Trisler v. Prison Health Services, Inc. et al
Filing
47
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 7/25/13. Copy sent: Yes(tdai, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
JASON TRISLER,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:11CV343-HEH
PRISON HEALTH
SERVICES, INC., etai,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Granting Motion for Summary Judgment)
Jason Trisler, a former Virginia prisoner proceeding pro se and informa pauperis,
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Trisler alleges that during his
incarceration at Haynesville Correctional Center ("Haynesville") the defendants2 failed to
ensure that he received adequate medical care for his abdominal and umbilical hernias.
By Memorandum Opinions and Orders entered on March 1, 2013 and February 28, 2013,
the Court dismissed the majority of Trisler's claims against the majority of the
defendants. Trisler v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:11CV343-HEH, 2013 WL
The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every personwho, under color of any statute ... of any State . .. subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereofto the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law....
42 U.S.C. §1983.
Trisler named a dozen individuals and entities as defendants in his Complaint.
870102, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2013); Trisler v. Prison Health Servs., Inc.,
No. 3:11CV343-HEH, 2013 WL 775376, at *5-8 (E.D. Va. Feb. 28, 2013).
The following claims remain:
Claim 1
Inviolation of the Eighth Amendment,3 Defendants Jabe, Johnson,
Mahon and Schilling (collectively "Correctional Defendants") and
the Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC") acted with
deliberate indifference to: (a) Trisler's need for surgery for his
abdominal hernia; and, (b) the pain caused to Trisler by his hernia.
(Comp.(ECFNo. 1) Tf 134.)
Claim 2
Prison Health Care, Inc. ("PHS") "has a custom, practice, and
reputation of employing unqualified and unlicensed persons to
provide health care to offenders." {Id. f 42.) Johnson, Schilling,
Jabe and the VDOC acted with deliberate indifference to Trisler's
medical needs by entering into a contract with PHS to provide health
care for inmates atHaynesville, including Trisler. {Id. \ 43.)4
Claim 3
The actions of the VDOC, Elam, Jenkins,5 andthe Correctional
Defendants violated Trisler's rights under the Virginia Constitution.
(Id H 134.)
Claim 4
"The defendants' action or inaction ... constituted the state law tort
of [(a)] civil conspiracy, [(b)] gross negligence, [(c)] breach of
contract, and [(d)] intentional infliction of emotional distress."
(Id. U137.) Additionally, Trisler states the following: "By enacting
and implementing the Utilization Management provision of OP
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const, amend. VIII.
4Trisler's Complaint spans 138 paragraphs. Trisler's claims for relief are set forth in
paragraphs 134 through 138. Claim 2 set forth above is not listed in this section. The Court will
address this claim because the Correctional Defendants deem Trisler to have raised such a claim.
The Correctional Defendants refer to this claim as "Claim I." (Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (ECF
No. 39) 4-5.) Nevertheless, the Court is neither obliged nor inclined to act as Trisler's advocate
and construct additional statutory and constitutional claims that Trisler failed to clearly raise on
the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241,243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J.,
concurring); Beaudettv. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
5The Court previously dismissed all other claims against Defendants Elam and Jenkins.
See Trisler, 2013 WL 775376, at *l-8.
720.2[,] which instructs an offender's treating physician that 'DO
NOT write in the medical record Request denied by UM, Please use
terms such as alternative treatment recommended, [(e)] the
defendants['] actions constituted the state tort of actual or
constructive fraud." (Id. 1138 (internal quotation marks omitted).)
The VDOC is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v.
Michigan Dep't ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Accordingly, Trisler's
§ 1983 claims against the VDOC, set forth in Claims 1 and 2, will be dismissed with
prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (permitting the courts to dismiss legally frivolous
claims). Additionally, Trisler's release from confinement moots his demands for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009)
("[A]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots his
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there."
(citing Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Griffin, 952
F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991); Taylor v. Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1048 n.l (4th Cir.
1986))). Accordingly, Trisler's demands for declaratory and injunctive relief will be
dismissed as moot.
The matter is before the Court on the Correctional Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 38.) The Correctional Defendants provided Trisler with
the appropriate Roseboro6 notice. (ECF No. 40.) Trisler has not responded. The matter
is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the
Correctional Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the federal
constitutional claims set forth in Claims 1 and 2. In light of the preliminary dismissal of
Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).
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the federal claims, the Court will dismiss without prejudice the remaining supplementary
state law claims.
I. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment must be rendered "if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the
responsibility to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify the parts of
the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly
be made in reliance solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file." Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the motion is
properly supported, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by citing
affidavits or '"depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate
'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting formerFed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c) and 56(e) (1986)).
In reviewinga summaryjudgment motion, the court "must draw all justifiable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." United States v. Carolina Transformer Co.,
978 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242,
255 (1986)). However, a mere scintilla of evidence will not preclude summary judgment.
Anderson, Ml U.S. at 251 (citing Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442,
448 (1872)). "s[T]here is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is
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literally no evidence, but whetherthere is any uponwhich a jury could properly proceed
to find a verdict for the party . .. upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.'" Id. (quoting
Munson, 81 U.S. at 448).
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Correctional Defendants
submitted the affidavits of Defendants Mahon and Schilling. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ.
J. Attachs. 1-2 ("Mahon Aff." (ECF No. 39-1)) ("Schilling Aff." (ECF No. 39-2)).)
Trisler's failure to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment permits the Court to
rely solely on the submissions of the Correctional Defendants in deciding the Motion for
Summary Judgment. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) ("'Rule 56
does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of
evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.'" (quoting Skotakv.
Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 &n.7 (5th Cir. 1992))).7 Accordingly, the Court
The Court notes that Trisler swore to the truth of the contents of his Complaint.
(Compl. at 27.) Nevertheless, the facts offered by an affidavit or a sworn statement must be in
the form of admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). In this regard, the statement in
the affidavitor sworn declaration "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would
be admissible in evidence, and showthat the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the
matters stated." Id. Moreover, "summaryjudgment affidavits cannot be conclusory or based
upon hearsay." Evans v. Techs. Applications &Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962 (4th Cir. 1996)
(internal citations omitted).
Large portionsof Trisler's Complaintrun afoul of the above-referenced principles for
proper summary judgment evidence. For example, Trisler fails to demonstrate he "is competent
to testify," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4), about Defendants Mahon's and Schilling's knowledge.
(Compl. f 84 ("Mahon at all times knew that the surgeryneeded to repair Trisler's hernia was
being delayed or deniedfor financial reasons
"; Id. ^ 86 ("Schillings [sic] knew at all times
that Trisler was being denied needed surgery for the hernia for financial reasons only.").)
Nevertheless, no need exists to catalog the entirety of inadmissible evidence previously
submitted by Trisler because he fails to directthe Court to any evidence, such as his Complaint,
that he wishes the Courtto considerin opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (explaining that "[t]he court need consider only the cited materials" in
deciding a motion for summary judgment).
deems the facts set forth below established for purposes of the present Motion for
Summary Judgment.
II. Summary of Pertinent Facts
Between 2007 and 2009, Trisler was incarcerated in Haynesville.8 (Schilling
Aff. % see Compl. fl 19, 81-82.) "The VDOC contracts with licensed doctors to
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provide comprehensive medical care and treatment to offenders. Medical judgment
always rests with qualified medical personnel who are trained to make medical
decisions
" (Schilling Aff. \ 5.) "If an offender has a medical problem or concern,
he may seek appropriate attention and care from the health care providers at his
institution. The health care providers evaluate the offender's complaint and determine
what treatment is necessary." (Id. ^ 6.)
As part of the VDOC policies regarding medical care, the VDOC employs a
Utilization Manager.9 (Id. \ 8.)10
The UM is to review any referral for any medical services beyond the
services available in a VDOC facility. In order to have a request reviewed
by the UM, the requesting physician will document their requested
procedure or consultation in the offender's Health Record progress notes as
8During that period, Defendant Johnson was the Director ofthe VDOC. (Compl. K16.)
Defendant Schilling was and is the Health Services Director for the VDOC. (Schilling Aff. K1.)
Defendant Mahonwas and is the Warden of Haynesville. (Mahon Aff. ^ 1.) Defendant Jabe was
the Deputy Directorof Operations for the VDOC. (Compl. If 15.)
"The Utilization Manager (UM) is the person responsible for reviewing, approving, and
suggesting alternative plans to consultation services. The UM is responsible for training users
and maintainingthe UM process." (Schilling Aff. K8 n.2.)
10 In his Complaint, Trisler alleged that Defendants Jabe, Schilling, and Johnson
employedthe Utilization Manager as a means for implementingand furthering the
"unconstitutional policy or practice of preventing Trisler and all offenders in the custody of the
VDOC from having necessarynon-emergency surgeries . ..." (Compl. K118.)
an order including the following information: procedure, treatment, or
modality requested; medical history; pertinent physical or ancillary
findings; and past and present treatments and response including
medications. After review of the requested medical procedure or
consultation the UM will take one of the following actions: recommend
and authorize a specific diagnostic or therapeutic treatment modality;
suggest an alternative treatment plan; or request additional information. If
the treating physician does not agree with the UM's response an appeal
may be made [to] the VDOC Chief Physician. The policy does state the
following, "DO NOT write in the Health Record 'Request denied by UM,'
please use terms such as 'alternative treatment recommended.'" This is
only to provide more detailed information for the offender's medical
records. This is not a way to omit information from an offender's record or
falsify documents. The treating physician is encouraged to explain to the
offender why the consultation or procedure is NOT medically necessary
and document it accordingly.
(Id. (punctuation corrected).)
"Haynesville has medical staff and facilities to provide diagnostic treatment and
consultant services for all offenders. Department operating procedures and policies have
been promulgated to implement these services." (Mahon Aff. 15.) On March 22,2007,
Trisler first reported to the Haynesville medical department with complaints of
abdominal pain. (Compl. ^ 19.) On June 2, 2008, Dr. Ajumobi informed Trisler that "he
would file a QMC Consultation Request to seek approval for the surgical repair of
[Trisler's] hernia." (Id. 138.) Dr. Ajumobi, "did not file the QMC Consultation Request
needed for approval of the [surgery]." (Id. \ 65.) Sometime thereafter, Dr. Ajumobi
stopped working at Haynesville. (Id. ^ 41.)
On December 12, 2008, upon learning that no QMC Consultation Request had
been filed, Dr. Johnson filed a requestseeking approval for Trisler's surgery. (Id. U68.)
On December 15, 2008, Trisler received emergency surgery for his hernia, which had
become strangulated. (Id. ffl[ 50-57.) On that same day, "the QMCrequest filed by Dr.
Johnson [was denied], stating as the reason for the denial that 'VADOC policy is to
observe reducible and ventral and inguinal hernias rather than operate on them.'" (Id.
169.)
Defendant Mahon subsequently acknowledged Dr. Ajumobi's oversight. (Id.
168.)
On February 12, 2009, Trisler filed a Regular Grievance Form in
which he complained about Dr. Ajumobi's refusal to file the QMC
Consultation Request. In ruling that Trisler's grievance was founded,
defendant Mahon stated: "An investigation into your grievance indicates
that you are correct. The doctor inadvertently did not file a QMC request
for your hernia repair on June 2, 2008. However, when Medical was made
aware of this, Dr. Johnson requested QMC for approval for your hernia
repair on December 12, 2008."
(Id.)
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Eighth Amendment Claims
In order to survive summary judgment, Trisler must demonstrate that a defendant
acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Brown v. Harris, 240
F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001). A medical need is "serious" if it "'has been diagnosed by
a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay personwould
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225,241
(4th Cir. 2008) (quotingHenderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)).
The subjective prong of a deliberate indifference claim requires the plaintiffto
demonstrate that a particular defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). "Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a
showing of mere negligence will not meet it." Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th
Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)).
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.
Farmer, 511U.S. at 837. Farmer teaches "that general knowledge of facts creating a
substantial risk of harm is not enough. The prison official must also draw the inference
between those general facts and the specific risk of harm confronting the inmate."
Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (citmgFarmer, 511 U.S. at 837;
Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 1997)). Thus, to survive a motion for
summary judgment, the deliberate indifference standard requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate that "the official in question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of
harm" and "that his actions were 'inappropriate in light of that risk.'" Parrish ex rel. Lee
v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rich, 129 F.3d at 340 n.2).
In evaluating a prisoner's complaint regarding medical care, the Court is mindful
that "society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care" or
to the medical treatment of their choosing. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)
(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04). In this regard, the right to medical treatment is
limited to that treatment which is medically necessary and not to "that which may be
considered merely desirable." Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977).
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Furthermore, absent exceptional circumstances, an inmate's disagreement withmedical
personnel with respect to a course of treatment is insufficient to state a cognizable
constitutional claim, much less to demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Wright v.
Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6
(3d Cir. 1970)).
Defendants Mahon and Schilling acknowledge that the VDOC has a policy "to
deny purely elective medical procedures." (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 8 (citing Schilling Aff.
19)). Whether an individual requires surgery for a hernia is a matter of medical
judgment. See Webb v. Hamidullah, 281 F. App'x 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2008)
(dismissing on summary judgment inmate's claim that physician acted with deliberate
indifference by classifying inmate's need for hernia surgery as elective). Defendants
Mahonand Schilling assert that they are not medical doctors and rely upon medical
professionals to diagnose offenders and provide the proper treatment. See Iko, 535 F.3d
at 242 (holding that once an inmate has beenplaced into the care of appropriate medical
personnel, '"a nonmedical prison official will generally be justifiedin believing that the
prisoner is in capable hands'" (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236
(3d Cir. 2004))).
Trislerfaces a fairly onerous task in demonstrating deliberate indifference in the
present circumstances because reliance upon the expertise of prison doctors in treating
inmates is generally appropriate for supervisory officials suchas Schilling and
Mahon. See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854-55; Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th
Cir. 2002). To overcome such reliance, the inmate must introduce evidence
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demonstrating that the supervisory official knew that the care provided by medical
personnel was so obviously incompetent that it posed a substantial risk of harm to the
inmate's health. See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854-55. Trisler has not done so. Trisler fails to
direct the Court to evidence that suggests either Mahon or Schilling knew Trisler required
surgery and acted with deliberate indifference to that need or any pain that Trisler may
have suffered.
Trisler also fails to demonstrate that Defendants Johnson and Jabe bear any
responsibility for the allegedly inadequate medical care. "Because vicarious liability is
inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiffmust [demonstrate] that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution." Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); see Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550
F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (noting that the doctrine of respondeat superior is
inapplicable to § 1983 actions). Trisler fails to direct the Courtto any admissible
evidence which demonstrates Defendant Johnson and Jabe personally denied him
appropriate medical care or engaged in conduct that would constitute deliberate
indifference. Accordingly, Claims 1(a) and (b) will be dismissed with prejudice.
In Claim 2, Trisler contends that the Correctional Defendants acted with deliberate
indifference by contracting with PHS to provide medical care to inmates at Haynesville
because they knew that PHS had "a custom, practice, and reputation of employing
unqualified and unlicensed persons to provide health care to offenders." (Compl. 142.)
PHS, however, had no involvement in the provision of medical care to inmates at
Haynesville during the relevant time period. (Schilling Aff. ^ 7); Trisler v. Prison Health
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Servs., Inc., No. 3:11CV343-HEH, 2013 WL 870102, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2013).
Moreover, the evidence reflects that, "[t]he VDOC does not allow unlicensed physicians
to work in its facilities and treat offenders." (Schilling Aff. K7.) Accordingly, Claim 2
lacks factual merit and will be dismissed with prejudice.
B.
State Law Claims
Generally, supplementary state law claims should be dismissed if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial. See United Mine Workers ofAm. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 726 (1966). In light of the preliminary dismissal of Trisler's federal claims, the
Court declines to exercise its discretion to retain Trisler's state law claims. See Jenkins v.
Weatherholtz, 909 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, Claim 3 will be dismissed
without prejudice. Additionally, Claims 4(a)-(e) against the Correctional Defendants
and the VDOC will be dismissed without prejudice.11
III. Conclusion
The Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 38) will be granted. The action will
be dismissed.
An appropriate Final Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
W
/s/
HENRY E.HUDSON
Date: JJk g,^fcpl3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Richmond' Virginia
11 The Court's prior dismissal with prejudice ofClaims 4(a)-(e) against Defendants
Elam, Jenkins, andPHS remains unaffected by the present decision. Trisler v. Prison Health
Servs., Inc., No. 3:11CV343-HEH, 2013 WL 870102, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2013); Trisler v.
Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:11CV343-HEH, 2013 WL 775376, at *5-8 (E.D. Va. Feb. 28.
2013).
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