Daniels v. Jarrett
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 7/21/14. Copy sent: Yes (tdai, )
IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
JOSEPH A.
DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No.
v.
3:13CV440
WILLIAM JARRATT,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Joseph A.
in
forma
§ 1983.-1
Daniels,
pauperis,
a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and
brings
action
pursuant
to
42
U.S.C.
The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant
to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2).
I.
The
this
Magistrate
Judge
BACKGROUND
made
the
following
findings
recommendations:
Preliminary Review
Pursuant
to
the
Prison
Litigation
Reform
Act
("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a
The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute
. . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person
within
the
jurisdiction
thereof
to
the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law ....
42 U.S.C.
§
1983.
and
prisoner
if
frivolous''
the
or
(2)
relief may be
28
U.S.C.
§
Court
determines
"fails
to
granted.''
1915A.
28
The
the
state
a
U.S.C.
first
action
(1)
claim
on
"is
which
§ 1915(e)(2);
standard includes
see
claims
based upon "'an indisputably meritless legal theory,'"
or claims where the "'factual contentions are clearly
baseless."'
Clay v. Yates,
809 F. Supp. 417,
427
(E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319,
327
(1989)).
standard
for
a
The second standard is
motion
12(b) (6) .
"A motion
to
to
dismiss
dismiss
under
under
the familiar
Fed.
Rule
R.
Civ.
12(b) (6)
P.
tests
the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does
not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits
of
a
claim,
or
the
applicability
of
defenses."
Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952
(4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
In considering a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
plaintiff s well-pleaded allegations are taken as true
and
the
complaint
is
viewed
in
the
light
most
favorable to the plaintiff.
Mylan Labs.,
Inc.
v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also
Martin,
to
980 F.2d at 952.
factual
This principle applies only
allegations,
however,
and
"a
court
considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of
truth."
Ashcroft
v.
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
662,
679
(2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ]
only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to
'give the defendant fair notice of what the .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'"
Bell
Atl.
Corp.
v. Twombly,
550 U.S.
544,
555
(2007)
(second
alteration
Gibson,
355
U.S.
in
41,
original)
47
(quoting
(1957)).
Conley
Plaintiffs
v.
cannot
satisfy this standard with complaints containing only
"labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of
the
elements
omitted).
sufficient
of
a
cause
Instead,
"to
a
raise
claim
that
is
action."
plaintiff
a
speculative level," id.
merely
of
right
must
on
Id.
its
at
face,"
570.
(citation
allege
relief
facts
above
(citation omitted),
"plausible
"conceivable."
to
Id.
rather
"A
the
stating a
claim
than
has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content
that
allows
the
court
to
draw
the
reasonable
inference
that
the
defendant
is
liable
for
the
misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).
In order for a
claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to
state a claim, therefore, the plaintiff must "allege
facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or]
her claim."
Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324
F.3d 761,
765
(4th Cir.
2003)
(citing Dickson v.
Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002);
Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir.
2002)).
Lastly, while the Court liberally construes
pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147,
1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's
advocate,
sua
sponte
developing
statutory
and
constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly
raise on the face of his complaint.
See Brock v.
Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)
(Luttig,
J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274,
1278
(4th Cir.
1985).
Summary of Allegations and Claims
Daniels alleges that Defendant denied him due
process, and violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
terminating
his
employment
after
an
unidentified
incident
that
occurred
on
March
30,
2013,
at
Greensville Correctional Center.
Daniels
states:
On April 1,
2013, upon conclusion of an
investigation
conducted
by
Lieutenant
Colonel,
William Jarratt
and Major Tony
Darden, which plaintiff was not subject, and
all
parties
identified
by
camera
surveillance, on the date of April 4, 2013,
plaintiff
was
called
to
his
place
of
employment and fired from his position as
secretary assistant, in addition to his job
d[e]scription being abolished and deleted
from the Master Job Inventory upon demand of
Lieutenant Colonel, William Jarratt, which
actions
were
a
direct
result
of
the
investigation.
The
Lieutenant's
actions
against plaintiff violated the Department of
Corrections,
Operating
Procedure
Offenders
Work
Programs,
rule:
practice of
'firing'
offenders from
assignments
applicable
without
Due
Process
the
833,
"The
work
benefit
is prohibited
of
.
[.]"
Plaintiff
Amendment
Rights
Constitution
a
direct
[sic]
that
asserts
of
to
Due
result
of
actions.
there
that
the
the
no
Fourteenth
United
Process
were
States
violated
Lieutenant's
Plaintiff
was
his
further
justification
as
injust
asserts
in
this
action against him, (firing, abolishing and
deleting
job
d[e]scription),
which
was
criminal in nature,
thereby resulting in
'Punishment
as
retribution
and
deterance
[sic]', an Eighth Amendment violation.
(Corapl. Part IV.)
Analysis
In
order
to
state
a
viable
§ 1983, a plaintiff must
under
color
of
state
claim
allege that
law
deprived
under
42
U.S.C.
a person acting
him
or
her
of
a
constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law
of
the
United
States.
See
Dowe
v.
Total
Action
Against
Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658
(4th Cir. 1998) .
The Due Process Clause applies when
government
action
deprives
an
individual
of
a
legitimate liberty or property interest.
Bd. of
Regents of State Colls, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569
(1972).
The first step in analyzing a procedural due
process claim is to identify whether the alleged
conduct affects a protected interest.
See Beverati v.
Smith,
120 F.3d 500,
502 (4th Cir.
1997).
A liberty
interest may arise from the Constitution itself,
from state laws
and policies.
See Wilkinson
Austin,
To
liberty
545 U .S. 209,
demonstrate
interest,
or
v.
220-21 (2005).
the
existence
Plaintiff
must
of
a
make
state-created
a
threshold
showing that the deprivation imposed amounts to an
"atypical
and
significant
hardship"
or
that
it
"inevitably affect[s] the duration of his sentence."
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 487 (1995); see
Puranda v. Johnson, No. 3:08CV687, 2009 WL 3175629, at
*4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2009) (citing cases).
Here, Daniels complains that Defendant denied him
due process by terminating him from employment and
eliminating his job.
However,
the law clearly
establishes that Daniels has no constitutional right
to
job
prisoner
interest
opportunities
enjoys
no
in a prison
while
incarcerated,
protected
job.
property
Bulger v.
and
that
or
liberty
U.S.
a
Bureau of
Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding
"that an inmate's expectation of keeping a specific
prison job, or any job, does not implicate a protected
property interest")
(citations omitted) ; Henderson v.
Capital Constr., 3:08cv207-HEH, 2011 WL 977580, at *5
(E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2011) (citing Backus v. Ward, No.
98-6331,
1998 WL 372377, at *1 (4th Cir.
June 8,
1998); Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d 812, 813 (4th
Cir. 1978) for the proposition that inmates have no
protected liberty interest in retaining prison jobs).
Moreover,
prison
regulations
that
entitle
prisoners to work or that require a hearing prior to
removing
a
prisoner
from
a
job
also
create
no
constitutionally
recognized
liberty
interest
"'because
a
inmate does
hardship on
denial
not
the
of
employment
opportunities
to
an
impose an atypical and significant
inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.'"
Seibert v. Mohead, No.
2:12cv399, 2012 WL 8123580, at *3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4,
2012)
(quoting Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1407
(10th Cir. 1996)) .
Daniels had no constitutionally
protected interest in retaining his prison job, and
thus, no entitlement to the protections of the Due
Process
Clause.
In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim,
Daniels must allege facts that show:
"'(1) a serious
deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate
indifference
to
prison
conditions
on
the
part
of
prison officials.'"
Strickler v. Waters,
989 F.2d
1375,
1379
(4th Cir.
1993)
(quoting Williams
v.
Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824
(4th Cir.
1991)).
The
first showing requires the Court to determine whether
the deprivation of a basic human need was "objectively
'sufficiently serious,' "while the second requires it
to determine whether the officials subjectively acted
with a '"sufficiently culpable state of mind.'"
Id.
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
"Only extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the
objective component
of an Eighth Amendment
claim
regarding conditions of confinement."
De'Lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing
Hudson
v.
McMillian,
503
U.S.
1,
89
(1992)).
Therefore, the inmate must allege facts to suggest
that the deprivation complained of was extreme and
amounted to more
than the
'"routine discomfort
[that]
is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.'"
Strickler,
989 F.2d
at
1380
n.3
(quoting
Hudson,
503
U.S.
at
9).
Accordingly, under the objective prong, Daniels must
allege facts that suggest he sustained "'a serious or
significant
physical
or
emotional
injury
resulting
from the challenged conditions.'"
De'Lonta, 330 F.3d
at 634 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381).
Daniels
fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest that his
termination from his prison job resulted in a serious
or significant physical or emotional injury.
See
Green v. Venable, 3:09CV154, 2010 WL 3384720, at *3
(E.D.
Va.
Aug.
20,
2010).
Accordingly,
it is
RECOMMENDED
that
Daniels's
claims
and
the
action
be
DISMISSED.
(April
18,
2014
Report
omission in original).)
and
Recommendation
(alterations
and
The Court advised Daniels that he could
file objections within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the
Report
and
Recommendation.
Daniels
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION."
II.
(ECF No.
STANDARD
filed
an
"OBJECTION
17.)
OF REVIEW
"The magistrate makes only a recommendation to this
The
recommendation
has
responsibility to
make
court."
v.
1993)
Estrada
a
no
presumptive
final
Witkowski,
(citing Mathews
v.
Weber,
TO
weight,
determination
816
F.
423
U.S.
and
remains
Supp.
408,
261,
court.
with this
410
270-71
the
(D.S.C.
(1976)).
This Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions
of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to
which
filing
district
objection
of
is
objections
judge
to
made."
to
focus
a
28
U.S.C.
magistrate's
attention
on
those
§
636(b)(1).
report
"The
enables
the
issues-factual
and
legal-that are at the heart of the parties' dispute."
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985).
and conclusory objections
specific
error
in
recommendations,"
the
de
Thomas v.
"[W]hen a party makes general
that
do not direct
magistrate's
novo review
is
the court
proposed
to a
findings
unnecessary.
and
Orpiano v.
Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
III.
Daniels
specific
filing
"OBJECTION"
error
an
DANIELS'S OBJECTION
in the
objection
fails
Report
to
and
pinpointing
judge's recommendations,
Daniels
direct
the
Court
Recommendation.
an
error
notes his
in
the
to
Instead
any
of
magistrate
in forma pauperis
status (Obj. 1), and recites the legal standard for bringing a
claim
(id. at 2) .
his claims.
Daniels then provides a brief restatement of
Because Daniels makes only conclusory objections,
de novo review is unnecessary.
As
the
magistrate
judge
explained,
Daniels
states
no
constitutional claim for relief based upon his termination from
his prison employment and the elimination of his job.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Daniels's objection will be overruled.
Recommendation will be accepted and adopted.
The Report
and
Daniels's claims
and the action will be dismissed without prejudice.
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of the Memorandum
Opinion to Daniels.
Robert E. Payne
Date:
Q^^A ^ ( / ^& ( 7
Richmond, Virginia
uu.
nu*
Senior United States District Judge
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