Coles v. Deltaville Boatyard, LLC et al

Filing 149

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis W. Dohnal on 1/25/12. (kyou, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
__________________________________________
)
COREY L. COLES,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
CIVIL NO. 3:10cv491-DWD
)
DELTAVILLE BOATYARD, LLC,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c)(1) on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No. 133). The matter has been
adequately briefed by the parties’ submissions and the Court dispenses with oral argument,
finding that it will not materially aid in the decisional process. For the reasons set forth herein,
the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No. 133) shall be GRANTED, in part, and
DENIED, in part, and the Plaintiff shall be awarded a sum of three-thousand eight-hundred
twenty-five and 00/100 dollars ($3,825.00) for attorneys’ fees.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 25, 2011, Corey L. Coles (“Coles” or the “Plaintiff”) filed a Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees and costs (ECF No. 112) (the “First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees”) associated
with his successful pursuit of a claim for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Thereafter, on November 8, 2011, Deltaville Boatyard, LLC
(“Deltaville Boatyard” or the “Defendant”) filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (ECF
No. 117), asking this Court to amend its earlier judgment so as to deny Coles the compensatory

and punitive damages previously awarded.
By Order dated December 12, 2011 (ECF No. 128), the Court denied the Defendant’s
Motion to Alter or Amend. Subsequently, on December 19, 2011 (ECF No. 130), the Court
granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s First Motion for Attorney’s Fees.
The Plaintiff now moves for an additional award of costs and attorneys’ fees incurred as a
result of having to respond to the Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (the
“Second Motion for Attorneys’ Fees”).1 The Plaintiff’s motion includes a declaration of counsel,
Christopher Colt North (the “North Declaration”), and a summary of services rendered by him
and his partner in responding to the Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment.
According to the North Declaration and the attached invoice, he spent a total of 3.75 hours
preparing Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend at a rate of
three-hundred dollars per hour ($300/hour), for a total fee of one-thousand one-hundred twentyfive and 00/100 dollars ($1,125.00). Mr. North’s partner, William L. Downing (“Downing”),
spent 23.30 hours preparing a response to the Defendant’s motion at a rate of two-hundred fifty
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On December 22, 2011, the Plaintiff simultaneously filed Motions to Reopen the Case
(ECF No. 131) and for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No. 133) under the mistaken belief that it would be
necessary for the Court to reopen the case in order to consider his supplemental request for
attorneys’ fees. However, the Court’s December 23, 2011 Order (EFC No. 135) denied the
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen, noting that it nonetheless retained jurisdiction to resolve collateral
matters such as further requests for attorneys’ fees. Thus, the Court’s December 23, 2011 Order
did not rule upon the Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Attorneys’ Fees filed on December 22, 2011.
Thereafter, on December 27, 2011, the Plaintiff re-filed the same motion and memorandum in
support (ECF Nos. 136 and 137) that had already been filed on December 22, 2011.
In its Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, the Defendant claims
that the Plaintiff’s motion is untimely on the grounds that it was “submitted” on December 22,
2011, but was not actually “filed” until December 27, 2011. The Defendant is “splitting hairs”
and this Court will not uphold an argument grounded in semantics where, as here, the Defendant
suffered no prejudice as a result. Notwithstanding this fact, the duplicative December 27, 2011
filing was timely because the motion was filed no later than 14 days after the Court’s ruling on
the subject Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, as required by Rule 54(d)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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dollars per hour ($250/hour), for a total fee of five-thousand eight-hundred twenty-five and
00/100 dollars ($5,825.00).2 Added together, the requested fees total six-thousand nine-hundred
fifty and 00/100 dollars ($6,950.00). The reasonableness of the hourly rates for Mr. North and
Mr. Downing is not in dispute, having already been established sub judice (ECF No. 130).
The Defendant contests the number of hours spent by Mr. North and Mr. Downing in
opposing the Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. Specifically, the Defendant
challenges as unreasonable Coles’ use of two attorneys to prepare the response to the motion,
and the number of hours allegedly expended by the attorneys.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. EEOC v.
Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 178 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Johnson v. City of Aiken, 278
F.3d 333, 336 (4th Cir. 2002)). Such a review is “sharply circumscribed” because federal
appellate courts recognize that the trial court “has close and intimate knowledge of the efforts
expended and the value of the services rendered,” so the award will not be overturned unless
“clearly wrong.” Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1990). The lodestar method, the
product of the hours reasonably expended times a reasonable rate, generates a presumptively
reasonable fee. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley
I), 478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986); Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir.
2009) (“In calculating an award of attorney’s fees, a court must first determine a lodestar
figure…”). While it is well within the discretion of the district court to determine the amount of
the fee, and to adjust the lodestar product upward or downward as it deems appropriate, “this
2

Plaintiff’s Statement of Legal Services Rendered claims a total of 24.30 hours for Mr.
Downing. In its Brief in Opposition, Defendant notes, and Plaintiff admits, that the statement
contains an inadvertent, mathematical error: the itemized time entries for Mr. Downing actually
add up to 23.30 hours.
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must be done on a principled basis, clearly explained by the court.” Lyle v. Food Lion, Inc., 954
F.2d 984, 989 (4th Cir. 1992).
III. ANALYSIS
Deltaville Boatyard argues against any award of attorneys’ fees on the grounds that the
Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Attorneys’ Fees was untimely. This argument fails because: (1) as
previously explained, supra at n.1, the Plaintiff’s submission was within the deadline; and (2)
under the “law of the case” doctrine, the Plaintiff’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees is no longer at
issue. Rather, the sole issue in this case is whether the hours claimed by the Plaintiff’s attorneys
are reasonable.
A.

An Award of Attorney’s Fees is Proper in this Case
The issue regarding Coles’ entitlement to attorneys’ fees was addressed previously in the

Court’s Memorandum Opinion resolving the Plaintiff’s First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. See
Coles v. Deltaville Boatyard, LLC, No. 3:10cv491-DWD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145551 (E.D.
Va. Dec. 19, 2011). As “the law of the case,” the Court’s previous legal conclusions support an
award of attorneys’ fees. See Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 137 (4th Cir. 2009).
Notwithstanding the “law of the case,” the Court also concludes that an additional award of
attorneys’ fees is proper on the grounds that, contrary to the Defendant’s argument in its Brief in
Opposition, the submission of the Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Attorneys’ Fees was timely, as
previously explained, supra, at n.1.
B.

The Hours Alleged Are Excessive
It is well-established that the lodestar approach is the proper method for determining

reasonable attorneys’ fees. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). The lodestar
figure is determined by multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable

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rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). As stated in Section I, supra, the
reasonableness of the rate has already been established sub judice. To establish the number of
hours reasonably expended, the Plaintiff must “submit evidence supporting the number of hours
worked.” Id. at 433. In determining the reasonableness of the hours expended, the Court is
guided by the twelve Johnson factors. 3 Additionally, the Court must exclude from the
calculation hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. at 434.
In the present case, Coles has submitted a Statement of Services Rendered and the North
Declaration in support of the attorneys’ fees requested. Mr. North reports that he spent some
3.75 hours in preparing Coles’ response to the Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend. Mr.
Downing reports 23.30 hours of work in preparing the same document. Deltaville Boatyard
challenges as unreasonable Coles’ use of two attorneys to prepare the responding motion, and the
number of hours reported by each attorney. Deltaville Boatyard supports its challenge by
arguing that either attorney should have been able to adequately respond to its motion to alter or
amend because both attorneys participated in the litigation through trial and are, therefore,

3

The Johnson factors are set forth as follows:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed
or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputations, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the
"undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The Court is
keenly aware of recent jurisprudence suggesting that the Johnson factors are often
“subsumed” by the lodestar figure. See, e.g., Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 564
(citation omitted). For that reason, the Court shall limit its discussion to the sole issue
of import herein, which is the reasonable number of hours expended.
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presumably well-familiar with the litigation. Moreover, the response to such a motion was a
relatively routine matter that should not have required a significant expenditure of time.4 The
Court agrees.
Upon consideration of the expenses submitted by Mr. North and Mr. Downing in
responding to the Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend, the Court finds the number of hours
reported to be excessive, or duplicative in some respects, so as to warrant a reduction from that
alleged. In particular, the Court finds as duplicative the decision to employ two attorneys to
respond to the Defendant’s motion. Both Mr. North and Mr. Downing had been involved in the
litigation through trial and, therefore, each was equipped with the necessary information to
adequately respond to the motion by themselves. Because Mr. Downing was tasked with
responding to the motion, the Defendant should not be responsible for the 3.75 hours also
claimed by Mr. North.
The Court also finds the time expended by Mr. Downing in preparing the response to the
motion to be excessive. Specifically, responding to the Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend
involves only a moderate level of difficulty, with no special skill being required. While the
Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum rightly notes that the evidence needed to be re-analyzed and new
supporting cases found in light of Deltaville Boatyard’s new legal arguments, Mr. Downing
assisted in litigating this case through trial and in submitting detailed post-trial motions.
Therefore, Mr. Downing was already intimately familiar with the Plaintiff’s evidence, as well as
the contents of the trial transcript. Furthermore, as an experienced attorney, Mr. Downing is
surely acquainted with the rules and standards governing post-trial motions such as motions to
4

The Court is cognizant of its finding that persistent threats of Rule 11 sanctions could
justify additional efforts. However, at this point in the litigation, the issues were well-settled as
made clear by the Court’s prior rulings. Accordingly, any further threat of sanctions does not
warrant additional efforts for purposes of resolving the Second Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.
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alter or amend a judgment, and with the procedural law governing mailings and presumptions
concerning receipts.
Where a court finds duplicative and excessive the hours claimed by the attorney of the
party requesting attorneys’ fees, the court has the discretion to exclude from its calculation those
hours that it deems were not reasonably expended. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; see also
Friedrich v. Thompson, No. 1:99CV00772, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21303 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 26,
1999) (finding that the use of two attorneys in an action that did not present legal tasks of novel
difficulty was unnecessary and resulted in unwarranted duplicative efforts). Therefore, the Court
will deduct from its calculation of reasonable hours expended the 3.75 hours claimed by Mr.
North and 8.0 of the 23.30 hours claimed by Mr. Downing. Such a calculation reduces the
reasonable number of hours spent preparing the motion from 27.05 hours to 15.30 hours, at a rate
of two-hundred fifty dollars per hour ($250/hour), rendering the total attorneys’ fees awarded of
three-thousand eight-hundred twenty-five and 00/100 dollars ($3,825.00). The Court concludes
its analysis by noting that the figure represents the lodestar and is, therefore, presumptively
reasonable. Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 564.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No.
133) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, and the Plaintiff shall be AWARDED threethousand eight-hundred twenty-five and 00/100 dollars ($3,825.00) in attorneys’ fees expended
in responding to the Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment.
/s/
Dennis W. Dohnal
United States Magistrate Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Dated: January 25, 2012
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