Brown v. Harris et al

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 1/3/12. Copy sent: Yes(tdai, )

IN THE UNITED

FOR THE

STATES DISTRICT

COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Richmond Division

RONALD BROWN,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No.

v.

3:10CV613

ALVIN EUGENE HARRIS, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Ronald Brown,

a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, brings this action.1

Brown alleges that

Defendants

Eighth

violated

his

rights

under

the

Amendment.2

Specifically, Brown asserts:

Claim One

Nurse Moore denied Brown adequate medical

care for his broken ankle on April 29, 2007.3
Claim Two

Dr. Harris failed to provide Brown with
adequate medical care for his broken ankle
between April 29, 2007 and May 4, 2009.

The

matter

Summary

is

before

Judgment

and

the

the

Court

Court's

on

physician

at

Southhampton

Harris's

authority

1 Brown names as defendants Dr.
Audrey Moore,

Dr.

under

Motion

28

for

U.S.C.

Alvin Eugene Harris,

Correctional

Center

("SHCC"),

a
and

a nurse at SHCC.

"Excessive bail shall not be required,

nor excessive

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S.

Const,

amend.

VIII.

3 In his Complaint, Brown complained that he broke his leg.
(Compl. 11 7.)
In his subsequent submissions, Brown specifies
that he broke his ankle.
(PL's Mem. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. 1.)

§ 1915(e)(2)

to dismiss

follow,

Claim One

statute

of

will

limitations

frivolous

be
and

claims.

For

dismissed

as

Claim

will

Two

the

barred
be

reasons

by the

dismissed

that

relevant
for

lack

of merit.

I.

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

As pertinent here,

Brown alleges:

[0]n or about April 29, 2007, when plaint[iff] was
playing baseball, he broke his leg.
When he went to
Moore

for treatment of his wounds,

she,

on said date,

only treated plaintiff by applying an ice pack and
giving him 200 mg of Advil, despite the fact his leg
was

broken.

Therefore,

Moore

demonstrated

deliberate

indifference towards plaintiff's serious medical need.
thereby
violating
plaintiff's
Inter
alia,
Constitutional Rights under the Eighth Amendment to
the federal Constitutional to be [exempt] from the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
Notwithstanding said duty, on or about April 29,
2007 through on or about May 4, 2009, despite having
adequate knowledge that plaintiff on April 29, 2007,
suffered substantial tra[u]ma to his right leg, Harris
refused to
examin[e]
plaintiff.
Therefore Harris
demonstrated

deliberate

indifference

towards

plaintiff's serious medical need.
Inter alia, thereby
violating plaintiff's Constitutional Rights under the
Eighth

Amendment

[exempt]

to

the

Federal

Constitution

to

be

from the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain.

(Compl.

!l

7,

8

(paragraph

number

omitted).)

Brown

demands

$100,000.00 in monetary damages.

II.

Pursuant to

the

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Prison Litigation Reform Act

("PLRA")

this

Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court

determines the action

(1)

"is frivolous" or

(2)

"fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C.
These

standards

permit

the

Court

to

sua

sponte

§ 1915(e)(2).
dismiss

claims

that are clearly barred by the relevant statute of limitations.
See Eriline Co.
2006);

S.A.

Nasim v.

(4th Cir.

v. Johnson,

Warden,

§

House

F.3d 648,

of

Corr.,

655-57
64

F.3d

955

951,

955

no explicit statute of limitations for 42

1983 actions,

the

courts

borrow

the

personal

statute of limitations from the relevant state.
at

(4th Cir.

1995).

Because there is

U.S.C.

Md.

440

(citing Wilson v.

Garcia,

471 U.S.

261,

Nasim,
266-69

injury
64 F.3d
(1985)).

Virginia applies

a two-year statute of limitations to personal

injury claims.

See

Hence,
years

Va.

Code

§

8.01-243(A)

(West 2011).

Brown was required to have filed his complaint within two
from when the underlying claim accrued.

when the plaintiff becomes
States v.

*is

Ann.

put

Kubrick,

on

444

notice

U.S.

...

"A claim accrues

aware of his or her injury,
Ill,

to

123

make

(1979),

United

or when he or

reasonable

inquiry'

as

she

to

whether a claim exists." Almond v.

Sisk,

No. 3:08cvl38,

2424084,

2009)

(omission in original)

at *4

(quoting Nasim,

(E.D.

Va.

Aug.

6,

2009 WL

64 F.3d at 955).

Brown's claim pertaining to the denial of adequate medical
care by Nurse Moore accrued as of April

29,

2007,

the date he

was denied adequate medical care by Nurse Moore.4
Meletis,

14,

No.

2010) .

filed

by

3:09CV537,

2010 WL

3656955,

*2

Thus, for this claim to be timely,

Wednesday,

April

present action until,

29,

2009.

Brown

at the earliest,

Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep't,

1991)

at

See Stout v.

(E.D. Va.

it must have been
did

not

August 20,

947

Sept.

F.2d 733,

file

2010.5

the

See

736 (4th Cir.

(concluding inmate's civil action was filed for statute of

limitation

purposes

mailing).

when

Therefore,

handed

Claim

One

to

is

prison

barred

by

officials
the

for

statute

of

limitations and will be DISMISSED.

II.

A.

DR.

HARRIS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment must be rendered "if the movant shows that

there

is

movant

Civ.

no

is

P.

genuine

entitled

56(a).

dispute

to

judgment

to
as

any
a

material

matter

of

fact

and

the

Fed.

R.

law."

It is the responsibility of the party seeking

summary

judgment

to

motion,

and

identify

demonstrate

as

to
the

inform

absence

of

the

the
a

court

of

parts

of

the

record

which

issue

of

material

fact.

genuine

the

basis

for

the

Brown does not allege facts suggesting that Nurse Moore
had any responsibility for his health care after this date.

5 This
(Compl. 6-7),
mailing.

is

the

date

that

Brown

executed his

Complaint,

and presumably handed it to prison officials

for

See

Celotex

"[W]here

trial

Corp.

Catrett,

the

nonmoving

a

dispositive

on

properly

be

depositions,
file."

v.

made

Id. at 324

party will

issue,

U.S.

317,

323

the

burden

of

bear

a

summary

judgment

reliance

in

answers

477

solely

on

to

interrogatories,

proof

motion

the

and

(1986).

at

may

pleadings,

admissions

(internal quotation marks omitted).

on

When the

motion is properly supported, the nonmoving party must go beyond
the

pleadings

answers

and,

by

citing

to interrogatories,

^specific

facts

trial.'"

Id.

(1986)).

The

showing

affidavits

and admissions

that

there

(quoting former Fed.

Supreme

Court

has

is

R.

a

Civ.

or
on

"^depositions,

file,'

designate

genuine

issue

P.

and 56(e)

interpreted

56(c)

Rule

56(e)

for

as

requiring "the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party
who

fails

to

make

a

showing

sufficient

to

establish

existence of an element essential to that party's case,

and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
at

the

Id.

322.

In support of his

submitted his affidavit
Brown

attached

to

Motion for Summary Judgment,

Dr.

and a copy of Brown's medical

his

Memorandum

in

Opposition

Harris

record.
to

the

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment a document he labeled as
an

affidavit.

However,

the

puntative

affidavit

does

not

indicate, as it must, that it was signed before a notary after
the notary administered an oath or under penalty of perjury.

See Strong v.

v.

Johnson,

Sept.

9,

Johnson,

No.

3:09cv413,

2010).

Therefore,

the

opposition

to

495 F.3d 134,

the

States v. White,

(4th Cir.

2010 WL 3665682,

Thus,
putative

140

at

best,

motion

for

366 F.3d 291,

at *5

it

is

may

affidavit

not

summary

2007);

n.7

(E.D.

unsworn
be

Hicks

Va.

argument.

considered

judgment.

See

300 (4th Cir. 2004)

in

United

(emphasizing

that unsworn argument does not constitute evidence).

In

light

of

the

above

authorities

and

submissions,

the

facts set forth below are established for purposes of the Motion
for

Summary

Brown's

Judgment.

All

reasonable

inferences

are

drawn

in

favor.

B. Summary of Pertinent Facts

Dr.

Harris learned of Brown's ankle injury on May 3,

(Def.'s Mem.
until

Supp.

November

Coffeewood

health

of

of

Summ.

2008,

Correctional

care

learning

Mot.

needs,

Center,

including

Brown's

injury,

orthopedic consultations

months

later

arranged

for

for

Brown

following

Ex.

to

injury."
Brown's

Center in November of 2008.

A.

Brown
Dr.

acquire

From that date

transferred

to

attended

Brown's

to

(Id.)

referred

the

After

Brown

"for

treatment of the break and

post-operative

special

SI 5. )

transfer

4.)

ankle.

Harris

rendered

(Id.

was

Brown's
Dr.

SI

Harris

for initial

surgery,

[Brown]

accommodate his

when

J.

2007.

to

(Id. SI 6.)

Dr.

care,

shoes

and

Harris

did not treat

Coffeewood

boots

and
to

Correctional

C.

Analysis

Brown bears
Harris

acted

need.

See

has

NMno

not

genuine
of

nonmoving

with

that

Fed. R.

v.

as

proof

case

Celotex

WL 6080431, at *2-3
Harris's
GRANTED.

The

Motion

to

a

serious

U.S.

97,

In

that

circumstance,

any material
an

477

106

fact,'

see Malone v.

at

Summary

(1976).

all

Brown

there

of

the

other

facts
former

Ford, No. 3:06CV500,

Judgment

is

(quoting

323

(E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007).

for

medical

element

renders

U.S.

Dr.

since a complete

essential

necessarily

Corp.,

56(c));

demonstrating that

429

concerning

party's

Civ. P.

Gamble,

to

proof of

indifference

obligation.

issue

immaterial."

burden of

deliberate

Estelle

met

failure

the

2007

Accordingly,

(Docket

No.

16)

will

Dr.
be

Claim Two and the action will be DISMISSED.

Clerk

is

DIRECTED

to

send

a

copy

of

the

Memorandum

Opinion to Brown and counsel of record.
An appropriate Order shall issue.

/s/

#1/

Robert E. Payne

Senior United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia

Date:

January JJ_, 2012