Craddock v. Fisher et al
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 4/21/15. Copy sent: Yes (tdai, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
RICHMONDLVA
ORILLION CRADDOCK,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No.
CLYD N.
FISHER,
3:12CV43 0
et al. ,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Orillion Craddock, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and
in
forma pauperis,
before
the
filed
Court
Leonard's
Motion
Dismiss")
and
on
the
reasons
Judgment
Motion
28
Clyd
on
U.S.C.
the
in part,
N.
the
Summary
below,
Motion to Dismiss,
Summary Judgment,
for
to
stated
Bivens1 action.
Defendants
for
evaluation pursuant
this
The
Fisher's
will
the
to
Court's
and 1915A.
grant
is
Scott
("Motion
and
§ 1915(e)(2)
Court
and
Pleadings
Judgment
matter
For
Defendants'
will grant Defendants'
Motion
for
and will dismiss the action.
I.
MOTION TO DISMISS
STANDARD
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA")
this
Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court
determines the action
(1)
a
relief
claim
on
Bivens
Narcotics,
which
v.
Six
403 U.S.
388
"is
Unknown
(1971).
frivolous"
may
be
Named
or
(2)
"fails to state
granted."
Agents
of
28
Fed.
U.S.C.
Bureau
of
§ 1915(e)(2);
includes
see
28
U.S.C.
claims based upon
§
1915A.
The
first
standard
M^an indisputably meritless
legal
theory,'" or claims where the w*factual contentions are clearly
baseless.'"
1992)
The
Clay v.
Yates,
(quoting Neitzke v.
second
standard
is
809
F.
Supp.
Williams,
the
417,
490 U.S.
familiar
427
319,
standard
(E.D.
Va.
327 (1989)).
for
a
motion
to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"A
motion
to
sufficiency of a
contests
dismiss
under
complaint;
surrounding the
12(b)(6)
importantly,
facts,
applicability of defenses."
the
tests
the
it does not resolve
merits
of
a
claim,
or the
Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin,
980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992)
Arthur R. Miller,
Rule
(citing 5A Charles A. Wright &
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356
(1990)).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the
complaint
is
plaintiff.
Cir.
viewed
in
the
only
to
factual
considering
a
identifying
pleadings
conclusions,
most
favorable
to
the
MyIan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th
1993); see also Martin,
applies
light
motion
are
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
not
980 F.2d at 952.
allegations,
to
that,
dismiss
entitled to
however,
can
because
This principle
and
choose
to
they
the
are
no
"a
begin
more
assumption of
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
court
by
than
truth."
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only xa
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief,'
in order to *give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'"
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
(second alteration in original)
U.S.
41,
47
(1957)).
555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson,
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard
with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions"
"formulaic
Id.
at
allege
recitation
555
of
(citations
of
a
cause
Instead,
a
of
action."
plaintiff
must
(citation omitted), stating a claim that
"plausible on its
Id.
plaintiff pleads
reasonable
Corp.,
face,"
id.
at
570,
rather than merely
"A claim has facial plausibility when the
factual
inference
misconduct alleged."
Atl.
elements
or a
facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the
"conceivable."
the
the
omitted).
speculative level," id.
is
355
content
that
Iqbal,
550 U.S.
at
that
the
the court
Ct.
to draw
is
defendant
129 S.
556) .
allows
for
liable
at 1949
Therefore,
the
(citing Bell
in order for a claim
or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
the
plaintiff
elements of
must
"allege
facts
[his or] her claim."
& Co. , 324 F.3d
761,
765
Microsoft Corp.,
309 F.3d 193,
sufficient
to
state
all
the
Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
(4th Cir.
2003)
(citing Dickson v.
213 (4th Cir.
2002); Iodice v.
United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Lastly,
complaints,
1978),
while
the
Gordon
v.
Court
Leeke,
liberally
574
F.2d
construes
1147,
1151
it does not act as the inmate's advocate,
pro
se
(4th Cir.
sua sponte
developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed
to clearly raise on the face of his complaint.
See Brock v.
Carroll,
(Luttig,
J.,
775 F.2d 1274,
1278
107
concurring);
(4th Cir.
F.3d
241,
Beaudett v.
243
(4th
Cir.
City of Hampton,
1997)
1985) .
II.
Craddock
Claim One,
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS
raises
two
claims
in his
sworn
Complaint.
he argues that Defendants Detective Clyd N.
In
Fisher,
Detective Scott Leonard, and the Richmond City Police Department
"violated [his] Fourth Amendment[2] constitutional right not to
be
subjected
(Compl.
5.)3
to
In
unlawful
Claim
searches,
Two,
seizures,
Craddock
claims
or
arrest."
"[m]y
Eighth
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses,
papers,
and effects,
against unreasonable
searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
U.S.
Const, amend. IV.
3 The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF
docketing system for citations to and quotations from Craddock's
Complaint.
The Court corrects the capitalization in the
quotations from Craddock's Complaint.
Amendment[ ] constitutional right was violated due to unlawful
incarceration,
and loss of freedom."
(Id.
at 10.)
Craddock
fails to suggest how the process used to obtain his conviction
violated
the
3:07cv319,
Eighth
2010
Amendment.
WL
1225741,
Cf.
*8
Shanklin v.
(E.D.
Va.
Seals,
Mar.
26,
No.
2010)
(explaining that when conduct plaintiff complains of occurred
prior
to
his
conviction,
"the
Eighth
Amendment
prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply"
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 3886, 394 (1989))).
(citing
Moreover, to the
extent he seeks to raise a constitutional claim under the Eighth
Amendment challenging his unlawful incarceration,
legally frivolous.
See Heck v.
see infra Part III.A.
Thus,
the
was
invalid
search.
to
(Compl.
Defendant
Fisher
Leonard executed
Dundee Avenue,
proceeds
alleges
due
a
applied
that
Craddock's
(1994);
his
federal
Fourth Amendment
firearm conviction
search warrant
Specifically,
Craddock
for
warrant
warrant
Richmond,
on
defective
8.)
the
512 U.S. 477
Claim Two will be dismissed.
action
claim in which he
Humphrey,
such claim is
a
search
upon a
Virginia
residence
23225,
and
illegal
argues
and
Defendant
located at
specifying
that
that
305
the
house was to be searched for weapons and "included the incorrect
factual assertion that [Craddock] resided at the address."
4
(Id.
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S.
Const,
amend.
VIII.
at 5. )
Craddock contends that the warrant "was constitutionally
flawed" for a litany of reasons including that Craddock did not
live at that address, the warrant failed to specify the areas of
the home
to be
searched,
affidavit ...
so he
Defendant
could
Fisher
unlawfully
"lied in his
arrest"
warrant
Craddock,
and
Defendant Leonard executed the warrant in Craddock's absence and
knowing Craddock did not reside at the address.
Craddock
arrest
argues
Mr.
Craddock
(Id. at 8.)
by
the
that
for
state,
defective
incarcerated."
No.
murder
search yielded
and
unlawful
evidence
gun
"to
possession."
but
the
gun
possession
(Id.)
search
was
transferred
to
the
Craddock contends that in light of
warrant
he
"has
been
and
punitive
unlawfully
(Id.)
Craddock
"vacation or
illegal
at 6-7.)
Craddock states that "the murder was nolle prose[d]
federal authorities."
the
the
(Id.
seeks
compensatory
invalidation of
3:08CR49."
(Id.
at
[his]
12.)
claims seeking invalidation of
As
criminal
discussed
damages,
and
conviction in Case
below,
Craddock's
his conviction and sentence are
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and any Fourth
Amendment claim for damages that may withstand Heck is barred by
the statute of limitations and also lacks merit.
III.
A.
MOTION TO DISMISS ANALYSIS
Claims Barred By Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)
The basic premise behind Craddock's complaint,
vacate
or alter
damages
stemming
through a
Humphrey,
civil
his
criminal
conviction
that he can
and obtain monetary
from his purportedly improper incarceration,
lawsuit
512 U.S. 477
"is legally frivolous under Heck v.
(1994),
and related
cases."
Payne v.
Virginia, No. 3:07CV337, 2008 WL 1766665, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr.
17,
2008) .
In Heck,
the Supreme Court emphasized that civil
tort actions are "not appropriate vehicles for challenging the
validity of outstanding criminal judgments."
486.
Heck,
512 U.S. at
The Supreme Court then held that:
[I]n order
unconstitutional
to recover damages for allegedly
conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Heck,
512
U.S.
at
486-87
(internal
footnote
omitted).
The
Supreme Court then required that "when a state prisoner seeks
damages
in
a
§
1983
suit,
the
district
court
must
consider
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,
the
complaint
must
be
dismissed
unless
the
plaintiff
can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated."
Id^ at 487.
The rationale in Heck and related
cases applies with equal force to Bivens actions.
Chasanow,
318 F.
App'x 188,
189 n*
(4th Cir.
See Omar v.
2009)
(citing
Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1997); Abella v.
Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. 1995); Tavarez v. Reno, 54
F.3d 109,
110 (2d Cir.
1995)).
The Supreme Court has extended Heck to civil rights actions
that do not directly challenge confinement,
procedures
which
Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S.
Supreme
Court
necessarily
concluded
imply unlawful
641,
that
the
sanction
confinement.
646 (1997).
a
challenge
purported bias of the decision-maker,
invalidity of
but instead contest
imposed by
See
In Balisok, the
based
upon
the
necessarily implied the
the decision-maker
thus was subject to the bar announced in Heck.
and
The Supreme
Court summarized that Heck and the related cases teach that:
[A]
state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred
(absent
prior
invalidation)-no
matter
the
relief
sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the
target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading
to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if
success in that action would necessarily demonstrate
the invalidity of confinement or its duration.
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) .
Heck
and
related
cases
bar
Craddock's
claim
seeking
invalidation of his sentence and subsequent release as it is
predicated
on
his
assertion
that
his
conviction
and
incarceration are improper.
See id. at 79 (citing Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)).
allegation that
conviction.
the
Heck,
federal
Craddock also presents no
court has
512 U.S. at 486-87.
is frivolous under Bivens.
invalidated his
Thus,
current
Craddock's claim
Id. at 81-82; see Preiser, 411 U.S.
at 500 (holding that writ of habeas corpus is the sole federal
remedy when an inmate challenges the fact of imprisonment and
relief
sought
release).
is
finding
that
the
inmate
is
entitled
to
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss in part.
Of course,
Amendment
the Supreme Court has noted that certain Fourth
claims
§ 1983 action.
for
damages
See Heck,
potentially
may
be
512 U.S. at 487 n.7.5
raised
in
a
No need exists
to extensively explore the applicability of Heck to Craddock's
inchoate Fourth Amendment claim for damages because his Fourth
Amendment claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
5 The Court explained:
For
example,
allegedly
challenged
a
suit
for
unreasonable
search
damages
search
produced
may
attributable
lie
evidence
even
to
if
that
an
the
was
introduced
in trial
resulting
in
the
§
1983
plaintiff's still outstanding conviction.
Because of
doctrines
like
independent
source
and
inevitable
discovery and especially harmless error,
. . . such a
§
1983
action,
even
if
successful,
would
not
necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction was
unlawful.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7
(internal citations omitted).
B.
Fourth Amendment Claim Is Untimely
Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2), the Court must dismiss claims
which the relevant statute of limitations clearly bars.
Brown
v. Harris, No. 3:10CV613, 2012 WL 12383, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3,
2012)
(citing Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655-57
(4th Cir.2006);
951,
955
Nasim v.
(4th Cir.
Warden,
1995)).
limitations
for 42 U.S.C.
borrow
personal
the
relevant state.
471 U.S.
261,
House of Corr.,
Because
§ 1983
injury
Md.
no explicit
of
§
of
the courts
limitations
from
the
Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955 (citing Wilson v. Garcia,
266-69
(1985)).
Virginia applies
statute of limitations to personal injury claims.
Ann.
statute
actions exists,
statute
64 F.3d
8.01-243 (A)
(West
2014).
Hence,
Craddock
a
two-year
See Va.
Code
should
have
filed his Complaint within two years from when the underlying
claims accrued.
"A claim accrues when the plaintiff becomes
aware of his or her injury, United States v.
Ill,
123 (1979),
Kubrick, 444 U.S.
or when he or she xis put on notice ... to
make reasonable inquiry' as to whether a claim exists."
Almond
v- Sisk, No. 3:08cvl38, 2009 WL 2424084, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 6,
2009) (omission in original) (quoting Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955) .
Craddock
filed his
Complaint
May
1,
2012.6
Thus,
for
Craddock's claims alleging an invalid search and seizure to be
Craddock signed his Complaint on this date.
(Compl. 12.)
Craddock or the institution, however, mailed the Complaint on
10
timely,
the claims must have accrued after May 1,
2010.
The
Complaint fails to contain any facts indicating that Craddock's
claims accrued after May 1, 2010.
Instead, Craddock challenges
the search warrant issued on August 10,
that occurred on August 11,
2008.
(Compl. 7.)
because
"his
2007, April 3,
judgment
(Id.
in
his
at 9.)
two-year
and April 14,
criminal
case
was
not
affirmed
§ 2255 motion ... is still
First, even using January 14,
the date his claim accrued,
the
2008,
Craddock states that his claims are timely
until on January 14, 2 010; and his
pending."
2007 and three searches
2010 as
the claim would still be barred by
limitation period.
More
importantly,
Craddock's
claims of illegal search and seizure arise from events on August
11,
April
dates,
3,
not
2008,
after
and
the
collateral challenge.
Cnty.
Gov't,
543
F.
April
14,
conclusion
2008
of
and
his
accrued
on
criminal
those
case
or
See Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
App'x
McCarthy, 349 F. App'x 851,
499,
502
(6th
857 (4th Cir.
Cir.
2013);
2009)
Smith v.
(finding § 1983
claims challenging search and seizure untimely because claims
accrued as of date of search).
Nothing in Craddock's Complaint
suggests that he lacked awareness that the search took place as
of
the
June
1,
date
2012.
of
the
search.
(ECF No.
1-6,
Accordingly,
at
1.)
While
Craddock's
the
Fourth
Court believes
that Craddock waited nearly a month the mail his Complaint, even
using the May 1, 2012 date, Craddock's claim is untimely.
11
Amendment claim is also barred by the statute of limitations.
Nevertheless,
even
somehow timely,
if
Craddock's
Fourth
as explained below,
Amendment
claim
was
Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on any remaining Fourth Amendment claim.
IV.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment must be rendered "if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material
movant
Civ.
fact and the
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
P.
56(a).
Fed.
R.
The party seeking summary judgment bears the
responsibility to inform the court of the basis for the motion,
and to identify the parts of the record which demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
v.
Catrett,
477 U.S.
317,
323
(1986).
See Celotex Corp.
" [W] here the nonmoving
party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive
issue,
a
reliance
summary
solely
judgment
on
the
motion
pleadings,
may properly
depositions,
be
made
in
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file."
Id. at 324 (internal
quotation
motion
marks
omitted).
When
the
is
properly
supported, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and,
by
citing
affidavits
interrogatories,
or
"'depositions,
and admissions on file,'
answers
designate
xspecific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"
(quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and 56(e)
12
(1986)).
to
Id.
In reviewing a summary judgment motion,
draw
all
justifiable
inferences
in
favor
the court "must
of
the
party."
United States v.
Carolina Transformer Co.,
832,
(4th Cir.
(citing Anderson v.
nonmoving
835
Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
1992)
255
(1986)).
However,
(citing Improvement Co.
442, 448 (1872)).
judge,
v.
Liberty Lobby,
a mere scintilla of
evidence will not preclude summary judgment.
at 251
978 F.2d
Munson,
Anderson, 477 U.S.
81 U.S.
(14 Wall.)
"' [T] here is a preliminary question for the
not whether there is literally no evidence,
but whether
there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a
verdict for the party . . . upon whom the onus of proof is
imposed.'"
Id.
(quoting Munson, 81 U.S. at 448).
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants
cite
to
Craddock's
exhibits,
including:
Complaint
1)
the
and
Affidavit
305 Dundee Avenue dated August 11,
and 2)
several
for
of
the
attached
Search Warrant
2007 (Compl.
the search warrant issued on August 11,
Ex.
2007
for
D(l)-(2);
(id.
Ex.
D(3)) .
As a general rule, a non-movant must respond to a motion
for summary judgment with affidavits or other verified evidence.
Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324.
Craddock has not responded to
the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Craddock's failure to respond
to the Motion for Summary Judgment permits the Court to rely
solely on the submissions of
the Defendants
13
in deciding the
Motion for Summary Judgment.
1537
(5th Cir.
1994)
See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527,
("'Rule
56
does
not
impose
upon
the
district court a duty to sift through the record in search of
evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment."'
(quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 & n.7
(5th Cir. 1992))); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)
consider only the cited materials . . . .").
("The court need
Furthermore, "[i]n
determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume
that facts identified by the moving party in its listing of
material facts are admitted,
unless such a fact is controverted
in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the
motion."
E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 56(B).
In light of the foregoing principles and submissions,
the
following facts are established for the purposes of the Motion
for Summary Judgment.
All permissible inferences are drawn in
favor of Craddock.
V.
On August 11,
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
20 07,
Defendant Fisher,
a Detective with the
City of Richmond Police Department, sought a search warrant for
305 Dundee Avenue,
(D)(2).)
in Richmond, Virginia.
(Compl. Ex. D(l) and
In support of the affidavit, Defendant Fisher swore:
On August 10,
2007,
police were called to
Avenue.
Upon arrival
Albertus BROWN,
at approximately 2231 hours,
the residence of 305 Dundee
they found the victim Naeem
shot and unresponsive and laying on
14
the front
[steps]
of the residence.
Following the
shooting incident, the suspect Orillion CRADDOCK was
observed running around the building and down the
alley.
Prior to the shooting incident the suspect
CRADDOCK was observed going into the basement of the
residence situated at 305 Dundee Avenue.
Witnesses
reported
prior
knowledge
of
the
utilizing the basement situated at
while possessing a firearm.
suspect
305
CRADDOCK
Dundee Avenue
(Id^ Ex. D(l).)
In the affidavit, Defendant Fisher explained
that
warrant
the
search
was
requested
to
seek
(Id.
relation to the first-degree murder offense.
Defendant
Fisher
requested
to
search
"[t]he
evidence
Ex.
entire
in
D(2).)
residence
(including the basement) located at 305 Dundee Avenue (two story
house,
white in color with house numbers clearly visible above
the front door)
to include all curtilage,
the City of Richmond . . . ."
(Id.)
which is located in
Defendant Fisher requested
that the warrant be issued to search for " [b]lood, weapons, DNA
evidence,
firearms
and
any
evidence
connected
(Id.)
commission of the crime of First Degree Murder."
on the information
found
probable
contained
cause
existed
in the affidavit,
for
search warrant on August 11, 2007.
The
search warrant was
the
search
with
the
Based
a magistrate
and
issued
the
(Id. Ex. D(4).)
executed on August
11,
20 07,
by
Defendant Leonard, a Detective with the City of Richmond Police
Department.
(Id^ Ex. D(5).)
Defendant Leonard found and seized
a shotgun and cartridges from 305 Dundee Avenue.
(Id.)
Police
conducted subsequent searches of 305 Dundee Avenue on April 3,
15
2008 and April 14, 2008.
at
3 05
Dundee
conducted;
Avenue
his
(Compl. 5-9.)
at
the
grandmother,
time
Pearl
in his
the
Brown
(See id. at 5-7; Ex. A, at 1-2.)
searches was used
Craddock did not reside
three
searches
resided
at
the
were
home.
Evidence recovered from these
criminal prosecution.
(Id.
at
8.)
This Court convicted Craddock of one count of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and one count of possession of an
unregistered sawed-off shotgun and was
of incarceration.
States v.
ECF No.
sentenced to 120 months
(See Mem. Supp. Summ. J.
Craddock,
No.
3:08CR49
(E.D.
1-2 (citing United
Va.
October 14,
2008),
53).)
VI.
FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment "protects persons against unreasonable
searches
of
'their persons
houses'
and
thus
be
invoked
by
an
.
. is
a
right
Minnesota
v.
original)
("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
Thus,
Katz
"'in
Amendment,
must
.
personal
(citing
that
[and]
Carter,
v.
525
United
order
to
U.S.
83,
States,
claim
88
389
the
(1998)
U.S.
(alteration
347,
protection
individual."
351
of
in
(1967))).
the
Fourth
a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has
an expectation of privacy in the place searched,
expectation is reasonable.'"
439 U.S. 128,
143-44
& n.2
Id.
(1978)).
16
and that his
(quoting Rakas v.
Moreover,
Illinois,
the expectation
of
privacy
must
have
a
"a
source
outside
of
the
Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal
property law to understandings that are recognized and permitted
by society."
Id^
The burden lies with Craddock to show that he
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.
United States v.
(citation
argue,
Rusher,
omitted).
much
less
As
966
F.2d 868,
discussed
establish,
that
874
below,
he
had
(4th Cir.
1992)
Craddock fails
to
an
of
expectation
privacy in 305 Dundee Avenue.
A person who lives at
tenant,
has
a
reasonable
a residence,
whether as an owner or
expectation
of
privacy
in
the
residence, even if he is not on the premises at the time of the
search.
2007);
See United States v. Gray,
United States v.
Va. 1997).
Beckford,
491 F.3d 138,
962 F.
Supp.
767,
took place.
C.)
770 (E.D.
the time the three
He provides a copy of his presentence
report to establish that he lived in another location.
Ex.
(4th Cir.
Craddock, however, adamantly and repeatedly asserts
that he did not live at 3 05 Dundee Avenue at
searches
144
Thus,
(Compl.
it is undisputed that Craddock did not live in
the home.
"[I]n some circumstances a person may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the house of someone else."
515 U.S.
Fourth
Carter,
at 89 (explaining that an overnight guest may claim
Amendment
protection);
see
17
Gray,
491
F.3d
at
144
(explaining that "relatives of home owners who regularly reside
at
the
residence"
Carolina,
may be protected
391 U.S.
demonstrate
543,
those
Craddock puts
546-48
circumstances
(citing Bumper v.
(1968))).
are
North
Craddock fails
present
here.
to
Indeed,
forth no evidence demonstrating that he
had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in 305 Dundee Avenue.
The
record reflects that Craddock visited the home and engaged in
illegal activity therein.
A person,
like Craddock,
"who is
merely present with the consent of the householder[,] may not"
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
at 90 (citation omitted).
to protect
illegal
individuals,
activity
in
a
Carter, 515 U.S.
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment fails
like
Craddock,
residence
that
who
is
are engaging
not
their
own.
in
Cf.
Gray, 491 F.3d at 146 (holding that person using an apartment to
traffic
drugs
is
not
a
social
guest
and
has
no
reasonable
expectation of privacy).
Craddock fails to argue, much less demonstrate, that he had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in 305 Dundee Avenue.
Thus,
he fails to establish any entitlement to the Fourth Amendment's
protection with regard to
recovery
of
prosecution.
the
gun
and
the
search of
other
items
the
used
residence and the
in
his
criminal
Craddock's Fourth Amendment claim is frivolous and
will be dismissed.
18
VII.
CONCLUSION
The Court will grant in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
To the extent a Fourth Amendment challenge survives Heck and is
timely filed, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Craddock's claims and the action will be dismissed.
/?J)h J> -> /
'
Date: (JfMJLjs'lf /^f 5>
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia
19
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