Foxworth v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 10-6-10. (kyou, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION CYNTHIA FOXWORTH, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. Civil Action No. 3:10CV317

MEMORANDUM OPINION T H I S M A T T E R i s b e f o r e t h e C o u r t o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' M o t i o n t o Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dock. No. 4). Upon due consideration and for the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and dismisses the Complaint with prejudice. I. BACKGROUND In 2005, Plaintiff Cynthia Foxworth brought a civil action in t his Court against D e f e n d a n t U n i t e d S t a t e s u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l T o r t C l a i m s A c t ( C a s e No. 3:05CV643). In that action, Foxworth alleged that she contracted hepatitis C due to the medical malpractice of t h e m e d i c a l s t a f f a t t h e N a v a l R egional Hospital in Philadelphi a , P e n n s y l v a n i a . T h e p a r t i e s voluntarily settled in 2006, and this Court entered an order of dismissal with prejudice on December 22, 2006. That order provided, in its entirety: "Pursuant to the Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice b e t w e e n t h e p l a i n t i f f a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a , i t i s

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hereby ORDERED that the abovecaptioned case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, with each party bearing its own fees, costs, and expenses." I n t h e s e t t l e m e n t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a g r e e d t o p a y F o x w o r t h $ 3 5 0,000 in the form of a $130,000 cash payment and a $220,000 annuity contract. (Stipulation for Compromise Settlement and Release of Federal Tort Claims Act Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (Settlement Agreement) ¶ 3). The Settlement Agreement also provided that [c]ounsel of record for the defendant will utilize their best efforts to ensure that any future medical treatment, including t h e s e v e n t y t w o [ s i c ] w eek protocol that has been recommended for the Plaintiff's medical condition, will be performed by and at the McGuire Veteran's facility in Richmond, Virginia or any other veteran's facility with consent of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 8). Foxworth agreed to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. T h e P l a i n t i f f w a s r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel in the 2005 action but i s p r o c e e d i n g p r o s e in the instant matter. In her cu rrent Complaint, filed May 11, 2 0 1 0 , t h e P l a i n t i f f i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e S e t t l e m e n t A g r e e m e n t r e quires the Government to ensure that she continues to r e c e i v e t r e a t m e n t a t t h e M c G u i r e V A M e d i c a l C e n t e r ( M c G u i r e ) i n Richmond, Virginia. She has learned that she once she reaches age sixtyfive and become s eligible for Medicare, her primary insurance provider will switch from Civilian Health and Medical Program at the D e p a r t m e n t o f V e t e r a n s A f f a i r s ( C H A M P V A ) t o M e d i c a r e . U p o n t h a t change, she will no longer be able to continue treatment at McGuire. Without using the terms "breach o f c o n t r a c t " o r c l e a r l y s t a t i n g a n y o t h e r c a u s e o f action, Foxworth essentially alleges that the Government breached the Settlement Agreement provision excerpted above. She asks the Court to enforce the Settlement 2

Agreement so that she can continue to receive treatment at McGuire. She also demands ten million dollars in damages. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f i l e d i t s M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s t h e C o m p l a i n t o n July 12, 2010. The G o v e r n m e n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e C o u r t should dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. II. LEGAL STANDARDS Rule 12 allows a defendant to raise a number of defenses to a c laim for relief at the p l e a d i n g s t a g e . A m o n g t h e s e a r e t h e d e f e n s e s t h a t a c o u r t l a c k s s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n over the case, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and that the pleadings fail to state a claim upon w h i c h t h e C o u r t c a n g r a n t r e l i e f , s e e Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The standards used to evaluate e a c h d e f e n s e v a r y . W h i l e a c o u r t must typically construe the pl e a d i n g s o f a p r o s e p l a i n t i f f liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus , 5 5 1 U . S . 8 9 , 9 4 ( 2 0 0 7 ) , a c o u r t c o n s i d e r i n g a m o t i o n t o dismiss must still evaluate the pro se p l a i n t i f f ' s p l e a d i n g s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a n d a r d s developed under Rule 12. A. Rule 12(b)(1) On a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), defendants may attack subject matter jurisdiction by contending that the complaint fails to sufficiently allege facts upon which the Court may make a finding of subjectmatter jurisdiction, or they may contend that the jurisdictional facts are untrue. King v. Riverside Reg'l Med. Ctr., 211 F. Supp. 2d 779, 780 (E.D. Va. 2002). In both situations, the burden is on the plaintiff, as the party

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asserting jurisdiction, to prove that federal jurisdiction is proper. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). I f t h e d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s t h a t t h e complaint fails to allege suf f i c i e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n a l facts, then the facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true. King, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 780. "The court construes all facts in favor of the plaintif f, and it relies solely on the p l e a d i n g s , d i s r e g a r d i n g a f f i d a v i t s o r o t h e r m a t e r i a l s . " I d . (citing Adams , 697 F.2d at 1219). I f , h o w e v e r , t h e d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s that the jurisdictional fact s a r e n o t t r u e , " n o p r e s u m p t i o n o f t r u t h f u l n e s s a t t a c h e s t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e complaint, and the trial court must weigh the evidence presented and evaluate for itself the m erits of the jurisdictional claims." Id. (citing Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 971 n.4 (4th Cir. 1990)). When a party sets forth a Rule 12(b)(1) defense in addition to other Rule 12 defenses, the court should resolve the 12(b)(1) motion first, because if the court lacks jurisdiction, the remaining motions are moot. See Sucampo Pharm., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc. , 4 7 1 F . 3 d 5 4 4 , 5 4 8 ( 4 t h C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) . B. Rule 12(b)(6) Where a motion pursuant to Rule 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) c o n t e n d s t h a t a p l a i n t i f f ' s p l e a d i n g s a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s h o w e n t i t l e m e n t t o r e l i e f , a c o u r t m u s t r e s o l v e t h e m o t i o n b y r e f e r e n c e t o the allegations in the complaint. See Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). The question then before the court is whether the complaint contains "a short and plain statement of the claim sho w i n g t h a t t h e p l e a d e r i s e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f " i n b o t h " l a w a n d fact." Id. at 19293. 4

T h e p l e a d i n g s n e e d n o t b e s u p p o r te d b y e v i d e n c e b u t m u s t " s t a t e a c l a i m f o r r e l i e f that is plausible on its face." Id. at 193 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). A plausible claim is one that contains more than just "unadorned, thedefendant unlawfullyharmedmeaccusation[s]." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. If the complaint a l l e g e s -- d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y -- e a c h o f t h e e l e m e n t s o f " s o m e v i able legal theory," the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to prove that claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 556, 563 n.8 (2007). In resolving a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must regard as true all of a plaintiff's well p l e a d e d a l l e g a t i o n s , Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari , 7 F . 3 d 1 1 3 0 , 1 1 3 4 ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 9 3 ) , a s w e l l as any facts that could be proven consistent with those allegations, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In contrast, the court does not have to accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, or "unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments," E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. With these principles in mind, a court must u l t i m a t e l y a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f f h a s s t a t e d a "plausible, not merely speculative, claim for relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. III. DISCUSSION The United States offers three primary arguments for dismissing Foxworth's complaint: (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim; and (3) the complaint fails to state a claim. 5

A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Enforce the Settlement Agreement In the Fourth Circuit, once a district court has entered an order dismissing a case b e c a u s e t h e p a r t i e s h a v e v o l u n t a r i l y s e t t l e d t h e m a t t e r , t h a t c ourt does not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement unless "the agreement had been approved and incorporated into an order of the court, or, at the time the court is requested to enforce the agreement, there exists some independent ground upon which to base federal jurisdiction." ColumbusAm. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. Fairfax County, 571 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir. 1978)). If a party breaches a settlement agreement th a t i s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a n order of the court, that breach is a violation of the court order, and the court has jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Id. In ColumbusAmerica, the district court had previously entered an order that specified that the Court "reta in[ed] jurisdiction to enforce the settlement of the parties and the prior Orders in this case." Id. The Fourth Circuit found t h a t s t a t e m e n t " s u f f i c i e n t t o g r a n t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t j u r i s d i c tion to enforce specifically the Settlement Agreement" at issue. Id. The 2006 order in the instant case made no reference to the Settlement Agreement e n t e r e d i n t o b y F o x w o r t h a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e r e f o r e , a p p l ying the Fourth Circuit's standard as captured in ColumbusAmerica, absent some independent ground, the Court does not have jurisdiction to enf o r c e t h e s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t . B. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction over the Breach of Contract Claim I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s p r o t e c t e d f r o m s u i t by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, except when it has consented by statute to be sued. E.g., United States 6

v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990). Plaintiffs suing the United States for breach of contract do so under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), which prescribes the limits of the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity for claims based on breach of contract, including those based on settlement agreements. Id. § 1491(a)(1); see McKay v. United States, 207 Fed. Appx. 892, 895 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 38182 (1994)). The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over breach of contract claims brought against the Government under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) .The Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2), grants district courts concurrent jurisdiction over most civil actions brought against the government where the monetary claims do not exceed $10,000. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only the powers authorized by the Constitution or conferred by statute. Kokkone n , 5 1 1 U . S . a t 3 7 7 . N e i t h e r the Tucker Act nor the Little Tucker Act expressly grants district courts jurisdiction to order specific performance in contract actions. The Acts prohibit the Court of Federal Claims from ordering equitable relief such as specific performance in contract actions, e x c e p t i n l i m i t e d s i t u a t i o n s n o t a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . R u t t e n b e r g v . U n i t e d S t a t e s, 6 5 F e d . C l . 4 3 , 4950 (Fed. Cl. 2005). Although the Little Tucker Act expressly grants district courts concurrent jurisdiction for claims against the United States of $10,000 or less, it does not expressly grant those the courts the power to order the equitable relief unavailable to the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2); Robbins v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 438 F.3d 1074, 1082 (10th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases) (holding that "the Tucker and Little Tucker Acts `impliedly forbid' federal courts from ordering declaratory or injunctive relief,

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at least in the form of specific performance, for contract claims against the government"); see also Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 64647 (9th Cir. 1998). Where district courts have jurisdiction to require specific performance of contracts a g a i n s t t h e G o v e r n m e n t , t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e a c h b e y o n d a b a s i c breach of contract claim. F o r e x a m p l e , i n C h a r t e r F e d e r a l S a v i n g s B a n k v . O f f i c e o f T h r i f t S u p e r v i s i o n , the Fourth Circuit held that the Tucker Act does not prohibit a court from ordering specific performance when Congress expressly allowed for such relief in a separate statute. 976 F.2d 203, 210 (4th Cir. 1992). As another example, the Tenth Circuit held that a district court had jurisdiction to order equitable relief because the plaintiff made a Fifth Amendment due process claim based on a contract. Robbins , 4 3 8 F . 3 d a t 1 0 8 3 8 4 . A b s e n t express authorization waiving sovereign immunity and allowing f o r i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f i n t h e form of specific performance or the presence of some other special circumstance, a district court does not have jurisdiction to grant specific performance in a contract action brought under the Tucker Act. In the instant case, the Plaintiff seeks both enforcement of the Settlement A g r e e m e n t a n d t e n m i l l i o n d o l l a r s in damages. Since specific pe r f o r m a n c e i s n o t a r e m e d y available to this Court in Tucker Act claims, and because the r equested damages exceed the statutorily provided jurisdictional limit, this Court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims. Therefore, the Court GRANTS with prejudice the Government's motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). C. The Rule 12(b)(6) Argument Is Moot but Has Potential Validity

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Since the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Government's Rule 12(b)(6) argument is moot. It is apparent on the face of the Complaint, however, that the Rule 12(b)(6) argument has potential validity because the Complaint appears to fail to state a breach of contract claim upon which the Court can grant relief. U n d e r V i r g i n i a l a w , a p a r t y c l a i ming breach of contract must es tablish three e l e m e n t s t o p r e v a i l : ( 1 ) a l e g a l l y e n f o r c e a b l e o b l i g a t i o n u n d e r a contract, (2) a breach of that obligation, and (3) injury or damage to the plaintiff flowing from that breach. E.g., E p l u s T e c h n o l o g y , I n c . v . N a t ' l R . R . P a s s e n g e r C o r p . , 407 F. Supp. 2d 758, 761 (E.D. Va. 2005). In the instant case, the Plaintiff fails to show that th e S e t t l e m e n t A g r e e m e n t established a legally enforceable o b l i g a t i o n f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o e n s u r e h e r t r e a t m e n t a t a s p e c i f i c l o c a t i o n . R a t h e r , t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e a g r e e m e n t provides that "[c]ounsel of record for the defendant will utilize their best efforts to ensure that any future medical t r e a t m e n t . . . w i l l b e p e r f o r m e d b y a n d a t t h e M c G u i r e V e t e r a n 's facility" (emphasis added). This statement of intent does not rise to the level of legally enforceable obligation. Furthermore, the change in the P l a i n t i f f ' s t r e a t m e n t l o c a t i o n i s a result of the end of h e r i n s u r a n c e e l i g i b i l i t y u n d e r C H A M P V A , n o t o f a n y a c t i o n s t a k e n b y t h e G o v e r n m e n t . T h u s , e v e n i f t h e S e t t l e m e n t A g re e m e n t d i d c r e a t e a l e g a l l y e n f o r c e a b l e o b l i g a t i o n , n o breach would be attributable to any person or entity bound by the Settlement Agreement. Finally, to provide the equitable remedy the Plaintiff seeks would bind the Department of Veterans Affairs, who was not party to the original lawsuit or t h e S e t t l e m e n t A g r e e m e n t .

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For these reasons, the Complaint appears to fail to state a claim upon which the Court can grant relief. Thus, the Court likely would have granted the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) upon a finding of subjectmatter jurisdiction. IV. CONCLUSION F o r t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h e C o u r t G R A N T S t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Let the Clerk send a copy of this Memorandum to all counsel of record. An appropriate order will issue. It is SO ORDERED.

/s/ James R. Spencer Chief United States District Judge

ENTERED this 6th day of October 2010

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