Belfield v. Stolle

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 4/3/15. Copy sent: Yes (tdai, ) (Main Document 8 replaced on 4/3/2015) (tdai, ).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
RICHMOND, VA

BRIAN BELFIELD,

'

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:13CV234

KEN STOLLE,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Brian Belfield, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and informapauperis, filed this 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action.1 The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a) and 1915(e)(2).
A.

Preliminary Review

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any
action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
first standard includes claims based upon "'an indisputably meritless legal theory,'" or claims
where the "'factual contentions are clearly baseless.'" Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417,427

(E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is
the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

1The statute provides, inpertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute . .. of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law....

42 U.S.C. §1983.

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;

importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits ofa claim, or the
applicability ofdefenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356

(1990)). Inconsidering a motion todismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded
allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Maikari, 1 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering
a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifyingpleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statementof the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in orderto 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" BellAtl Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations

omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,
rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing BellAtl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In
order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must

"allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPontde
Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d
193,213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. UnitedStates, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly,
while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 51A F.2d 1147,1151 (4th

Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and
constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v.

Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City ofHampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
B.

Allegations

In his Complaint,2 Belfield alleges, in sum:
As a state inmate that's been[ ] in the Va. Beach City Jail that these people
wanted ship off to prison. And as well as the state not calling for me after I have
been here over a year and 2 months. That's called pain[ ] and suffering of a civil
rights matter which is a law suit matter as well. On the jail of the City of Va.
Beach and the state prison system as well too. So my claim is that a state inmate
should not be treated wrong in a city jail at all far as feeding goes. With bugs on
the trays from the kitchen every day in the morning. And we don't eat 7 days a
week within 12 hours apart[ ] from the next tray which will be a dinner tray at
4:00 p.m. in the afternoon. And on top of that people he is overcharging over a
100% on his canteen items so I really think that the IRS needs to look in to his
listed on the internet online people very much so and you will see that I am not

lying at all about any of this far as this matter goes people. And the canteen
address is VBDS caremark.com online people look it up please? ... so my claim
is about pain and suffering of my civil rights of the law as a person as well as a[n]
inmate. So I hope you people will honor me that I have been violated in the city
jail of Va. Beach, Va. 23456.

{Id. at 5.) Belfield names SheriffKen Stolleas the sole defendant. (Id. at 2.) Belfield seeks

unspecified money damages. (Id. at 6.) The Court construes Belfield to raise the following
claims:

The Court has corrected the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation in the quotations
from Belfield's Complaint.

Claim One:

Stolle violated Belfield's Eighth Amendment rights because he receives
meal trays with insects.

Claim Two:

Stolle violated Belfield's Eighth Amendment rights by providing
inadequate food.

Claim Three: Stolle violated Belfield's Eighth Amendment rights by overcharging
inmates for canteen items.

C.

Analysis

To make out an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts that indicate (1)
that objectively the deprivation suffered or harm inflicted "was 'sufficiently serious,' and (2) that

subjectively the prison officials acted with a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Johnson v.
Quinones, 145 F.3d 164,167 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,298

(1991)). Under the objective prong, the inmate must allege facts that suggest that the deprivation

complained of was extreme and amounted to more than the "'routine discomfort'" that is '"part
of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" Strickler v.
Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1380 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9

(1992)). "In order to demonstrate such an extreme deprivation, a prisoner must allege 'a serious

or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.'" De 'Lonta

v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381).
The subjective prong of a deliberate indifference claim requires the plaintiffto allege
facts that indicate a particulardefendant actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of

serious harmto his person. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). "Deliberate

indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will notmeet it." Grayson

•5

"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const, amend. VIII.

v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1976)).

[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Farmer teaches "that general knowledge of facts creating a substantial
risk of harm is not enough. The prison official must also draw the inference between those

general facts and the specific risk of harm confrontingthe inmate." Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating
same). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the deliberate indifference standard requires a
plaintiffto assertfacts sufficient to form an inference that "the official in question subjectively
recognized a substantial risk of harm" and "that the official in question subjectivelyrecognized
that his actions were 'inappropriate in light of that risk.'" Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372

F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rich, 129 F.3d at 340 n.2).
In Claim One, Belfield alleges that his food trays "arrive [w]ith bugs on the trays from
the kitchen every day in the morning." (Compl. 5.) "It is well-established that inmates must be

provided with nutritionallyadequate food, prepared and served under conditions which do not

present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it."

Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 986 (4thCir. 1985) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted). "The fact that [Belfield's] food occasionally contains foreign objects ... while

unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation." Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 11A F.2d
1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); accordCartwright v. Woody, No. I:llcvl070
(JCC/JFA), 2012 WL 5866457, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 2012) (citing Lunsfordv. Reynolds, 316

F. Supp. 526, 527 (W.D.Va. 1974)). Thus, Belfieldfails to allege facts sufficient to satisfy either
the objective or subjective component of the Eighth Amendment.

Instead, Belfield's claim amounts to no more than a "'routine discomfort [that] is part of
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" Strickler, 989 F.2d at

1380 n.3 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (some internal quotation marks omitted). With respect

to the objective component, Belfield fails to allege that he sustained any injury, much less a

serious or significant physical or emotional injury, resulting from receiving food trays with
insects on them. Id. at 1381. Belfield fails to allege facts suggesting that he lost weight, that he
has suffered other adverse physical effects, or that his diet poses a substantial risk of serious

harm to his person. Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1999). For the subjective
component, Belfield fails to allege facts indicatingthat Stolle knew of and disregarded a

substantial risk of serious harm to Belfield. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Belfield provides no
indication that he placed Stolle on sufficient notice of an excessive risk of harm to his health or

safety. Given that deficiency, Belfield fails to allege an Eighth Amendment claim. Claim One
will be DISMISSED.

In ClaimTwo, Belfield alleges that "we don't eat 7 days a week within 12 hours apart[ ]

from the nexttray which will be a dinner tray at 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon." (Compl. 5.) Once

again, Belfield fails to satisfy either the objective or subjective component of his Eighth
Amendment claim.

"Allegations of inadequate food for human nutritional needs ... [maybe] sufficient to

state a cognizable constitutional claim, so long as the deprivation is serious

" King v. Lewis,

358 F. App'x 459,460 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). In determining whether an Eighth
Amendment violation has occurred, "[c]ourts consider the amount and duration of the

deprivation offood." Lockamy v. Rodriguez, 402 F. App'x 950, 951 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted) (finding deprivation of six meals in fifty-four hourperiod insufficient to state a claim

absent allegation of injury as a result of missing meals); see also Berry, 192 F.3d at 506-08 (5th
Cir. 1999) (finding deprivation of eight meals overseven-month period insufficient to state an
Eighth Amendment claim because no specific allegations of physical harm). However,

Belfield's general allegation that "wedon't eat 7 days a week within 12 hours apart[ ] from the
next tray" (Compl. 5), with no "suggestion of any deleterious physical or mental effects from this

meal schedule," fails to suggest a sufficiently serious deprivation. White v. Gregory, 1 F.3d 267,
269 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that two meals a day on weekends, "simply does not rise to the
level of 'serious or significant physical or mental injury'"); see Berry, 192 F.3d at 507

(recognizing that"[e]ven on a regular, permanent basis, two meals a day may be adequate"
(citing Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1986))); see also De 'Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634

(quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381). Belfield neither claims that he has lost weight or that he
suffered from other adverse physical effects, nor has he alleged facts suggesting a substantial risk

to his health. Berry, 192 F. 3d at 508. Belfield's bare allegations about sometimes receiving
meals twelve hours apart fail to suggest the requisite level of seriousness for an Eighth
Amendment claim. See Strickler, 989 F. 2d at 1381 n.9.

Belfield also fails to allege facts that indicate that Stolle knew of and disregarded an

excessive risk to Belfield's health. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Belfield's vague allegations
fall short of permitting the conclusion that his complaints placed Defendant Stolle on sufficient
notice of an excessive risk to Belfield's health or safety. SeeParrish, 372 F.3d at 303;Rish v.

Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4thCir. 1997). As such, Belfield's vague factual allegations
against Stolle fail to "produce an inference of liability strong enough to nudge the plaintiffs

claims 'across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.

Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,256 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683)
(some internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Belfield fails to state an Eighth Amendment
claim. Accordingly, Claim Two will be DISMISSED.

In Claim Three, Belfield alleges that Stolle overcharges for canteen items in violation of

the Eighth Amendment. The Court fails to discern how Belfield's allegations state a

constitutional claim under § 1983. "There is no federal constitutional requirement that jails must
provide inmates with a canteen at which to purchase food items at any price." MuhammadAbdullah v. Albemarle Charlottesville Reg'I Jail, No. 7:08-cv-0327,2008 WL 2271231, at *2

(W.D. Va. June 2, 2008) (citing Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Moreover, inmates have no constitutionally protected right to purchase items inthe prison
canteen at the lowest price possible. Gray v. Stolle, No. 3:11CV546,2013 WL 4430915, at *5

(E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2013) (citing Collins v. Virginia, No. CIVA 7:06CV00326,2006 WL

1587467, at *1 (W.D. Va. June 6, 2006)); Muhammad-Abdullah, 2008 WL 2271231, at *2
(citations omitted). Accordingly, Claim Three will be DISMISSED.
D.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the action will be DISMISSED. The Clerk will be DIRECTED to note the

disposition of the action for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: f -1-1$
Richmond, Virginia

James R. Spencer

Se"'°rU.s.Dis(rictJud