v e n t s , C h ea t h a m s t a t e s t h a t " [ o ] n t h e t h r e e y e a r s e n t e n c e o f incarceration authorized by the Loudoun County Circuit Court's order dated Aprill 11, 2007, the Defendants imprisoned Mr. Cheatham for 1142 days, approximately seven months longer than the 931 days (counting good time) authorized by law." (Compl. ¶ 23.) As required by Virginia Code § 8.01195.6, Cheatham notified the Commonwealth of Virginia of his claim on May 31, 2009. And in October 2009, Cheatham filed his three count Complaint, alleging that the Defendants deprived him of his due process rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Count 1), inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count 2), and falsely imprisoned him in violation of state law (Count 3). The Complaint seeks $100,000 in damages for the approximately s even months that Cheatham alleges he was unlawfully detained. He also seeks attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In respon s e , t h e D e f e n d a n t s h a v e n o w filed the present motions. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW A. Motion to Dismiss Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint stating a claim f o r r e l i e f t o c o n t a i n a s h o r t p la i n s t a t e m e n t o f t h e c l a i m t h a t g i v e s t h e d e f e n d a n t f a i r n o t i c e of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Defendants police this requirement using Rule 12(b)(6), which permits a party to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint.

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Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin , 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). A 12(b)(6) motion does not, however, "resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, o r t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f d e f e n s e s . " I d . As a result, in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must regard all of plaintiff's wellpleaded allegations as true, Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993), as well as any facts that coul d b e p r o v e d c o n s i s t e n t w i t h those allegations, Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In contrast, the court does not have to accept legal conclusions couched as factual al legations, Twombly , 5 5 0 U . S . a t 5 5 5 , o r " u n w a r r a n t e d i n f e rences, unreasonable conclusio ns, or arguments," E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). With these principles in mind, the court m u s t u l t i m a t e l y a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f f h a s s t a t e d a " pl a u s i b l e , n o t m e r e l y speculative, claim for relief." Twombly , 5 5 0 U . S . a t 5 5 5 . " D e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a c o m p l a i n t states a plausible claim for r e l i e f [ i s ] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. While Rule 8(a)(2) requires a showing, not simply a blanket assertion of "en titlement to relief," the plai ntiff is not required to show that it is likely to obtain relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. In the end, if the complaint alleges--directly or indirectly--each of the elements of "some viable legal theory," the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to prove that claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. B. Summary Judgment

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A m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t l i e s o n l y w h e r e " t h e r e i s n o g e n ui n e i s s u e a s t o a n y m a t e r i a l f a c t " a n d w h e r e " t h e m o v i n g p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o j udgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). All "factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences [are resolved] in the light most favorable to the party opposing that motion." Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks a nd citations omitted). In mak ing its decision, a court must look to the affidavits or other specific facts pled to determine whether a triable issue exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where no genuine issue o f m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s , i t i s t h e " a f f i r m a t i v e o b l i g a t i o n o f t he trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 77879 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere unsupported speculation is not sufficient if the undisputed evidence indicates the other party should win as a matter of law. Emmett v. Johnson , 5 3 2 F . 3 d 2 9 1 , 2 9 7 ( 4 t h C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) . H o w e v e r , summary judgment should not be granted if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. III. DISCUSSION A. Gene Johnson's Motion to Dismiss 1. Due Process Violation (Count 1) Defendant Johnson seeks dismissal of Cheatham's due process claim on several g r o u n d s . C l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e w a s l e g a l a u t h o r i z a t i o n t o c o n f i n e Cheatham until the Loudoun County Circuit Court ordered Cheatham released, Johnson states that Cheatham has not alleged facts upon which relief can be granted. Cheatham was also provided a

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process to challenge any detention, so, Johnson observes, any claim of a procedural due process violation must fail. Johnson further reasons that any facts Cheatham has presented would rise only to the level of mere negligence, which is insufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983. Cheatham's due process claim is premised on Johnson's failure to provide adequate p r e d e p r i v a t i o n p r o c e s s t o e n s u r e t h a t C h e a t h a m w a s n o t i n c a r c e rated unlawfully. Cheatham's complaint does not appear to make a substantive due process claim. The Due Process Clause2 applies when government action deprives an individual of a l e g i t i m a t e l i b e r t y o r p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t . B d . o f R e g e n t s o f S tate Colls. v. Roth , 4 0 8 U . S . 5 6 4 , 569 (1972). The first step in analyzing a procedural due process claim is to identify whether the alleged conduct affects a protected interest. See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997). Liberty interests "may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word liberty, . . . or [they] may arise from an e x p e c t a t i o n o r i n t e r e s t c r e a t e d b y s t a t e l a w s o r p o l i c i e s . " W i l k i n s o n v . A u s t i n , 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, the Constitution g u a r a n t e e s a l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t -- a bs e n t d u e p r o c e s s , a d e p a r t m e n t o f c o r r e c t i o n s o f f i c i a l cannot imprison an inmate longer than he was sentenced by the sentencing court. See McNeill v. Dir., Patuxent Inst. , 407 U.S. 245, 24952 (1972). Once a liberty interest is established, the second step in a procedural due process a n a l y s i s a t t h i s s t a g e i n t h e p r oceedings is to evaluate whethe r Cheatham has alleged facts

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"No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 7

to support the claim that the process Johnson provided Cheatham was constitutionally i n a d e q u a t e . S e e W i l k i n s o n v . A u s t i n , 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005). The adequacy of the procedures in place is assessed by balancing three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the government action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures u s e d a n d t h e p r o b a b l e v a l u e , i f a n y , o f a l t e r n a t i v e o r a d d i t i o n al procedures; and (3) the state's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens of added safeguards. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). This third factor encompasses the state's interest in prison management, particularly in allocating scarce resources and in maintaining order, security, and discipline. See id. at 227; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (recognizing that there must be "mutual accommodation" between i n s t i t u t i o n a l n e e d s a n d i n m a t e s ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l protections). Additionally, to establish liability under § 1983, Cheatham must show that t h e d e f e n d a n t s a c t e d i n t e n t i o n a lly in depriving him of his prot e c t e d i n t e r e s t . B e c a u s e t h e protections of the Due Process Clause are not triggered by the "mere failure to take reasonable care," negligent deprivations are not actionable under § 1983. Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 33031 (1986). Although Cheatham does not give an exact date when he says he first should have been provided a hearing, it is clear that he alleges he was held beyond his original s e n t e n c e w i t h o u t f i r s t b e i n g a f f o r d e d a h e a r i n g o n t h e p r o p r i e t y of that action. When an individual's personal liberty is at stake and there are no other countervailing considerations, due process requires at a minimum a predeprivation hearing because once the due process clause has been violated, a deprivation of liberty has occurred. See,

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e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131 (1990) (concluding that detention without h e a r i n g t o d e t e r m i n e p r o p r i e t y o f d e t e n t i o n " c l e a r l y i n f r i n g e s " on an individual's liberty interest); see also Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."). Here, Cheatham alleges that he was held--without a prior hearing--by the DOC until the Loudoun County Circuit Court ordered him released. But, Johnson says, even if that is the case, the lack of a hearing was the result of m e r e n e g l i g e n c e , w h i c h c a n n o t b e t h e b a s i s o f a § 1 9 8 3 s u i t . T hat much is true: Cheatham must allege that his alleged unla w f u l d e t e n t i o n w a s n o t m e r e l y t h e r e s u l t o f n e g l i g e n c e , but was a purposeful decision by Johnson. And indeed, here, Cheatham alleges that Johnson acted intentionally by "a uthorizing a state process tha t deprived Mr. Cheatham of liberty without constitutionally adequate safeguards to protect a g a i n s t u n a u t h o r i z e d incarceration." (Compl. ¶ 29.) An official who deprives a person of liberty by deliberately establishing state procedures that are later held to be constitutionally inadequate can be held liable for due process violations. See, e.g., Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1114 (3d Cir. 1989). Whether or not these allegations will ring true is not the question on a motion to dismiss; instead the question is whether the bell has been rung at all. And as to that question, the answer is yes. Thus, the Motion as to Count 1 is DENIED. 2. Eighth Amendment Violation (Count 2) Johnson begins by articulating t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d f o r a n E i g h t h A m e n d m e n t v i o l a t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e c o n d i t io n s o r p u n i s h m e n t d e n i e s t h e m i n i m a l n e c e s s i t i e s o f l i f e a s measured by civilized society or a p r i s o n o f f i c i a l a c t s i n t e n t i onally or with a deliberate

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indifference in the face of risks to the prisoner's health or safety. The Complaint, Johnson contends, does not allege facts to suggest that Cheatham's pris o n c o n d i t i o n s w e r e anything other than ordinary prison conditions or that Cheatham faced risks to his health or safety while incarcerated. I n c a r c e r a t i o n b e y o n d t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f o n e ' s s e n t e n c e m a y s t a t e a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Golson v. Dep't of Corr., 914 F.2d 1491, 1990 WL 141470, at *1 (4th Cir. 1990). To prevail on that theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant a c t e d w i t h d e l i b e r a t e i n d i f f e r e n c e . I d . (citing Sample , 8 8 5 F . 2 d a t 1 1 1 0 ) . T h e C o m p l a i n t merely states the legal conclusi on that Johnson "knew that Mr. C h e a t h a m ' s s e n t e n c e w a s over, but failed to correct the problem by releasing him or taking other corrective action." (Compl. ¶ 35.) Besides this statement, the Complaint is silent on how or when Johnson knew these details. It is well settled, however, that "[t]hrea dbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 129 S . C t . a t 1 9 4 9 . C h e a t h a m ' s a l l e g a t i o n s a r e s i m p l y s t e r i l e l e g a l conclusions that "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1950. At oral argument, Cheatham's counsel conceded to these deficiencies. As a result, the Motion as to Count 2 is GRANTED. 3. False Imprisonment (Count 3) Johnson asserts that because the r e w a s " a d e q u a t e l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n " f o r Cheatham's confinement until he was ordered released by a court, Cheatham was lawfully incarcerated and therefore cannot establish a false imprisonment claim. In Virginia, the tort of false imprisonment is defined as "the direct restraint by one person of the physical liberty o f a n o t h e r w i t h o u t a d e q u a t e l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . " J o r d a n v .

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Shands, 500 S.E.2d 215, 218 (Va. 1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Complaint alleges that Johnson extended Cheatham's imprison ment without legal justification. The Motion to Dismiss as to Count 3 is DENIED. B. Jack Lee's and Michael Manning's Motions to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motions for Summary Judgment Defendant Jack Lee, Superintendent of the Middle River Regional Jail, and D e f e n d a n t M i c h a e l M a n n i n g , a s s i s t ant division commander for con f i n e m e n t a t t h e Loudoun County Office of the Sheriff, have each filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment. L e e a n d M a n n i n g a s s e r t t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n t should be dismissed in its entirety because Cheatham cannot establish that Lee, Manning, or any of their employees had the authority to compute the actual time that could have or should have been served by Cheatham and no authority to release Cheatham unless ordered to do so by the DOC or a court.3 Even accepting the DOC record provided by Cheatham, he cannot escape the f a c t t h a t n e i t h e r L e e n o r M a n n i n g had the ability to c o m p u t e C h e a t h a m ' s s e n t e n c e o r r elease him prior to the Loudoun C o u n t y C i r c u i t C o u r t ' s order. Cheatham's sentence was f or three years and, thus, under V i r g i n i a l a w , C h e a t h a m ' s fate was in the hands of the DOC. Va. Code § 53.120(B) ("Persons convicted of felonies committed on or after January 1, 1995 . . . sentenced to confin e m e n t i n j a i l f o r a y e a r o r more shall be placed in the custody of the [DOC] . . . ."). DOC prisoners are routinely

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The Motions for Summary Judgment are supported by an affidavi t f r o m e a c h D e f e n d a n t stating that the sole authority to calculate Cheatham's sentence rested with the Department of Corrections. Lee and Manning also state that nei ther they nor their e m p l o y e e s h a d t h e a b i l i t y t o r e l e a s e C h e a t h a m a b s e n t a d i r e c t i v e from the Department of Corrections or a court order. 11

p h y s i c a l l y k e p t i n l o c a l a n d r e g i o n a l j a i l s , h o w e v e r , t h e e x a c t length and calculation of those prisoners' sentences remains in DOC's control. Cheatham e x p e r i e n c e d t h a t v e r y r e a l i t y . T h u s , b e c a u s e L e e a n d M a n n i n g n e v e r h a d t h e a b i l i t y t o control Cheatham's sentence, their Motions for Summary Judgment as to all three cl aims are GRANTED. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Johnson's Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS Lee's and Manning's Motions for Summary Judgment. Lee's and Manning's M o t i o n s t o D i s m i s s a r e D E N I E D a s M O O T . A n a p p r o p r i a t e o r d e r w i ll accompany this memorandum. Let the Clerk send a copy of this memorandum to all counsel of record.

/s/ James R. Spencer Chief United States District Judge

ENTERED this 18th day of February 2010

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