Saunders v. Riverside Regional Jail
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 6/13/12. Copy sent: Yes(tdai, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
MICHAEL J.G. SAUNDERS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:10CV258-HEH
v.
RIVERSIDE REGIONAL JAIL, et aL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By Memorandum Opinion and Order on September 19,2011, this Court dismissed
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Saunders v. Riverside Reg'lJail, No. 3:10CV258-HEH, 2011 WL 4369127, at
*4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2011). The matter now comes before the Court on Plaintiffs
motion for relief under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 59(e).1 Inhis Rule 59(e) motion,
Plaintiff requests that the Court alter or amend its order of dismissal in order to provide
him an opportunity to further amend his Complaint to comply with the standards
articulated by the Court in its September 19 Memorandum Opinion.2
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which
should be used sparingly." Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'I Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396,403
(4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relief under Rule 59(e) is
1Plaintiffalso submitted a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint on
September 23,2011 (Dk. No. 35.), but moved to withdraw that Motion on October 11, 2011.
2Plaintiffsubmits a Proposed Amended Complaint with his Rule 59(e) Motion. (Dk.
No. 36-1.)
appropriate only "(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to
account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice." Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993)
(citations omitted). "In other words, it is a means by which the district court can correct
its own mistakes, thereby 'sparing the parties and the appellate courts the burden of
unnecessary appellate proceedings.'" Patterson v. Kaine, No. 3:08CV490, 2010 WL
2232410, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 1,2010) (quoting Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403).
"'[Ojnce judgment is entered the filing of an amended complaint is not
permissible until judgment is set aside or vacated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or
60(b).'" Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original)
(quoting Cooper v. Shumway, 780 F.2d 27, 29 (10th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, when a
party seeks to amend his complaint afterjudgment has been entered, he must satisfy Rule
59(e) before being permitted to amend under Rule 15(a). See Mayfleld v. Nat'I Ass'nfor
Stock CarAuto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) ("Rule 15(a) and Rule
59(e) motions rise and fall together."). Leave to amend under Rule 15(a) "should be
denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has
been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or amendment would be futile." Matrix
CapitalMgmt. Fund, L.P. v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs presentmotion does not demonstrate a clear error of law or any other
basis for granting relief under Rule 59(e). Rather, Plaintiff asserts merely that failure to
correct this Court's September 19 Order would result in a manifest injustice, "because it
would cause [Plaintiff] to suffer a 'strike' under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), which is very
stigmatizing." (PL's Mot. 6.) Simply put, Plaintiff has not raised any grounds that justify
reconsideration of this Court's prior judgment.
Further, even if Plaintiff s Rule 59(e) motion were granted, this Court would deny
Plaintiff leave to amend under Rule 15(a). In order to state a cognizable denial of access
claim, a prisoner must show (1) that he suffered an actual injury—namely, that he was
somehow precluded from pursuing a "nonfrivolous" or "arguable" underlying claim; and
(2) that he lacks any other "remedy that may be awarded as recompense" for the lost
claim other than in the instant suit. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,415 (2002).
Expounding upon this latter element, the Supreme Court has explained that there is "no
point in spending time and money to establish the facts constituting denial of access when
a plaintiff would end up just as well off after litigating a simpler case without the denialof-access element." Id.
Here, Plaintiff contends that, by denying him physical access to the law library
while incarcerated at the Riverside Regional Jail, Defendants interfered with his ability to
properly litigate (1) the ineffective assistance of counsel claims contained in his state
habeas corpus petition, and (2) the denial of adequate medical care claim alleged in his
state petition for a writ of mandamus. Yet Plaintiff is currently seeking afederal writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court and the Fourth Circuit. See
Saunders v. Clarke, No. 3:1 lcvl70, Docket Nos. 48, 51 (E.D. Va.). He is also presently
litigating in this Court his claim for denial of adequate medical care. See Saunders v.
Smith, No. 3:09cv815, Docket No. 1 (E.D. Va. filed Dec. 23,2009). Under these
circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to identify any remedy available in the instant case
which "may be awarded as recompense but [is] not otherwise available in [Petitioner's
habeas case]." Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not plausibly
alleged a constitutional claim for denial of access upon which relief could be granted.
Because even his Proposed Amended Complaint does not "allege facts sufficient
to state all the elements of his claim," Plaintiffs proposed amendment would be futile.
Bass v. E.I Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Burns
v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 166 F.3d 292, 294-95 (4th Cir. 1999). Thus, contrary to
Plaintiffs contention, refusal to permit the amendment of Plaintiff s previously dismissed
complaint will not work a manifest injustice. See Smith v. Waverly Partners, LLC,
No. 3:10-CV-28, 2011 WL 3564427, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2011) ("In the context of
a motion to reconsider, manifest injustice is defined as 'an error by the court that is direct,
obvious, and observable,'") (quoting Register v. Cameron & Barkley Co., 481 F. Supp.
2d 479, 480 n. 1 (D.S.C. 2007)). Having failed to satisfy the standards for relief under
Rules 59(e) and 15(a), Plaintiffs Motion must be denied.
An appropriate Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
4M^
Isl
HENRY E.HUDSON
Date: Tu^ \2Zoiu
Richmond, Virginia
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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