Matthews El v. Clarke et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 6/10/14. Copy sent: Yes(tdai, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

ARTHUR RICHARD MATTHEWS EL,

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 3:12CV402

HAROLD CLARKE, et al,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, a Virginia inmate, has submitted this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.l The
matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c),

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a), 20(a),2 and Plaintiffs compliance with the Court's
May 23, 2013 Memorandum Order. Specifically, by Memorandum Order entered May 23, 2013,
the Court directed Plaintiff to submit an appropriate particularized complaint. The Court warned

That statute provides, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute . .. of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law....

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(2) Defendants. Persons . .. may be joined in one action as defendants if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).

Plaintiff that if he failed to submit an appropriate particularized complaint, the Court would drop
all defendants not properly joined with the first named defendant.
On August 12, 2013, the Court received Plaintiffs Particularized Complaint. (ECF

No. 25.) As explained below, the Particularized Complaint fails to comply with the rules
regarding joinder.
I.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any
action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
first standard includes claims based upon "'an indisputably meritless legal theory,'" or claims

where the '"factual contentions are clearly baseless."' Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427

(E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is
the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the

applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356
(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded

allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980

F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering

a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more

than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations

omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,
rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing BellAtl Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In
order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the

plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I.

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft
Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. UnitedStates, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th
Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 51A

F.2d 1147,1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua sponte,
statutory and constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his
complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring);

Beaudett v. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

II.

JOINDER

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place limits on a plaintiffs ability to join multiple
defendants in a single pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). "The 'transaction or occurrence test'
of [Rule 20] ... 'permit[s] all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties
to be tried in a single proceeding. Absolute identity of all events is unnecessary.'" Saval v. BL
Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027,1031 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330,

1333 (8th Cir. 1974)). "But, Rule 20 does not authorize a plaintiff to add claims 'against
different parties [that] present[ ] entirely different factual and legal issues.'" Sykes v. Bayer
Pharm. Corp., 548 F. Supp. 2d 208, 218 (E.D. Va. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting
Lovelace v. Lee, No. 7:03cv00395, 2007 WL 3069660, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2007)), "And, a

court may 'deny joinder if it determines that the addition of the party under Rule 20 will not
foster the objectives of [promoting convenience and expediting the resolution of disputes], but
will result in prejudice, expense, or delay."' Id. (quoting Aleman v. Chugach Support Servs.,
Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 218 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007)).

In addressing joinder, the Court is mindful that "the impulse is toward entertaining the
broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties
and remedies is strongly encouraged." United Mine Workers ofAm. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724

(1966). This impulse, however, does not provide a plaintiff free license to join multiple
defendants into a single lawsuit where the claims against the defendants are unrelated. See, e.g.,
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350

(9th Cir. 1997). Thus, "[a] buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person—

say, a suit complainingthat A defrauded the plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed

to pay a debt, and E infringed his copyright, all in different transactions—should be rejected if
filed by a prisoner." George, 507 F.3d at 607.
"The Court's obligations under the PLRA include review for compliance with Rule
20(a)." Coles v. McNeely, No. 3:11CV130, 2011 WL 3703117, at *3 (E.D. Va. Aug 23, 2011)

(citing George, 507 F.3d at 607). "Thus, multiple claims against a single party are fine, but
Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.

Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the
sort of morass that these complaints have produced but also to ensure that prisoners pay the
required filing fees." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Showalter v. Johnson, No. 7:08cv00276,
2009 WL 1321694, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 12, 2009) ("To allow [plaintiff] to pay one filing fee
yet join disparate claims against dozens of parties flies in the face off the letter and spirit of the
PLRA.")
III.

SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

Plaintiffs Particularized Complaint names fifteen separate individuals as defendants.

The Particularized Complaint contains five claims for relief. Plaintiff lists his claims as follows:3
l.a

I was forced into agreement/contract with the Virginia Department of
Correction by L.V.C.C/GEO Group Inc. employee's after clearly making
a reservation of all my rights. After addressing this issue through the
Virginia Department of Correction . . . Grievance Operating Procedure, it
was brought to my attention that I was forced into contract a second time
months later without being notified of any transaction occurring.
Regardless of being informed of the wrong that has occurred
L.V.C.C./G.E.O. Group Inc and D.O.C. employee's failed to act.

2.b

On several occasions both L.V.C.C./G.E.O. Group Inc. and D.O.C.
employee's failed to act promptly and fairly; also the above mentioned
have repeatedly obstructed justice via delay and hinder of my exhaustion

of. . . Grievance Operating Procedure and my U.S. Constitutional right to
fair due-process of filing and equal protection of the law.
The Court corrects the capitalization in the quotations from Plaintiffs submissions.

3.c

On several occasions the process of me complying with the Virginia Code
section 53.1-41 (B) was ignored by L.V.C.C. employee's and the
V.A.D.O.C. employee's. As a result of this I was not permitted to receive
payment for working as a maintenance worker from 5-31-11 to 2-31-13
here at L.V.C.C.

4.d

The L.V.C.C./G.E.O. Group Inc. medical staff continues to neglect the
proper handling of mental health medicine.

5.e

The repeated abuse, disrespect and malfeasance of my filing through . . .
Grievance Procedure and U.S. Constitutional safeguards demonstrated by
L.V.C.C./G.E.0 Group Inc. and the D.O.C. caused mental anguish.

(Part. Compl. ii.)

Summarized, Plaintiffs disparate, rambling, and unclearly labeled claims range from

Defendants "forc[ing him] into contract/agreement," (id. at 2.), mishandling Plaintiffs
grievances and appeals and interfering with the grievance procedure (id. at 4-15), refusing to pay

Plaintiff for work (id. at 16-18), misplacing his prescription medicine (id. at 19), and causing
him "mental anguish" (id. at 20).

The first named defendant in the Particularized Complaint is Dr. George Zoley the
"C.E.O./Chairman of the G.E.O. Group." (Part. Compl. iv.) Plaintiff names Defendant Zoley in

Claim La and states in a conclusory manner that, "Mr. Zoley is responsible for, after being

informed, allowing unfair practices and lack of constitutional oversight of the handling of me as
an offender under the supervision of the G.E.O. Group Inc. and operating policy of the
Department of Corrections." (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims that Zoley failed to address his

employees actions who "forc[ed] me into contract," and "acted indifferent towards my complaint
and cry for intervention." (Id.) In Claim 1.a, Plaintiff also lists Defendants W. Bacon, the "80

building unit counselor" at the Lawrenceville Correctional Center ("LVCC") and S. Skinner in
"Accounting" at LVCC. (Id. at iv, 3.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Bacon failed to

"properly fil[e] the 'offender pay withholding agreement/contract'" and "refuse[d] to investigate

the issue of me being forced into contract." (Id. at 3.) Finally, Plaintiff contends that Defendant
Skinner "is in violation of my due-process rights for actually deducting money off of my account
and forcing me into contract.... without authorization." (Id.)
In Claim 2.b, Plaintiff contends that at least eleven different defendants interfered with or

"hindered" Plaintiffs pursuit of filing grievances and appeals. (Id. at 5-15.) In Claim 3.c,

Plaintiff claims that three new defendants prevented him from receiving pay for his work as a
maintenance worker because he refused to sign the offender pay agreement. (Id. at 16-18.) In
Claim 4.d, Plaintiff contends that one unrelated defendant misplaced his prescription medicine.
(Id. at 19.) Finally, in Claim 5.e, Plaintiff names no Defendant with regard to his claim that he
suffered "mental anguish" while incarcerated. (Id. at 20-21.)
IV. ANALYSIS

A.

Dismissal of Improperly Joined Claims and Parties

While the Court expresses doubt that Claim 3.c arises out of the same transaction or

occurrence as Claim 1.a, facially, the claim appears to present a common question of law and
fact pertaining to the offender pay agreement. Claims 4.d and 5.e, concerning the denial of
adequate medical care and Plaintiffs "mental anguish," do not arise out of the same transaction

or occurrence and do not present questions of law and fact common to Claim la. Additionally,
Plaintiff fails to coherently articulate how Claim 2.b, his rambling allegations about the
mishandling of Plaintiff s grievances and appeals, presents questions of common law and fact or

is transactionally related to Claim La. Plaintiff fails to satisfy the joinder requirements based
upon his frivolous and conclusory allegations. See Jackson v. Olsen, No. 3:09cv43, 2010 WL

724023, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2010) (citing cases for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot
satisfy the joinder requirements with a conclusory allegation of conspiracy).

Plaintiff has submitted the sort of "'mishmash of a complaint'" that the rules governing

joinder aim to prevent. Id. at *7 (quoting George, 507 F.3d at 607). Plaintiffs Particularized
Complaint raises a variety of claims against many defendants. Claims 2.b, 4.d, and 5.e share no

discernable common question oflaw orfact with Claims 1.aor3.c.4 '"Assuch, this
[Particularized C]omplaint comprises multiple law suits, rather than one suit.'" Id. at *8
(quoting Canada v. Ray, No. 7:08cv00219, 2009 WL 2448557, at * 2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 10,

2009).5 Moreover, the objectives of Rule 20 will not be fostered by permitting the joinder of
Claims l.a and 3.c with the ill-formed Claims 2.b, 4.d, and 5.e.

Accordingly, the Court will proceed with the analysis it announced it is May 23, 2013
Memorandum Order. The action will PROCEED ONLY on Claim 1.a against Defendants Zoley,

Skinner, and Bacon6 and Claim 3.c against Defendants Shaw, Hill, and Clarke. Plaintiffs
remaining claims against the remaining Defendants will be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.

4The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff occasionally references a defendant named in
another claim to describe the facts supporting the claim.

5Through the PLRA, Congress sought to ensure "that the flood of nonmeritorious
[prisoner] claims does not submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations
with merit." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327 (1989)). The requirement that inmates must pay the full filing fee for each separate suit, see
28 U.S.C.1915(b)(1), is one of the PLRA's key "reforms designed to filter out the bad claims and
facilitate consideration of the good." Id. at 204. To allow an inmate, such as Plaintiff, to
"package many lawsuits into one complaint exempts him from such a cost, benefit analysis and
thus undercuts the PLRA." Canada, 2009 WL 2448557, at *3.

6"Such aprocedure fosters the objectives ofRules ofCivil Procedure[ ] ofexpediting the
resolution of disputes, without further squandering scarcejudicial resources on 'disputes that are
not structurally prepared to use those resources efficiently.'" Jackson, 2010 WL 724023, at *8
n.10 (quoting Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 4646 F.3d 1273, 1279-80 (11th Cir.
2006)).

B.

Analysis of Remaining Claims l.a and 3.c

In Claim l.a, Plaintiff argues that Defendants Zoley, Bacon and Skinner violated his
*7

&

Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection with regard to an "offender

pay withholding agreement/contract." (Part. Compl. 3.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Bacon
stands in violation of my 14th Amendment by not properly filing the "offender
pay withholding agreement/contract" . . . with the business office and ensuring
through constant follow ups. That my refusal to sign the above mentioned
contract would receive the same due-process of filing and equal protection
provided individuals who has [sic] consented to the above mentioned contract.

(Id.) Next, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Skinner "is in violation of my due-process rights for

actually deducting money off my account and forcing me into contract.... without
authorization." (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff states in a conclusory manner that, "Mr. Zoley is
responsible for, after being informed, allowing unfair practices and lack of constitutional
oversight of the handling of me as an offender under the supervision of the G.E.O. Group Inc.

and operating policy of the Department of Corrections." (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims that Zoley
failed to address his employees actions who "forc[ed] me into contract," and "acted indifferent
towards investigating my complaint and cry for intervention." (Id.)

Similarly, in Claim 3.c, Plaintiff faults Defendants Shaw, Hill, and Clarke for forcing him
into "contract" and refusing to pay him for his work as a maintenance worker "because [he]
reserve[d his] right not to enter" into the offender pay withholding system in violation of due
process and equal protection. (See, e.g., id. at 17.)

While Plaintiffs allegations lack clarity, the sum of his claims stem from Defendant

Zoley, Bacon, Skinner, Shaw, Hill and Clarke's (hereinafter "Defendants") deduction of money

7"No State shall. .. deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ...." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.

8"No State shall. .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection ofthe
laws." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.

from his inmate account to pay for Plaintiffs legal obligations and their refusal to pay him for
work performed because he refused to agree to the offender withholding agreement.
1.

Due Process

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a

person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right

conferred by a law of the United States. See Dowe v. TotalAction Against Poverty in Roanoke
Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). The Due Process Clause applies only when
government action deprives an individual of a legitimate liberty or property interest. Bd. of
Regents ofState Colls, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). The first step in analyzing a

procedural due process claim is to identify whether the alleged conduct affects a protected
interest. Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing cases). Plaintiff fails to
indicate that Defendants' actions resulted in the deprivation of any liberty interest. Instead,

Plaintiff claims that Defendants' deprived him of property, in the form of money, without due
process of law.
First, a state prisoner possesses no constitutional right to be paid for his labor. Anderson

v. Morgan, No. 89-6737, 1990 WL 29173, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 1990) (citing Manning v.

Lockhart, 623 F.2d 536, 538 (8th Cir. 1980)). Any compensation provided '"is by the grace of
the state."' Taylor v. Robinson, No. 02-CV-510, 2003 WL 23314150, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 4,
2003) (quoting Hrbekv. Farrier, 787 F.2d 415, 416 (8th Cir. 1986)); see Borror v. White, 377 F.

Supp. 181,183 (W.D. Va. 1974). Thus, under the Due Process Clause, Plaintiff has no property
interest in earning wages for his labor. Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 184-85 (4th Cir.

2000) (citations omitted); see McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297, 311 (E.D. Va. 1972)

(explaining that an institution may constitutionally force a validly convicted inmate to perform

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work, with or without pay, so long as the work assignment amounts to no cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment (citing Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.

1970)). Any entitlement to pay for services rendered by Plaintiff "derive[s] from the laws of
Virginia, and is not a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Borror, 3>11 F. Supp. at 183. Plaintiffs claims that he failed to

receive compensation for his work as a maintenance worker while housed in LVCC because he
refused to sign the offender withholding contract states no actionable federal constitutional

claim.9
Accordingly, Plaintiffs due process claims lack merit and will be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

2.

Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that similarly
situated persons be treated alike. See City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,

439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). In order to state an equal protection

claim, Plaintiff must allege facts indicating: (1) that he and a comparator were treated differently
and were similarly situated; and (2) that the different treatment was the result of discrimination.
See Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Because Plaintiffs

claims implicate no suspect class, the Court presumes the state action to be valid and will be
upheld if it "is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." City ofCleburne, A13 U.S. at 440
(citations omitted).

9Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff contends that the Defendants somehow wrongfully
deprived him of money, Virginia's provision of adequate post-deprivation remedies forecloses
Plaintiffs due process claim for the deprivation of property. See Wilson v. Molby, No. 1:12cv42
(JCC/JFA), 2012 WL 1895793, at *6-7 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2012); Henderson v. Virginia, No.
7:07-cv-00266,2008 WL 204480, at *10 n.7 (W.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2008).
11

In Claim 1.a, Plaintiff alleges, in sum: "That my refusal to sign the [offender pay
withholding] contract would receive the same due process of filing and equal protection provided
individuals who [have] consented ... ." (Part. Compl. 3.) In Claim 3.c, Plaintiff merely states
that "the privilege to work and be compensated while fairly being considered, under the equal

protection of the law was compromised and rejected." (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff fails to state an equal
protection claim in either Claim 1.a or 3.c.

Plaintiff argues that those inmates who sign the offender pay withholding agreement are
treated differently than those inmates who refuse to sign the agreement because those inmates

who sign the agreement receive pay for their prison jobs. Nevertheless, Plaintiff fails to identify
how the inmates who sign the offender pay withholding agreement are similarly situated to
Plaintiff, and thus, he fails to make a threshold showing for an equal protection claim. See
Wright v. Johnson, No. 3:01CV215, 2001 WL 34644299, at *2 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2001)
(citations omitted). Moreover, from the limited record, the Court discerns that a rational basis

exists for treating differently those inmates who agree to have pay withheld from those who
refuse to sign such an agreement. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)
(citations omitted) (explaining that a policy "must be upheld against an equal protection

challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification"); see Maimed v. Thornborough, 621 F.2d 565, 569 (3d Cir. 1980) (a state

action may be upheld on any valid ground, including those hypothetically posed by the court).
The purpose of the offender pay withholding agreement is to repay an inmate's court fines or
outstanding court-imposed debts. See Dukes v. Wilson, No. 7:1 l-cv-00530, 2013 WL 2237777,

at *1 (W.D. Va. May 21, 2013). It is reasonable for Virginia to decline to pay an inmate for his

or her work if the inmate refuses to apply a portion of the pay he or she receives to satisfy

12

outstanding debts to the Virginia courts. Thus, a rational basis exists for any purported
differential treatment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs equal protection claims will be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
V.

CONCLUSION

Claims 2.b, 4.d, and 5.e are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Claims l.a and 3.c

will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs letter seeking to amend his complaint to
delete a defendant (ECF No. 42) will be DENIED AS MOOT. The action will be DISMISSED.

The Clerk will be DIRECTED to note the disposition of the action for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).

An appropriate Order shall issue.

/s/

James R. Spencer
Senior U. S. District Judge

Date: £-/<W^
Richmond, Virginia

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