Britt v. Watson

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 5/11/11. Copy sent: Yes(tdai, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

DAVID P. BRITT,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

Civil Action No. 3:10CV05-HEH

)

BILL WATSON,

)

)

Defendant.

)
MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment)

David P. Britt, a former Virginia inmate, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. In

his Complaint, Mr. Britt asserted that his rights under the Eighth Amendment were
violated on November 4, 2008, when deputies at the Portsmouth City Jail/Workcenter

("the Jail"), forced him and other inmates to kneel "for over three hours." (Compl. 5.)
Mr. Britt further alleges that those inmates "who could not hold [their] position[s] were

tasered in the back." (Id) Mr. Britt names Bill Watson, the Sheriff for the City of
Portsmouth as the sole defendant.

Sheriff Watson moved for summary judgment on January 17, 2011. The Sheriff

provided Mr. Britt with the appropriate Roseboro1 notice (Dk. No. 19). Nevertheless, Mr.
Britt has not responded. The motion for summary judgement is ripe for disposition.

Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).

I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment must be rendered "if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). It is the responsibility of the party seeking summary
judgment to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify the parts of the
record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[W]here the
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary
judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Celotex Corp. All U.S. at 324

(internal quotation marks omitted). When the motion is properly supported, the
nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by citing affidavits or '"depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and 56(e)

(1986)). "If a party fails ... to properly address another party's assertion of fact as
required by Rule 56(c), the court may... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the

motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).2
2 In order to ensure that the parties shoulder their respective burdens for a motion for
summary judgment, Local Civil Rule 56(B) requires:

Each brief in support of a motion for summary judgment shall include a specifically
captioned section listing all material facts as to which the moving party contends
there is no genuine issue and citing the parts of the record relied on to support the
listed facts as alleged to be undisputed. A brief in response to such a motion shall

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court "must draw all justifiable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." United States v. Carolina Transformer Co.,
978 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,

255 (1986)). Nevertheless, the nonmoving party cannot "'create a genuine issue of
material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.'"

Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d
213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985)).

Sheriff Watson supported his motion for summary judgment with affidavits from

deputies and with copies of records from the Jail. Sheriff Watson's Memorandum in
Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment included a "Statement of Undisputed

Facts," as required by Local Civil Rule 56(B). (Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 1-3.) In light
of the foregoing principles and submissions, the following facts are established for
purposes of the motion for summary judgment.

include a specifically captioned section listing all material facts as to which it is
contended that there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated and citing the
parts of the record relied on to support the facts alleged to be in dispute. In
determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts
identified by the moving party in its listing of material facts are admitted, unless
such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to
the motion.

E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 56(B); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) ("The court need consider only the
cited materials....").

II. SUMMARY OF PERTINENT FACTS

1.

On November 4,2008, the Emergency Response Team ("ERT")

of the Portsmouth Sheriffs Office ("PSO") conducted a search of the inmates
and dormitories at the male Work Release Center. [(Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ.
J. Ex. 1, Attach. A; Ex. 2 K 4.)]
2.
PSO initiated the search because of security concerns involving
recent inmate unrest and contraband. [(Ex. 2 H 5.)]

3.

The ERT entered the work center at 2100 hrs. [(Id H 6.)]

4.

Initially, inmates in each of the dormitories, A-F, were ordered

to lie, face down, with their fingers interlocked behind their heads. Deputies
then led the inmates to common areas to enable trained dogs to check the
living areas for drugs. [(Id)]
5.
Dormitories A-D, approximately 15-20 inmates, filed into the

bathroom, led by Sgt. Michal, Dep. Youngblood, Dep. Washington, and Dep.
Briggs. [(Id H 7.)]

6.

The inmates were instructed to line up on both sides of the

bathroom, to kneel down, facing away from the deputies, and to refrain from
talking. [(Id H 8.)]

7.

Inmates who stated they had bad knees were cuffed, and moved

down the hallway from the bathroom, to sit on the floor. [(Id. U 9.)]
8.

Those inmates kneeling on the floor had breaks. [(Id. f 10.)]

9.

Several inmates who refused to cooperate, and disobeyed the

deputies' orders and instructions, received mild shocks to their backs from an
electrified shield worn by Dep. Youngblood. The shield was used solely to
maintain control. [(Id. 111.)]
10.
No stun gun (taser) was used in the bathroom. [(Id. K 13.)]
11.

The search concluded at approximately 2345 hrs. [(Id. 1j 14.)]

12.

On November 7, 2008, almost three days after the incident, a

nurse at Portsmouth City Jail evaluated plaintiff for a swollen knee with a

small bruise and a swollen shoulder blade with four red marks. She prescribed
a three (3) day course of Motrin. [(Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3, Attach.

A.)]
(Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 1-3.)

III. ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court has made clear that "vicarious liability is inapplicable to

Bivens and § 1983 suits." Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). "Absent
vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only
liable for his or her own misconduct." Id at 1949.

To survive summary judgment on an

Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must demonstrate that "'the prison official acted

with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) and ... the deprivation
suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective
component).'" Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v.

Benjamin, 11 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). "These requirements spring from the text of
the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed on an inmate cannot
properly be called 'punishment,' and absent severity, such punishment cannot be called

'cruel and unusual.5" Id (citing Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991)). "What
must be established with regard to each component 'varies according to the nature of the
alleged constitutional violation.'" Williams, 11 F.3d at 761 (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)).

When an inmate challenges his conditions of confinement, he must show "(1) a
serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison
conditions on the part of prison officials." Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th

Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted) (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 301-03). Deliberate

indifference requires the plaintiff to produce evidence that a particular defendant actually
knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to his person. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

When an inmate claims that prison officials used excessive force against his
person, the objective component is less demanding and the subjective component is more

demanding. See Williams, 11 F.3d at 761. With respect to the objective component, the

inmate must demonstrate that the "nature" or amount of force employed "was nontrivial."
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1179 (2010); see id at 1178 (observing that "a 'push
or shove' that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive

force claim" (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9)). With respect to the subjective component,

the inmate must demonstrate '"wantonness in the infliction of pain.'" Iko, 535 F.3d at
239 (quoting Whitley v. Alters, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986)). Specifically, "the 'core
judicial inquiry' regarding the subjective component of an excessive force claim is

'whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'" Id. (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).
Whether Mr. Britt's claims are viewed as a challenge to his conditions of

confinement or as an excessive use of force, he has adduced no evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Sheriff Watson acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. There is no evidence that Sheriff Watson directly participated in

the events of November 4, 2008, much less that he '"acted maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm'" to Mr. Britt. Id. (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). Furthermore, Mr. Britt
has not introduced evidence that demonstrates Sheriff Watson actually knew of and
disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Mr. Britt. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Accordingly, Sheriff Watson's Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED. The
action will be DISMISSED.

An appropriate Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
It is SO ORDERED.

J

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1st

HENRY E. HUDSON

Date: *fl&U // toll
Richmond, Virginia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE