Coles v. Deltaville Boatyard, LLC et al
Filing
110
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis W. Dohnal on 10-11-11. (kyou, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
COREY L. COLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
DELTAVILLE BOATYARD, LLC,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CIVIL NO. 3:10cv491-DWD
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c)(1) for trial, as well as the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings (ECF No.
98). The Court took the matter under advisement following trial (without jury) and permitted the
parties to submit post-trial briefs in lieu of oral argument,1 in addition to submission of briefs
addressing the Defendant’s post-trial motion. The matter has now been thoroughly briefed and
the Court has considered the evidence presented at trial. For the reasons set forth herein, the
Court shall DENY the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings.
1
The parties agreed to file post-trial briefs arguing the merits of the case, as well as addressing
any post-trial motions. However, in addition to the agreed briefing, the Defendant has filed a
Post Trial Reply Brief, without leave of the Court, which the Plaintiff asks this Court to
disregard. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the submission at issue and concludes that it
does nothing more than debate the short-comings of the Plaintiff’s pleadings, essentially
accusing him of deceit by virtue of his failure to offer proof of some of the allegations set forth
therein. The Court finds the arguments in the Post Trial Reply Brief unpersuasive and,
accordingly, the submission has no impact on the Court’s resolution of the relevant issues.
Moreover, it is noted that pleadings are not filed under oath in federal court. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
11. Furthermore, unless a foundation is established to show otherwise, a pleading is not
necessarily a “prior statement made by the witness” so as to permit impeachment pursuant to
Fed. R. Evid. 613.
In addition, upon consideration of all the evidence and the applicable law, the Court
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Defendant retaliated against the Plaintiff in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Accordingly, judgment is rendered for the Plaintiff in the amount of two thousand dollars
($2,000.00) for compensatory and related punitive damages for the reasons set forth herein, with
an additional award of attorney’s fees and costs to be determined hereafter.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a trial without a jury, a court must make specific findings of fact and separately state
its conclusions of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). The trial judge must weigh the evidence, choose
from among conflicting versions of events, and draw those inferences which the court deems
most reasonable. Penn-Texas Corp. v. Morse, 242 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir. 1957) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). As the finder of fact, it is incumbent upon the trial court to
make judgments about the reliability of witnesses by evaluating their testimony, including
weighing any interests each might have in the outcome of the case, and their demeanor on the
witness stand. See Burgess v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 335 F.2d 885, 889 (4th Cir. 1964); see also
Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556, 567 (4th Cir. 1995). At the
same time, the court is not required to issue findings on all facts presented during trial or make
detailed evidentiary findings. Darter v. Greenville Cmty. Hotel Corp., 301 F.2d 70, 75 (4th Cir.
1962). If the findings are sufficient to support the ultimate conclusion of law, the trial court’s
decision will prevail. Id.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1), the Court makes the following findings of fact.
1.
Deltaville Boatyard, LLC (“Deltaville Boatyard” or “Defendant”) employed
2
Corey L. Coles (“Coles” or “Plaintiff”) as a boat painter on June 8, 2004, until his employment
was terminated on May 9, 2005.
2.
Less than two weeks later, on May 19, 2005, Coles accepted a similar position
with another maritime entity in the same area, Crown Marine, Inc. (“Crown Marine”).
A.
EEOC Charge
3.
On or about May 26, 2005, Coles filed an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) charge against Deltaville Boatyard (the “EEOC Charge”), alleging that
throughout his employment with the company he was subjected to racial discrimination that
culminated in his termination.
4.
At some point between June 3 and June 8, 2005, Deltaville Boatyard received a
copy of the EEOC Charge. Keith Ruse (“Ruse”),2 the owner of Deltaville Boatyard, thereupon
informed his employees of the EEOC Charge.
5.
Ultimately, the EEOC did not authorize Coles to file a lawsuit based on the
allegations in the EEOC Charge, and the allegations therein are not the subject of the matter
presently before the Court. Indeed, the only evidence in the record that the underlying
discrimination claim had merit is Coles’ conclusory testimony that he believed that Ruse treated
him differently. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that Coles belief that he was subjected to
discrimination was sincere to a certain extent, so as to motivate him to file the EEOC Charge,
and forms a basis for his claim of retaliatory activity by Deltaville Boatyard.
B.
Dissemination of EEOC Charge to Subsequent Employers
6.
On June 8, 2005, just days after receiving the EEOC charge, Ruse discussed the
2
The parties stipulated that Ruse’s actions are also the actions of Deltaville Boatyard by virtue of
his ownership and management of the business.
3
EEOC charge with John “Bubbie” Crown (“Crown”), the owner of Crown Marine, most likely at
a local convenience store known as “The Little Sue.” 3 During this conversation, Ruse warned
Crown that he might face a similar EEOC charge as a result of employing Coles. Ruse explained
to Crown that he should “proceed with restraint” in disciplining Coles. As Crown testified at
trial, Ruse appeared to be angry because of the EEOC Charge filed against Deltaville Boatyard.4
As Ruse viewed the events, Coles had made an unfounded accusation of wrongdoing against
him. Nevertheless, Ruse testified that he did not believe that it would harm Coles when he
provided the information to Crown.
7.
Later that same day, Ruse faxed a copy of the EEOC Charge to Crown’s offices.
Deltaville Boatyard disputes that the fax was sent by Ruse himself, asserting that “Crown’s
recollection is that the fax was not sent by Ruse, but rather was sent to him by the Deltaville
3
The Defendant does not dispute that Ruse discussed the matter with Crown on or about this
date, but challenges whether or not this was the first time that Crown first learned of the EEOC
Charge. Specifically, the Defendant points to Coles’ word choice in the EEOC Charge itself,
which states that “[w]hen I was initially hired I told Bubbie Crown about the [discrimination]
charge that I had filed against Deltaville Boatyard.” The Court accepts Coles’ explanation that
his use of the word “initially” simply means early in his employment, such as the first several
weeks, and that it could have, and did, occur after the June 8th conversation between Ruse and
Crown.
4
Although Ruse denies that he was angry, the Court accepts Crown’s testimony to the contrary.
As was established at trial, Crown has little if any interest in the dispute between Deltaville, his
competitor in business, and Coles, whose employment he terminated. Moreover, the Court finds
that Crown was a generally believable witness, as he appeared to answer questions with candor.
For example, Crown admitted that he was nervous in court, which is to be expected of any
person unfamiliar with the legal process. This is especially true where one is compelled to
testify in a matter involving two persons with whom the witness is well-acquainted. He also
admitted that he was, himself, angry at Coles when, during the course of events in this case, he
was also accused of discrimination during his employment of Coles. This admission stands in
stark contrast to Ruse’s testimony, in which he attempted to obscure his own anger. There is
nothing unlawful about an employer being angry at an employee who files an EEOC charge.
Indeed, one would expect discord between the parties when, as is the case here, the employer
denies the allegations and considers them unfounded. Accordingly, the Court’s findings of fact
rely heavily on Crown’s trial testimony to resolve disagreements that exist between Coles’ and
Ruse’s evidence.
4
Boatyard office manager.” (Def.’s Post-Trial Br. at 14 (citing Crown’s trial testimony, Trial
Transcript at 84).) However, such a statement is effectively refuted because, recorded on the
same page of the trial transcript, is the additional statement by Crown that he received the fax
“from Mr. Ruse, that’s -- that is correct.”
8.
Five months later, on November 8, 2005, Crown Marine terminated Coles’
employment. The Court concludes that Crown’s decision was not influenced by the EEOC
Charge that Coles had filed against Deltaville Boatyard. Rather, it resulted from Coles’ frequent,
private telephone calls while “on the job” and “disappearances” on company time, coupled with
at least one instance of apparently inadequate work product. Specifically, there was an incident
shortly before Coles’ termination from Crown Marine in which a particular assignment of his
(fiberglass preparation) failed due to Coles’ actions.
9.
Approximately one week after losing his job at Crown Marine, Coles obtained
employment with yet another boatyard in the area, Deagles Boatyard, Inc. (“Deagles”), again as
a boat painter.
10.
On February 7, 2006, Coles filed a retaliation charge with the EEOC against
Crown Marine and Deltaville Boatyard (the “Retaliation Charge”). He alleged that Ruse’s
dissemination of information about the EEOC Charge was an act of retaliation which led to
Crown terminating Coles’ employment. Based upon the timeframe in which Ruse received the
first EEOC Charge, the Court reasonably infers that Ruse received the second Retaliation Charge
within two (2) weeks of it being filed. Thus, Ruse was on notice at that time that his
dissemination of the initial EEOC Charge might be unlawful.
11.
On or about March 1, 2006, Ruse called Deagles’ owner, Janie Ruark, to discuss
Coles’ EEOC charge then pending against Deltaville. In doing so, he stated that “I hope he
5
doesn’t do to you what he did to me,” and “I hope you don’t get in the same trouble I’m in.”
(Transcript of the Deposition of Janie Ruark at 11:14-15, 12:25-13:1.)
12.
The Court concludes that Ruse implied that by employing Coles, Deagles was at
risk of facing the same “trouble” that Deltaville Boatyard had confronted. That is, Coles might
file an EEOC charge against Deagles. At trial, Ruse denied that this conversation ever occurred,
but in weighing the evidence, the Court does not accept his version -- the Court finds that the
conversation occurred approximately as described by Ruark.5
13.
In August 2006, Chesapeake Marine Railway (“Chesapeake Marine”) purchased
Deagles’ assets, and Deagles ceased business operations. Initially, Chesapeake Marine retained
all of Deagles’ employees as part of its growing operation at Deagles’ former worksite. Among
those employees retained were Coles and Steve Price (“Price”), an intermediate level supervisor
of Coles’.
14.
In late August 2006, Coles saw Ruse at Chesapeake Marine. The very next day,
Coles saw Ruse return and speak with Price. Coles never heard what was discussed between the
two of them, but assumed that it involved his EEOC Charge against Deltaville, and asks the
Court to infer as much. However, the Court must consider Coles’ testimony together with the
transcript of the deposition of Rick Farinholt (“Farinholt”), the owner of Chesapeak Marine, in
5
Ruark did not testify in person, but her deposition transcript was submitted to the Court as
evidence in the case by agreement of the parties. The Court has reviewed the entirety of the
Ruark deposition transcript and, based on the testimony therein and the context in which it was
presented, the Court finds her testimony highly credible and accepts it. First, in regard to Crown,
she had little if any interest in helping a competitor of hers -- Deltaville Boatyard. Second,
although she experienced some health-related memory problems, she candidly admits when she
cannot recall every detail of an event. At the same time, those details which she provides with
certainty and confidence are corroborated by other testimony, suggesting that her testimony is
reliable. Accordingly, as with Crown, the Court relies on Ruark’s deposition testimony to
resolve factual discrepancies between the parties.
6
which he unequivocally denies ever discussing the EEOC Charge with Ruse, Price, or Coles
before 2007.6 The Court credits Farinholt’s deposition testimony because it is consistent with
Ruse’s trial testimony and there is simply no evidence in the record concerning Price’s
involvement in the matter. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Farinholt did not learn about
the EEOC Charge at any time during Coles’ employment.
15.
In mid-October of 2006, Farinholt met with Coles and terminated his employment
with Chesapeake Marine. As for his reasons, he explained that Coles was continually late to
work, absent on a few occasions, and that his work was “subpar.” The Court credits such
testimony because it is consistent with that of Coles’ other employers, including those
subsequent to Chesapeake Marine -- Schroeder Yacht Systems, Ltd. (“Schroeder Yacht”) and
Zimmerman Marine, Inc. (“Zimmerman Marine”).7
C.
Damages
16.
It is agreed that Coles suffered no lost wages but for one disputed week without
work between his employment with Crown Marine and Deagles. In any event, the Court credits
Crown’s testimony and finds that Coles’ termination from Crown Marine was not the result of
any information shared by Ruse. Rather, it resulted from misuse of Coles’ personal cellular
phone during work, absenteeism, and at least one instance in which he did not adequately
perform his job. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Coles lost no wages as a result of any
6
The parties stipulated to the admissibility of Farinholt’s deposition transcript, and it was offered
by the Defendant, Deltaville Boatyard, as part of its case-in-chief.
7
By agreement between the parties, the Court has considered the affidavits of the president of
Schroeder Yacht, Jeffrey Schroeder, and the president of Zimmerman Marine, Steve
Zimmerman. Both affidavits unequivocally indicate that Ruse never contacted either employer
to discuss Coles and that neither learned about the EEOC Charge during the course of Coles’
employment. Both Schroeder Yacht and Zimmerman Marine terminated Coles because of
similar issues, such as frequent attendance problems and problems with the quality of his work.
7
conduct on Deltaville Boatyard’s part.
17.
Coles also argues that he suffered extensive emotional distress damages. The
Court credits such damages to only a minimal degree. If everything to which Coles testified
were true, it would appear that he suffered extensive emotional distress. However, his evidence
includes the deterioration of his personal life in a way which has little, if any, relation to his
alleged problems with Deltaville Boatyard. Accordingly, given his own exaggeration, Coles’
testimony concerning his emotional damages is afforded little weight. For example, Coles relies
heavily on the testimony of Ms. Tanya Brown, the mother of his son with whom he had a
committed relationship for some time. According to Brown, there were several incidents in
which Coles’ fear of Ruse’s retaliatory conduct led him to distance himself from her.
Eventually, Coles terminated the relationship altogether in an abrupt fit of rage. There is simply
no evidence associating Coles’ employment issues to his behavior towards Ms. Brown, apart
from Coles’ and Brown’s own conclusory, speculative testimony.
18.
There is also one instance in which Coles physically disciplined his son for failing
to tie his shoes, apparently with enough force to cause his son to urinate in his pants. Without
any foundation evidence whatsoever, Coles seeks to have this Court make a logical leap of faith
by associating that example of excessive corporal punishment with an ongoing employment
dispute. This, the Court will not do. And although the described conduct also appears to fall
short of abuse, public policy concerns would give the Court significant pause before allowing a
Title VII plaintiff to use his civil claim to shirk personal responsibility for his own parenting
mistakes. In any event, without more meaningful evidence, the Court will not place the
responsibility for such an incident on Deltaville Boatyard.
19.
By his exaggeration of the supposed emotional distress resulting from Deltaville
8
Boatyard’s retaliation against him, Coles, in fact, gives support to the challenge to such damages.
In any event, the Court concludes that the emotional distress suffered was barely more than
nominal.
20.
The Court further concludes that the actions of Deltaville Boatyard towards Coles
did not interfere with any subsequent employment. Nor did those events ultimately lead to
Coles’ decision to leave the boat repair profession altogether. Rather, the evidence establishes
that Coles obtained further employment in the industry at Schroeder Yachts and Zimmerman
Marine without meaningful difficulty or delay.
III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PARTIAL FINDINGS
Deltaville Boatyard moves for judgment on partial findings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(c), arguing that Coles offers no evidence of “retaliatory animus” on Ruse’s part. In apparent
confusion, Deltaville Boatyard has improperly merged the concepts of “retaliatory animus,” as
courts have utilized that phrase, with malice. Were the two concepts identical, then every
instance of retaliation would give rise to punitive damages. See Lowery v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that malice in Title VII cases may result in
punitive damages). Such is not the case here and, indeed, the two concepts are distinct.
For purposes of resolving a motion for judgment on partial findings, the Court must
evaluate the evidence and render findings of fact in the same manner required by Rule 52(a), as
the Court has attempted to do, supra at Section II. With those findings of fact in mind, Rule
52(c) provides, in pertinent part, that:
If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a nonjury trial and the court
finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against the
party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or
defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue. The court may, however,
decline to render any judgment until the close of the evidence.
9
Stated another way, a court may render judgment upon making a finding of fact which is, by
itself, dispositive of the legal issues in the case.
To establish a prima facie retaliation claim brought pursuant to Title VII, a plaintiff must
prove that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action was taken
against him; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Mackey v. Shalala, 360 F.3d 463, 469 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
The same elements apply to a retaliation claim brought pursuant to § 1981. Aleman v. Chugach
Support Servs., Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 213-14 (4th Cir. 2007). “Retaliatory motive,” or “retaliatory
animus,” as this Court has previously referred to in this case, simply refers to the requirement
that the employer be motivated by the employee’s protected activity in taking the adverse action
at issue. Coles v. Deltaville Boatyard, LLC, No. 3:10cv491, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48884, at *7
(E.D. Va. May 6, 2011). Stated another way, the employee’s protected activity must have
motivated, or caused, the employer to take the action at issue. Thus, the concept of retaliatory
motive implicates the causation element of a retaliation claim, not whether such reactive
response was undertaken with malicious intent.
Deltaville Boatyard relies on Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53
(2006), to argue that a minimal level of harm must exist in order to establish a retaliation claim,
and that such harm implicitly requires evidence of “retaliatory motive.” (Def.’s Post-Trial Br. at
27-28.) Developing this argument, the Defendant cites extensively from Burlington Northern’s
discussion of the magnitude of harm that an employee must suffer for an employer’s action to
constitute retaliation. But in doing so, Deltaville Boatyard has confused the element of causation
(i.e. “retaliatory motive”), with the element of an adverse employment action, which was the
10
element at issue in Burlington Northern.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Burlington Northern, explicitly framed the issue in the
form of the following question: “how harmful must the adverse action be to fall within its
scope?” 548 U.S. at 56 (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that the Court was not addressing the
causation, or “retaliatory motive” element of the claim. Instead, the Court sought to clarify what
minimum threshold of harm that an employer’s action must cause before its conduct is
sufficiently adverse to constitute “adverse action” for Title VII purposes. Resolving the question
presented, the Supreme Court found that Title VII was intended “to provide broad protection
from retaliation,” such that “Title VII’s substantive provision and its antiretaliation provision are
not coterminous.” Id at 67.
Once the Supreme Court concluded that antiretaliation protection is broader than the
substantive protections afforded by Title VII, it then addressed what constitutes a sufficiently
adverse action. It held that “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found
the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id at 68
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court “refer[s] to reactions of a reasonable
employee because . . . the provision’s standard for judging harm must be objective.” Id
(emphasis in original). Moreover, “the standard is tied to the challenged retaliatory act.” Id at
70 (emphasis added). Thus, the standard defines the element of adverse employment action, not
causation or “retaliatory motive.”
Here, Deltaville Boatyard argues that “[t]he evidence shows that Ruse merely told Crown
about the charge . . . [and] that Ruse had no expectation that Crown would make any decision
concerning Plaintiff’s employment.” (Def.’s Post-Trial Br. at 29.) The Defendant “misses the
11
mark” for two reasons. First, it is his act of disseminating the information that constitutes the
alleged adverse action at issue, not how Crown responded to it. Indeed, this Court has already
made a finding of fact that Crown’s subsequent employment decision concerning Coles was
unaffected by his knowledge of the EEOC Charge filed against Deltaville Boatyard. Second, the
standard for defining harm set forth in Burlington Northern does not implicate Ruse’s subjective
motives, but instead evaluates whether Ruse’s actions “might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at
68. In other words, would a reasonable employee be dissuaded from filing an EEOC charge
against his former employer if he knows that his former employer will inform his current
employer that he has taken this step?
The Court concludes in the affirmative. As Burlington Northern recognized, and as even
Deltaville Boatyard emphasizes here, “context matters.” Id. at 69. Here, the context involves
Coles departing Deltaville Boatyard under less than favorable circumstances, suspicious that its
owner discriminated against him on the basis of his race.8 Certainly, an employee, departing
under such unpleasant circumstances, would wish to keep such ill-will from “infecting” his
reputation at his next place of employment. He would be expected to at least hesitate in filing an
EEOC charge if he knows that any resulting enmity will follow him to his next job. Thus,
Ruse’s actions to warn Coles’ subsequent employers about the EEOC Charge against Deltaville
Boatyard, taken together, constitute a series of adverse employment actions as defined in
Burlington Northern.
8
As Burlington Northern recognized, it is irrelevant whether Coles was correct in his belief that
Ruse actually discriminated against him on the basis of his race, which was the allegation in the
underlying EEOC Charge. 548 U.S. at 69 (“[T]he standard is tied to the challenged retaliatory
act, not the underlying conduct that forms the basis of the Title VII complaint”).
12
For these reasons, the Court denies the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on Partial
Findings, and will proceed to render its conclusions of law on the merits.9
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As the Court perceives the facts of this case, liability may be sufficiently established, but
the resulting damages are far less certain. Accordingly, the Court will address the two issues
separately. To that end, as required pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1), the Court issues the
following conclusions of law.
A.
Liability
1.
Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any of [its]
employees . . . because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(e).
2.
As the Court has already explained, Coles must prove three elements to establish
his retaliation claim: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action was
taken against him; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Mackey, 360 F.3d at 469; Aleman, 485 F.3d at 213-14 . It is undisputed
that Coles engaged in protected activity by filing the EEOC Charge. Thus, only the second and
third elements are at issue.
3.
The Court concludes that the second element is satisfied because the
dissemination of prior EEOC charges by a former employer to the employee’s future employers
9
Deltaville Boatyard has comingled its arguments on the merits with its arguments in support of
its Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings. The first argument, related to the issue of
retaliatory animus, appears to be the only one related to its motion. The other arguments
(material adversity, causation, and damages) require the Court to weigh the evidence, and are
therefore not appropriate for resolution on a motion made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c).
Accordingly, the merits of those arguments are addressed by the Court’s Conclusions of Law,
infra at Section IV.
13
(or prospective employers) constitutes a materially adverse employment action. The Court has
previously reached the same conclusion in resolving the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on
Partial Findings, supra at Section III. Accordingly, the Court incorporates that analysis in
rendering its conclusion that Deltaville Boatyard took adverse employment action against Coles
in disseminating the EEOC Charge. Moreover, the Court rejects Deltaville Boatyard’s argument
to the contrary, based upon the factual allegation that Coles informed Crown about the EEOC
Charge before Ruse discussed the matter with Crown. Weighing the evidence, as the Court is
required to do, the Court has credited Coles’ version of events, concluding that Crown first
learned of the EEOC Charge from Ruse on or about June 8, 2005.
4.
The Court further concludes that the third and final element has been satisfied
because Coles’ filing the EEOC Charge was the cause of Ruse’s dissemination thereof. Here,
the protected activity itself is intimately connected with the resulting act of retaliation such that
the two cannot be separated, absent some alternative explanation. The only alternative offered is
that Ruse wanted to help Coles’ future employers avoid a similar result (i.e. an EEOC charge
against any one of them). In addition, Ruse has explained that he faxed the EEOC Charge itself
to Crown solely to support what had already been conveyed verbally. The Court simply does not
credit Ruse’s testimony of such a rationale. First, it is irrelevant whether Ruse faxed a copy of
the charge as an act of retaliation or simply to “back up” the retaliation which he had already
engaged in. That is, by telling Crown about the EEOC Charge, Ruse had already retaliated
against Coles. The relevant question of law is whether his act of retaliation was caused by
Coles’ protected activity, and the fact that one isolated act may have been motivated by
additional reasons does not necessarily “break” the causal chain. But for Coles’ filing the EEOC
Charge, the act of disseminating it could not have occurred, either verbally or through facsimile.
14
The most reasonable inference is that the protected activity was the cause of the retaliation.
Accordingly, the third and final element of Coles’ retaliation claim -- causation -- has been
established.
5.
The Court rejects (again) the Defendant’s argument that the case of Gnadt v.
Castro, No. 95-1369, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17333 (4th Cir. July 10, 1997), holds that liability
requires proof that Coles lost his subsequent employment because of the retaliatory act in order
to establish liability for retaliation. Deltaville Boatyard has misunderstood this Court’s holding
in resolving the motion for summary judgment to suggest that the Court held that Gnadt “is [not]
still good law and should [not] be followed.” (Def.’s Post-Trial Br. at 31.) The Court only
distinguished the facts in Gnadt because the employer in that case merely threatened action,
whereas Ruse here actually took action in disseminating the EEOC Charge to Coles’ subsequent
employers.
6.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the holding in Gnadt that some effect must be
felt by the employee, which might include “emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.” 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
17333 at *10 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)). Deltaville Boatyard seeks to limit the universe of
available damages to pecuniary losses only, which is inconsistent with the holding in Gnadt.
Indeed, in weighing the evidence, the Court agrees that Coles suffered no lost wages, but
concludes that some emotional pain was suffered on his part, minimal though it may have been.
There is nothing inconsistent in this conclusion from that of Gnadt, and the Court therefore
rejects the Defendant’s narrow view of the remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs.
7.
Dissemination of the EEOC Charge was a materially adverse employment action
caused by Coles’ protected activity, regardless of whether Ruse subjectively believed that it
15
would harm Coles in any way. Thus, Deltaville Boatyard is liable to Coles for retaliation
pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
B.
Damages
1.
Lost Wages
8.
In cases brought pursuant to Title VII, lost wages in the form of “back pay” are
generally available to a prevailing employee, which includes those wages that would have
accrued to the time when the court might reinstate the employee. See Corti v. Storage Tech.
Corp., 304 F.3d 336, 342 n.11 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)).
Such “back pay” is “a make-whole remedy that resembles compensatory damages in some
respects.” Id (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 253 (1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, to avoid a “double-recovery,” such damages were explicitly
omitted from those compensatory damages available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Id at 34243. In addition, the Court may exercise its discretion to award “front pay,” which includes those
future earnings lost as a result of the statutory violation. See Benson v. Thompson CadillacOldsmobile, Inc., 287 Fed. App’x 249, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Dennis v. Columbia
Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 651 (4th Cir. 2002)). In any event, such “make whole”
relief must be “for losses suffered on account of” the Title VII violation. Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975) (adopting the rule from cases brought pursuant to the National
Labor Relations Act in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941)).
9.
The parties agree that Coles suffered no lost wages except for possibly one week
without work between his employment with Crown Marine and Deagles, which the Defendant
disputes. However, the Court credits Crown’s testimony and finds that Coles’ termination from
Crown Marine was not the result of any information shared by Ruse. Rather, it resulted from
16
frequent and improper cellular phone use, leaving the jobsite early without permission, and at
least one instance in which he did not adequately perform his job. Accordingly, the Court does
not award any damages resulting therefrom.
2.
Compensatory Damages for Emotional Distress
10.
Coles argues that he suffered extensive emotional distress damages. The Court
credits such damages to only a minimal degree. If everything to which Coles testified were true,
it would appear that he suffered extensive emotional distress. “[A] plaintiff’s testimony,
standing alone, may support a claim of emotional distress.” Dennis, 290 F.3d at 652 (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “courts scrupulously analyze an award of
compensatory damages” such that the “injured party must reasonably and sufficiently explain the
circumstances of [his] injury and not resort to mere conclusory statements.” Id (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he injury must be demonstrable and [] the plaintiff must
show a causal connection between the violation and [his] emotional distress.” Id (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the evidence from which Coles argues for
emotional distress damages includes the deterioration of his personal life in a way which has no
apparent or reasonable causal connection to his problems with Deltaville Boatyard. See Findings
of Fact Nos. 18-19, supra at Section II.
11.
The Court has found that only minimal emotional distress resulted from Deltaville
Boatyard’s retaliatory acts against Coles. Accordingly, the Court concludes that appropriate
compensation for emotional distress in this case is one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).10
10
The one-thousand dollar value ($1,000) is not reached arbitrarily or without consideration. It
was disclosed at trial that the EEOC had previously facilitated a settlement of this matter for
five-thousand dollars ($5,000.00), presumably with Coles’ concurrence, but Deltaville Boatyard
withdrew its initial consent due to additional conditions added by the EEOC. (Trial Transcript at
17
3.
Punitive Damages
12.
Punitive damages are available where “the complaining party demonstrates that
the [employer] engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless indifference
to the federally protected right of [the employee].” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (emphasis added).
The same rule applies to Title VII claims. Lowery, 206 F.3d at 441. Malice is established where
“the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent.” Kolstad v. Am.
Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999). However, reckless indifference may be established
simply by showing that the employer acted despite a perceived risk that its actions would violate
federal law. Id. at 536. Such punitive damages are available regardless of whether any
compensatory damages are awarded. Corti, 304 F.3d at 342.11
13.
Here, there is no evidence that Ruse acted with malice. First, with respect to the
initial dissemination of the EEOC Charge to Crown, the parties have stipulated that Ruse acted
41-42.) That, of course, was a value agreed to prior to what this Court has concluded is Coles’
exaggeration of his emotional distress damages at trial. Accordingly, starting at a value of five
thousand dollars ($5,000.00), and reducing it based on the Court’s conclusion that Coles’
exaggeration has now become apparent, the Court arrives at a value of one-thousand dollars
($1,000.00). No other reasonable measure of such damages is available or known.
11
The Fourth Circuit, the appellate jurisdiction governing this Court, has held that “[i]n Title VII
cases, a jury’s punitive damage award will stand even in the absence of compensatory damages if
back pay has been awarded.” Corti, 304 F.3d at 343. However, the Fourth Circuit also
acknowledged that some circuits award punitive damages regardless of whether back pay is
awarded, but refrained from so holding because the district court had awarded back pay in the
case then under review. Id at 343 n.13 (citing Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d
1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) and Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir.
2001)). At a minimum, the analysis in Corti suggests that any compensatory damages would be
sufficient to reach the result therein, not necessarily back pay alone. Id at 343. Even so, the
Fourth Circuit’s recognition that “nothing in the plain language of § 1981a conditions an award
of punitive damages on an underlying award of compensatory damages” suggests that it might
agree with the Seventh Circuit decision in Timm, permitting punitive damages even when no
compensatory damages are awarded. Here, because compensatory damages have been awarded
due to emotional distress suffered by Coles, minimal as those damages may be, punitive damages
are available here regardless of which approach is taken.
18
with no intent to harm Coles. Moreover, there is otherwise no evidence that he acted with “evil
motive or intent” in any later discussions with Coles’ subsequent employers. True, the Court has
concluded that Ruse was angry. But the fact that he was angry, especially if he believed that
such anger was justified, does not render his conduct evil in order to award punitive damages.
His conduct was prohibited by the statute under these circumstances, but simply violating the
statute falls short of malicious activity.
14.
Nevertheless, the reckless indifference standard warrants some minimal level of
punitive damages in this case. Because Ruse received notice of the Retaliation Charge before he
contacted Deagles, he was on notice that his conduct might be retaliatory. By engaging in
further retaliation by warning Ruark about Coles’ EEOC Charge, Ruse was retaliating against
him while aware that his conduct might be a violation of Coles’ Title VII rights. Accordingly, he
acted with reckless indifference to Coles’ Title VII rights.
15.
However, the level of retaliatory conduct established here is not as pervasive as
Coles has argued. While Coles asserts that Ruse continued to contact multiple employers, all the
while intending to disrupt Coles’ career, the evidence establishes only that on two occasions,
Ruse discussed the EEOC Charge with Coles’ subsequent employers. First, he discussed the
matter with Crown and faxed the EEOC Charge to him. Second, he discussed the matter with
Ruark, who does not appear to have allowed it to affect her opinion of Coles. The Court has
credited the deposition testimony of Farinholt, concluding that he did not discuss the matter with
Ruse at all during the relevant timeframe. Accordingly, Ruse was not orchestrating a “grand
conspiracy” among the boatyards in the region, as Coles would have this Court believe. While
Ruse’s actions were retaliatory, they were isolated events that do not appear to have “infected”
the local industry, as Coles has asserted.
19
16.
Because there was no malice, and Ruse’s conduct caused only minimal actual
harm to Coles, the Court does not consider a substantial punitive damages award appropriate in
this case. However, some level of punitive damages are appropriate. Accordingly, the Court
awards punitive damages of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).12
C.
Attorney’s Fees
17.
As the prevailing party in a claim brought pursuant to Title VII, the Court must
award attorney’s fees to Coles. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k); see also Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs.
of Montgomery Cmty. Coll., 928 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1991). The Court directs Coles to file a
motion forthwith for such fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), which this Court shall review
for reasonableness.
18.
However, in addressing attorney’s fees, the Court emphasizes the de minimis
results obtained in this case, especially in light of the considerable time and resources expended
by both parties. In addressing what constitutes a reasonable fee, both parties should account for
this variable. Pellegrin v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. (In re Abrams & Abrans, P.A.), 605 F.3d 238,
247 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Doe v. Chao, 435 F.3d 492, 506 (4th Cir. 2006)) (“We have noted that
‘the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success
obtained’”); see also Gumbhir v. Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 157 F.3d 1141, 1146-47 (8th
Cir. 1998) (reducing fee award by seventy-five percent due to limited success).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that Deltaville Boatyard retaliated
against Coles because he filed the EEOC Charge. The Court shall enter JUDGEMENT for Coles
12
In arriving at this figure, the Court has conducted essentially the same analysis as it did with
regard to emotional distress damages, infra at 17 n.10, and concludes that an equal amount is
warranted.
20
in the amount of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00). Moreover, the Court shall award attorney’s
fees and costs to Coles as the prevailing party, subject to review for reasonableness as shall be
addressed in a forthcoming motion made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2).
An appropriate Order will issue.
/s/
Dennis W. Dohnal
United States Magistrate Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Dated: October 11, 2011
21
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?